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ABSTRACT 
 
GRAND PLANS IN GLASS BOTTLES: A SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL HISTORY OF BEER IN EGYPT 1880-1970. 
 
 
Omar D.Foda 
Dr .Heather J. Sharkey 
 
Contrary to common perceptions, the history of beer (and indeed of other 
alcoholic beverages) in the Muslim-majority context of Egypt has not been a history of 
government officials desperately seeking to extirpate the evil of alcohol as rumrunners, 
backyard brewers, and moonshiners stayed one step ahead. Rather it was a history of a 
commercially-marketed product that enjoyed relatively wide popularity and robust 
growth from 1880 to 1980, and sat at the cutting edge of technological innovation in 
Egypt in that same period.  Its success was not only evident from the profitability of the 
companies that sold it, but also from its increasing appearances in all popular forms of art 
and media. The title of my dissertation is “Grand Plans in Glass Bottles: An Economic, 
Social, and Technological history of Beer in Egypt, 1880-1970”.  My dissertation studies 
Egypt during an exciting period, when the country was transitioning from being a quasi-
colonial state, under British Occupation after 1882 and, until 1914, under Ottoman 
influence as well, to being an independent country within a highly competitive global 
economy. Using American, Dutch, and Egyptian archival sources, as well as Arabic 
literary sources, I focus on two closely linked companies, Crown and Pyramid Breweries.  
 
 
vi 
Originally founded by Belgian expatriates in Egypt, these two firms in their various 
incarnations developed the Egyptian beer industry and cultivated a wide customer base.  I 
take the story past the 1950s, when the Egyptian government under Gamal Abdel Nasser 
nationalized the beer industry (which was by then led by Stella Beer and owned primarily 
by Heineken) much as it nationalized the Suez Canal.  Through the study of this 
beverage, my research connects the history of Egypt to Belgium, Netherlands, Britain, 
and elsewhere; the history of a business to developments in technology, politics, and 
consumer culture; and the history of the people – of “everyday Egyptians” – to business 
elites. Viewed through a mug of beer, we can tell the economic, political, and cultural 
history of Egypt at large   
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Chapter 1:Introduction  
 
In the course of my research for this dissertation, I made several trips to the 
copy room of Egypt’s national library (Dar al-Kutub) in Cairo. The room is truly an 
awe-inspiring place, endlessly engrossing for a student of the country’s history. 
Besides being filled with the comforting smell of toner and the persistent hum of laser 
scanners and printers, the place is a nexus of past and present, where millennia of 
Egyptian history are accessed, copied, and distributed to the contemporary world. The 
sight of a manuscript, yellowed by the centuries, being laboriously scanned and 
reproduced by the latest digital scanner is a stark and compelling juxtaposition.  This 
room is all the more striking in that it functions in a distinctly Egyptian way.  You 
hand your copy-request slip to an employee at a desk at the end of the room, and he 
tells you to sit a row of chairs with the other researchers. Then, you wait until your 
name is called by one of the employees working at the machines.  If it is microfilm 
you are here for, you then sit with the employee at the microfilm copier, telling him 
the pages that you want copied as he brusquely flips through the film. The man does 
all of this with the patience of one who has tens of thousands of pages to copy before 
the end of the day, and for whom your pages comprise a mere one hundred.  
All this to say that I was quite taken aback when, one day in that copy room, 
the employee who was so graciously helping me, having noticed a pattern in my copy 
requests, asked, “Does Stella Beer still exist in Egypt?”  The question shocked me at 
first because, for me, Stella and Egypt have long been inextricably linked. I do not 
think there has ever been a time when I have been in Egypt and not seen something 
 
 
2 
related to Stella, whether the distinctive green bottle or a chance bit of paraphernalia 
such as a coaster, mug, or ashtray. Moreover, Egypt is the only place in the world 
where I have been that a person can buy Stella.  Everywhere else in the word, when 
you ask for Stella, you receive its Belgian cousin, Stella Artois.  Therefore, I had 
assumed, foolishly, that this was the case for all Egyptians living in the country’s 
urban centers—that even if they did not drink Stella due to personal taste or religious 
objections, they at least knew of its continued presence within Egypt. 
However, the more I thought it over, the more I realized that without seeking 
Stella out or having a pre-established connection to it, an Egyptian could live his or 
her entire life without ever becoming aware of this important cultural artifact. As a 
product, Stella is not nearly as culturally pervasive as Budweiser, Miller, or Coors in 
the United States. No billboards announce it, no newspapers or televisions advertise 
it, and no sports teams or stadia sponsor it.  Yet as I came to discover in the course of 
my research, this was not the default state of Stella beer. The beverage was not 
simply a hidden industry that had thrived in the country’s dark corners.  Stella once 
had a presence in Egyptian culture, but over the past thirty years, it has been erased. 
This dissertation seeks to counteract some of this erasure by telling the history of 
Stella beer and of the two companies that once sold it, Crown and Pyramid Breweries.     
Contrary to common perceptions, the history of beer—and indeed of other 
alcoholic beverages—in the Muslim-majority context of Egypt has not been a history 
of government officials desperately seeking to extirpate the evil of alcohol while 
rumrunners, backyard brewers, and moonshiners stayed one step ahead. Nor was the 
history one of alcohol as a “poison” seeping into a “dry” country, yet another 
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example of colonialism’s pernicious effects on the Global South. Rather, this was a 
story of a product that had been commercially marketed, and that had enjoyed a 
relatively wide popularity and robust growth in Egypt from 1880 to 1970, even 
despite the economic vicissitudes that Egypt experienced during this period.  Its 
success was not only evident from the profitability of the companies that sold it, but 
also from the increasing frequency of its appearances in all popular forms of art and 
media. The history of beer was the history of a largely mundane product, on par with 
bottled water and carbonated drinks, that tracked Egyptian economic and technologic 
development more broadly in the circumstances of its production, sale, and 
management. 
All of these factors make the study of beer and bottled beverages an ideal lens 
for providing a fresh history of Egypt in the century from 1880 to 1970. This 
dissertation seeks to tell this history through the study of the culture, economics, and 
technology that surrounded the production and consumption of beer in Egypt. It uses 
these three inter-related histories to problematize our conceptions of Egyptian society 
as it relates to notions of “Western,” “Eastern,” foreign, local, modern, pre-modern, 
traditional, and new—and all during a time when the country was transitioning from 
being a quasi-colonial state under post-1882 British Occupation, and until 1914, 
under Ottoman influence as well, to being a member of the neoliberal global 
economic system.  
This dissertation presents a hybrid history, which instead of cordoning 
economic and cultural affairs apart from one another, argues that the two spheres only 
make sense when they are considered together.  The need to connect the economic to 
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the cultural is particularly pressing in the field of consumer goods, where a 
company’s success or failure hinges upon its ability to embrace, reject, or even 
change cultural norms and practices.  As such, this study looks at both 
macroeconomic matters (e.g., global economic integration, and economic 
imperialism) and microeconomic matters (e.g., prices, consumption, and distribution) 
together with social and culture issues, including, for example, the development of a 
middle class, the emergence of youth culture, the politicization of religion, and 
changing notions of entertainment in daily life.  
This study also challenges the popular and academic tendency to divide native 
“Egyptian” from “foreign” elements when describing nineteenth- and twentieth-
century Egyptian history.  The beverage industry is extremely helpful in this process 
because it was, from its very beginnings, a mix of “foreign” ambitions and “native” 
moneymaking. The industry combines both something new—the large-scale sale of 
beverages—and something old, given that Egyptians have been producing and selling 
beverages, often of the alcoholic variety, since Pharaonic times. The capital that 
drove the industry, the businessmen who profited from it, and the workers who made 
the whole enterprise go, all existed in the interstices between the so-called “East” and 
“West.”  Likewise, the cultural and social phenomena that drove or repelled the 
consumption of these beverages cannot be easily grouped under headings like 
“Westernization,” “Modernization,” or even “Islamicization,” but rather represent the 
fascinating interplay of ideas and concepts from numerous traditions.  
Finally, this dissertation will add to the growing literature on the history of 
technology.  Specifically, it will examine how technological advances—such as new 
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techniques for brewing and distilling, refrigeration, and transport—not only 
undergirded trends and developments in beverage production but also shaped 
consumption patterns and altered cultural conceptions of food, drink, and 
nourishment. In addition, my focus on technology will show how the companies that 
succeeded were those that were most adept at using the new technologies of the era, 
like refrigeration, to exploit the inherent advantages of the Egyptian context, 
including an abundant water supply, a cheap labor force, and a large population. 
Thus, the history of technology will serve as another medium through which this 
study integrates the economic and cultural and further questions the dichotomy of 
Egyptian-versus-foreign that persists in the country’s historiography.    
 
Historiographical Survey 
In a number of works, the distinguished scholars Roger Owen and Robert 
Tignor have expertly mapped out the general outlines of Egyptian economic 
development from 1800 to 1963.1  The work of Tignor in particular serves as a 
starting point for any discussion of Egypt economics in the period from 1882 to 1963. 
His works, Modernization and British Colonial rule in Egypt, 1882–1914; State, 
Private Enterprise, and Economic Change in Egypt, 1914–1952; Egyptian Textiles 
and British Capital, 1930–1956; and Capitalism and Nationalism at the End of 
Empire: State and Business in Decolonizing Egypt, Nigeria, and Kenya, 1945–1963 
each set high standards for their respective topic and timeframe. More recently, other 
scholars, notably Robert Vitalis, Relli Shechter, and Nancy Y. Reynolds, have 
provided fresh perspectives on Egyptian economic history by shifting the focus of 
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study away from the traditional production-based outlook. Vitalis examined the 
composition and maneuverings of the executive sphere in the Egyptian private sector 
and showed how its foreign and native dimensions overlapped during the years from 
1920 to 1955, a time when European and Egyptian businessmen shared common 
interests and capital ventures.2  Shechter conducted a microanalysis of the tobacco 
industry in order to provide insights into the social, cultural, and economic 
development of Egypt in the period from 1850 to 1950.3 Reynolds examined the 
apparel consumption habits of Egyptians in colonial and semi-colonial Egypt between 
the years of 1882 and 1952 in order to assess larger cultural changes that were 
occurring in Egypt.4  This dissertation is particularly indebted to the latter two works. 
Like the work of Shechter and Reynolds, this dissertation draws from literature, film, 
and advertisements in an attempt to craft an integrative socio-economic history of the 
country.  
Again, this dissertation covers the period from 1880 to 1970, providing a look 
at four distinct economic periods in Egypt.  Scholars commonly think of these periods 
in terms of a Colonial/Semi-Colonial era (1880–1930); an Economic Nationalist era 
(1930–1960); and an Arab Socialist era (1960–1970). My inclusion of this last period 
most clearly distinguishes this study from those that have preceded it. For most 
studies, the endpoint is the Free Officers movement of 1952, which was marked by a 
government takeover by a cohort of young dissatisfied army officers. Studies that do 
go beyond that moment typically discuss this period in broad strokes, and the Nasser 
government is attributed with amazing power.  Historians talk of Nasser-era policies 
like sequestration, nationalization, and land reform as frictionless processes, as 
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though these major transitions happened overnight. As I argue, nationalization was a 
laborious and messy process wherein the demands of an exceedingly popular 
government were met by varying levels of cooperation and resistance from the private 
sector. 
Another limitation of ending studies near or around the Free Officers 
movement of 1952—especially studies that focus on ideas of Egyptianness and 
foreignness—is that this endpoint privileges the narrative that 1952 marked the true 
ascension of Egyptianness in the country. As I show, even after the Free Officers took 
over, what it meant to be or not to be Egyptian was variable. This variability was 
especially the case with large entities like private companies.  What it meant to be an 
Egyptian company changed significantly between 1947, when the Joint Stock 
Company Law of 1947 required Egyptian companies (those with major bases in 
Egypt) “to offer 51 percent of their stock to Egyptians and to place Egyptian nationals 
on 40 percent of the board seats,” and 1961, when Nasser nationalized much of the 
private sector.5   
As I have mentioned, another contribution of this study is its focus on the 
technological aspect of this history, particularly on the relationship of technological 
change to the knotty concept of “modernity.”6 The latter builds off the work of On 
Barak in his book On Time: Technology and Temporality in Modern Egypt.  I 
examine some of the technological processes that were essential to the making of a 
modern beverage industry—notably refrigeration, mechanization, transportation, and 
bottling—and do so while tracing the transition from the pre-industrial to the 
industrial phases in the beverage industry.7  As I argue, a “modern” Egyptian 
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beverage industry appeared in a relatively narrow time frame, between 1890 and 
1920; carried certain hallmarks; and had a significant impact on both consumption 
patterns and cultural conceptions of beverages. I define a modern beverage industry 
as one guided by what Barak refers to as the “technoscientific” ideals of Western 
Europe, including efficiency, accuracy, and standardization, etc. Western thinkers 
crafted these ideals during the massive industrialization of Europe in the 18th and 19th 
centuries, imagining that a country’s level of adherence to them was the reason for its 
advancement, or lack thereof, in the teleology of progress.    
In his study Being Modern in the Middle East: Revolution, Nationalism, 
Colonialism, and the Arab Middle Class, Keith David Watenpaugh showed that 
modernity, on the cultural front, was a performative act that involved the use of new 
media, new social spaces, and new consumer goods to make “being modern 
observable and reproducible.”8 Nancy Y. Reynolds concurred in her own dissertation, 
noting that consumer goods were an important way for Egyptians to craft their 
identity through participation in “commodity communities.”9  Using these two works 
as starting points, I show how alcohol served as an ideal commodity with which 
Egyptians could perform their modernity because its consumption achieved a double 
effect: while linking its Egyptian drinker to the “modern” European, who drank on 
social occasions, beer consumption also separated the Egyptian from non-elite or 
religious compatriots, who were likely to view alcohol as socially suspect at best or 
religious anathema at worst. 
Although alcohol played an important role in the definition of Egyptian 
modernity, there has been a general dearth of scholarship on the subject. Kathryn 
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Kueny in the Rhetoric of Sobriety has written expertly on how the early Islamic 
community formed its stance towards alcohol, through a critical analysis of the 
Qur‘an, hadith, poetry, and early history.10 Likewise, Phillip Kennedy and Th. Emil 
Homerin have written extensively on the wine-poetry of the Arabic literati Abu 
Nuwas (al-Hasan b. Hani’ al-Hakami d. 813–15) and ‘Umar ibn al-Farid (d. 1235), 
respectively.11  However, these scholars have limited themselves exclusively to the 
pre-1500 Islamic world. Two close approximations of a full-length monograph on 
alcohol in the modern Middle East are Rudolph Matthee’s The Pursuit of Pleasure 
and Ralph Hattox’s Coffee and Coffeehouses: The Origins of a Social Beverage in the 
Medieval Near East.  Matthee’s work focused on the period 1500–1900, taking an 
integrative look at the role of intoxicants (not only wine, but also opiates and 
stimulants) in Safavid Iran.12 Hattox, studying an earlier period (1300–1600), looked 
at the introduction and normalization of coffee’s cultural role in the Middle East.13  
Both works provide useful frames for thinking about the historical development of 
cultures of alcohol production and consumption in the Islamic world. Nevertheless, 
they are both removed spatially, temporally, and thematically from the focus of this 
work, which is, again, beer in modern Egypt.   
A closer analog for this dissertation is Paulina Lewicka’s encyclopedic work, 
Food and Foodways of Medieval Cairenes: Aspects of Life in an Islamic Metropolis 
of the Eastern Mediterranean, which dedicates a chapter to the subject of alcohol 
consumption in Egypt.14 This extensive section is a richly detailed and thorough 
resource for the consumption habits of Mamluk and early Ottoman-era Cairenes. As 
such, it is both spatially (Egypt) and thematically (alcohol consumption) relevant to 
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this dissertation; however, its focus ends around the 17th century. Another relevant 
precursor to this dissertation is François Georgeon’s article, entitled “Ottomans and 
Drinkers: The Consumption of Alcohol in Istanbul in the Nineteenth Century.” This 
article, which is among the few works that delve into the history of alcohol in the 
nineteenth-century Ottoman world, argues that starting in 1800, there was a change in 
attitudes among residents of Istanbul towards the consumption of alcohol.15  Alcohol 
was no longer a private habit, to drink in shady taverns on the edge of town, but 
became a way to “affirm [one’s] adherence to the values of the modern world” by 
drinking in public places located in the heart of the city.16 Published in 2002, this 
article was groundbreaking in its confirmation of the link between alcohol 
consumption and identity.  
Malte Fuhrmann’s 2014 article, “Beer, the Drink of a Changing World: Beer 
Consumption and Production on the Shores of the Aegean in the 19th Century,” 
follows in the footsteps of Georgeon by studying the consumption and production of 
specific alcoholic beverage, beer, in the Ottoman domains.17  Like Fuhrmann, this 
study welds the histories of the consumption and production of beer in Muslim-ruled 
domains with its social history. However, this study looks not only at how a beer 
industry established itself within Muslim-ruled domains, but also what followed that 
establishment. Specifically, I explain how a country that increasingly imagined itself 
as Muslim and Egyptian grappled with a transnational industry that sold a religiously 
questionable drink. 
Perhaps the most significant scholarly guidepost for this dissertation is Nathan 
Fonder’s unpublished dissertation, “Pleasure, Leisure or Vice? Public Morality in 
 
 
11 
Imperial Cairo, 1882–1949.” In this fascinating dissertation, he discusses how the 
morality of intoxicant consumption and gambling in Cairo was defined at the nexus 
of popular culture, the weak Egyptian state, and the British colonial presence.18 As 
Fonder amply shows, the consumption of alcohol is an excellent way to probe deeper 
socio-political issues in colonial Egypt.  However, as evidenced by the title, this 
dissertation is framed by the logic that alcohol consumption in Egypt is irrevocably 
linked to issues of morality and vice. 
While I concede that alcohol consumption and production across both space 
and time has been a moral issue for many Egyptians, I do believe that the 
unquestioned association of alcohol with vice in the historiography on the region 
requires reassessment. This assumption of alcohol-as-vice reflects a deeper-seated 
issue in the same historiography, namely, the scholarly conflation of “Islamic” culture 
with what Marshall S. Hodgson famously called “Islamicate” culture—the latter 
referring to culture as actually practiced and lived by real Muslims in everyday life.19   
This distinction is necessary because, due to the well-documented Islamic legal 
tradition and the vociferous support of Islamists for the idea, it is easy to assume that 
all aspects of life in any locale where Islam was the dominant religion must be, in 
some way, shaped by the corpus of Islamic law.  It is even more important to 
recognize this distinction given that, as scholars have shown, the Islamic legal 
tradition generally reflects the tastes and priorities of ordinary people from specific 
times and places.20    
If scholars do recognize the fissure between “Islamic” and “Islamicate,” they 
free themselves from the need to inject religion into every cultural process that occurs 
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in Islamic domains.  One scholar who shows how productive this mode of thinking 
can be is James Grehan in his monograph Everyday Life & Consumer Culture in 18th-
Century Damascus. One of the most incisive points of his study is that the Western 
academy’s insistence on religion as the defining feature of Middle Eastern culture 
strips its past of the “everyday experience of its gritty urgency and immersion in the 
demands and pressures of the moment.”21   
In particular, Grehan’s examination of Damascenes’ consumption of coffee 
and tobacco in light of the prohibitions of the ‘ulama shows how demand dictated not 
only the supply, but also the religious conception of these products. As Grehan 
showed, the introduction of tobacco and coffee into Damascus in the 15th and 17th 
centuries, respectively, was met with disdain by some members of the ‘ulama and 
outright prohibition by others.22 Despite the strong religious rhetoric, the 
consumption of tobacco and coffee not only continued, but also expanded 
tremendously after their initial introduction. The growth in consumption of these 
products was so great that the coffeehouse became one of the most important staging 
grounds for the Damascene public sphere.23 Grehan attributes the inability of the 
religious authorities to stop the growth of these two habits to the fact that it was not 
the decision of the ‘ulama to make.24 Public opinion for the products was so 
vociferous that it overrode any attempts to limit consumption.   When scholars choose 
to follow a path similar to Grehan’s, the topics of study that are acceptable vis-à-vis 
the Middle East expand greatly. This study follows in the path that Grehan created 
insofar as it recognizes beer-drinking as a social fact in Egypt regardless of what 
Islamic scholars or foreign scholars have said or claimed about this practice. 
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With the strong linkage of alcohol and vice in the Middle Eastern tradition, 
this study also looks beyond Egypt for cues on how to write a history on alcohol and 
other bottled beverages that focuses on production, distribution, and consumption. 
Recently, within American and European universities, scholars have evinced a 
burgeoning interest in what they call “consumption studies,” which is based on a 
belief that “the consumption of goods, not their production, drives history.”25 
Nevertheless, much of this work, like Iain Gately’s Drink: A Cultural History of 
Alcohol, considers alcohol’s evolution across a vast expanse of time and space.26 
While this type of work can no doubt provide interesting cross-cultural comparisons, 
its massive span limits the amount of meaningful conclusions that one can draw. A 
much better template is John Burnett’s Liquid Pleasures: A Social History of Drinks 
in Modern Britain that narrows the focus to a certain time frame (1600–present) and 
area (Great Britain) to produce more specific conclusions.27  Likewise, Emmanuel 
Akyeampong’s discussion of the social meaning of alcohol in Ghana, Drink, Power, 
and Cultural Change, serves as an excellent example of the merits of a scope that is 
narrow in both region and timeframe.28  Finally, Mikael Hård’s Machines are Frozen 
Spirit: The Scientification of Refrigeration in the 19th Century—A Weberian 
Interpretation, shows how relevant the study of technology can be in the history of 
beverage production and consumption.29 
Methodology and Sources 
This analysis is based heavily on archival records found in three countries: 
Egypt, the Netherlands, and the United States. In Egypt, I focused on the Egyptian 
National Archives (Dār al-Wathaʾiq al-Qawmiyya) in Cairo and its Department of 
Company Archives (Maslaḥat al-Sharikāt), which, as its name suggests, preserves the 
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histories of most of the major companies in Egypt from the 1920s to the 1950s.which, 
as its name suggests, preserves histories of most of the major companies in Egypt 
from the 1920s to the 1950s.  I have also closely consulted the archive of Egyptian 
periodicals housed at the National Library (Dār al-Kutub) adjacent to the Egyptian 
National Archives.  
In the Netherlands, I primarily focused on the City Archives of Amsterdam. I 
used these archives primarily to research the Heineken Brewing Company, which 
played a significant role in the Egyptian beverage industry. From the 1930s to the 
1950s, Heineken was a major stockholder in the two largest Egyptian beer companies, 
Al-Ahram (Pyramid) Brewery and Crown Brewery. It was only when the Nasser 
government nationalized these companies in 1963 that the relationship ended. 
However, nearly four decades after this nationalization, Heineken re-entered the 
Egyptian beverage market when, in 2003, it bought al-Ahram Beverage Company, the 
successor to the Pyramid and Crown Breweries, which by then had expanded to 
become Egypt’s leading alcohol producer. The records for Heineken are primarily 
composed of letters between the managing director of Pyramid Brewery, who was the 
nexus of Heineken’s operations in Egypt, and Cobra, the international holding 
company that owned shares in Crown and Pyramid breweries.    
While Egypt and the Netherlands provide information on the internal 
workings of the beer industry and its international reach, the United States, 
specifically the Presbyterian Historical Society in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 
provides information on the cultural impact of the beer industry. Its records on the 
Presbyterian mission in Egypt, particularly its involvement in a short-lived Egyptian 
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temperance movement, helps us understand the pitched cultural battle surrounding 
alcohol in Egypt that occurred in the period under study. 
I also looked elsewhere to understand alcohol’s consumption in its cultural 
context. In order to capture the importance of beverage consumption, I focused on the 
“image” of the drinker, using what the scholar W.J.T Mitchell, in his book Iconology: 
Image, Text, Ideology, terms the “Family of Images.”30 This “family” includes both 
pictorial representations and “literary” depictions.  With this definition in mind, I 
looked not only at cartoons, advertisements and films, but also memoirs, short stories, 
poems (oral and written), novels, histories, social criticism, and religious polemical 
tracts. Most importantly, this focus on the image allows me to show how Stella Beer, 
the flagship product of Pyramid and Crown Brewery, was able to position itself as a 
preeminent brand in Egypt.  
Chapter Outline  
The dissertation includes seven body chapters. Chapter 2 uses a drink present 
before the development of a modern beverage industry, būẓa (boza, in Turkish)—a 
fermented cereal beverage that is closer to a solid than a liquid and resembles a 
slightly fermented farina—to discuss the complex reality of the production, 
consumption, and sale of alcohol in an Islamic social milieu, where alcohol was both 
religiously suspect and an important cultural artifact. 31  The chapter traces the history 
of būẓa in Egypt from Pharaonic times to the 1880s while looking at the beverage’s 
dual role as both a nutritive food beverage of the lower classes and a target of activist 
Islamic ideologues and leaders. This chapter also looks beyond Egypt to the Sudan in 
order to understand the long and powerful cultural history of this supposedly “low-
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class” beverage. Tied to this analysis, this chapter uses būẓa, which observers so often 
linked with southern African migrants in Egypt, to examine the complex history of 
race in Egypt. Finally, this chapter discusses the production of būẓa in order to 
understand the technological state of alcoholic beverage production in Egypt prior to 
1880.  
With the background in place, Chapter 3 turns to consider the origins of beer 
manufacturing in Egypt in the period from 1880 to 1930.  It begins by observing the 
technological transition of beer production into an industrial concern in the 19th and 
20th centuries. The chapter situates the development of the beer industries within the 
general development of the alcoholic beverage industry in Egypt. I look not only at 
the technological innovations that initiated the industrialization of the beer industry 
(advances in the study of yeast, in refrigeration, in bottling, and in transportation 
infrastructure), but also how this history of advancement differed from traditional 
narratives of the East being “enlightened” by the West. The Egyptian beer industry 
flourished as a hybrid entity, one that was neither exclusively foreign nor Egyptian. 
This hybridity gave the industry both the foreign capital and the expertise to compete 
with the international brands, and the local business connections and market 
familiarity to guard against the errors that a foreign venture would likely face. 
However, this powerful combination of foreign and local would not have worked 
were it not for the concomitant cultural changes that were taking place in Egypt. This 
period witnessed the rise of a new middle class of Egyptians, the effendis, who in an 
attempt to meld both East and West created their own distinctly Egyptian 
“modernity,” signaled through the use of new social spaces and through the 
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consumption of new products, including modes of dress. Because of beer’s social 
value as a modern and secular product, many Egyptians found it to be a powerful tool 
for communicating identity.  
Chapter 4 looks at the contentious cultural battle between advertisers and 
Islamic Modernists over beer in the period from 1923 to 1945. Whereas advertisers 
portrayed beer as a salubrious and delicious drink that could refresh and revive, 
Islamic Modernists saw beer as a pernicious poison, whose presence in Egypt was yet 
another symptom of the disease that was Westernization. In addition, this chapter 
adds another layer to the discussion of modernity that began in Chapter 2. It looks at 
how “modernity” as a cultural concept in Egypt has defied easy periodization or even 
definition. Taking a cue from Keith David Watenpaugh’s Being Modern in the 
Middle East, I discuss how “modernity” was a performative act, contingent upon the 
people who staged it.  This characteristic of “modernity” is what explains the 
simultaneous existence of Egyptians who defined their modernity through their 
consumption of alcohol and those who did so through their abstention from it.  These 
Islamic Modernists found common cause with members of the Presbyterian Mission 
in Egypt, who, at the time, were waging their own war against “brain poisons” like 
beer. This chapter will examine the organization that grew out of this confluence of 
Islamic modernism and Protestant evangelicalism, the Egyptian Temperance 
Association (ETA). 
Chapter 5 narrows the focus of the dissertation by turning to the two most 
important Egyptian beer companies, Crown and Pyramid Brewery. Looking at the 
period from 1945 to 1952, the chapter shows how the events of World War II brought 
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greater involvement from both the Heineken Brewing Company and the Egyptian 
government. Heineken became involved in both companies, when, as part of their 
commitment to growing a multinational beer empire, became the lead investor in 
both. World War II, however, laid bare how little control they had of their 
investments. They thus set about not only increasing their say in all decisions the beer 
companies made, but also in streamlining the operations of both companies by 
consolidating them. As for the Egyptian government, World War II provided it a 
greater chance to monitor companies within its borders than ever before. This 
newfound opportunity, coupled with the rising tide of Egyptian economic nationalism 
and the end of the Capitulations, emboldened the Egyptian government to be more 
assertive in its relationship with limited liability companies, especially those with 
foreign ties. 
Chapter 6 looks at the activities of Crown and Pyramid Breweries in the 
period from 1952 to 1958. It shows that between these years, Crown and Pyramid 
breweries’ flagship product, Stella Beer, began its cultural ascendency, as the two 
companies started to crack underneath the ever-increasing pressure of an activist 
Nasser-led government. It was in this period that the beer industry became a national 
industry that delivered a standardized product throughout Egypt, and that the industry 
established its national brand in magazines and newspapers. On the cultural front, 
beer was carving out its role as the refreshing drink of the summertime and as the 
drink immediately associated with youth, relaxation, and having a good time. 
Paradoxically, this occurred as Nasser’s regime slowly worked to gain greater control 
of the private sector. In Nasser’s way of thinking, the private sector was troublingly 
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subject to the control of foreign capitalists and feudalists who were stifling the 
economic progress of Egypt. The most remarkable aspect of this period was the 
government’s push for the “Egyptianization” of the financial sector, which entailed 
identifying “foreign” workers, executives, and sources of capital, and finding native 
replacements for them. This process culminated with the Nasser government’s 
nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956.  
 Chapter 7 shows that the period from 1957 to 1960 was characterized by a 
battle between the management of the Egyptian breweries and the Nasser government 
over what constituted a “model company.” For the management of the breweries, a 
model company was a profitable one that had the autonomy and the efficient, 
disciplined, and obedient workforce to implement Heineken’s methods of brewing. 
For the Nasser-led government, a “model company” was one that would make large 
profits autonomously, but was willing and able to mobilize in support of Nasser’s 
grand projects, like the United Arab Republic, and his vision for the Egyptian 
economy. Tied to that, this company should house an empowered and unambiguously 
Egyptian workforce that was unquestionably loyal to the Egyptian government. The 
battle over visions for a “model company” was fought through letters and legislation. 
In the one area where the differing visions overlapped—namely, in the desire to make 
profits—the breweries were successful. In the period from 1957 to 1960, breweries 
witnessed unprecedented profits and deep cultural penetration. However, in every 
other avenue, it was the Nasser-led government and its conception of a “model” 
company that won out.   
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Chapter 8 looks at the beer industry in the period from 1961 to 1970 as it 
transitioned from a private to a nationalized industry. This transition was anything but 
smooth, as the relationship between, on the one hand, Heineken and Crown and 
Pyramid Breweries, and on the other hand, the Nasser-led Egyptian government, was 
truly contentious. On the brewery side, Dutch and Egyptian decision-makers fought 
against nationalization in an effort to preserve their lucrative multinational venture. 
Their active forms of resistance included letters and political and legal actions, while 
their passive resistance included the withholding and hiding of information regarding 
employment, finances, profits, etc.  The Egyptian government, for their part, treated 
these companies with similar distrust, as it viewed them as ideal examples of the 
foreign influence that was stifling the Egyptian economy. Nasser’s regime used every 
method at its disposal to gradually undercut the power bases of the breweries and 
force all “foreign” elements out. This push to remove the foreign included populist 
policies that strictly defined Egyptian identity as Muslim, male, and middle-class. 
Everyone else had to prove their Egyptianness or suffer the confiscation of their 
property, expulsion, or both.  
 For all this contention, the beer itself needed no Egyptianizing. Thanks to the 
work of both the Dutchmen and Egyptian entrepreneurs that the Nasser-led regime 
would rally against, Stella beer had become the beverage of choice for young 
Egyptians looking for fun. As Stella became the beer of Egypt, it lost some of its 
“foreign” veneer and allure. Along the way, many Egyptians had come to regard beer 
as a drink that was not simply “evil” or “fun” drink, but something in between: an 
everyday, if complex, part of leisure culture. Nevertheless, following Egyptianization, 
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Stella’s new role as a state-owned and -produced beverage arguably cast a shadow 
over its sunny disposition—particularly as the authoritarian limits of the regime 
became clearer. 
In sum, this study seeks to tell the history of Egypt from 1880 to 1970 through 
the study of the culture, economics, and technology that surrounded the production 
and consumption of bottled beverages in Egypt. I use the understudied history of beer 
in Egypt, a product whose mundaneness placed it on par with bottled water and 
carbonated drinks, to track the Egyptian economy more broadly. The history of beer 
not only provides an excellent entry point for the study of Egyptian economics of this 
period, but it also provides an unparalleled case study of economic success in the 
period from 1880 to 1970, a rare quantity considering the massive economic change 
the country witnessed during that time.  The beer industry’s success was built on a 
fascinating mix of technological innovation, efficient use of local resources, world 
economic developments, executive excellence, and shifting cultural dynamics, 
making it a story about far more than merely profits on the balance sheet.  Beer, 
specifically Stella Beer, the flagship brand of Pyramid and later Crown Brewery, 
achieved a powerful presence in all popular forms of art and media, ranging from 
Arabic novels, songs, and films to newspapers and magazines. This history of beer in 
Egypt stretches across four economic eras, from the pre-colonial era (pre-1880), to 
the Colonial/Semi-Colonial era (1880–1930), to the Economic Nationalist era (1930–
1960), and finally to the Arab Socialist era (1960–1970). Thus, the study study allows 
for a more integrative Egyptian economic history than has been previously 
accomplished. The study shows that Nasser’s government’s sequestration and 
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nationalization of private industries was not a definitive break point between the era 
of the free market and the era of Arab socialism, but rather one among several 
integral and interconnected steps in Egypt’s economic evolution. All of these factors 
make the study of beer and bottled beverages an ideal medium for providing a fresh 
history of Egypt in the century from 1880 to 1970. 
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Chapter 2: The Pharaoh’s Home-Brew and Muslim Moonshine: The History 
of Būẓa in Egypt  
 
From Pharaonic times until roughly 1880, the production of alcoholic beverages 
in Egypt remained an artisanal activity.  This artisanship is especially evident in the case 
of the beverage known as būẓa (and by other names as well), which one scholar described 
as 
a drink closer to a solid than a liquid, resembling nothing more than cool, slightly 
fermented farina, with a sort of fizzy tingle imparted by the carbon dioxide, as 
well as the tell-tale yeasty-sour smell and taste of the stuff leaves little doubt that 
it contains some, though probably very little, alcohol… 1 
 
This apt description accurately identifies three key features of the ancient beverage—
semi-solidity, carbonation, and alcohol—while also suggesting the beverage’s humility. 
Variously made from barley, sorghum, millet, or any other available grain, būẓa differed 
in important respects from the European-style beer that would emerge in Egypt in the 
1880s.  For one thing, būẓa lacked yeast and hops, two critical ingredients for beer.  More 
significantly, Egyptians made their būẓa by following a flexible recipe that 
accommodated available ingredients and that, therefore, produced beverages varying 
widely in consistency, taste, and alcohol content.  In other words, būẓa production lacked 
standardization.  The historian On Barak, in his monograph On Time: Technology and 
Temporality in Modern Egypt, defines standardization as the “perceived necessity of a 
correspondence between standard and example.” Standardization was one of the 
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numerous “technoscientific” ideals of the Western world, which in the nineteenth century 
were just starting to enter Egypt.  The ideal of standardization would become a guiding 
principal for the colonial project.2  
Because būẓa was cheap and pleasantly alcoholic, the drink was popular in 
entertainment venues such as būẓa shops, taverns, coffee houses, kebab houses, and even 
brothels.  In some circles, the drink’s association with illicit sexual activity made the 
beverage controversial, and drew the ire of activist leaders. But just as significantly, būẓa 
was nutritious, filling, and cheap.  Unlike the commercially produced beer that would 
debut in post-1800 Egypt, būẓa was a food as well as a drink for the otherwise under-
nourished working class, providing cheap protein, iron, and other nutrients. 
 As this chapter will argue, understanding the history of būẓa in Egypt is critical for 
appreciating the indigenous social context against which late nineteenth-century beer 
production would emerge. Like the modern beer that descended from it, būẓa was a very 
real, albeit contested, part of Egyptian society.  Egyptians enjoyed the beverage in the 
privacy of their homes and in social settings like taverns, but the drink was also an easy 
target for activist ideologues and leaders. And despite frequent calls to ban the beverage, 
its presence did not diminish until another beverage, modern beer, came along that was 
more closely attuned to “modern” values that entered Egypt in the 19th century. 
Pharaonic/Hellenistic/Islamic Beer 
 Būẓa has generally received short shrift in the Egyptian historical record because 
of its humble associations. A Western analog for the beverage would be moonshine, 
referred to colloquially as “hooch”; that is, a beverage with questionable aesthetic appeal, 
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indeterminate ingredients, varying consistency, and unmistakable alcohol content.  Būẓa 
was not a finely crafted, subtly aesthetic beverage; instead, like moonshine, it was 
powerfully associated with the rural and poor classes. The most famous historical 
mention of būẓa is in Edward Lane’s seminal 1836 work, An Account of the Manners and 
Customs of the Modern Egyptians, in which Lane refers to būẓa as the drink of Nile 
boatmen “and other persons of the lower orders.”3  
 Despite būẓa’s humble associations, its lineage stretches as far back as the 
Pharaohs. As Egyptologists have shown, būẓa was, in both method of preparation and in 
composition, a very close approximation to the beer that Ancient Egyptians were famed 
to have consumed.4  The technology of beer drinking in the ancient Near East provides 
further proof of this, as the main method of consumption was by drinking the beer from a 
jar through a straw.5  The use of the straw is a critical piece of evidence because the 
almost gruel-like texture of būẓa necessitates a straw, serving as a filter so that the 
drinker does not get a mouthful of particulates.6 This necessary innovation persists today, 
as būẓa is most often consumed by drinking it from a plastic bag with a straw. As 
scholars have shown, būẓa/beer was an essential part of the Ancient Egyptian diet, not 
only as an alternative beverage to water, but also as a source of nutrition in its own right. 
The drink also had significant cultural capital, being used to pay wages and purchase 
brides.7  
 Equating būẓa with beer, as I do in this chapter, not only establishes beer’s rightful 
place relative to or as a successor of Egypt’s Pharaonic past, but also gives the beverage a 
place in the other major epochs of Egyptian history. The Greco-Roman word for 
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Egyptian beer, zythos, was a favorite topic of Greek and Roman thinkers of the 
Hellenistic (323 to 146 BCE) and Roman periods (1st century BCE–6th century CE). For 
example, the famous Greek physician Galen (130–200 CE) believed that zythos was bad 
for the body because, being fermented, it seemed to Galen to have derived from 
“decaying” materials.8 Writers from these ancient periods, reflecting their own biases, 
argued despite evidence to the contrary that wine was for the Egyptian elite and beer was 
for everyone else.9  
 Despite authors’ biases against beer, the drink was an important part of Egyptian 
society in both the Hellenistic and Roman periods. Egypt was at that time an exporter of 
beer to the rest of the known world. The Hellenistic government actually relied on beer 
taxes as a revenue stream.10 The famous Greek historian Herodotus (484–425 BCE), in 
his classic work The Histories, made note of the essential role of beer in the Egyptian 
diet.11 Other authors such as Strabo (64 BCE–22 CE), Pliny (1st Century CE), and 
Athenaeus (3rd Century CE) all discussed Egyptian beer production as well. While these 
authors generally focused on the Pharaonic era, their opinions were no doubt informed by 
the existence of a contemporary beer culture in Egypt. 
 The linkage of būẓa to beer is also appropriate in the Islamic era. The Yemenites 
living at the time of the Prophet are said to have drunk mizr (Ar. beer), an intoxicating 
beverage made from barley.  The first mention of any beer-like product in the records of 
Islamic Egypt occurs in the 11th century, when the Fatimids ruled Egypt. The Fatimid 
ruler, al-Hakim, banned the Jews of a holy shrine from brewing mizr and put forth a 
general ban on another beverage, fuqqāʿa. In the hadith literature, the Yemenites are 
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purported to have explained their propensity for the beverage to the Prophet by saying, 
“Our country is cold and gloomy, and we live from the cultivation of the soil; if not for 
mizr, we would not be able to do our work.”12 This passage again shows the prevalence 
of the idea that beer/būẓa is irrevocably tied to the humble classes and their agrarian 
work.  
  The composition of fuqqāʿa remains ambiguous. One of the most popular medieval 
dictionaries, Lisān al-ʿArab, defined it as a “drink made of barley, and called this way 
after the froth that gathers on its top.”13  Other sources assert that its main ingredient 
could be a host of things, including sugar or molasses.14 In a Baghdadi cookbook from 
the second half of the 10th century, written by Ibn Sayyar al-Warraq, a description of how 
to prepare the barley for fuqqāʿa seems to indicate that production relied on malting, 
which is also the essential feature of būẓa and beer-making.15 Certain scholars are willing 
to equate this fuqqāʿa beverage with beer because of a similarity in ingredients and the 
possible use of fermentation;16 however, other scholars are more hesitant because some 
sources insist that fuqqāʿa was strictly non-alcoholic.17  
 The indeterminacy of fuqqāʿa is emblematic of the general dearth of available 
knowledge on alcoholic beverages in the pre-modern Arab world. While this ambiguity 
makes difficult any kind of firm declaration about the precise ingredients and production 
of certain beverages, it also provides further credence to my grouping of all fermented 
cereal beverages of pre-1880s Egypt into a single būẓa category. This holistic approach 
becomes all the more important when looking at the Mamluk period in Egypt (1240–
1517). As Paulina B. Lewicka describes this period, it saw a transition in the terminology 
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for fermented-cereal beverages. At first, the term mizr featured prominently in the work 
of medieval chroniclers, especially in the work of Egypt’s most famous medieval 
chronicler al-Maqrizi (1364-1442).18 For example, in his al-Mawaʿiz wa-l-Iʿtibar fi dhikr 
al-Khitat wa-l-āthār (Admonitions and Reflections on the Quarters and Monuments), Al-
Maqrizi recounts not only how mizr was a favorite among the populace, but also how it 
was a target of pre-Ottoman Egyptian rulers like Salah al-Din and Sultan Baybars, who 
used the prohibition of mizr to prove their Islamic bona fides.19 
 However, after al-Maqrizi, mizr disappeared from the chronicles of Egypt, and būẓa 
took its place. The first mention of būẓa comes in Ibn Tagribidi’s (d.1470) chronicle, 
Nujūm al-Zāhira fi Mulūk Miṣr wa al-Qāhira (The Shining Stars from among the Rulers 
of Egypt), in the entry for the year 1341–42. Ibn Tagribidi describes how one amir uses 
another amir’s history as a būẓa seller to dismiss his legitimacy as a potential sultan.20  
While Lewicka does entertain the possibility that the bifurcation between mizr and būẓa 
may be artificial, she ultimately deems the two drinks to be distinct based on a strict 
definition of beer and the ingredients that can serve at its base (barley and wheat).21 Thus, 
for her, this transition in terminology represents būẓa’s replacement of mizr. Still, 
considering the ambiguity surrounding the composition, production, and naming of 
beverages in pre-1880s Egypt, as discussed above, this differentiation between the two 
beverages is problematic.   
 The writings of a twentieth century Egyptian religious scholar, Shaykh Muhammad 
Farag al-Sanhuri, support my view. His 1917 treatise, al-Muskirat (Intoxicants), aimed to 
document, describe, and rule on the legality of the alcohol present in Egypt at the time. 
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What makes this source important is its breadth and depth, which speak to the author’s 
strong familiarity with alcoholic beverages. The detail in which he discusses alcoholic 
beverages and their effects may seem incongruous with his religious training, but in fact 
Islamic legal scholars very often did study their subject matter intimately in order to 
make strong rulings on it. Al-Sanhuri’s work comes in a long line of Islamic legal 
writings on the subject of beverages and the permissibility of their consumption.22 In al-
Sanhuri’s work, he places mizr and būẓa in the same family, stating that the term mizr, 
which he defines as “a drink made from durra” (sorghum), is the best possible term to 
encompass beer, būẓa, and fermented fruit beverages.23 Thus, for al-Sanhuri, būẓa is 
merely a variant of mizr. This synchronicity explains how scholar Abd al-Rahman al-
Jabarti (1753–1826) could make reference to a mazzār, a brewer of mizr, in his ninetieth-
century chronicle of Egypt, ‘Ajā’ib al-āthār fī-l-Tarājim wa-l-Akhbār, around the same 
time that the French authors of Description de l’Égypte asserted that “at this time, beer is 
totally absent from Egypt.”24  
Ottoman Būẓa 
  While the relationship between mizr and būẓa prior to the sixteenth century is 
certainly debatable, there is no doubt that būẓa became the preeminent Egyptian 
fermented-cereal drink after the arrival of the Ottomans in 1517.  This predominance 
should not be surprising considering the cultural footprint of būẓa in Ottoman history. 
Like the Ancient Egyptians, the pre-Islamic inhabitants of Central and East Asia 
produced a būẓa-like substance prior to the arrival of the Ottomans. Būẓa’s creation was 
often credited to the Tartars, a Central Asian ethnic group.25 Regardless of the drink’s 
provenance, by the time the Ottomans came to rule over Anatolia and parts of Central 
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Asia, būẓa (boza in Turkish) made with millet had become popular throughout Ottoman 
domains.26  Among the best documentations of būẓa’s presence in Ottoman domains is 
Evliyya’s Celebi’s seventeenth-century travel account, Seyahatname (The Book of 
Travels), in its chapter on būẓa sellers in Istanbul. According to Celebi, būẓa was sold in 
Istanbul by some 1,110 men, primarily Tartars and Gypsies, working in 340 shops, and 
by others selling from carts with tent-like coverings.  Two main varieties of the drink 
were sold, “acid” būẓa (ekşi boza) and “sweet” būẓa (tatlı boza or kuru bozası). The 
sweet variety was made from Tekirdaǧ millet and had a milk-like appearance.27 
According to Çelebi, the best būẓa came from shops in the bazaar near the Hagia Sophia 
and the Hippodrome, because there the cream was left atop the beverage, and it was laced 
“with grape syrup [pekmez] and sprinkled with cinnamon, cloves, ginger and coconut. ”28 
Çelebi’s reliability as a source is attested by his admission to having a predilection for the 
sweet būẓā, especially during Ramadan. He declares the consumption of būẓa to be licit 
as long as one avoids intoxication, even noting that the sweet būẓa was a favorite of 
scholars and sheiks. He assures readers that he could drink ten ladle-fulls without 
becoming intoxicated. Nevertheless, he concedes that overconsumption could cause 
drunkenness, gout, and dropsy.29  
 Besides Çelebi, another testament to the cultural significance of būẓa in the 
Ottoman domains is an untitled manuscript housed at the library in Leiden. As shown by 
Hatice Aynur and Jan Schmidt in their excellent study, this manuscript was a nineteenth-
century münazara (argumentation) between several anthropomorphized intoxicants, 
including opium, wine, coffee, hashish, būẓa, and berş (a drug concoction that contained 
opium) over which of them provides the greatest benefit. After much arguing, 
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pontificating, and some physical altercation, Opium, Berş, and Coffee decide to exile 
Wine, Būẓa, and Hashish from the mansion where the argument is taking place to three 
separate locations, Europe, the Tatar Khan, and Khorasan, respectively.30 Before Būẓa is 
exiled, he is portrayed as 
[A] white-bearded, old, but naive man, clad in white from head to toe, holding a 
handkerchief full of chickpeas in his hand, passing for a person of dignity while 
moving spastically…A regiment of Tatars unfurls white banners before him and a 
bunch of stupid muleteers and camel-drivers are gathered at his stirrup.31 
 
The features in this characterization are very much in line with Çelebi’s description: The 
figure’s age represents the ancient origins of the substance; his all-white garments 
represent būẓa’s distinctive milky hue; his handful of chickpeas symbolizes a common 
accompaniment to būẓa; the retinue of the Tatars points to their supposed invention of the 
beverage; and the juxtaposition of faux dignity with the muleteers and camel-drivers 
represents the equivocal respectability of the drink. This last point is particularly 
interesting, for it gets to the heart of būẓa’s position in Ottoman domains. Scholars would 
drink būẓa unashamedly, even during Ramadan, but the drink was also consumed among 
prostitutes in the seedier parts of town. 
Būẓa in Ottoman Egypt 
 With būẓa’s significant foundation in the Ottoman culture, its predominance as the 
fermented-cereal beverage of Egypt after the arrival of the Ottomans should come as no 
surprise. Nevertheless, būẓa held a slightly different status in Egypt from the one it held 
in Ottoman culture. A significant source in the discussion of būẓa’s place in Egyptian 
society under the Ottomans is, once again, the Seyahatname of Evliya Çelebi.  
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Considering his fondness for the beverage, it is not surprising that he dedicated part of his 
chapter on Egypt to būẓa. One of Çelebi’s favorites was subya, a būẓa made from rice 
that was particular to Egypt.32  
 Beyond detailing this local variety of būẓa, Çelebi also shows how the drink was 
integral to the Cairene economy. He portrays the būẓa shop, like the tavern, the coffee 
house, and the kebab house, as important entertainment venues of late seventeenth-
century Cairo.33 This is an indication of how closely entwined the būẓa shop and café 
were, even setting aside their main product. Both were urban social spaces where men of 
a certain social status could meet, talk, and enjoy different forms of entertainment, such 
as listening to recitations of famous folk epics or watching dancers, jugglers, and snake 
charmers.34 The close relationship between taverns and coffee houses is one that Ralph 
Hattox explores fruitfully in his monograph Coffee and Coffeehouses.  He posits that the 
coffeehouse built upon the nighttime social community that had been established by the 
less-respectable institutions of the tavern and the gambling den, but that the coffeehouse 
was then able to surpass these institutions because of the product it sold.35 Further 
evidence of the closeness of these two institutions is that some members of the ‘ulema 
used the term “tavern” (ḥanāt) to refer to the coffeehouse (qahwa).36   
 As Çelebi notes, būẓa shops, taverns, and coffeehouses were closely associated 
with prostitution, as well as other illicit behavior and less-than-respectable professions.37 
One particularly interesting profession is that of the bazaar jobber, who subsisted on the 
selling of items taken from “boza shops and taverns and kebab-houses and other places of 
entertainment in Babulluq.”38 These bazaar jobbers often came upon their wares for sale 
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in a most unscrupulous way:  
Sometimes a silly and inexperienced youth gets leave from his master to go to the 
bathhouse and instead comes to Babulluq where he makes out with a sweetheart 
in one of these huts. At some point he wants wine and kebab, so he gives three 
akçe to the bazaar jobber who obtains whatever the youth desires. But into the 
wine or the boza, the bazaar jobber puts white clove or datura or earwax or rush 
ashes, and when that youth drinks a cup, he topples over like a sack of henna. At 
once he is relived of his clothes and his knife or dagger and his purse.39 
 
After that, Celebi adds, the unfortunate and naked youth is left to the unsavory local 
residents to do with him as they please. The poor youth has no recourse, for he should not 
have been in these questionable locales in the first place. This description illustrates not 
only the grittiness of the bazaar jobber’s profession, but also of the culture that 
surrounded būẓa and the shops where it was sold. In Çelebi’s passage, būẓa is almost 
indistinguishable from wine; he makes the seamless verbal switch from “wine” to “wine 
and būẓa,” linking them in their illicitness.  Çelebi’s remark on the lack of recourse for 
the indulgent but wronged youth illustrates why prostitution, crime, and alcohol had such 
a persistent association in Muslim domains. Because a Muslim should not be in a place 
like a būẓa shop, he could not seek justice for the crimes that took place there for fear of 
self-incrimination.  
 The association of būẓa shops with taverns, prostitutes, and criminal activity meant 
not only that partaking of the beverage was dangerous, but also that the shops tended to 
be targeted for criticism by pious leaders. The earliest documented instance of this is in 
al-Maqrizi’s al-Khitat, which recounts how Salah al-Din and Sultan Baybars aimed to 
close the būẓa shops. Similarly, Çelebi describes one governor in Egypt, Capoladzade 
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Hüseyn Pasha, who upon learning about bazaar jobbers, declares that they constitute a 
loss of revenue and that he, Pasha, could be held responsible for the jobbers’ actions. 
Pasha then ordered the destruction of the places where they made their living.  One of his 
subordinates organized a few thousand Barbaris (Nubians) and fellahin, who burned 
down all of the taverns, brothels, and būẓa shops and banished all the prostitutes from 
Cairo. Thus, as Çelebis put it, “Cairo was cleansed.”40  This activity was not limited 
solely to Egypt. As Fariba Zarinebaf notes, in 1597 the Ottoman government ordered the 
qadi of Galata to close the taverns, coffeehouses, and būẓa shops in Istanbul and 
Galata.41 
 The narrative of the pious leader shuttering and destroying the būẓa shop appears 
again in another important source for the Ottoman period in Egypt, Al-Damurdashi’s al-
Durra al-Musana fi Akhbar al-Kinana (The Protected Pearl in the History of Egypt). As 
al-Damurdashi recounts in the year 1703, under the governorship of Kara Muhammad 
Pasha, Egypt was suffering hardship due to a shortage in copper coinage. In order to 
address the problem, the leaders of the country convened a council and decided to leave 
the regulation of money in the hands of the head (agha) of the Janissaries, ‘Ali Agha.42  
The agha accepted the posting, but only after the council agreed on certain conditions, 
including one that Ali Agha be allowed to “close the pubs (khamamir), the cafes where 
buza is drunk, and the brothels.”43  The council agreed to the demands, Ali Agha 
accepted the posting, and he followed through on his word by going around Cairo 
smashing būẓa shops and driving out prostitutes. 
 Most accounts of these “cleansing” activities are vague, lumping together būẓa 
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shops, taverns, and brothels. For example, in another instance of a leader closing būẓa 
shops in al-Damurdashi, 
He [the governor] issued a firman closing the buza establishments and houses of 
prostitution from all the districts in Cairo, Bulaq, and Old Cairo and the Janissary 
Agha descended [to proclaim it in the streets]44 
 
The grouping of buẓa with taverns and brothels again signifies the beverage’s perceived 
low social value and its association with immorality. In fact, whether or not the būẓa 
shops were actually closed is debatable, as the Janissaries, the main force behind closing 
the būẓa shops in the above anecdote, often profited from the sale of būẓa and other 
alcohols.45 One notable exception is Al-Damurdashi’s recounting of ‘Ali’s time in Bulaq: 
He [‘Ali Agha] rode with this procession [the Jawsihiya, the police officials, the 
lieutenants and the messengers] to Bulaq where he wrecked the buza cafe of al-
Majmara and drove out its prostitutes…He attacked and closed down the sherbet 
shops and attacked the Jir pub which was later rented by Ayyub Bey, who 
transformed it into a wikala…[‘Ali Agha] rested in the takiya, ate lunch, then rode 
to Cairo where he passed the buza cafe of al-Qammahin, which he demolished. 
He also resided in bait al-Naqba and drove out the prostitutes.46    
 
In this passage, Al-Damurdashi specifies names for each of the būẓa shops, lending the 
account a credibility that is generally lacking from other similar accounts. Regardless of 
whether these būẓa shops and their closures were real, the evidence presented in this 
section confirms that, despite its differing ingredients, būẓa was, like wine, still 
considered a religiously suspect beverage.  
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Merīssa 
Būẓa’s low status extended into the nineteenth century, as evidenced by the 
statement of Edward Lane in his Manners and Customs, quoted above, that būẓa was the 
drink of Nile boatmen “and other persons of the lower orders.”47 The association of būẓa 
with the lower classes must have carried significant weight because author Karl Baedeker 
reproduced the same statement in his 1878 travel guide of Egypt. Baedeker added that it 
was Nubians who primarily ran the būẓa trade.48 The association between būẓa and black 
Africans was hardly new in Egypt; Umar Al-Halabi, in his al-Nuzat al-Udaba’ wa-Salwat 
al-Quraba’ (ca.1707), asserts that mizr (which I have shown to be another name for būẓa) 
was the preferred drink of blacks in Egypt.49  Although būẓa had been culturally 
important in Egypt for centuries, the drink took on complex new meanings in the late 
nineteenth century as the colonial imaginings of Africans, Egyptian racial politics, and 
actual consumption patterns converged. 
 In order to discuss būẓa adequately in the African context, it is once again 
necessary to clarify terminology. As shown above, būẓa had various names, which has 
caused scholars to assume the presence of numerous different cereal-based alcoholic 
beverages instead of recognizing their likeness. But another term, merīssa, consistently 
appears in sources on the Sudan, and scholars are divided on whether this beverage is 
synonymous with Egyptian būẓa. According to ‘Awn al-Sharif Qasim’s dictionary of 
colloquial Sudanese, merīssa is "a drink made from an infusion of sorghum or millet... It 
is steeped in the liquid of the dates or something else and worked by hand until it 
dissolves into its constituent parts.”50  This method of preparation sounds very similar to 
the description of būẓa. For Qasim, this is only natural, for he defines “būza” in the same 
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dictionary as “merīssa and the like.”51 Qasim also notes the alternate spellings of the 
word (for example, this chapter’s preferred spelling, būẓa,), and notes that būza, in other 
Arabic dialects, comes from a Persian word meaning “ice cream.”52 The detailing of 
alternate definitions of būẓa indicates the author’s acute familiarity with the beverage and 
its surrounding nomenclature. 
 However, Hamid A. Dirar argues in his work The Indigenous Fermented Foods of 
the Sudan: A Study in African Food and Nutrition (1993) that although merīssa is often 
referred to as būẓa, the two beverages are in fact distinct. Dirar believes they are distinct 
beverages because the Egyptian preparation of būẓa is far simpler than the preparation of 
merīssa, and because Egyptian būẓa is unknown in the northern parts of the Sudan.53  
The merīssa-making process he describes, which he takes to be the definitive method, is 
far more complex than a typical būẓa recipe; it involves at least two more steps and 
specifies measurements more finely than is typical in Egyptian production of the 
beverage. Dirar’s description is based on his first-hand observations of contemporary 
merīssa-making in the Sudan; when he details older recipes from European accounts, 
they are simpler and more similar to Egyptian būẓa recipes. Nevertheless, Dirar is firm in 
his belief that merīssa is distinct from būẓa. 
 As in Lewicka’s distinction between mizr and būẓa, this is another case of a scholar 
attributing fixity to a beverage where it is not warranted. While there were certainly 
particularities to the production of merīssa in the Sudan, it seems arbitrary to cordon off 
two beverages that are so similar in appearance, taste, and raw materials based merely 
upon minor differences in production. As Dirar notes, merīssa was an opaque sorghum (a 
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common base for būẓa) beer that can best be described as an “alcoholic food beverage.”54  
These two beverages shared numerous similarities, not least their production methods. 
Although Dirar is keen to note that merīssa production was more complex than that of 
būẓa, the former was similarly artisanal, involving the same basic methods and materials 
(fire, earthenware pots, etc.) that are used for making Egyptian būẓa.  On top of all of 
this, Dirar’s definition of merīssa is very broad and includes numerous other Sudanese 
fermented-cereal beverages that have different preparations. All of these factors justify 
adding merīssa to the list of names for būẓa. 
 Equating merīssa and būẓa is not merely a pedantic exercise. Recognizing the two 
beverages’ likeness provides an important link between the drinking cultures of Egypt 
and the Sudan. As many outsiders observed of Sudanese culture in the nineteenth 
century, merīssa was an important, albeit perhaps unseemly, part of that culture:  
As we stroll about the market-place we notice the Egyptian official stamping the 
wares and levying duties, and farther on give a passing glance at the bakeries and 
beer-shops, where durra (sorghum) bread and merissa, brewed from the same 
corn, are dispensed by young and middle age-aged women…In the merissa booths 
wild orgies are often witnessed, as the day wears on and topers become inflamed 
by the intoxicating drink.55      
 
This short passage from the travelogue of Dr. Wilhelm Junker (1875–1878), which 
describes the market in Gedaref near the Ethiopian border, captures the essential elements 
of foreign depictions of merīssa: the beverage was produced by women and had strong 
associations with sexual licentiousness. The link between merīssa and female sexuality is 
one that Heather Sharkey explores in her in unpublished thesis, “Domestic Slavery in the 
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Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Northern Sudan.”  As Sharkey shows, 
prostitution and the subsidiary industry of merīssa production were lucrative ventures 
both before and after the abolition of slavery in the Sudan in 1898. Before abolition, the 
profitability of the merīssa industry induced slave-owners to push their female slaves into 
the industry. After abolition, the dual role of prostitution/merīssa sale proved to be one of 
the only venues through which a female ex-slave could make a profitable living.56  Often 
these women would establish anadi (sing. indaya), the Sudanese term for a local bar, as 
their base for the sale of merīssa. The anadi, which were often near brothels, were 
especially prominent in Khartoum, serving as important sites of leisure activity for the 
non-elite.57     
 Unsurprisingly, these merīssa shops, like the būẓa shops of Cairo and Istanbul, 
were targeted for regulations that aimed to stop the prostitution and other illicit activities 
they supposedly caused.  For example, in 1795, a sultan in Darfur forbade beer drinking 
on penalty of execution. The sale and consumption of merīssa continued unabated, 
though, and the law became a dead letter.58  Likewise, the Condominium government, the 
Anglo-Egyptian government in Sudan (1899–1956), worked hard to control merīssa 
production, issuing three ordinances aimed at regulating what they termed “Native 
Liquors,” in 1903, 1907, and 1913.  These ordinances attempted to curb the sale of the 
beverage by requiring every seller to acquire a license through the state and by 
threatening transgressors with prison time (up to three months) and a hefty fine (ten 
Egyptian pounds).59   
 These ordinances reflected more than just a governmental concern for the moral 
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fortitude of the Sudanese subjects, however. The strictures were tied heavily to the 
Anglo-Egyptian colonial project in Sudan. As Eve Troutt-Powell showed in her study A 
Different Shade of Colonialism, Egypt had, since the reign of Muhammad ‘Ali, justified 
its presence in the territory that would become Sudan through a paternalism that aimed at 
civilizing the barbaric “natives” in hopes of helping them advance toward “modernity.”60 
This colonialism differed from that of imperial powers like France and Britain in that 
Egypt was what Troutt-Powell terms a “colonized colonizer”; that is, Egypt carried out an 
imperial project even as the Ottomans, French, and British pursued their own projects in 
Egypt. Thus, Egypt’s colonial actions in the Sudan were intimately tied to its own 
colonial yoke. As Timothy Mitchell has shown, an essential element of the European 
colonial project in Egypt, which was begun by the French in 1798 and continued by the 
British in 1882, was the imposition of “order.”61 In domains including urban planning, 
military organization, schooling, and even the language of Arabic, the colonial powers 
aimed to impose discipline and order on what they deemed to be the unruly Egyptians. 
Those elements that could cause disorder, confusion, or lack of discipline were anathema 
to the imperial project. In Egypt’s role as “colonized colonizer,” it was not only subject to 
this prioritization of order, but also worked with the British to implement the same 
mentality in the Sudan.  
 Given the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium’s colonial interest, then, it is not 
surprising that this government would target the excessive consumption of alcohol on the 
grounds that it lowered inhibitions and encouraged allegedly disorderly behavior. 
Similarly, the merīssa/anadi nexus was seen to need regulation as a main vector of 
sexually transmitted disease. The high rates of syphilis that were affecting British 
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imperial armies in the Sudan, as elsewhere, were a real danger to Britain’s imperial 
project. The anti-alcohol ordinances of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium government 
were an example par excellence of the unique colonial history of Egypt in the Sudan; 
however, the targeting of alcohol production and consumption was not confined there. 
Starting with the Brussels Act of 1890 and strengthening with the League of Nation 
Treaty Series, all the colonial powers (Britain, France, Belgium, Italy, etc.) prohibited 
“the importation, distribution, sale, and possession of trade spirits of every kind” in the 
continent of Africa.62 This legislation grew out of an infantilizing discourse that was used 
to justify the colonial presence in Africa.63  
 To add one more layer to the discussion of what merīssa was and meant in the 
Sudan, we must consider the sources that provide much of our information on the 
beverage. Like the passage cited above, most source documents were produced by 
foreign visitors to the country. These observers, be they European or Egyptian, were 
reporting from positions of power and perceived moral superiority. Therefore, their focus 
on merīssa and the juxtaposition of its mundane production with “wild orgies” can be 
seen as, at best, reflections on the “barbaric” nature of the Sudanese designed to excite 
readers, or at worst, another example of a European recording the lasciviousness of the 
natives as justification for the colonial project.  
 The imperialist undertones of these foreign visitors’ accounts become all the more 
stark when we consider the high cultural position of merīssa in the Sudan. The beverage 
was, in numerous instances, invested with a great deal of symbolic meaning. For 
example, among the mythology of some of inhabitants of the Nuba Mountains, merīssa 
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was supposed to have come down from heaven.64 For other tribes of the Nuba Mountains, 
merīssa was a central element in festivals that commemorated either the beginning of the 
planting season or the harvest season. For example, certain tribes in either February or 
June, two months known for their rains, carried out the deboia festival. In this festival, a 
deboia (“antelope” in the local language) was caught and given merīssa in the presence 
of a kujur (witch doctor). When the antelope died from the power of the kujur, the 
animal’s meat was given only to the children and elderly to eat.65 Merīssa also played a 
role in the marriage ceremonies of the Fur people, an ethnic group from the western 
Sudan. During the ceremony, the betrothed met two representatives from each of the 
tribes in attendance. Each tribal representative would present the couple with gifts 
commensurate with their tribe’s social standing. One of the most common gifts was a 
package of ‘aṣīda (a thick paste made of flour and clarified butter), merīssa, and boiled 
and grilled meats.66 The ceremonial role of merīssa even extended to Islamic rituals. It 
was reported that a woman composed an extempore poem at a Sufi dhikr, a Sufi 
ceremony that centered on the “tireless repletion of an ejaculatory litany, in which 
merīssa featured prominently.67  
 On a more utilitarian plane, despite merīssa’s portrayal as a drink that brought out 
the lasciviousness of the Sudanese, it actually had a large role to play in the people’s 
work habits. With its nutritive value as a good source of protein and other essential 
nutrients, merīssa provided Sudanese workers with a day’s worth of caloric intake. The 
drink not only drove work; it was also a social adhesive.  In rural Sudan, villagers would 
congregate under shade trees and drink jars of home-brewed merīssa brought by the 
village women. Any man who drank was supposed to donate money to the jar’s owner. 
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Those without the money to pay were still able to drink, for to deny a man his merīssa 
was to deny him sustenance.68  
 The significant social value attached to merīssa is further supported by another 
foreign account of the Sudan from Ignatius Pallme (1844). In Pallme’s description of the 
toilette of a Baqqara Arab shaykh's wife living in Kordofan, a critical aspect of this 
toilette is that a slave holds a gourd of merīssa at the mistress’s side so that she can sip 
the drink whenever she desires.69  This anecdote shows how multifaceted the role of 
merīssa was in Sudanese society; in this case, it is not so much an inciter of Sudanese 
licentiousness as a status symbol of the leisure class.  
 But perhaps the best indication of the importance of merīssa to Sudanese culture 
is an anecdote from Muhammad al-Tunisi’s travelogue, Tashhidh al-Idhan bi-Sirat Bilad 
al-Arab wa al-Sudan (Sharpening the Intellect with Travel in the country of the Arabs 
and the Blacks, 1845).  This anecdote comes after al-Tunisi discusses the implementation 
of a law in Darfur that, among other things, had come down hard on drinkers of alcohol. 
Al-Tunisi tells of a man in Darfur who loved drinking merīssa so much that he could not 
stop even despite the harsh penalties—eighty lashes and the smashing of all liquor in the 
home. The man’s solution was to dig a cave for himself underground, where he could 
drink until he became intoxicated and then come back to the surface. He did this 
repeatedly until an official in Darfur heard and came into the cave to stop him. The hole-
digger’s response was that while the official may be able to prevent him from drinking 
above ground, as God granted the official rights on the face of the earth, but the laws had 
no jurisdiction under the Earth.70      
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 Notwithstanding this masculine anecdote, there certainly was some truth in 
Junker’s statement as to merīssa’s associations with women and sexual licentiousness. 
This nexus of women, brewing, and prostitution was not strictly limited to the Sudan; 
rather, it reflected a major commonality between this region and the rest of Africa. For 
example, in Umtata (now Mthatha in present-day South Africa), women were the 
traditional brewers of a local variety of a būẓa-like substance (utywala). The work of 
brewing was accepted, along with child rearing, cooking, gathering wood, and tending 
the crops, as one of women’s standard jobs in rural places. As Umtata gradually 
urbanized around the turn of the twentieth century, and male migrant labor became a 
defining feature of the area, town-based brewing became one of the most attractive 
professions open to women, as it was both lucrative and allowed for self-employment. 
The profession was particularly attractive to single women. 71  
 As in Egypt, colonial authorities feared that the presence of single women selling 
beer, not to mention the attendant specter of prostitution, represented the degradation of 
the local African family structure. The authorities thus enacted a series of laws aimed at 
stopping the sale of beer and the migration of single women from the countryside into 
towns.72 Justin Willis shows in his social history of alcohol in East Africa that the sale of 
alcohol was an “illicit field of entrepreneurship for women in chronic conflict with the 
state and the patriarchy.”73  Willis also notes that an “alternative” economy developed, 
one based on selling sex, food, and alcohol, that was exploited by the predominately male 
population of the new urban centers that colonialism helped to create.74  The link among 
women, brewing, and prostitution was also seen in western Africa, with Emmanual 
Akyeampong noting similar cultural trends in Ghana.75   
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 The link between women and brewing was also a feature of early European 
brewing. For example, British domestic brewing, a major source of the country’s beer 
prior to the nineteenth century, was primarily the domain of the housewife and was seen, 
as in Umtata, as an accepted domestic duty.76 For Dutch women in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, the production and sale of beer also offered significant economic 
opportunities; indeed, it provided one of the few opportunities for a woman of the time 
“to act as an independent businesswoman.”77  Up to the seventeenth century, women 
comprised “as much as 50% of the labour force and rarely less than 20%” in the Dutch 
brewing industry.78 In Holland, however, the brewing operations were generally not 
headed by women, but rather functioned within the patriarchal family unit. In these 
operations, women could serve as brouwsters (the overseers of boiling the wort with the 
hops and highest paid assistant to the brewer/father), wringsters (the mixers of the malt 
and the hot water) and the comptoirmeyd (the one responsible for keeping track of 
outgoing beer and keeping records).79 A woman also had the option of taking over the 
brewery if her husband died, but not before then. 
Merīssa/Būẓa in Egypt   
 This long excursus into the African heritage of būẓa is necessary to a discussion of 
the sale and consumption of būẓa in Egypt prior to 1880. As I have discussed above, 
Baedeker cites the Nubians as the primary consumers of būẓa; however, he was not the 
only foreign observer to note the link between būẓa and Africans along the length of the 
Nile Valley. J.W. McPherson (1941) also states that būẓa was the national drink of the 
Sudanese in Egypt and that it was heavily involved in their ritual dance of the ringū, 
which was performed at weddings, circumcision, and mawlids (saints’ birthdays). 
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McPherson, giving further evidence of the conflation of būẓa and merīssa, asserts that at 
home in the Sudan, the Sudanese referred to this type of beer, būẓa, as merīssa, but that 
term was hardly ever used in Egypt. McPherson also states that the Sudanese and the 
Barabira (another name for Nubians) were the most prominent owners of būẓa booths.80 
Each of these authors links būẓa to a different African group present in Egypt: Baedeker 
to the Nubians, the name for Muslims living along the Nile south of Aswan, and 
McPherson to the Sudanese, immigrants from the territories generally referred to as Bilād 
al-Sūdān.81 Although these were two distinct groups I will, for the remainder of the 
chapter, conflate them, and any other under group from south of Egypt, under the term 
Sudani.   
 This conflation is justified because, ultimately, the boundaries among designations 
like Nubian, Sudanese, and other black African groups in Egyptian society were porous. 
As Walz and Cuno show, Sudani, the Arabic word for Sudanese, is best translated as 
“black” and can be applied to various non-Sudanese groups when discussing the history 
of Egypt.82 Eve Trout-Powell observes a similar phenomenon, wherein Egyptian 
newspaper writers constantly conflated terms like “Sudanese,” “Nubian,” “Barabari,” and 
“Habashi” (Ethiopian).83  This conflation seems all the more justifiable when considering 
that many of our sources on būẓa are accounts by foreign authors, who were more 
cavalier with their identification of ethnic groups.84  
 The assignation of būẓa to the Sudani by foreign observers was not merely an 
innocuous statement on the consumption habits of a Cairene minority; rather, it was a 
value judgment on the beverage itself. As I have already discussed, Egypt’s position as a 
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“colonized colonizer” requires us to interrogate statements about and observations of the 
Sudani in Egypt that one might otherwise be tempted to accept at face value. This need is 
especially apparent in the case of alcohol consumption, which was heavily tied up in 
discussions of modernity and colonialism. As Troutt-Powell argues, the term Sudani was 
heteroglossic, by which she meant, borrowing from the Russian theorist Mikhail Bakhtin, 
that, “at any given time, in any given place, there will be a set of conditions—social, 
historical, meteorological, physiological—that will insure that a word uttered in that 
place and at that time will have a meaning different than it would have had under any 
other conditions[.]”85   
 In the case of the term Sudani, Troutt-Powell means that in the eyes of certain 
Egyptian cultural critics (Yaqub Sannu‘, Abdallah al-Nadim), what was meant by the 
term depended entirely on the environment and context in which the word was used. 
When the Sudani were in Egypt and were exposed to the civilizing process of the 
country, they were passive, docile, and fit for servitude. This valuation was tied heavily 
to Egypt’s history of using this population to supply the slave trade, which persisted even 
after it was legally abolished in 1877. The racist ideas on the inferiority of blacks that 
were used to justify slavery maintained a currency in Egypt up until at least the 1920s.86 
These cultural commentators also noted that if the Sudani remained within their 
homelands, they were savage, lascivious, bestial beings who were dangerously and 
desperately in need of civilization.87   
 The hoary concept of black inferiority traces its origins to the very beginnings of 
Egyptian nationalism. Egypt’s first proto-nationalist writer, Rifa‘a Rafi‘ al-Tahtawi 
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(1801–1873), believed that the Sudani were backwards and that civilizing them was an 
essential goal of the Egyptian nation.88  Thus, when Baedeker and McPherson anointed 
būẓa the drink of choice for the Sudani of Egypt, they linked this beverage to the socio-
cultural baggage of this population. Emblematic of this loaded linkage is McPherson’s 
description of the ringū and the būẓa booth: 
There are recondite features connected with the origin and the analogies of 
this weird institution (ringū)…the tread-mill-like step of the dance, and 
the weird instruments which include a bit of a railway line, are not quite 
like anything else, and the rather sour and cloudy Sudanese beer (booza) 
served in bowls or gourds by ebony hands is equally strange: luckily tea, 
coffee, or qirfa (cinnamon tea) can be indulged instead.89 
 
From the passage, it is immediately obvious that McPherson considers the culture of the 
Sudani, of which būẓa is a very important part, inherently exotic. In this short passage, he 
calls the ritual and the beverage “strange” and “weird.”  The clearest sign of the 
exoticization of the Sudani and their drink, būẓa, is how McPherson describes the image 
of the beverage being passed in strange receptacles (bowls and gourd) between ebony 
hands. If that image is not enough, his qualifying statement at the end that “luckily” there 
are more mundane beverages (coffee, tea) to drink reaffirms that būẓa, like its drinkers, 
were inherently at odds with the culture of the author and the assumed reader. As I have 
shown in the above discussion of merīssa and būẓa, this linkage of drink to population 
certainly contained elements of truth; that is, the Sudani had quite an extensive history 
with the beverage. Nevertheless, by asserting this connection, outside observers were also 
imputing the drink with a low but exotic status. Another foreign observer Edward 
Pococke (1745) echoes this valuation by noting that only “the most vulgar people” were 
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consumers of būẓa.90   
It was not only Western observers who linked the Sudani to būẓa; Egyptians did 
so as well. The clearest statement of the link between the Sudani and the sale of būẓa 
comes in the newspaper of another important Egyptian nationalist, Abdallah al-Nadim 
(1845-1896), al-Tankit wa al-Tanbit (Satire and Reproach), who included a parable in the 
newspaper to warn the public of the dangers of both būẓa and Sudani. In this parable, two 
Sudani slave women, Nakhla and Oshama, earn a significant sum from the sale of hashish 
and “beer” (read būẓa) in their neighborhood, but the sale brings a curse upon their 
neighborhood. Al-Nadim included this parable in his newspaper to spur Egyptians to 
educate and civilize the Sudani lest they bring an atmosphere of ignorance and 
immorality into Egypt.91 Beyond the edifying purpose of this article, its patent linkage of 
Sudani women, būẓa, exoticism, low status, and irreligiousness is a perfect encapsulation 
of the role of the beverage in Egyptian society.92  
 But how strong was the actual link between būẓa and the Sudani? It is hard to tell 
because names associated with būẓa in the historical record so often provide very little 
information on the origins.  One hint of the etymology is a complaint made in the 1930s 
by a būẓa shop to the police department, alleging that a group of police officers were 
targeting the shop with attacks. In a letter describing the incidents, the complainant notes 
that these būẓa shops were run by sudāniyāt.93 While it would be easy to assume that this 
reference means Sudanese women were running these shops, as noted above, the 
reference could simply indicate black Africans. Regardless of which meaning is intended, 
the point is that, at least anecdotally, the Sudani were still participating in the sale of būẓa 
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in the 1930s. Further evidence of the link between the Sudani and būẓa in Egypt comes 
from the Islamic scholar Muhammad al-Sanhuri. As noted above, his 1917 treatise, al-
Muskirat, is an excellent source for discussion of alcohol in Egypt in the twentieth 
century. In the section entitled al-būẓa al-baladī (Native Būẓā), al-Sanhuri notes that, “in 
our county [Egypt] Nubians, Barbaris, and the Ethiopians (al-Aḥbāsh)” drown in the 
stuff.94  Al-Sanhuri’s statement at once elides the differences among black African 
groups in Egypt, and situates them as the primary consumers of the beverage. 
 The link between būẓa and the Sudani appears to be logical considering the position 
of the Sudani in Egypt. As noted above, they did not enjoy a high social valuation, with 
society deeming them either docile, unintelligent beings whose natural position was one 
of servitude, or as wild men of Africa who were in dire need of civilization. At that time, 
many Sudani were slaves, but there were also freedmen who worked in coffeehouse, ran 
messages, served in the army, and worked as guards, haulers, and wood collectors.  A 
Sudani could even reach the position of a high-level servant administering the estate of an 
elite household.95 However, these positions were rare, and most avenues for advancement 
were closed to the great majority of Sudani at the time. Because of their former slave 
origins, they were on the bottom rung of society.   
 In this context, it makes sense that the Sudani would flock to the būẓa business, as 
it was one that was profitable, familiar, and open to them. Būẓa shops were a significant 
feature of the Egyptian urban landscape.  Terrence Walz estimates that there were ten 
būẓa shops in Cairo at the time of the 1848 Egyptian census. ‘Ali Mubarak (1823-1893), 
the famous Egyptian “official, cabinet minister and writer,” recorded in his seminal al-
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Khitat al-Tawfiqiyya al-Jadida that there were over forty būẓa shops in Cairo.96 There 
was enough business for the būẓa sellers in Cairo to organize a guild.97An Egyptian guild 
was, at the most basic level, “a group of town people practicing the same occupation and 
headed by a shaykh.”98 While the organization and activity of guilds varied greatly, they 
generally provided some regulation of crafts through their control of licensing and 
formed a “community for craft and service workers in particular professions.”99 Guilds 
were sometimes organized along particular identities (confessional, ethnic, national).  So 
it seems reasonable to suppose a strong link between the culture/race of the Sudani and 
the craft of producing and selling būẓa.   
 Despite the profitability of būẓa sales, it was open to the Sudani because it was a 
low-status occupation. As noted above, būẓa carried the same religiously suspect 
reputation as wine, so its public sale was not a respectable profession. On top of this, 
similar to in the Sudan, the link among būẓa, women, and prostitution was strong in 
Egypt. For example, in the court records on one 1877 theft case in Alexandria, the three 
accused were reported to have gotten drunk at a būẓa shop and stopped by a nearby 
brothel before they committed their crime.100 More broadly, governmental officials and 
social reformers grouped būẓa shops with coffee shops and taverns, considering them all 
dangerous places in desperate need of reform.101   
Thus, it certainly stands to reason that the humble Sudani were consumers of the 
beverage, for būẓa was the cheapest alcohol available and would not put a strain on their 
meager incomes. Yet the Sudani were not the only poor to enjoy the cheap price of būẓa.  
As al-Sanhuri notes, it was the drink of all those who were barely making a living.102 
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Like moonshine, būẓa was valued for the ease of production and the cheapness of its raw 
materials; all that was needed to produce it were some excess cereal grains and water. 
Another overlooked aspect of why būẓa was so appealing to the lower classes, Egyptians 
and Sudani alike, was that in its unfiltered form, it provided significant nutritive value. 
As noted above, būẓa was an essential driver of labor in the Sudan. In the case of the poor 
in Egypt, because būẓa contained fat, protein, carbohydrates, iron, and calcium, it 
actually offset the vitamin deficiencies of the typically meager diets of the lower 
classes.103  This nutritive boost was especially important in the towns and cities where 
urban poor had to purchase, rather than farm, most of their food.104     
The Technology of Būẓa 
 While this chapter has discussed the social and cultural import of būẓa, it is the 
technical aspects of the production of the beverage that make it the quintessential 
alcoholic beverage of Egypt prior to 1880. Its artisanal production was generally 
reflective of all alcohol production prior to industrialization and can provide a 
counterpoint to the next chapter, which discusses this industrialization in depth. The 
source that best captures the process of būẓa production is al-Sanhuri’s al-Muskirat: 
Grains of durra (sorghum), millet, rice or the like are soaked for around 12 hours. 
They are placed in a hole filled with leaves, covered with more leaves and left 
there for two nights. On the morning of the third day they are removed and you 
should see that they have opened and sprouted similar to the way fava beans or 
fenugreek sprout. The sprouts are removed, dried, and ground up. Then you make 
a fine paste out of the flour of the grain (be it rice, durra, etc.) then sprinkle more 
of the flour made from the sprouted grain all over it. Place it into a good 
container, and keep the container in a dry place for two whole days. On the third 
day remove the cover and you should see the beginnings of fermentation. 
Dissolve the paste in the just the right amount of water so that mixture does not 
become too weak or thin. When the paste has soaked in the water put it through a 
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strainer made of palm leaves attached to a bag with a small opening and a wide 
base to get rid of the dregs (which will resemble the siftings of flour). Then close 
up the dough for five days in the winter, or three in the summer. This period will 
be enough to cause fermentation, which will look something like soap bubbles. 
The end result will be fragrant and bitter.105   
 
 As this recipe demonstrates, producing būẓa was an inherently artisanal process. 
First, every step could be performed with ingredients and materials that were readily 
available to most Egyptians. Another artisanal characteristic is that the recipe is 
composed of general guidelines rather than hard and fast rules; for example, the only 
specified value in the recipe is time (e.g. 12 hours, two whole days, etc.); otherwise, there 
are no concrete measurements. A third artisanal characteristic is that the explanations 
used to clarify ambiguous points draw upon traditional sources. For example, when 
discussing how to identify fermentation, the recipe notes that the process should produce 
soap-like bubbles. The best example of the artisanal nature of the recipe is its informal 
discussion of the primary ingredient, which, as the recipe notes, can really be any type of 
grain. This nonchalance regarding the primary ingredient gives further credence to my 
argument that when discussing cereal-based beverages, it is more prudent to treat them as 
a whole rather than trying to establish artificial boundaries among varieties like mizr, 
merīssa, and būẓa.   
 Even with the artisanal nature of the recipe, būẓa’s production still relied upon the 
process that is central to beer-making: fermentation, the conversion of sugar into CO2 and 
ethanol, the drinkable form of alcohol. Every stage of the recipe was aimed at drawing 
out the fermentable sugars from the grain so that they could be made into alcohol. The 
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first few steps, soaking the grain and leaving it in a covered hole until it sprouted, 
constituted a form of malting, which facilitated the breakdown of starch in the grain and 
the release of fermentable sugars.106  These malted grains were then baked, crushed up, 
and made into a paste. Baking the grains (called “kilning” in modern parlance) added 
flavors, while crushing them brought forth even more sugars.  Sealing the product and 
leaving it for two days began the fermentation process. Fermentation was then halted 
because there were still some complex carbohydrates in the grain that needed to be 
broken down into even more fermentable sugars.  The next step, dissolving the slightly 
fermented paste in water (analogous to the modern process of mashing), broke down 
these complex carbohydrates and produced the soupy, white paste that, when it was 
filtered and stored for three to five days depending on season, became būẓa.   
 What is most noteworthy about this recipe is that the only ingredients are grain and 
water. Two key ingredients that are missing from this recipe and whose presence would 
be the greatest differentiators between būẓa and modern beer are hops and yeast. Hops, as 
will be discussed later, is a plant that gives beer its flavor. Hops do not grow naturally in 
Egypt, so its exclusion seems inevitable. But the other ingredient, yeast, is today the 
essential actor in the fermentation process. In modern beer-making, this organism is most 
responsible for turning sugars into ethanol and CO2, and yet this ancient recipe makes no 
mention of the ingredient.   
 Despite the omission of yeast from the recipe, the recipe attests that fermentation 
did occur, so this recipe, like most būẓa recipes, must have relied on yeast. The most 
likely entrance point for yeast would have been when the grain was ground up. The 
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grinding of grain would have allowed the yeast living on the outside of the grain to enter 
the process. More importantly than when the yeast entered the equation, is the point that 
this recipe was entirely based upon a permeable process. By “permeable,” I mean that 
due to the nature of the machinery (earthenware containers, reed pipes, palm-leave filters, 
etc.) and techniques (hand-crafting, lack of sterilization and refrigeration, etc.) used in 
pre-industrial beverage production, foreign organisms and materials were bound to enter 
somewhere in the transition from raw materials to final product, just as materials essential 
to production were bound to exit. As I will show in the proceeding discussion, the 
permeability of the būẓa-making process was the essential feature of this product, and 
more broadly, was central to the production of alcoholic beverages in Egypt prior to the 
1880s. The above recipe cannot work if it does not allow the penetration of yeast. The 
permeability of the process not only made the product possible but also put the 
production into direct conflict with the technoscientific ideals that began to enter Egypt 
after the arrival of the French in 1798. 
 While the creation of būẓa depended on permeability, its role was not entirely 
salubrious. Because permeability was not selective, other organisms and materials could 
accompany the yeast as it entered the drink. This penetration had two effects: first, the 
outcome of the brewing process was not assured (certain organisms or materials could 
make the beverage undrinkable) and second, if the brewing was successful, the product 
would be maximally local, housing a flavor profile that was particular to the place where 
it was brewed. Both of these effects were counter to the “technoscientific” ideals of the 
Western world which, as On Barak details in his monograph On Time: Technology and 
Temporality in Modern Egypt, first entered Egypt in the nineteenth century and quickly 
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become guiding principals for the colonial project.107   
 The first effect of permeability was counter to these Western ideals because it 
injected an element of uncertainty that was anathema to an ideology that relied on order 
and predictability.108 Even if the būẓa-maker followed the directions to the letter, there 
was still the distinct possibility the drink would not come out the same.  The second 
effect of permeability also ran afoul of these ideals because it militated against the 
standardization of the product. As Barak notes, the pursuit of standardization, defined as 
“the perceived necessity of a correspondence between standard and example, and the 
continued pursuit of better theory” to achieve this result, was a crucial element of this 
technoscientific mindset.109  Indeed, as I will later discuss, one of the key steps in the 
development of any beer industry is companies’ ability to produce a standardized 
product. Heineken would not be Heineken if it could not produce its distinctive-tasting 
beer, which is so unlike other brands, consistently for every market. In the case of būẓa, 
not only did its taste vary depending on the locale, but the very base of the product could 
change, as the above recipe makes allowance for all types of cereal grains.    
Permeability of process was not limited strictly to būẓa production; it was also 
emblematic of all alcohol production in Egypt prior to the 1880s. Both araq (an anise-
flavored liquor made from dates) and wine were produced in a similar way. An excellent 
description of araq production comes from the Description de L’Egypte, a collection of 
the work of the savants who accompanied Napoleon on his expedition in Egypt between 
1798 and 1801: 
The dates are steeped in the water for forty days in winter, and for ten to fifteen in 
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the summer. They are then mixed with yensoun or anise, and the mixture is boiled 
for a half day. This mixture is then put into the still where distillation occurs… 
The liquor is very white and smells strongly of anise. Its quality is less than liquor 
made from wine.110 
 
This passage is not so much a recipe as it is a description of how the araq was made. 
Nevertheless, this description does communicate the non-technical nature of the 
beverage’s production. As with the būẓa recipe above, precise quantity measurements 
and temperatures are not specified. The time measurements are only recommendations, 
and they vary based on the season. Although the mention of the still may appear to 
indicate that this process was more technologically advanced than būẓa production, this 
was not really the case. The savants, taking special notice of the still, described it as 
follows:  
 
The still is made from earth and is of the greatest simplicity … it is in the shape of 
a bell and has a diameter of about eighteen inches by sixteen high. Its top is about 
fourteen inches, and the total height of the apparatus is between two and two and 
half feet. There is no furnace rather the still is placed on the ground atop of the 
fuel for the fire. Its tubes have been crudely fashioned from reed lutes. Instead of 
a pipe with the coil or condenser commonly used in our workshops, the vessel 
receiving the liquor is immersed in a bowl full of water. Cooling is thus a rather 
unscientific process, and loses a great deal of steam in the laboratory, if we can in 
any way compare the workshops of Cairo with distilleries France. In a country, 
which is considered the homeland of chemistry and is one of the first places to 
have written on this science, it is surprising to encounter such imperfect 
instruments and processes for a scientific art as old as distillation.111 
 
 Judging by the savants’ comments, which are couched heavily in an imperialist 
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rhetoric, they still appear to be very much in line with the technology used for creating 
būẓa. The still was an artisanal device fashioned out of materials that were as available to 
the sixteenth-century Egyptian as they were to nineteenth-century Egyptians. The 
artisanal nature of this technology made it adaptable across both time and space. As 
testament to this fact, another late nineteenth-century European visitor to the Sudan, 
Georg Schweinfurth (1874), observed a similar set of technology: “the apparatus for 
distilling consisted of a series of covered clay retorts, connected by tubes made of 
bamboo…”112      
 However, the French savants did not see this still as the marriage of technology and 
environment, but rather as an imperfect rendering of a science that the Egyptians should 
have known better to avoid. For the French, the most galling aspect of the būẓa-making 
process was the cooling stage that eschewed the “advanced” methods they used in their 
own stills. As the French noted, there was a critical loss of steam at this juncture. The key 
process of distillation is the vaporization and condensation of a primary fermented liquid 
(in this case the steeped dates mixture) to produce a liquor of great purity and high 
alcohol content. The loss of steam is significant, then, because it represents the loss of 
liquor that had yet to condense.  So again, the process of būẓa-making is permeable, but 
in this instance the French viewed the permeability (the loss of steam) as an affront to 
their scientific sensibilities because it was counter to the ideals of efficiency.  
 As On Barak so expertly argues in his book on the efficient use of time, efficiency 
was one of the pillars of the technoscientific enlightenment that the colonial project was 
supposed to bring to Egypt. Efficiency was believed to assure a more orderly society, 
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another important ideology of the colonial project in Egypt, as well as to enable the 
maximizing of profits.113 As On Barak notes, the efficient use of time was closely 
associated with the commodification of time, an idea best summarized by the Weberian 
ideal that “time equals money.”114 In the case of beverage production, an efficient 
method would be one that produces the maximal amount of end product (būẓa, araq, etc.) 
from the raw materials in a minimal amount of time.  
 As is obvious from the French savants’ detailed measurements of the still at the 
beginning of the passage, they were very much influenced by this technoscientific ideal. 
Given the value they placed on efficiency, it is no wonder that the French were so 
dismissive of the araq-making process. The variable amount of time required to steep the 
dates, as well as the fact that the process was measured in days rather than hours or 
minutes, was an affront to the efficient use of time. If the duration of the process could 
not be measured in distinct time units, then it would very difficult to build a concrete 
schedule for the sale of the product. Likewise, the leaky distillation system meant that 
every puff of smoke from the still represented the vaporization of profit.   
 As with the recipe for būẓa, it is obvious that any colonial power looking for 
efficiency would not have found it in the production of this araq beverage. As noted 
above, the entire process was framed in terms of a variable time scale that dealt in 
nonspecific units. At almost every step, the permeability of the process assured that 
outside organisms and materials would enter the beverage and that some of the beverage 
would also leave through the same permeable borders. Permeability represented 
unpredictability and non-standardization, and therefore it was antithetical to modern 
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Western capitalism, with its efficiency obsession.   
 While the French savants may have been galled by the backwardness of araq 
production, they surely were even more dispirited by the fact that even production of 
wine, a beverage near and dear to the French, was characterized by permeability in 
Egypt, as their description details: 
Having trod the grapes for one hour in a jar of cylindrical earth in the shape of a 
small chest, they are put into a large bag made of a very thick woolen cloth, which 
is wrung out and the juice of the raisins is placed into another jar that is similar to 
the first. The liquid is then allowed to ferment for eight to fifteen days. The liquid 
is then transferred to one of those great amphorae, which are used to transport oils 
of the Berbers, and this earthenware vase is buried almost to the neck and closed 
with a wooden plug sealed with plaster. Despite this precaution, the wine will not 
keep beyond a few months like ordinary vinegar.115⁠  
 
The production was low-tech and inherently small-scale. As the Description de L’Égypte 
also notes, wine production was limited almost exclusively to the Fayyoum, which had a 
long reputation for producing excellent wine. The timeframe for consumption was also 
quite limited. Under ideal conditions, when buried underground in a large container and 
sealed tightly, wine only lasted two months. Its shelf life was no doubt much shorter 
when transported, as, at the time, there was no method to refrigerate the wine as it 
travelled. 
The beverage’s limited timeframe is, again, associated with the permeability of 
the process. If the intrusion of foreign particles and the loss of the beverage were integral 
to the Egyptian brewing and distilling process, then it is only natural that spoilage, which 
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is the result of foreign organisms and materials entering a beverage, would also play into 
the process. Thus, all of these beverages prior to the introduction of refrigeration and 
improvements in the infrastructure were inherently ephemeral. This was especially the 
case with būẓa, which did not enjoy the same benefits of aging that a product like wine 
did. It was a beverage made to be drunk shortly after it was made. This intended 
ephemerality is further confirmed by the lack of hops in the būẓa production processes. 
Besides contributing to beer’s distinct flavor, hops are a preservative; its ability to 
preserve the beer was the reason it was introduced to the recipe in the first place.116 
The ephemerality of wine was truly counter to the technoscientific discourse, with 
its capitalist underpinnings, that came to Egypt in the nineteenth century. How could one 
sell a product that did not keep? The French savants clearly had these capitalistic notions 
in mind when they stated later in their assessment of Egyptian wine production that the 
country had both the high quality grapes and soil to excel in viticulture.117 This 
ephemerality should also temper any suspicion that the presence of guilds and numerous 
shops indicates that an alcoholic beverage industry was present in Egypt before 1880.118 
Yes, there were a significant number of merchants who made profits from the sale of 
alcoholic beverages; however, as I will show in subsequent chapters, in order for 
anything resembling a national industry to develop, a method for transporting the product 
across long distances must first be devised. 
As I have shown, the permeability of the production process was a key feature in 
the production of alcoholic beverages in Egypt prior to the 1880s. This permeability was, 
however, antithetical to the technoscientific discourse that the European colonial project 
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brought to Egypt in the nineteenth century. Whereas this technoscientific discourse 
privileged standardized products that could be reliably and efficiently produced, stored, 
and sold on the market, the alcohol products in Egypt prior to 1880 were unpredictable, 
inefficient, wildly variable, and inherently ephemeral. In the case of būẓa, the 
permeability of the process was essential to the beverage itself. If everything were sterile 
and hermetically sealed, that is if all the permeability were removed, the beverage would 
never come into existence because yeast would not be able to enter and ferment it. Būẓa 
was not a universal product that could be easily reproduced in all locales of the world, but 
rather a product that relied on the particularities of the locale in which it was produced. 
The method of būẓa production, which can be best termed artisanal, is emblematic 
of alcoholic beverage production in Egypt from Pharaonic times to the 1880s. The 
artisanal feature is what most distinguishes pre-1880 alcohol production from that which 
came after.  As I have shown, the production of an artisanal cereal-based beverage 
connected Egypt to its own past (Pharaonic, Hellenistic/Roman, Islamic, and Ottoman) as 
well as to an under-studied culture within and beyond its own borders (Sudani). Although 
this continuity of būẓa production could be used as evidence of the unchanging nature of 
the Global South before the arrival of the West, I rather view it as evidence of the power 
and adaptability of the artisanal method. As noted above, all one needed were water, 
grain, and palm leaves in order to produce a drink that was both intoxicating and 
nutritious. As I will discuss below, the cost of entry for producing a “modern” alcoholic 
drink was much higher. And while this modern product that was more predictable, 
standardized, and permanent, it arguably was also less firmly rooted in Egyptian history.  
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Chapter 3: Revolutionary Ferment: Importing the Modern Alcohol 
Industry into Egypt, 1882–1933 
 
 While there was a local culture of alcoholic beverage production and 
consumption in Egypt prior to 1882, this chapter will show that the alcoholic beverage 
businesses that appeared in the time period that followed, 1882 to 1933, were entirely 
different in scale, methods, goals, and technology. Whereas the earlier būẓa, wine, 
and arak businesses were overwhelmingly local, artisanal, and do-it-yourself 
operations, the alcoholic beverage businesses that appeared after 1882, aided by the 
colonial apparatus in Egypt, were industrialized ventures that aimed to use imported 
and cutting-edge technology to reach a large Egyptian market. To label these 
businesses as “imports” is not to deem them “foreign” or “unwanted,” but rather to 
recognize, as I will show, that they grew out of complex motives on the part of 
Europeans to bring an industrialized alcoholic beverage industry to the country and to 
spur a growth in demand for the beverage among the Egyptian population.    
 The European motivation to bring an industrialized alcoholic beverage sector 
to Egypt, as well the increasing local demand for one, grew out of the knotty concept 
of “modernity.” For the European brewers and the Egyptian industrialists who 
partnered with them, modernity was a short-hand term for the scientification and 
mechanization of the alcoholic beverage industry. Modernity stood in for the Western 
techno-scientific ideals of standardization, efficiency, order, and cleanliness, which 
were applied indiscriminately to the industry in Egypt.1 Likewise, modernity 
encompassed those methods and machinery that entrepreneurs, both Egyptian and 
European, insisted should replace the more “traditional” methods of production. In the 
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cultural realm, Egyptians viewed modernity as the set of behaviors, practices, and 
ideas that they had to adopt in order to “catch up” with the West. In practice, 
modernity became a performative act that involved Egyptians using new media, new 
social spaces, and new consumer goods to make “being modern observable and 
reproducible.”2 Although assumptions of Western superiority underlay these ideas of 
modernity, the efforts at modernization that Egyptians made—including the 
application of techno-scientific ideals, the implementation of new methods and 
machinery, and the adoption of “modern” habits and styles—were not frictionless 
processes. Rather, they were contested battles that ultimately produced a distinctive 
Egyptian modernity.    
 This chapter features a six-part analysis. The first three sections set the context 
for the arrival of a “modern” beer industry in Egypt by tracing the economic, 
technological, and cultural changes that preceded it. The first section examines the 
economic trends that made importing an alcoholic beverage industry into Egypt not 
only feasible, but also attractive. The second section discusses the technological 
trends that contributed to this feasibility. The third section looks at the cultural 
developments that made the alcoholic beverage industry a welcome addition in Egypt 
rather than a foreign imposition. Following these contextual discussions, the 
remaining three sections recount the actual arrival of the modern alcoholic beverage 
industry in Egypt. The fourth section looks at the companies that spearheaded the 
importation of the alcoholic beverage industry into Egypt and the methods they used 
to do so. The next section focuses on how two companies, the Pyramid and Crown 
Breweries, aimed to establish themselves in the country; the section focuses in 
particular on their technological challenges. The final section details the success of 
Pyramid and Crown Breweries in creating the foundations of a modern beer industry 
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in Egypt.  As this account shows, the companies that succeeded in the Egyptian 
alcoholic beverage industry were those that were able to adapt their methods and 
machinery to the particularities of the country.  
 
Economic Incentives 
 
While it is possible to overstate the impact on Egypt of the British Occupation 
of 1882, in the case of Egypt’s alcoholic beverage industry, the occupation was truly a 
seminal moment. The massive impact of this invasion can only be understood within 
the context of the events that led up to it. The British invasion of 1882 grew out of the 
Khedive Ismaʿil’s (1830–1895) push to transform Egypt into a “modern” state.3 For 
Ismaʿil, a modern state was one with greater control of its population. Building on the 
reforms of his grandfather, Mehmet Ali (1769–1849), Ismaʿil expanded Egypt’s 
police force, army, and bureaucracy. In addition, believing that a modern state was 
one that adopted the latest European cultural and technological advances, Ismaʿil 
invested in cultural landmarks (the Cairo Opera House, theatres, palaces), 
infrastructure (railways, telegraphs, etc.), and education, aiming to make Egypt the 
equal of the countries of Europe, with Cairo as his “Paris along the Nile.”4 These 
programs were funded primarily by loans from British and French banks, which were 
willing to offer easy credit because of the boom in Egyptian cotton prices in the 
1860s.5 However, the revenue the government was able to generate could not keep up 
with its loan payments, so in 1875 Egypt defaulted on its debt. In response to the debt 
crisis, the foreign creditors forced Ismaʿil to create the Caisse de la Dette, or the Debt 
Commission, which, through the heavy taxation of the Egyptian populace, aimed to 
pay off Egypt’s interest payments and amortize its debts.6 The harsh measures 
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provoked Egyptian unrest, which was partially stemmed by the removal of Ismaʿil in 
favor of Tawfiq (1879–1892). Nevertheless, a powerful movement soon coalesced 
around a charismatic colonel, Ahmed ʿUrabi, who led an open rebellion that engulfed 
the country between 1881 and 1882. The sustained success of the ʿUrabi revolution, 
with its anti-foreign message, raised the specter of non-repayment to such a level that 
in 1882 the British came to occupy Egypt.7  
The economic pretext of this invasion emboldened Evelyn Baring (later Lord 
Cromer, 1883–1907), the Controller-General of Egypt and the head of the British 
Commission there from 1883 to 1907, to enact a set of economic reforms that opened 
the Egyptian market up to global trends and forces.8  Before coming to Egypt, Lord 
Cromer, who was a member of the famous Baring banking family in England, had 
worked in British-controlled India and had restructured its economy quite 
successfully. Lord Cromer brought to Egypt the same policies that had worked in 
India: the elimination of customs, the substitution of direct taxes for indirect taxes, 
and the encouragement of private enterprise.9 These policies brought some stability to 
the Egyptian market, and together with Cromer’s courting of foreign investors, 
brought a boom of foreign investment in Egypt after 1893.10 Between the years 1897 
and 1903, the amount of foreign money invested in Egyptian companies doubled from 
twelve million LE to twenty-four million LE.11  It is within this boom of foreign 
investment that the Egyptian alcoholic beverage industry developed. 
Yet it was not only Cromer’s economic policies that drew the eye of foreign 
investors. Around the same time as Cromer was restructuring the Egyptian economy 
to be more outward-looking, a series of technological developments were taking place 
both within Egypt and abroad that had made the country an appealing market for 
investment. Perhaps the most significant internal development was the expansion of 
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the Egyptian infrastructure. Although the beginnings of Egyptian infrastructural 
development lay in the regimes of Mehmet Ali (ruled 1805–1848), who, among other 
things, instituted an Egyptian postal system, and Saʿid (1822–1863), under whom a 
209-kilometer railway line was installed between Cairo and Alexandria, it was under 
the reign of Khedive Ismaʿil (1830–1895) that the great Egyptian infrastructural 
expansion truly began. In Ismaʿil’s quest to place Egypt on par with European 
countries, he invested heavily in Egypt’s infrastructure. Arthur E. Crouchley estimates 
that during Ismaʿil’s reign, he spent around forty million Egyptian pounds on 
infrastructure, much of it borrowed on cotton credit.12 This investment proved 
fruitful; by 1877, “There were 1,519 kilometers of standard-gauge railways and 
13,500 kilometers of irrigation canals, many of them navigable throughout the 
year.”13 Ismaʿil was also Egypt’s greatest proponent of telegraphy. Under his rule, 
Egypt became a telegraphic hub connecting Europe and India through the Malta–
Alexandria cable, and connecting the Suez and Karachi through the Red Sea cable.14 
In 1865, Ismaʿil even expanded on the work of his grandfather, Mehmet Ali, when he 
bought the Poste Européenne, a postal service established by Europeans that 
connected Cairo, Alexandria, the Delta, and Upper Egypt.15  
Together with the Suez Canal, which had opened to traffic in 1869, these 
developments meant that Egypt now had an infrastructure that could not only handle 
the transport of humans and goods both within and abroad, but could also keep 
operations in Egypt connected to Europe. When the British arrived in 1882, they 
continued to work on this infrastructure. This work served a dual purpose: it was both 
a way to strengthen British control of the country by increasing Egypt’s connectivity 
to the British Empire, and also a way to implement the techno-scientific ideals that lay 
at the heart of their conceptions of a “modern” state.16 An example of this 
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commitment to building infrastructure is that between the years 1880 and 1907, the 
amount of cargo transported on the Egyptian rail lines increased from 1.145 million to 
nearly 4.2 million tons.17  This infrastructure development meant that established 
companies like Johnnie Walker (whisky, Scottish), Guinness (beer, Irish), and Otard 
(cognac, French) could not only bring their products to Egypt but could also distribute 
them throughout the country.  
 
Scientification of Brewing 
 
 While the economically friendly policies of Cromer and the development of an 
Egyptian infrastructure incentivized investment from foreign beverage companies, 
technological developments in the alcoholic beverage industry itself also made 
expanding into foreign markets desirable.18 This section discusses those technological 
advances in greater detail, showing how they contributed to making Egypt amenable 
to the importation of the foreign beer industry. The most important of the 
technological developments were the advances in microbiology and the study of 
yeast. European brewers and liquor-makers who came to Egypt in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries would have deemed the old recipe for būẓa at best 
“traditional” and at worse “backwards.” The recipe relied on the permeability of 
process, meaning that due to the nature of the machinery (earthenware containers, 
reed pipes, palm-leave filters, etc.) and techniques (hand-crafting, lack of sterilization 
and refrigeration, etc.) used in būẓa production, foreign organisms and materials were 
bound to enter somewhere in the transition from raw materials to final product, just as 
materials essential to production were bound to exit. The resulting product was 
inconsistent and uneven in quality. The permeability of the production process was no 
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longer inevitable once European scientists of the mid- to late-nineteenth century came 
to truly understand the process of fermentation and yeast’s role in it.19  
 The key figure in this discovery was Louis Pasteur (1822–1895), who 
conducted experiments with beer yeast in the 1860s from which he was able to 
confirm the essential role of yeast cells in the production of alcohol. Pasteur thus 
ended the controversy over the origins of fermentation.20 Pasteur’s impact on brewing 
went beyond elucidating the process of fermentation; his work with yeast became 
even more applicable to the beer industry in 1883, when Emil Christian Hansen 
(1842–1909), a scientist working at the Carlsberg Laboratory, which was run by the 
famous Carlsberg Brewery in Copenhagen, was able to grow a pure culture of yeast in 
the lab.  With this innovation, brewers now had full control of the fermentation 
process and could introduce a specifically chosen strain of yeast at the optimal 
juncture in the brewing process.21     
Pasteur’s experiments also provided strong support for germ theory, which 
stated that processes like fermentation and the spoilage of beverages like wine, beer, 
and milk did not happen spontaneously but rather were the result of micro-organisms 
entering somewhere in their production and storing processes.22 Based on this 
information, Pasteur developed a method, pasteurization, that involved heating a 
beverage to a certain temperature in order to remove the unwanted microorganisms 
that caused spoilage and illness.  Pasteur’s research had a massive impact on the 
scientific community and laid the groundwork for what would become modern 
microbiology. Most relevant for this study, Pasteur’s work with microorganisms 
transformed the permeability of the brewing process from an unavoidable feature into 
something that “modern” brewing had to avoid at all costs, and reasonably could 
avoid.  By showing that permeable boundaries would as often lead to spoiled 
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beverages as to drinkable ones, Pasteur’s work put a premium on closed and sterile 
processes.  
These scientific discoveries concerning fermentation and germs as the cause of 
spoilage changed the production of beer from a process filled with guesswork to one 
of the century’s most significant displays of the human ability to control nature. With 
this new sense of control, brewers of beer sought to improve other parts of the 
process, which had for so long relied on ideas passed from master craftsmen to 
apprentice.23 Thus discoveries in zymology (the study of fermentation) and 
microbiology inaugurated the scientification and mechanization of brewing.24  
Based on these discoveries, two new devices, the thermometer and the 
saccharometer (hydrometer), were soon introduced into the brewing process. The 
thermometer was vitally important because with their improved understanding of 
yeast, brewers were able to discover the ideal temperatures for fermentation and thus 
needed a device that could give them an accurate reading. Although devices to 
measure temperature had existed since the 17th century, it was only in the late 18th 
century that thermometers achieved an accuracy of 1/10°F, and it was only in the 
1880s that there appeared thermometers that used temperature-resistant glass, which 
assured an accurate reading.25  Not only could these brewers measure temperatures to 
maximize fermentation, but they also could control the strength (alcohol by volume, 
or “abv”) of their beers using the hydrometer (saccharometer). The latter was a 
“sealed glass tube weighed down with an amount of lead suitable to allow it to float 
within the density band of the relevant liquid. The tube ha[d] a narrow neck that 
protrude[d] from the liquid and allow[ed] a scale to be read at the meniscus of the 
liquid.”26  This hydrometer device enabled the brewer to measure the amount of 
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fermentable sugar in pre-fermented beer (called wort) and thus to determine, and alter, 
how strong the beer would be after fermentation. 
 In addition to these two instruments, another set of improvements that arose 
from discoveries in zymology and microbiology was the mechanization of certain 
processes. In the late 1800s, the malting of the grain, which was typically done in an 
oven, began to be carried out by a pneumatic system called the Saladin box.27 
Likewise, wort began to be filtered (also referred to as “lautered” in brewing parlance) 
by a mechanized sieve and transported between different stages of the brewing 
process through steam-powered mechanisms. The mechanization of malting and 
lautering were important, but the new ancillary technology that was most important to 
brewing and most exemplary of its mechanization was refrigeration. Refrigeration had 
an unquestioned centrality to the brewing process, as the ability to lower a beverage’s 
temperature manually and maintain that temperature was crucial to the production and 
preservation of beer.  The ties between the refrigeration industry and the beer industry 
were indeed very strong. Most beer companies, at least in their early years, 
specialized in refrigeration as much as in beer. As Mikael Hård has argued, brewing 
and refrigeration evolved together in the early years, with brewers being one of the 
main drivers of refrigeration innovation.28  
 A crucial advance in refrigeration came in the late nineteenth century, when 
Carl von Linde (1842–1934), an engineer financed by the Spaten brewery in Munich, 
Germany, invented a vapor-compression refrigeration system. This system used the 
basic thermodynamic concept that when a vapor is compressed, it releases heat, and 
when it is decompressed or evaporated, it draws in heat (and thus creates cold). By 
piping ammonia, with its properties of rapid expansion, through a system that both 
compressed and expanded it, Linde was able to create a refrigeration system that 
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became the industry standard and the forerunner to all modern-day refrigeration 
systems.29 Brewers used Linde’s system in two ways. The first application of this 
system was in the creation of ice. Exemplary of the fact that technological change was 
evolutionary rather than revolutionary, brewers kept their old methods of refrigerating 
but relied on ice that they made, rather than harvested. In this process, a block of man-
made ice was placed above a cellar and, depending on its size and proximity to the 
cellar, provided the desired cooling effect. This technique not only required minimal 
adjustment of methods, but also reduced one of the main carriers of foreign bodies, 
naturally harvested ice.30 The second technique was direct refrigeration, which is 
what we have come to consider the standard refrigeration procedure, cooling a space 
down to a certain temperature through direct contact with piping. However, this 
refrigeration system took awhile to catch on due to fears of permeability; most 
brewers feared that coolant, which was usually toxic or foul-tasting, would seep from 
the pipes into the beer.  
 The advances in yeast and microbiology not only had a positive effect on beer 
brewing, but on all liquor production. The key process of liquor production is the 
distillation of a low-alcohol fermented liquid (wash) into higher-alcohol liquor. For 
example, whisky is the distillation of a wash strikingly similar to beer. Thus, liquor 
producers underwent a similar process of scientification and mechanization, featuring 
the use of new tools (thermometer, hydrometer) and machinery (refrigeration and 
steel machinery). The best example of the scientification and mechanization of the 
liquor industry was the introduction of the patent or Coffey still in the mid-nineteenth 
century.31 The Coffey still was a continually operating system that could produce a 
much greater volume of liquor of a much greater purity in a much shorter time than 
other stills. 
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The scientification and mechanization of brewing and distilling allowed for 
the technological buildup of the industries, and in the process removed the artisan 
brewer and distiller as the main alcohol producers.32 Previously, in order to make a 
large amount of beer or liquor, a company required numerous brewers and distillers 
who had spent their lives learning the craft; now, however, one could produce a great 
deal of alcohol with just a few people who had mastered the science of beer or liquor 
making, supported by a host of interchangeable unskilled laborers. Likewise, in order 
for one to master the processes of brewing or distilling, one no longer had to work his 
way up the apprentice/artisan chain; instead, one went to schools that taught brewing 
and distilling sciences, whose curriculum included not only descriptions of how to 
make a product, but also discussion of the science that underlay it. The deemphasizing 
of the artisan brewer and distiller encouraged a growth in scale among beer and liquor 
manufacturers both domestically and abroad. The late-nineteenth century saw the rise 
of major world alcohol producers like Bass, Guinness, Heineken, and Johnnie 
Walker.33  As we will see later in this work, for a company like Heineken to start 
producing beer abroad, all it needed to do was select a few well-trained 
representatives who could be sent to a country to implement the processes of the 
home factory and assure quality control of the product.   
The scientification and mechanization of the brewing and distilling industries 
not only made these two industries more scalable and transferable, but also brought 
them in line with the techno-scientific ideals, discussed in the previous chapter, that 
essential to European conceptions of modernity. Both of these developments, 
scientification and mechanization, instilled order and predictability into the brewing 
and distilling processes, while making them more efficient and standardizable. The 
developments also eliminated the permeability of process that was a distinct feature of 
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būẓa production, but that was anathema to techno-scientific ideals. Brewers’ decision 
to start pasteurizing their beer was significant: while pasteurization eliminated all 
possible microorganisms, it could also cause the beer to become stale and flat.34 The 
sacrifice of flavor for preservation was the ultimate rejection of the permeability of 
process in favor of order and control.   
In essence, the scientification and mechanization of these two industries, beer 
and distilling, was tantamount to their modernization. Thus, the expansion of both 
industries into Egypt was heavily tied to their own modernization. The relationship 
between modernization and expansion was only natural because the sense of control 
that modernization gave to its brewers and distillers led them to believe they could 
transfer everything they knew about brewing and distilling to an entirely different 
geographic and cultural setting and still turn a profit.  As I will show in the next 
section, a different aspect of “modernity” reinforced this thinking by producing a 
large demand for “modern” beverages among the Egyptian population.   
 
Changing Tastes     
 While the technological advances described above made possible the 
importation of an alcoholic beverage industry into Egypt, this importation would have 
been fruitless were it not for a crucial cultural change in the population: a growing 
demand for alcoholic beverages. The origins of the sustained and durable growth of 
the alcoholic beverage industry in Egypt lay in the emergence of a new class, the 
effendiya, during the Mehmet Ali dynasty’s (of which Ismaʿil was a prominent 
member) quest to create a “modern” Egypt. The effendiya were a small group of “new 
men,” set apart from other Egyptians by their education, their Western manners and 
dress, and their worldviews.35 By the end of the nineteenth century, the effendiyya 
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came to represent a “new urban society, new social institutions, and new ways of 
life,” serving as engineers, doctors, lawyers, journalists, and political activists. The 
effendiyya included in their ranks the sons of the provincial elite who were on their 
path to the honorific titles of pasha or bey, as well as to full inclusion in the national 
hierarchy.36  
Members of this new secular elite, which subsumed much of the old elite 
through “effendification,” associated themselves with “modernity,” which to them 
was synonymous with their self-identification as secular, Western, and elite, as 
distinct from both from the non-elite masses and the traditional al-Azhar-trained 
hierarchy. As Keith Watenpaugh has shown, the effendiyya’s modernity was a 
performative act that involved the use of new media, new social spaces, and new 
consumer goods to make “being modern observable and reproducible.”37 Nancy 
Reynolds concurs, noting that consumer goods were an important way for Egyptians 
to craft their identity through participation in “commodity communities.”38  
In this context, alcohol served as an ideal commodity for the effendi to 
perform modernity because its consumption achieved a double effect: while linking 
its Egyptian drinker to the “modern” European, who drank on social occasions, 
alcohol also separated him from both non-elite and religious Egyptians, who viewed 
alcohol as socially suspect at best or as religious anathema at worst. As Emmanuel 
Akyeampong has shown in his study of drink in Ghana, alcohol can serve as an 
especially powerful tool for the ordering of society and the signaling of power.39 In 
the case of colonial Egypt, alcohol consumption represented the rejection of the 
traditionally trained al-Azhar shaykh in favor of the effendi.40 As Will Hanley has 
shown, alcohol continues to maintain this signification in the European-American 
academy, where its consumption among academics is equivalent to Middle Eastern 
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cosmopolitanism.41 In any case, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
effendiyya’s consumption of alcohol distanced them from most other Egyptians.  
Another group of drinkers whose consumption was shaped by the policies of 
the Mehmet Ali regime were the urban subalterns. Unlike the effendiyya, they were 
not the desired end product of a push for modernity but rather were an unforeseen 
outgrowth of the Mehmet Ali regime’s push for Egyptian urbanization. Between 1820 
and 1882, the populations of most of the major cities in Egypt saw significant growth 
due primarily to migration from the rural areas of Egypt.42 For example, Alexandria 
saw a ten percent growth rate from 1820 to 1846, as compared to the .04 percent 
growth rate of the total population. Mansura and Suez each grew at a rate double the 
rate of total population growth in the period from 1846 to 1882.43 Urbanization was 
thus slowly beginning in the period 1840 to 1882, with nearly 1.5 million people 
living in cities by 1882.  While some of these migrants were wealthy landowners, the 
great majority were fellahin looking to escape a hard rural life. For these new 
migrants, who had some taste for fermented beverages from their experience with 
būẓa, the consumption of alcohol did not signal a rejection of tradition, as it did for 
the effendiya, but rather was a potent signifier of “modern,” elite life.44 The best 
example of the aspirational power of alcohol for this class of Egyptians comes from 
the movie al-Suq al-Sawdaʾ (The Black Market, 1945).45 In this movie, one of 
Egyptian cinema’s first “realistic films,” a group of urban roughs makes a fortune on 
war profiteering. In their desire to reflect their new wealth, the gang is fitted with new 
Western dress and starts visiting cabarets to drink all night.46  
The processes that formed these two groups of drinkers, urbanization and 
“effendification,” only accelerated after the arrival of the British in 1882. As 
Mohammad A. Chaichian has pointed out, “One of the dominant and common 
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features of colonial domination is the concentration of commercial, administrative, 
and political institutions in a few localities for the purpose of reducing the costs of 
running the colony.”47 Egypt was no exception; fourteen cities saw growth greater 
than the total growth of the population in the first fifteen years of British rule in 
Egypt. Cairo, the imperial nerve center, saw the greatest growth in the period, with a 
growth rate of twelve percent compared to the 1.4 percent of the general population.48 
Overall, between 1882 and 1907, the urban population of Egypt increased by fifty 
percent.  Not only was there a significant population of British soldiers and officers in 
Cairo, but many local Egyptians also moved to the city to fill service jobs in the new 
imperial administration.49 Thus, thousands left the countryside for cities in the north, 
with Cairo and Alexandria being the premiere destinations.50 
Colonial rule aided the process of effendification. Under the British, an influx 
of foreign-born residents, who had few religious qualms about drinking, flooded the 
urban spaces of Egypt.51 As Robert Ilbert and Janet Abu-Lughod have shown, 
between 1897 and 1917, the foreign population grew at a significant rate, with the 
largest increase coming from Greeks, Italians, North Africans, Maltese, and Ottoman 
subjects.52 For example, in Cairo, between the years 1897 and 1907, the number of 
foreign residents nearly doubled, from 31,543 to 62,000.53  Cairo and Alexandria, 
because of their economic and political importance, proved to be the primary 
destinations of immigrants from Southern Europe and Greater Syria.  By 1907, 
“11.5% (75,000) of Cairo’s population and 17.6% of Alexandria’s population” were 
foreign-born.54  Demographically, these immigrants were overwhelmingly from the 
lower-middle classes and became quickly integrated into Egyptian society.  These 
foreign-born residents normalized the consumption of alcohol in the cities and also 
drove the alcohol business itself.  
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As a result of the demographic shift, there was a proliferation of spaces in 
which one could drink. While the exact number of places is unknown, by 1899, the 
British consul estimated that there were over four thousand establishments in Egypt 
that sold alcohol.55 The alcohol licenses issued in Cairo from 1891 to 1896 give a 
sense of the dynamics of the business. The records show that foreign protégés, 
especially Greeks and Italians, played a significant role in the proliferation of drinking 
spaces. For example, in the year 1893, Greeks and Italians comprised seventy-five 
percent of those receiving licenses to sell alcohol.56 As Alexander Kitroeff has shown, 
the predominance of Greeks and Italians was typical of the Egyptian economy in this 
era.57 Likewise, Relli Shechter has shown that the tobacco industry was a major 
employer of Greeks.58  
With the preponderance of Greeks and Italians in the distribution of alcohol in 
Egypt, it would be easy to dismiss the burgeoning Egyptian alcohol industry as a 
foreign imperial imposition. However, on closer inspection, the picture appears to be 
far more nuanced. When we shift our gaze from the managers of these establishments, 
who tended to receive the licenses, to their owners, there appears to have been a 
significant Egyptian contingent among the latter. For example, the British consul 
reported that of the 4,015 alcohol distributors in 1904, 2,257 were foreign and 1,758 
were local subjects.59 One of the most prominent owners of bars was the elite Jewish 
businessman Yusuf Qattawi Bey. The Qattawi family, alongside the Mosseris, led the 
Jewish community in Egypt from the 1880s to the 1920s.60 Yusuf Qattawi Bey played 
a significant role in the sugar industry, land reclamation, and Bank Misr.61 In the late 
1890s, he also owned eight separate establishments that sold spirits. These places, 
dispersed primarily in the Muski and Azbakiyya districts of Cairo, included bars (e.g., 
Crini Bar), cafés, restaurants, and even an ice cream shop.62  
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Economic involvement in the alcohol industry was not strictly the domain of 
non-Muslims. The British consul also reported that, in 1904, 385 of the alcohol 
distributors in Egypt were Muslim-owned.63 The records bear this out, with many of 
the Cairo licenses featuring Muslim names, some with honorifics like pasha and bey 
attached to them. One noteworthy example of a Muslim alcohol distributor was 
Mahmud Pasha Falaki, who owned three bars in the ʿAbdin district in Cairo. Even 
more noteworthy were three princes who held alcohol licenses: Prince Ibrahim Pasha, 
Prince Halim Pasha, and Prince Husayn Pasha. While these princes may not have 
been personally involved in the sale of alcohol, there is no denying that the properties 
of each of these royals housed a café or bar. One particularly illustrative example of 
such an establishment was the bar Bodega Nouvelle Avenue. Established in 1894, it 
sat on the property of Prince Halim Pasha, on Gamal Street in Azbakiyya, and was 
run by an Italian, Riccardo Belloni.64 As shown elsewhere, the royal family was not 
shy about profiting from the business of bars and taverns.65 
Who were the denizens of these drinking establishments? An answer lies in a 
stinging social critique of turn-of-the-century Egypt, Hadir al-Misriyyin aw Sirr al-
Taʾakhkhurihim (The Present State of the Egyptians, An Explanation of their 
Backwardness), written by Muhammad ʿUmar, a writer known only by this work and 
by his employment in the postal service. In this work, ʿUmar divides Egypt into three 
classes—the rich, the middle, and the poor—and then criticizes each for what he 
perceives as its failures.66 ʿUmar uses alcohol consumption as a key part of his 
critique. The houses of the rich, he asserts, are filled with “bottles of liquors” and 
stacks of wine barrels, which are proof of the group’s indolence, profligacy, and self-
indulgence.67 In the middle group, the youth spend all night drinking in the ever-
increasing number of bars, cafés, and dance clubs in Egypt, which represent the 
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insidious penetration of Western habits throughout the country.68 As for the poor, 
despite their indigence, they drink even more than rich, especially at religious 
festivals like mawlids (saints’ birthday celebrations). The poor people’s consumption 
is attributable to their ignorance and their prioritization of enjoyment and pleasure 
over all other values.69  
While Muhammad ʿUmar crafts a neat taxonomy of Egyptian drinkers, 
Ibrahim al-Muwaylihi’s (1846–1906) turn-of-the-century novel and social critique, 
Hadith ʿIsa ibn Hisham, presents a far more nuanced picture.70 The sections most 
pertinent to this study are those in which the two protagonists, ʿIsa ibn Hisham and 
the pasha, visit drinking establishments. His first stop is the “club” (klūb), where the 
grandees of the Egyptian state drink, bet, and gamble in a palatial multiroom house.71 
From there, he travels to four locations (a meeting hall, a restaurant, a tavern, and a 
dance hall) that fall within close vicinity of ʿAtaba Square, or as Ibn Hisham calls it, 
the “square of drunkenness” (saḥat al-sukr).72 Here the protagonists shift from Ibn 
Hisham and the pasha to the khaliʿ (playboy) and the ʿumda (village chief), a 
deliberate indictment of those most susceptible to alcohol. The playboy is a depiction 
of the new class of tarbush wearers (mutaṭarbishūn), the effendiyya, whereas the 
ʿumda, who owns a thousand feddans, represents the uncultured rural elite that was 
slowly integrating into the urban hierarchy and absorbing its cultural mores.73 In 
addition, the ʿumda stands in for rural migrants to the city, who are ignorant of urban 
custom and victimized by urban depredations.  
The first location to which Muwaylihi travels on his night of drinking and 
carousing, the meeting hall (mujtamaʿ), is rather upscale; it is renowned, located near 
the Opera House, and frequented by foreigners and tourists. The next stop is a 
restaurant located within a bar. It, too, is an upstanding location, serving food and 
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alcohol and notable for its “cleanliness, good service, and the prestige” of its 
customers.74 After stopping at a tavern (ḥān), which is given little description, the 
final stop on the night of drinking is the dance hall (marqas). This hall is a dank 
subterranean haunt choked by a foul miasma of sewage and sweat, in which degraded 
women dance and prostitute themselves to besotted men from all walks of life, 
including a policemen, an adjutant, a drunkard, a notable shaykh, and a provincial 
governor.  
While the first location, the meeting hall or club, is a bastion of the ruling 
elites and their scions, the other three locations, which vary in cleanliness and 
respectability, are home to a broader spectrum of Egyptians. This variegated milieu 
conforms to Reynolds’ depiction of Cairo as an “ever-melting” city, characterized, 
especially around these bustling squares, by the contiguity and propinquity of the 
foreign (ifrangī) and native (baladī).75 An ideal example of this “melting” is the 
prominent shaykh drinking in the filthy dance club. The shaykh’s presence 
undermines both dichotomies within the culture, the foreign/native and the 
elite/subaltern. The shaykh is at the same time foreign and native, elite and non-elite. 
Beer fit nicely into this milieu because of its generic similarity to būẓa, which made it 
also native and foreign, elite and non-elite.  
However, the fluidity of place and culture was strictly a male prerogative. 
While elite men could traverse societal boundaries and visit both the elite and 
subaltern drinking establishments, “respectable” women were limited to elite venues. 
In the only scene of Hadith ‘Isa ibn Hisham wherein women make a prolonged 
appearance, they are portrayed negatively. Ibn Hisham recounts how the most 
“beautiful” dancer in the club, as she dances, transforms “into the guise of a harpy 
appearing in a desert mirage, a ghoul grimacing and leaping around, or a bear 
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quivering and crawling.”76 Similar to the Egyptian social evaluation of female dancers 
and performers that Karin van Nieuwkerk details, Egyptian intellectuals perceived 
alcohol-consuming women first in terms of their gender and then as alcohol 
consumers.77 In al-Muwaylihi’s harsh rebuke of women in drinking clubs, we see a 
redefinition of femininity that helps to constitute a new effendi manhood.78 Thus in 
Hadith ʿIsa ibn Hisham, only low-status female dancers and prostitutes frequent 
drinking clubs. 
Despite this exclusion of women, many clubs did list a woman as their 
manager. For example, an Austrian protégé, Anne Fielder, was in charge of the 
Steinfeld Bar, founded in 1894 in Darb al-Mahabil in ʿAbdin. Women were not 
limited to managerial roles; they could also be owners. A good example is Caterina 
Bakesova, an Austro-Hungarian protégé who opened up the “Anglo-American Bar” in 
Harat al-Mudarrisin in Azbakiyya. While many of these owners were European 
protégés, with Austrian subjects featuring most prominently, Egyptian women, both 
Christian and Muslim, also served as owners. The lists of owners include names like 
Sayyida bint Muhammad al-Zakiyya, Jawhara bint Haslan, and Marie Bittar.79  
Arrival 
At the turn of the twentieth century, Egypt was fertile territory for the 
development of an alcoholic beverage industry. It had an indigenous drinking 
tradition among both the elite and the poor, an emerging class that saw alcohol as an 
ideal commodity through which to perform their identity, an explosion of urban social 
spaces where drinking would be acceptable, a centralizing and urbanizing population, 
and a modern infrastructure that could accommodate the bulk movement of 
manpower and goods. Unsurprisingly, the period from 1882 to 1923 witnessed the 
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foundation of a large number of businesses looking to succeed in the alcoholic 
beverage market.  
 Generally, these businesses took two forms: agents for established foreign 
brands and local limited liability companies that sold their own domestic products. 
Agents (Ar. wakīl, pl. wukalā’) were a common feature of the Egyptian economy in 
this period, serving as the primary means through which imported goods penetrated 
the country.80 The agent’s business model relied on a relationship with a multi-
national company, for which the agent served as the proxy in a market in which the 
agent had some expertise. The relationship was mutually beneficial; the agent was 
able to profit off the brand recognition and the backing of a multi-national company, 
while the company was able to use the agent’s local business connections and 
familiarity with the market to ease the penetration of a product into the market.  
 Multi-national beverage companies could have multiple agents in the country, 
but often they opted to make a certain merchant the sole agent (al-wakīl al-waḥīd), 
sometimes even granting the agent exclusive control of a brand’s trademark (ṣāḥib al-
imtiyāz al-waḥīd). One of the most prominent examples of this type of business 
relationship was John Walker and Sons Limited Company, which was the sole agent 
of Johnnie Walker whisky and had exclusive control of the trademark from 1911 until 
the 1950s.81 This trademark control meant that not only was John Walker and Sons in 
charge of distributing Johnnie Walker in the country, but the agent could also use the 
brand any way it saw fit. What this usually entailed was the use of the Johnnie Walker 
brand in a newspaper advertisement for their business.  
 An excellent example of such an advertisement, from a 1933 edition of the 
newspaper al-Ahram, displays the synergy between agent and multi-national 
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company.82 The top of the advertisement features, in English, the slogan, “Born 
1820—Still Going Strong,” which became a part of Johnnie Walker’s branding in 
1908. Next to the slogan is the iconic “Striding Man” logo, which was also created in 
1908 and became the defining symbol of Johnnie Walker.  Below that are two lines of 
Arabic text that read, “All whiskies look the same, and that is dangerous. For your 
health and safety, order Johnnie Walker.” Below the Arabic is the Johnnie Walker 
name in English and another slogan, in English, that is in dialogue with the Arabic 
above. It states why a patron should choose Johnnie Walker: “Guaranteed same 
quality all over the world.” The bottom of the advertisement then states in Arabic, 
“Walker and Vallois in Cairo; sole agents in Egypt, Palestine, and Syria.” Overall, the 
advertisement has a distinct collage aesthetic.  The parts in English and the “Striding 
Man” appear to have been lifted from another advertisement and then surrounded with 
Arabic text in dialogue with the English. The bricolage approach, combining Egyptian 
and foreign elements, tells us something about the imagined consumers of Johnnie 
Walker in Egypt and about the people advertising the product. The Arabic message—
“since all whiskies, both high-quality and inferior, look alike, you must choose the 
brand that guarantees quality, i.e. Johnnie Walker”—combined with images and 
slogans lifted from English advertisements signals that the target consumer base 
valued the foreign but still needed a message grounded in Egyptian culture. For the 
advertisers, this bricolage was an easy and inexpensive way to trade on the product’s 
foreign and exotic appeal and tailor their message to the desired audience.  
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 Unlike John Walker and Sons, most registered importers could not afford to 
limit themselves to one product, and instead had to serve as agent for multiple brands. 
One notable instance was the company K. Bursa. With branches in Alexandria, Port 
Said, the Suez, and Khartoum, K. Bursa had a large portfolio of brands primarily from 
Italy. They had control of the trademark for Fernet Branca (Fernet, Italy), Fusani 
Chianti (Italy), and Gioconda and Nocera Umbra (mineral water, Italy). Most 
interestingly, they also had the trademark for Haig whisky (Scotland). K. Bursa’s 
focus on a series of brands from one country, Italy, made a great deal of economic 
sense because this focus allowed them to provide a diverse set of products while 
limiting transport costs. This method of diversification was especially popular for 
companies dealing with alcoholic beverages from France, as an agent could sell wine, 
champagne, and brandy. 
 As should be obvious from the names of the companies, these import agencies 
were a very popular business venture for imperial protégés, that is, local residents 
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with legal affiliation with one of the imperial powers. In fact, a few of the agents for 
foreign alcohol companies included the title al-khawāja (foreigner) in their names. 
For example, in an advertisement for McNish’s Special scotch whisky, the sole agents 
of the product are listed as the “foreigners” Joel and Henry Floran.83  It is not 
surprising that foreign companies making their first entry in a country would choose 
to work with people who had a linguistic, if not cultural, familiarity with Europe. 
Likewise, it is not surprising that protégés and foreign entrepreneurs would have an 
inclination for working with a European-based multi-national. The agent/importing 
businesses were the lifeblood of the early Egyptian alcohol industry; they dominated 
the sector from before the British arrived in 1882 into the 1910s. For example, as 
early as 1839, agents were bringing beer into the country.84  
 The first local alcohol business also preceded the British Occupation, as the 
Da’ira Saniyya sugar refinery started making alcohol in 1879. They had six Upper 
Egypt outposts in Biba, Mataya, Maghagha, Minia, Abu Qurqas, and Rawda, which 
made rum from their excess molasses.85  However, the amount of alcohol that Da’ira 
Saniyya produced was far outpaced by the amount of alcohol imported into the 
country. One of the biggest reasons for this was that the duty on alcohol coming into 
Egypt was quite small at the time, especially in comparison with European duties on 
imported alcohol.86  For Da’ira Saniyya, this importation meant that it was only 
profitable to dedicate a small portion of its molasses to making its own alcohol.   
 The first large-scale attempt to profit from the sale of alcohol produced in 
Egypt was headed by the Volanakis family, who established the Bolonachi distillery 
in Alexandria in 1884.  Zottos and Co., founded by Andreas Zottos in 1890, soon 
joined the Bolonachi distillery in the alcohol market, as did the Cozzika Brothers, 
who opened their distillery in Tura in 1892. The most noticeable aspect of all of these 
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ventures is that they were headed by Greeks. This involvement was emblematic of 
greater trends in the Greek community in Egypt, who served as pioneers in many of 
the country’s early consumer goods industries. For example, Greeks established 
Egypt’s first chocolate factory in 1908.87  As evidenced by the discussion of bars 
above, Greeks were also heavily involved in the distribution of alcohol. It only makes 
sense, then, that some of these Greeks would attempt to enter the production side of 
the industry as well.  
 Most of these Greek alcohol producers started as agents/importers and used 
the money made from these ventures to invest in the technological infrastructure 
required to produce alcohol in Egypt. The Cozzikas, for example, continued importing 
alcohol even as they started producing their own.88 The blurred line between 
importer/producer was quite common in the beverage industry; two of the most 
famous aerated water companies, Spathis and McDonald, also had their start in 
importing products from Europe. This blurred line was also necessary because starting 
out as an alcohol producer in Egypt was fraught with difficulties. The Cozzikas’ first 
year in Egypt was, as they themselves admitted, a “disaster” and almost killed the 
project before it got off the ground.89 However, with the funds from the import and 
sale of foreign alcohols, the distillery was able to survive and reinvest in its 
infrastructure. The company replaced its machinery and buildings with those that 
combined “all of the known improvements of the day.”90  As a result, they were able 
to produce, in their state-of-the-art Coffey still, alcohol of 95 to 96% abv, which was 
an improvement over the previous technology that topped out at 95% abv. The 
reinvestment in their own infrastructure, coupled with the sugar industry’s [increased] 
production of molasses, allowed the Cozzika distillery to go from producing 350,000 
kilograms of alcohol in 1892–3 to producing more than seven million kilograms in 
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1913. Meanwhile, the amount of imported liquor that Cozzika was selling fell to 
700,000 kilograms in 1913.91 
 The alcohol produced and sold by Cozzika was mainly rectified alcohol. 
While it could be used to make alcoholic beverages (especially blended whiskies and 
brandies), it also was used to make medical tinctures and solvents. Cozzika’s primary 
concern was producing alcohol cheaply and efficiently. That is why they were willing 
to invest in new infrastructure to produce an alcohol that was only slightly higher in 
abv than prior versions.  
 On the other hand, the Bolonachi distillery was a business geared to sell 
various types of liquor to the public, and thus was maximally concerned with the 
palatability of their beverages. In the first decades after being founded in 1884 in 
Alexandria, Bolonachi’s prime product was brandy, and its main consumers were 
abroad, primarily in England. Although Bolonachi was a new brand, it made inroads 
into the British market because of “its taste and the purity of its materials.”92  The 
company eventually penetrated the domestic market by offering a new type of brandy, 
carrying the designation of V.O. (Very Old), that maintained a certain level of quality 
but carried a better price than all of its competitors.93 Bolonachi not only produced 
brandy, but rum and whisky as well.  The company made its rum using local sugar 
cane and the Jamaican system of rum distillation.94 The main particularity of 
Jamaican rum-making was the use of the dunder, the yeast-rich foam left over when 
sugar cane was fermented, in order to ferment new sugar cane. Regardless of the 
product sold, Bolonachi had found a winning formula for the alcoholic beverage 
business in Egypt, using cutting-edge technological practices to exploit the local 
advantages of the Egyptian market: primarily cheap labor, plentiful water, and a 
thirsty population. Bolonachi would thus become one of the pillars of the industy, and 
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their product, Bolonachi Brandy, would sit with Stella Beer as one of Egypt’s 
distinctive alcoholic beverages.    
Pyramid and Crown 
 
 The Greeks were not the only ones to see opportunity in the alcoholic 
beverage business in Egypt.  On May 15, 1897, a group of Belgian investors, led by 
Albert Heyndrickx, founded the Crown Brewery of Alexandria in Belgium, with a 
capitalization of one million francs. They built a factory in the Ibrahimia district of 
Alexandria, where the company had instant success. After that, the board decided to 
open another brewery in Cairo to exploit that city’s larger market.95 In 1898, the 
board opened Société Anonyme Brasserie des Pyramides (Pyramid Brewery), which 
had a factory on the outskirts of the city and an initial capitalization of 1.5 million 
francs.  These two breweries, the Crown and Pyramid breweries, contrasted with 
Vottos and Bolonachi in that they were transnational ventures, with all of the capital 
and some of the leadership coming from abroad, while local protégés and business-
minded Egyptians oversaw the daily management and functioning. 
The lead investors in the Crown and Pyramid breweries were part of a larger 
influx of Belgian investors and industrialists into Egypt; no fewer than thirty Belgian 
companies were founded in Egypt in the period between 1897 and 1907.96 This 
Belgian penetration of the Egyptian economy was emblematic of the massive inflow 
of foreign capital into Egypt after the arrival of the British, which is discussed 
above.97  These foreign investors chose to establish a brewery because the beer 
market in Belgium was too fractured to support a new large-scale brewer; this meant 
that they had to look abroad for hopes of greater growth.98 Thus, the two beer 
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companies were the byproduct of trends in both Belgian brewing and Belgian 
economics in the late nineteenth century.  
Although the Crown and Pyramid breweries were located in Egypt, they were 
transnational. The directorate of both companies was split between Alexandria and 
Brussels, where the head offices were located.  Two members of the five-person 
board for Crown brewery and three members of the seven-person board for Pyramid 
lived in Brussels, while the rest, who were a mix of Egyptian citizens and foreign 
protégés, maintained operations in Egypt. The transnational character of the 
directorate was due to the small size of the Belgian community relative to other 
foreign communities like the French and the British.99 In order to maintain a strong 
business presence in Egypt, much of the financing and direction had to come from the 
metropole; many Belgian firms were tied closely to large metropolitan banking and 
holding companies in Brussels.100  
 The relatively small size of the Belgian community in Egypt also necessitated 
that Belgian businessmen rely on the business group model, a model where a group of 
companies from different sectors and in different countries were under the control of a 
small, unified directorate. Perhaps the most famous group of companies was the 
Groupe Empain, which was led by Baron Edouard Empain, the man who built the 
Paris metro. His group consisted of Andre Bertholet, the French architect and designer 
of the Paris Metro; Henri Urban, a member of the board of the Chemin de Fer 
Économique and a director of companies that had established trams in Turin, Odessa, 
Naples, and Russia; and Jean Jadot, an engineer who specialized in light railways. 
This group acquired the concession for the Cairo tramway and developed an upscale 
residential neighborhood in Cairo, called Heliopolis. The Lambert-Rolin group, 
headed by the prominent Belgian glassmaker Florent Lambert, based in Brussels, was 
 
99 
another example of this model. This group included the Pyramid Brewery, as well as 
the Anglo-Belgian Company Limited of Egypt, the British Tropical Africa Company 
(which worked in the Congo), a railway company, a tramway company, a cement 
company, and even a company in charge of maintaining gardens in Cairo.101  
 Although a large portion of both companies’ leadership was located in 
Belgium, both companies utilized Belgians living in Egypt and powerful members of 
the Egyptian business elites. One board member of the Crown Brewery, Georges 
Nungovich, a Belgian national and major hotelier, was on the advisory board and 
board of directors of two other companies and the owner of the Georges Nungovich 
Egyptian Hotel Company.102 Another local Belgian member, A.L. Gorra, was on the 
board of directors of three other companies. As for local Egyptians, the presidents of 
both companies were Egyptians from the Pasha class: Khalil Khayyat Pasha (Crown 
Brewery) and J.G. Chakour (Shakur) Pasha (Pyramid Brewery). Each man had 
important positions in other joint-stock companies as well. Khalil Khayyat Pasha was 
a director in the Société Égyptienne de Tabacs, the Egyptian Land investment 
company, the North Egypt Land Company Limited, and the sole director of the 
limited liability company of Tambeki Monopoly Co.103 Shakur Pasha, meanwhile, 
was the managing director of Société Anonyme des Ciments d’Égypte and the 
Chairman of the Menzaleh Canal and Navigation Company.104 These two 
businessmen were early examples of the native oligarchs who would come to 
dominate the Egyptian economy in the late 1930s and early 1940s. 
 Despite the Greeks not being heavily involved in the financing and leadership 
of these two companies, they still played a significant role in their operations in 
Egypt. Two Greeks, M.M. Miltiade and Henri Klonaridis, used their local connections 
to help the Belgium entrepreneurs found Crown Brewery in 1897. Their role was so 
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significant that Anthanse Politis incorrectly cited them as the founders of the Crown 
Brewery, thus crediting them with being the originators of the beer industry in 
Egypt.105 As I have shown, it was not the native Greeks but foreign entrepreneurs 
who, using local intermediaries and transnational business connections, believed they 
could build modern alcohol industries in Egypt. 
Establishment 
The men who founded and led the Crown and Pyramid breweries strongly 
believed in the superiority of the “modern” over the “traditional.” Thus, when they 
established these breweries, they were insistent on bringing to Egypt the 
scientification and mechanization that was, as I discussed above, taking place across 
Europe in the late nineteenth century. What this meant in practical terms was that 
these breweries charged their brewing operations to men trained in some of the most 
important beer-brewing countries in Europe. Crown employed a German brewer, 
Alfred Weber, and Pyramid employed a Czech brewer, Jan Krècek.106 These brewers 
aimed to replace the permeability that was so distinctive to the būẓa process with 
“total control”—the assumption, often misguided and hubristic, that through the 
assiduous application of the most current technologies, brewers could produce a 
standardized and sturdy product in a timely and cost-efficient manner. This sense of 
control was especially important in a market like Egypt, which, in the eyes of these 
entrepreneurs, had not yet been fully modernized.  
So what did completely controlled brewing look like? It started with the 
malted barley, which was imported to Egypt from Czechoslovakia. Barley was malted 
by soaking the grain in water about two days; then, the grains were exposed to moist 
air, at about 15°C (60°F), and allowed to germinate. This germination started to break 
down the starches and proteins in the barley into fermentable sugars. The barley was 
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then dried or kilned at 40°C (100°F) to arrest the breakdown of its starches and 
proteins.107 Because malting is one of the key processes for establishing a beer’s 
flavor, these breweries only used imported barley from the fields of Moravia that had 
been malted by the best malt makers in Czechoslovakia.108  
Using the imported malted barley, the Egyptian breweries would start the 
brewing process proper, which included crushing, mashing, boiling, lautering, 
cooling, fermenting, and storing. First, crushing the malted barley separated the 
outside of the barley, the insoluble husk, from the interior of the barley, the germ.  
Then, mashing broke down the starch in the barley into fermentable sugars. Mashing 
could take two forms, infusion or decoction. Infusion meant soaking the barley in 
water at 65°C (150°F) in the same way one soaks tealeaves to make tea. Decoction, 
on the other hand, involved separating out part of the malted barley and water and 
bringing it to a boil at 100°C (212°F). This boiled mixture was then returned to the 
rest of the water and barley and allowed to infuse. Regardless of which method the 
breweries chose, mashing was subject to total control; it occurred in a mash tun, 
imported from Belgium, that was made of sterile copper. The mashing stage was 
when the second raw material, water, was introduced. Unsurprisingly, the breweries 
were particular about their water. The Pyramid Brewery thought that the water of the 
Nile was unsuitable for any of their products and drew their water from artesian wells 
that the company owned.109  
After mashing, lautering removed the husks of the malted barley that had been 
separated out by crushing. This step represented a vital difference between beer and 
būẓa, as the husk was what gave būẓa its gruel-like texture. The sugar-filled mixture 
remaining after lautering, called wort, was then boiled for forty-five to ninety 
minutes, and hops were then added. The hopping of the wort was another key 
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difference between beer and būẓa, and it had a significant impact on the beer’s taste 
(adding the distinctive bitterness), consistency (helping to precipitate any remaining 
proteins), and shelf life (making it more durable).110 The breweries imported the hops 
from the choicest harvests in Bohemia, a place known for its hop-making, and stored 
the hops a refrigerated room to preserve their taste and aroma until they were ready 
for use.111 
 While the beer-making process up to this point may seem quite similar to the 
būẓa-making process, the next three steps truly differentiated the two beverages. The 
breweries had to cool the hot and hopped wort to a temperature of either 7°C (40°F) 
or 15°C (60°F) and then add the yeast, which was a proprietary strain owned and 
perfected by the brewery. The strain had a significant impact on the beer, and thus a 
good strain of yeast was a precious commodity. The choice in temperature also had a 
significant impact on the product. A lower temperature allowed for bottom-
fermentation, meaning that the yeast that sank to the bottom of the beer carried out 
most of the fermentation, while a higher temperature assured top-fermentation, where 
the yeast at the top did most of the work.112 These two types of fermentation produced 
different types of beer: bottom-fermentation produced lagers and top-fermentation 
produced ales. 
 If the brewery was making a top-fermented beer, it would allow the yeast to 
ferment the wort for a couple of days (two to seven) at a temperature ranging from 
15°C to 24°C (60°F–78°F) and then store it for less than a week at 7°C (45°F). It 
would then have its final product, an ale.113 If the brewery was making a lager, on the 
other hand, the beer had to be stored for eight days at 7° to 13°C (45°–55°F) to allow 
primary fermentation to occur. After those eight days, bottom fermentation would 
start, and the brewery would have to store the beer for around three months at 1°C 
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(34°F). Fittingly, the name “lager” was derived from the German word meaning “to 
store.”114   
 This entire process, from mashing to storing, could not have been done 
without the instruments (thermometer, saccharometer) and technologies (Saladin 
boxes, mechanized sieves, ice machines, cooling vats, copper piping, etc.) discussed 
above, which were the tangible results of the scientification and mechanization of the 
beer industry in late nineteenth-century Europe. The breweries, on their arrival in 
Cairo, imported the top-of-the-line varieties of all of these materials from Belgium 
and housed them in factories that were kept in impeccable shape.115  
Despite the breweries’ commitment to “modern” brewing, their early days 
were trying. The Cairo operation, which was still under the control of Crown 
Brewery, soon ran into financial trouble because of poor management and over-
expansion. The company would have dissolved were it not for the intervention of 
another group of Belgian investors, the Lambert-Rolin group, in 1904, which 
addressed the brewery’s financial problems through the amortization of debts and the 
selling of assets and stocks.116 This over-expansion was caused by the fact that 
beyond the initial successes, the breweries faced a problem: Egyptians who were 
drinking beer were more likely to choose imported varieties from well-established 
brewing nations like Germany or Austria, rather than Egyptian brands.117 The 
fledgling beer industry was also hurt in these early years by the Egyptian government, 
which did not place significant duties on imported beer and thus eliminated one of the 
main advantages that local companies might have had.118 
 Soon after the breweries’ founding, they would face another major hurdle, the 
stock market crash of 1907. The crash was a direct result of the influx of foreign 
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capital into the Egyptian stock market between 1898 and 1906. Typical of an 
economic bubble, a speculative fever overtook Egypt in 1905 and 1906 as, according 
to Roger Owen, “Land companies sold land for very little deposits, banks lent 
liberally on shares…second or even third mortgages could be readily obtained.”119 
The inevitable “market correction” came when the American market dipped and 
wreaked havoc in the Egyptian economy. The most visible effect of the crash was that 
it wiped out many of the firms founded during the boom.  The number of cases for 
bankruptcies in the courts rose from 310 in 1907, to 520 in 1908, and to 546 in 
1910.120 Egypt did not truly recover from this market correction until after World War 
I. Despite the general gloom of the economic scene in Egypt, both of the beer 
companies survived. Their survival was due in part to the profitability of the 
breweries despite, or perhaps because of, the economic downturn. The fact that 
another set of Belgians founded a beer company in 1909, Société Anonyme de Belge 
Brasserie d’Égypte (Belgian Brewing Company), is indicative of this counterintuitive 
profitability.121   
 Like the brewery Cozzika, which had to rely on imports, and Bolonachi, 
which relied on the British market, the Crown and Pyramid breweries were able to 
survive and thrive amidst the economic downturn by generating revenue streams 
beyond the sale of domestically produced alcohol. The sale of malt and ice, two 
products essential to beer but which also had a market on their own in Egypt, proved 
to be lucrative enough to keep the businesses afloat. Malt could be used to make 
vinegar and other food products for animals and humans, while ice was the primary 
way things were refrigerated in this era, so both remained viable products. Through 
these alternative revenue sources, the breweries were able to weather the storm and 
maintain profitability until the beer business truly took off during World War I.122  
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 World War I was vital to the establishment of the Egyptian beer industry 
because it cut Egypt off from the global economy that Lord Cromer had worked so 
hard to bring the country in line with. Although the temporary isolation of Egypt 
provided a terrible shock to its economy overall and to those companies that were 
heavily supported by foreign capital and goods, for local producers the isolation 
provided the protection from foreign brands that the government would not.123 Those 
companies that had survived the prewar economic downturn, including the two beer 
companies, were able to reinvest in their infrastructure to better adapt to the local 
market. Adaptation was necessary because despite the industrialists’ assumption of 
the superiority of the modern over the traditional, the establishment of a modern beer 
industry in Egypt was not a frictionless process.  
The most obvious example of breweries’ adaptation comes from the 
refrigeration machinery that the companies used after World War I. Recognizing that 
the Egyptian environment was harsher than they imagined, the companies invested in 
and expanded their cellars so that they could house a greater amount of beer.124 
Likewise, they used several methods for cooling or refrigerating their beer: they kept 
some beer in casks in their cellar, some beer in tanks made of enameled iron also in 
the cellar, and some in vats armed with a system of internal refrigeration.125 The 
juxtaposition of these three methods represented the reality of technologic change in 
Egypt.   While all of these technologies were imported, each represented a different 
phase of brewing. Casks were a quintessential feature of pre-mechanized brewing, 
cooling vats were a feature of the introductory phase of mechanized brewing, and the 
internally refrigerated vat was a hallmark of the latest innovations in brewing.    
As several scholars have shown, despite the typical assumption that the arrival 
of new technology or ideas would immediately replace the old ideas, the reality was 
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that technologies tended to agglomerate and exist simultaneously until older 
technology was slowly phased out, if at all.126 This agglomeration occurred in Europe 
and America because of the long-standing traditions of brewing that made brewers 
hesitant to abandon older technologies. In Egypt, this agglomeration represented the 
confluence of the total control tradition with the realities of the Egyptian market. If 
the ideology of total control had worked, then there would only have been the need 
for one type of cooling, but the fact that three remained in use indicates that despite 
the rhetoric of insuperable modernity, Egypt presented numerous challenges to these 
companies.  
We also see this confluence in the case of the raw materials used to make the 
beer. Although originally the breweries limited themselves to using imported malted 
barley, locally grown rice eventually became an important part of their beer recipe. 
Cooked rice was added to the malted barley before mashing and served as a filler to 
make the breweries’ supplies of malted barley last longer.127 This transition was only 
logical, as Egypt was a significant producer of rice; its use in lieu of imported malted 
barely was an easy way to lower overhead without drastically affecting the beer.  A 
similar process occurred with the water that the breweries used. Originally they 
deemed Nile water as unsatisfactory for their beer production; however, these 
companies eventually had to face the reality that Nile water was the only consistent 
source of water in the country, and to avoid using it was simply poor business. 
Nevertheless, the idea of total control persisted as the breweries insisted on analyzing 
the Nile water before every round of brewing, sending samples to major European 
laboratories so they could deem it fit for making beer.128 Thus we see that even after 
adapting to the realities of selling in the Egyptian market, the foreign entrepreneurs 
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behind the beer industry did not abandon their commitment to the techno-scientific 
ideals of “modernization” 
Success 
World War I marked the full-fledged establishment of the two breweries in 
Egypt. After this point, Crown and Pyramid would remain profitable until their 
nationalization by the Nasser-led government in the 1960s. As I will show in this 
section, it was in this post World War I period that these two breweries would come 
to find a formula of success for selling beer in the Egyptian market. This formula 
involved adapting their methods and machinery to the particularities of the country 
and establishing a partnership based upon the division of the Egyptian market in two 
autonomous, but linked, sales regions. 
 Immediately after World War I, the companies’ beer production grew from 
the prewar level of around 40,000 hectoliters per year to 71,000 hectoliters per year in 
the period from 1923 to 1929.129 These levels of production not only made the 
breweries economic powerhouses in Egypt, but some of the largest bottled beer 
producers in Africa.  
Although Egypt was a Muslim country, its beer industry was well in advance 
of most other colonies in Africa due to the regulations imposed by colonial powers. 
Starting with the Brussels Act of 1890, and strengthened with the League of Nation 
Treaty Series, colonial powers including Britain, France, Belgium, and Italy had 
prohibited “the importation, distribution, sale, and possession of trade spirits of every 
kind” in the continent of Africa.130 These ordinances grew out of the infantilizing 
discourse that was used to justify the colonial presence in Africa.131 However, Egypt 
and the rest of North Africa were spared this paternalism.132 While this regulation 
stymied the creation of any large-scale native brewing ventures in other African 
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countries, Egypt remained unencumbered. Thus it would take until the 1920s (Kenya 
Brewers Limited) and later (Nigerian Brewing Limited, 1946) for ventures on the 
scale of Crown and Pyramid to appear in other African countries.133  
In Egypt, the beer companies did so well that the capitalization of Pyramid 
Brewery placed it in the top twelve best-funded companies in Egypt at the time.134 As 
I will show, this sustained postwar success had a great deal to do with the fact that 
after World War I the breweries came upon a successful strategy for exploiting the 
major markets of Egypt. This strategy would become the standard practice of Crown 
and Pyramid from this point forward.  
Despite the profitability of the beer industry, it was in flux after World War I. 
The entrance of two enterprising Swiss brothers, Walter and Curt Bomonti, who had 
founded the first brewery on the European side of Istanbul in 1890, had significantly 
altered the beer market in Egypt.135  They had become familiar with intricacies of the 
beer industry in Egypt through their work supplying beer to the Navy and Army 
Canteen Board of the British occupying forces.136 They made their first foray into the 
Egyptian market with a brewery/rice mill built in Alexandria under the name 
“Bomonti Brothers.”  Their venture was so successful that in 1923 they were able to 
buy and consolidate Pyramid Brewery, Belgian Brewing, and their own beer company 
into a new entity named Société Anonyme Biéres Bomonti et Pyramides (henceforth 
Bomonti-Pyramid).137 Although the brewery came to bear their names, the Bomontis 
resided in Bern rather than Cairo. Another member of the new board, Jacques Ruch, 
lived in Zurich. Rudolph Jost, a Swiss citizen who lived in Alexandria, represented 
the Swiss industrialists at the meetings with the rest of the board, composed of two 
British protégés, a Greek protégé, and another Swiss citizen living in Alexandria. 
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 While the Bomontis took control of Pyramid, Crown remained locally owned. 
After its founding in 1897, Crown had gone through several chairmen. After Khalil 
Khayyat Pasha, a British protégé named Edward Crewe was the head of the company 
until 1925. After 1925, Charles Cantoni, whose father had been in the retinue of 
Kaiser Wilhelm II (r.1888–1918) took over and would chair the company until 
1932.138  Although Cantoni was the chairman of the board and president of the 
company from 1925 to 1932, it was Max Raybaud who ran the day-to-day operations 
of the brewery as the managing director. Raybaud would serve in this position until 
the 1940s.139   
 At first, Crown was a direct competitor to the newly formed Bomonti-Pyramid 
in the Cairo market. Although Pyramid had broken off from Crown after its 
establishment in 1898, Crown maintained a presence in Cairo to take advantage of 
Egypt’s largest market.  However, the breweries quickly realized that because their 
headquarters were in different cities, a partnership made more sense that an expensive 
battle to try to conquer each other’s territory.140 Therefore, in 1921, even before 
Bomonti-Pyramid had taken on its final shape, the two breweries agreed on a plan to 
exploit the beer markets of all of Egypt. They both found the agreement to their 
liking, renewing in it 1923, 1925, and 1931.141 Examining the particularities of this 
agreement and what it meant in practice for the two brewers enables us to explicate 
their successful formula for selling beer in Egypt.  
 The most appropriate place to begin this examination is with Egypt’s largest 
market, Cairo. The nerve center of the joint operation in Cairo was the Central 
Bureau, located on No. 68 Ibrahim Pasha Street in the heart of the city. The bureau 
was in charge of delivering all the beer produced in the Bomonti-Pyramid factory to 
the markets of Cairo, Suez, and Upper Egypt (which was classified by the companies 
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as anything geographically below Cairo). The head of the bureau was Constantine 
Mouratiadis, a Greek protégé, a lawyer, and major stockholder in Crown brewery.142 
The choice of a Greek made sense because, as discussed above, Greeks ran the 
majority of the brewery’s clients (bars, cafes, pubs, restaurants).143 The choice of 
Mouratiadis, specifically, made sense on three levels. First, his father Michel 
Mouratiadis had worked for Crown, so he had a significant familiarity and familial 
connection with the business. Second, he had all the personal characteristics that 
companies look for in their leaders; he was outgoing, personable, honest, loyal, and 
enjoyed a good reputation among what one Heineken employee called “Europeans,” 
of which the Greek community was part.144  Third, as a major stockholder in 
Crown—he would eventually become the largest shareholder in the company—he 
embodied a tangible link between the two companies, who ensured that the operations 
in Cairo would suit the needs of both breweries.  
 Mouratiadis had almost complete control of the Cairo operation. He was the 
director of the company’s storage facilities, its customers’ accounts, general statistics, 
general accounting, commercial services (sales), and advertising.145  He organized the 
people below him into three departments: bureau employees, salespeople, and stock 
workers/deliverymen. Inside the bureau, he employed six people: a head account, an 
accountant, an assistant accountant, a secretary, a cashier, and a debt collector. He 
paid them between twenty-five Egyptians pounds, the pay of the chief accountant, and 
sixteen pounds, the pay of the debt collector.146 Outside of the bureau, he employed 
two salespeople. His head of sales was a sixty-something Greek man, Mr. Metaxas, 
who was in charge of all of the markets to which Bomonti-Pyramid sold product. 
Mouratiadis employed another salesmen whose sole responsibility was Cairo. He had 
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three men charged with running the stock houses and another four who delivered beer 
to customers.147 
 The sale and delivery of beer in Cairo and Upper Egypt was organized in 
concentric circles centered on the Central Bureau. The first circle encompassed those 
retailers, grocers, cafés, bars, and beer halls that were close enough to the Bomonti-
Pyramid factory to receive direct deliveries. The next circle out contained those 
locations that were outside the immediate vicinity of the factory but still within Cairo 
proper. This circled covered establishments in Azbakiyya, Bulaq, Abdin, and Bab Al-
Luq. Instead of delivering directly from the factory, Bomonti-Pyramid used fifteen 
depots throughout Cairo to deliver their beer. The deliverymen of Bomonti-Pyramid 
ran these semi-autonomous depots; they received shipments from the factory and then 
arranged their delivery schedules with the customers. In the next circle were those 
customers who lived in the suburbs of Cairo, which at this time included Giza, Dokki, 
Zaytun, Heliopolis, Helwan, and Maadi.148 Six more depots served these suburbs. Out 
of the twenty-one depots of Bomonti-Pyramid (fifteen in Cairo and six in the 
suburbs), sixteen were run by Greeks, two by Muslims, and two by Coptic 
Christians.149 Beyond the confines of Cairo and its suburbs, wholesalers, based in 
Cairo, did most of the work of the brewery in places like Aswan, Minya, and Fayum.   
The only customer outside of Bomonti-Pyramid’s circles was the English Army. They 
always received direct deliveries of beer, no matter their location.150 
The points of connection between these circles and the center were the 
brewery’s salespeople and the deliverymen. The salesmen were in charge of going out 
to the establishments in each of these circles to find new business and negotiate the 
contracts between the purchasing parties and the Central Bureau, which was in charge 
of all sales.151 Payment could come in the form of cash or credit. While the salesmen 
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established the terms of the relationships, it was the deliverymen who serviced and 
maintained them.  Deliverymen were charged with delivering beer from the 
warehouses to both the direct purchasers (bars, cafés etc.) and the depots in Cairo and 
the suburbs.  The technology of transportation that was at the deliverymen’s disposal 
once again shows the agglomeration of new and old technologies rather than new 
technology eliminating the old. They had four to ten motorized trucks depending on 
the season, five horse-drawn trucks, eight to ten scooters, and thirty handcarts.152 
The deliverymen were actually central to Bomonti-Pyramid’s business in 
Cairo,  enjoying a level of autonomy not typical of our contemporary conception of 
deliverymen. Instead of being assigned certain delivery routes and clients, they 
cultivated their own client bases and had strong relationships with those to whom they 
delivered. The deliverymen received no salary from the brewery; instead, they made 
all of their money off of the one-piaster commission they received on every dozen 
bottles of beer they delivered successfully.153 These men determined their own routes 
for bringing the beer from the warehouses to the clients, and they were also the ones 
to receive payment and look after unpaid debts. The only accountability these 
deliverymen had to Bomonti-Pyramid was that their receipts had to match up with the 
beer they sold. This system only worked because most of the deliverymen were 
former employees of Mouratiadis from his time at Crown before he took over control 
of the Cairo office.154  
The system presented some significant advantages. First, it allowed for 
widespread publicity for the brewery’s products. Each of these deliverymen was an 
evangelist for the company, and he would use his strong relationships with clients to 
solicit advice on new potential clients. Second, this system allowed the brewery to 
efficiently supply its customers with beer. Because these deliverymen knew their 
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clients so well, they could make sure that no one went too long without the proper 
supply of beer. For example, they would know that a certain beer hall always ran out 
of beer on a Wednesday and thus would make sure to deliver to them on Thursday. 
Finally, because the deliverymen had such good relations with the clients, they could 
keep track of clients’ debt situations and help ensure they never owed too much to the 
brewery.155 
There were downsides to this system as well. First, because the breweries had 
no real relationship with customers, it was difficult for the brewery to deal with them 
directly. In addition, accounting could get confusing, as each deliveryman used his 
own system.  There was also the unfortunate reality that some of these deliverymen 
could either lose or steal some of the money that was intended to reach the company. 
But perhaps the most significant difficulty this system presented was that these 
deliverymen were not very easy to replace.156 
In balance, the system functioned well for Mouratiadis. He worked hard to 
keep the clients within these concentric circles connected to the center, especially 
those within Cairo proper. For the places that could receive direct deliveries, 
Mouratiadis made sure that they were visited daily and stocked well. Generally, if an 
order was placed in the morning, it was ready that afternoon. If it was ordered in the 
afternoon, it was typically delivered by the next morning. Mouratiadis was also very 
generous with these clients. For example, in 1934, he gave an advance to sixty-seven 
of these establishments that equaled roughly 2,700 Egyptian pounds. Most of this 
money was meant to fun these establishments’ retrofitting their bars with the 
mechanisms to serve Bomonti-Pyramid’s beer from a keg on tap.  This was an 
important step, as most of the “high-quality” foreign beers were served on tap. 
Another advantage to serving beer on tap was that delivering barrels or kegs instead 
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of bottles reduced costs; the brewery could ship more beer at one time in a sturdier 
case because barrels and kegs were much less likely to break then bottles. 
Mouratiadis was also generous with the depots in Cairo. His generosity came 
in three forms. First, the lease for eight of the fifteen Cairene depots was in his own 
name, and he paid the rent for all fifteen. He also paid the phone bill for six of the 
fifteen. Second, besides paying service fees, he also gave the depots free coolers, 
scooters, and handcarts to run their businesses, replacing the materials when they 
wore out. Third, Mouratiadis would give the depots free ice produced by Bomonti-
Pyramid. This ice was a significant gift because these depots used ice to refrigerate 
their beer. Mouratiadis did all of this because depots were concentrated primarily in 
what were know as the “European” districts of Cairo.  There was, thus, a significant 
growth potential here if he could establish a fleet of loyal depots. This growth was 
essential because Cairo was Bomonti-Pyramid’s most profitable and successful 
market. Outside of Cairo and its suburbs, Bomonti-Pyramid did not sell a great deal of 
beer.  
Whereas the Bomonti-Pyramid operation was under the control of a Greek 
stockholder at Crown, it was an Egyptian citizen, Mr. Gibara, who ran Crown’s 
operations in Alexandria.  While the biographical information about him is scant, we 
do know that he originally came from Syria, was the director of the board of Crown, 
and spoke fluent Greek, Italian, English, French, and Arabic.157 Crown paid him fifty 
pounds per month in salary and bonuses, and he oversaw a staff of ten employees in 
the Alexandria bureau. Of the ten workers, five were Greeks (a typist, debt collector, 
assistant accountant, cashier, and the head of the warehouse), four were “Arabs” (all 
four served as porters), and one was Syrian (the chief accountant). The highest paid, 
at nineteen Egyptian pounds per month, was the cashier. The next highest paid was 
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the Syrian head accountant, who had a salary of eighteen pounds per month. The 
Greek typist was the only woman employed in the office, and she only made six 
pounds per month. The only employees of the bureau who made less than her were 
the four “Arab” porters, who were paid four pounds per month.158  Mr. Gibarra’s 
three salespersons were one in charge of Alexandria (Mr. Caritato); one who would 
travel to the villages, Mr. Sirakis; and one in charge of the brewery’s relations with 
the beer depots. 
Crown organized the Alexandria and Lower Egypt market similarly to the 
market in Cairo and Upper Egypt. Again, the Central Bureau sat at the center of five 
concentric circles. The first circle covered those cafés, brasseries, restaurants, and 
grocers who were located near enough to the factory to receive direct shipments.159 
The circle just outside this one contained those customers outside of the immediate 
vicinity of the Crown factory, who received beer from the six depots. The third circle 
covered the customers in the suburbs of Alexandria. The fourth circle encompassed 
all customers located in the villages and cities above Cairo. The last circle included all 
the export markets including Syria, Palestine, and the Docadenese. 
Although Crown organized its markets similarly to Bomonti-Pyramid, the way 
it connected these circles differentiated the Alexandrian brewery from its Cairene 
partner. All beer produced by the Crown factory was delivered to the Central Bureau.  
From here, the porters employed by the Central Bureau would deliver to all the 
establishments within the first circle.  The three deliverymen who were in the service 
of Crown would also pick up their beer from here. These three were in charge of the 
six depots of Alexandria, which operated semi-autonomously like the depots of 
Pyramid. Crown’s three deliverymen covered all the expenses of transporting the beer 
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and were paid by commission: they received two milliemes for every bottle sold by 
them and eight milliemes per dozen bottles they successfully delivered.  
However, these deliverymen did not have as much autonomy as those of 
Bomonti-Pyramid.  The salesmen of Crown directly controlled their routes and 
deliveries, which were all formalized in contracts between clients and the Central 
Bureau. Moreover, they relied on the largess of the Central Bureau for the continued 
functioning of their depots. The Central Bureau provided the depots with thousands of 
blocks of ice to keep the beer stocked in the depots refrigerated. The Central Bureau 
also provided them with an allowance of two and a half pounds for the maintenance 
of their depots, and offered them three days of credit if they wanted it.160   
In the suburbs of Alexandria, the two agents of Crown, who operated 
exclusively in the Ramleh suburb, were tasked with both the sale and delivery of beer 
to customers. The agents would buy the beer from the Central Bureau at the standard 
rate and would incur all the costs of transport to one of their four depots. However, 
the agreement was definitely in favor of the agents. For every dozen bottles they sold, 
they would receive a commission of five Egyptian pounds, a huge sum. They also 
received an eight-millieme commission on every successfully delivered dozen, and 
two thousand blocs of ice from the Central Bureau.161  Nevertheless, Crown was more 
successful than Bomonti-Pyramid at exploiting the suburban market.  
This success was built on Crown’s sales in the villages outside of the city and 
its suburbs. For example, in 1934, Crown sold more beer in Port Said and Ismailia, 
1477 hectoliters, than Bomonti-Pyramid sold in all of Upper Egypt, roughly 1300 
hectoliters.162  These superior sales probably had something to do with the fact that 
Crown had a salesman who visited every client outside of Alexandria four to five 
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times per week.163  The strong sales probably also had to do with the fact that Crown 
had excellent agents in both cities. These peripheral agents were left a great deal of 
autonomy, so they were the ultimate determinants of the success or failure of the 
brewery there. Fortunately, the agent in Port Said, Mr. Garangiotis, was active, 
intelligent, and had the support of his son, who was fully committed to selling beer. 
On top of these personal characteristics, Garangiotis had lived in Port Said for more 
than forty years and was embedded in the community as a municipal councilor.164  
In addition to serving villages, Crown also, as part of its agreement with 
Pyramid, exported to all clients in foreign markets. The two breweries’ decision to 
leave exports solely to Crown had a great deal to do with the “total control brewing” 
strategy. With Crown running exports, it was easier to ensure that the beer exported 
was of a good quality. The beer could go straight from the factory onto boats and 
trucks headed out of Egypt, instead of making the hard journey between Cairo and 
Alexandria, which added an extra chance of breakage or spoilage.  In the 1920s, the 
three largest export markets were Syria, Palestine, and the Dodecanese, the group of 
12 larger and 150 smaller islands in the Aegean. By the 1930s, however, these three 
markets were in decline; they went from consuming nearly 1500 hectoliters in 1930 to 
consuming 856 hectoliters in 1934. This decline was the result of three factors: more 
organized local competitors offering their beer at lower prices; foreign countries 
raising tariffs and other barriers to the import of beer; and Egypt’s overall decreased 
trade with these countries.165 
The agreement between the two breweries not only allowed them to formulate 
a coordinated plan to sell to Egypt, but it would also allow them to launch a shared 
brand, Stella. As Chapter 6 will describe, this shared brand enabled the breweries to 
sell to a product nationally. Although the two breweries’ recipes for Stella ended up 
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being slightly different from one another, the fact that Crown and Bomonti-Pyramid 
were both producing and selling Stella beer in their respective markets meant that 
Egyptians could buy it almost anywhere in Egypt. This ability to sell nationally was a 
crucial step in the development of the Egyptian beer industry. 
The breweries positioned this new beer as an upscale cousin to the blond beers 
that both breweries were selling under their own names. Stella was also a blond beer, 
but it had slightly higher alcohol content, 13 percent instead of 12 percent abv, and a 
higher price tag. In Alexandria, a large bottle of regular Crown beer cost 2.5 piasters 
at grocery stores, while a large bottle of Stella cost 3.5 piasters. The difference was 
even starker at bars, where the regular beer could cost from anywhere from 4 to 6 
piasters, while Stella could cost 6 to 10 piasters.166 Along with a higher price and 
alcohol content, the breweries also were assiduous in their application of their total 
control brewing methods to produce a high-quality beer, meaning better taste, 
brightness, and foam stability. As a result, Stella compared favorably to beers 
imported from Europe.167   
Nevertheless, the two breweries’ unification behind Stella did not mean that 
their offerings were the same. Bomonti-Pyramid supplemented its standard beer and 
Stella with a “petite” beer and a brown beer. The “petite” beer was a cheaper and 
lower-abv offering. The brewery achieved these two characteristics by diluting their 
regular beer, adding thirty-five percent more water to the finished product. The brown 
or “brune” beer was also the regular brew, but with added coloring. Despite the 
willingness to create “new” beers by adulterating their product, Bomonti-Pyramid was 
known to produce better beer than Crown. Both its regular offering and its Stella were 
superior to Crown’s in clarity, durability, and taste.168  
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For both of the breweries, the main motive for teaming up was to protect their 
interests from both local and foreign competitors, who were real threats to the 
viability of the breweries.169 On the local level, there were two breweries, Cavafakis 
and St. Georges, competing with Crown and Pyramid to capitalize on the growing 
beer market in Egypt.  However, these breweries were never really serious challengers 
to Crown and Pyramid. Both were too small and too poorly established to overcome 
the fact that they sold a low-quality beer. They quickly fizzled, unable to compete 
with Crown and Pyramid, which sold affordable and high-quality products. Nor could 
Cavafakis and St. Georges compete with the host of European beers that were present 
in the market, which although they were more expensive than Crown’s and Bomonti-
Pyramid’s beers, they were also of a superior quality.170    
  Such foreign beers were the true obstacles to the continued growth and 
success of Crown and Bomonti-Pyramid. After World War I ended, Egypt was 
reintegrated into the world market and once again filled with imported alcoholic 
beverages, including beer. Foreign alcohol mainly entered the Egyptian market 
through the alcohol agents discussed above. These agents aimed to maximize profits 
through the diversification of the brands they sold. Thus, an internationally known 
brand of beer was an essential part of their business portfolio. For example, Walker 
and Vallois, who were the sole agents of Johnnie Walker in Egypt, were also the main 
importers of Amstel and Allsop’s beer.171  
These agents ensured that the Egyptian beer market was a truly global one. 
The beers with which Crown and Pyramid had to battle came from all over the world. 
There were beers from the major beer-producing countries, including Germany 
(Dressler, Kupper), England (Allsops, Watneys, Whitbreads), Netherlands (Amstel, 
Heineken), and Czechoslovakia (Urquell), but also from smaller beer producing 
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countries like Denmark (Carlsberg), Greece (Fix), Sweden (Falcon), Japan (Asahi), 
and Scotland (Tennet’s).172  Agents imported beer in two forms, in cases of bottles 
and in barrels/kegs, the latter being the most effective way to import beer while 
maintaining the quality. (As I will discuss in the next chapter, kegs were both sturdier 
and more likely to keep their seal than bottles, which made them valuable because 
bottle breakage was a significant source of lost revenue.) The beer imported from all 
of these countries was consumed throughout Egypt; Alexandria and Lower Egypt 
consumed roughly thirty-five percent of the imported beer, while Cairo and Upper 
Egypt consumed the rest, sixty-five percent.173 
Four of the biggest importers of beer into Egypt were Société McEwans, 
Slavick & Co., Eredi Albertini, and the Fix Brewery of Greece. Société McEwans 
made a great deal of profit because they were the sole supplier of beer to the British 
Army stationed in Egypt; this was a huge concession because the army was rather 
prodigious in its consumption. For example, in 1934, out of the 84,000 hectoliters 
consumed in Egypt, the British army and their families drank 16,000 hectoliters.174 
McEwans was thus able to afford a bottling plant, where they could bottle the beer 
that they imported in barrels/kegs.  They were also able to afford to market and sell 
their beer to non-army personnel. The second importer, Slavick, was the main agent 
for Heineken in Egypt. They had a strong presence in Cairo and a powerful control of 
the beer market in Port Said. Very little beer was sold in Port Said without Slavick’s 
approval.175 Of the remaining two major importers, both Albertini (which sold 
Urquell Beer, Puntigam, and Bavaria Beer), and Fix (which sold its own brand of 
beer), had local connections in Alexandria that bottled the beer they imported.   
These foreign competitors were dangerous to Crown and Pyramid breweries 
because they not only had a way to provide high-quality beer, but they also had a 
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loyal market in Egypt. The rich and affluent beer drinkers of Egypt, among whom 
were both foreign and Egyptian-born elites, consumed foreign beers mainly out of 
“reasons of snobbery, preference, or nationalism.”176 Elites, with their financial 
wherewithal, were an important group to capture, yet the breweries were at a 
disadvantage with these consumers because their consumption was not tied heavily to 
price. Rather, they bought and consumed certain beers based on taste and the desire 
for the social and cultural benefits of beer. Although Stella’s high quality had enabled 
it to make some inroads in this group, the breweries ultimately decided not to target 
the group because it would always have members who would not drink Stella because 
it was made in Egypt. 
Instead of pursuing these elites, the breweries decided to focus on those 
residents of Egypt for whom beer was a luxury, and for whom price was extremely 
important: the employees (muwaẓẓafīn), artisans, and workers of Egypt.177 By 
employees, they meant both high-level office workers (those whose made twenty-five 
pounds per month or more), and low-level office workers (those who made between 
ten and twenty pounds per month).  By artisans, the breweries meant those specialized 
workers who made five to seven pounds per month. And by workers, they were 
referring to, as they called them, “indigenous” workers who made between two and 
three pounds per month.178 This income-based sketch of the breweries’ imagined 
consumers signals that the breweries had their sights squarely set on the effendi and 
the urban worker. 
Crown and Pyramid breweries targeted these groups by producing a beer that 
was high quality, yet cheaper than its competitors. For example, whereas a case of 
large bottles of imported beer would sell at 248 piasters per case, the breweries could 
sell a case of Stella beer at 128 piasters per case.179  The prices could be kept low 
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largely because of their business model, which involved the import of most of the raw 
materials of beer (malt, hops, and yeast), and the use of cheap and plentiful local 
resources (labor, rice, and water) to produce a product more affordable than its 
imported competition.180  
By aiming at this market, the Crown and Pyramid breweries may have been 
able to circumvent their foreign competitors, but they placed themselves in 
competition with other, more popular products. Specifically, they had to compete with 
Turkish coffee and whisky. Turkish coffee offered a better price, none of the religious 
baggage, and was also typically served with a free glass of water—a strong incentive 
at the time. Whisky, for its part, offered more alcoholic bang for the buck, as it was 
only slightly more expensive and offered a much greater alcohol by volume. The 
breweries saw whisky as a direct competitor to beer and believed that, if the public 
authorities placed sufficiently high tariffs on whisky and were stricter in their fight 
against whisky adulteration, the consumption of beer would increase in line with the 
decrease in whiskey consumption.181 Both Turkish coffee and whisky were difficult 
opponents, and the breweries would struggle with them until the 1930s, when 
Heineken bought into both breweries. As I will show in the next several chapters, 
Heineken figured out a way to tackle these two competitors and make beer a primary 
leisure-time drink of the effendi. However, even before Heineken took over, the 
breweries were thinking of how to beat out Turkish coffee and whisky. This fact is 
evident in one of Heineken’s first feasibility reports on the country. The report speaks 
of two ways that Stella beer could win this battle for the money of the effendi and the 
worker.  
The first strategy identified in the report was to further beer’s connection with 
the Egyptian custom of mezze, which, as it was practiced in Egypt, often consisted of 
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spicy dishes and hors d’oeuvres: “ham, salami, meats, cheeses, supplemented with 
Eastern specialties such as crab, shrimp, cucumber.”  Heineken’s plan was to promote 
the pairing of mezze and beer by promoting a practice whereby mezze would come 
free with an order of a beer.182  Although this practice would place a burden on the 
sellers of mezze, it was great for the sale of beer. Not only did it add value to beer, 
tying it closely to an indigenous custom, but it also supplied the customer with dishes 
that would make them thirsty for another beer. By the same logic that many bars in 
America offer free pretzels or peanuts, the encouragement of mezze in Egypt boosted 
beer sales. 
The second strategy identified in Heineken’s report for expanding beer’s role 
in Egypt was that beer could be branded as a key hot-weather alcoholic beverage. In 
Egypt, the hotter the weather, the more beer people would drink. As evidence of this 
link, one of the depots in Alexandria was only open for the six months of the year 
when it was hot enough for people to swim on the beach. As I will show in the 
following chapters, Heineken would use these associations of beer with mezze and 
with warm weather, especially the latter, to sell beer to effendis and workers in Egypt.   
Conclusion 
 
 The creation of an industrialized alcoholic beverage sector in Egypt was 
spearheaded by Europeans, and yet this industry was not a foreign imposition 
completely at odds with the culture and people of Egypt.  As this chapter has shown, 
although the pioneers in this industry were European, the arrival and the success of 
the alcohol industry was not the capitulation of a nation to the demands of its new 
colonial masters. Rather, it represented the confluence of revolutionary trends in the 
alcoholic beverage industry that pushed European brewers to expand to untapped 
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markets, as well as massive social and cultural changes in the Egyptian population 
that created a demand for these new alcoholic beverages. While it would be naive and 
false to claim that these alcoholic ventures were not aided by the presence of an 
imperial power in Egypt, much of what attracted the investors were trends and events 
that were already taking shape before the British invaded Egypt in 1882. In particular, 
the consumption of alcoholic beverages was becoming a key marker for many 
Egyptians of their new “modern” identity.   
 As I have shown, the importation of the technologies that lay at the heart of 
industrial alcoholic beverage production was not a frictionless process. The 
companies that arrived in Egypt, deluded by the perceived superiority of their 
“modern” methods and machinery, were not immediately profitable, but instead met 
with early difficulties and had to diversify in order to survive their early days. In 
addition, the techno-scientific mindset that undergirded these modern methods and 
machinery, one shaped heavily by the sense of “total control,” was challenged by the 
particularities of the Egyptian situation. Only by adapting their methods and 
leadership structure to Egypt, calling on early business elites, and exploiting the 
advantages of the country, including plentiful water, grains, and population, did these 
companies establish an industrialized base in the country. Thus these early ventures, 
which would eventually serve as the base of the modern Egyptian alcoholic beverage 
industry, survived only through the significant investment, persistence, and 
commitment of the businessmen who led this industry. 
                                                 
 
1 On Barak, On Time: Technology and Temporality in Modern Egypt (Berkeley, CA.: 
University of California Press, 2013). 
 
125 
                                                                                                                                            
 
2 Keith David Watenpaugh, Being Modern in the Middle East: Revolution, 
Nationalism, Colonialism, and the Arab Middle Class (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2006), 16. 
3 P.J. Cain and A.G.Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-2000 (New York: Pearson 
Edcuation, 2002), 313. 
4 Cynthia Myntti, Paris Along the Nile: Architecture in Cairo from the Belle Epoque 
(Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1999); Juan Cole, Colonialism and 
Revolution in the Middle East: Social and Cultural Origins of Egypt’s ʿUrabi 
Movement (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). 
5 David Landes, Bankers and Pashas: International Finance and Economic 
Imperialism in Egypt (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1969). 
6 Ibid., 92-97. 
7 Juan Cole, Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East. 
8 E.R.J. Owen, “From Liberalism to Liberal Imperialism: Lord Cromer and the First 
Wave of Globalization in Egypt, in Histories of the Modern Middle East: New 
Directions ed. Israel Gershoni, Hakan Erdem, Ursula Wokock (Boulder, CO.: Lynne 
Rienner, 2002), 95-112. 
9 Robert Tignor, Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt 1882-1914 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), 59. 
10 E.R.J. Owen,  “Liberalism to Liberal Imperialism,” 101. 
11 E.R. J Owen, Cotton and the Egyptian economy: a study in trade and development 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1969), 281. 
12 Arthur E. Crouchley, Investment of Foreign Capital in Egyptian Companies and 
Public Debt (New York: Arno Press, 1977), 117. 
13 Mohammad A. Chaichian, “The Effects of World Capitalist Economy on 
Urbanization in Egypt, 1800-1970,” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 
20 (1988):  28. 
14 On Barak, On Time: Technology and Temporality in Modern Egypt (Berkeley, 
CA.:University of California Press, 2013), 105, 298. 
15 Ziad Fahmy, Ordinary Egyptians: Creating the Modern Nation through Popular 
Culture (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press), 26-7. 
16 Barak, On Time,153-159. 
17 Fahmy, Ordinary Egyptians, 25. 
18 R.G. Wilson and T.R. Gourvish, “Introduction,” in The Dynamics of the 
International Brewing Industry since 1800 ed. R.G. Wilson and T.R. Gourvish (New 
York: Routledge, 1998), 4. 
19 Syed Nomanul Haq, Names, Natures, and Things: The Alchemist Jābir ibn Ḥayyān 
and His Kitāb al-Aḥjār (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994). 
20 Louis Pasteur, “Memoir on the alcoholic fermentation,” Milestones in Microbiology 
trans. and ed. Thomas D.Brock (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 1961), 31-38. 
In nineteenth century Europe, those who sought to explain fermentation fell into two 
camps: vitalists and chemists. Vitalists believed that fermentation was one of those 
“mysterious forces in the living organism that enabled it to produce all those 
substances that it needed and which chemists seemed incapable of synthesizing in 
their test tubes.” The chemists, on the other hand, believed that fermentation was a 
purely chemical process where, in the presence of unknown chemical substance called 
a ferment, sugar and oxygen would break down in to alcohol and carbon dioxide, see 
 
126 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Ulf Langerkvist, The Enigma of ferment: From the Philosopher’s Stone to the First 
Biochemical Nobel Prize (New Jersey: World Scientific Publishing, 2005), 110; 
Vitalism took the upper hand when scientists in the 1830s, using the newly invented 
achromatic compound microscope, discovered that brewer’s yeast, a substance 
brewers understood helped make alcohol, was made of living cells. These scientists 
posited that the yeast cell’s growth and reproduction produced alcohol and carbon 
dioxide as byproducts, see Justis Liebig, “Concerning the phenomena of fermentation, 
putrefaction, and decay, and their causes.” in Milestones in Microbiology trans. and 
ed. Thomas D.Brock (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 1961), 24-27. 
21 Anders Brinch Kissmeyer, “Emil Christen Hansen,” Oxford Companion to Beer ed. 
Garret Oliver (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Online Version, 2013) Accessed 
April 23, 2014.  
22 Louis Pasteur, “On the organized bodies which exist in the atmosphere; 
examination of the doctrine of spontaneous generation,” Milestones in Microbiology 
trans. and ed. Thomas D.Brock (Englewood Cliffs (NJ):Prentice-Hall, 1961), 43-38. 
23 Mikael Hård, Machines are Frozen Spirit: The Scientification of Refrigeration in 
the 19th Century—A Weberian Interpretation (Boulder, CO..: Campus Verlag, 1994), 
181-192. 
24 Ibid., 210-220. 
25 Theodore S. Feldman, “Thermometer,” The Oxford Companion to the History of 
Modern Science, ed. J.L. Heilbron (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Online Version, 
2003) Accessed April 22, 2014. 
26 Keith Thomas, “Hydrometer,” The Oxford Companion to Beer, ed. Garret Oliver 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, Online Version, 2013) Accessed April 23, 2014. 
27 Colin J.West “Saladin Box,” The Oxford Companion to Beer ed. Garret Oliver 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, Online Version, 2013) Accessed April 20, 2014. 
28 Hård, Machines are Frozen Spirit. 
29 Brian Hunt, “Refrigeration” and Horst Dombusch, “Carl von Linde,” The Oxford 
Companion to Beer ed. Garret Oliver (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Online 
Version, 2013) Accessed April 23, 2014. 
30 Hård, Machines are Frozen Spirit. 
31 Ronald Weir, The History of the Distillers Company: Diversification and Growth in 
Whisky and Chemicals (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1995), 7-26. The Coffey still drew its 
name from its inventor Aeneas Coffey, an Irishmen and distiller, who patented the 
still in 1830. Prior to the Coffey still, liquors, like whisky and brandy, were produced 
in a pot still, which heated a wash until it evaporated, cooled it, and then collected the 
condensing liquid. Since alcohol’s boiling point was lower than the boiling point of 
water, the new liquid would be of higher alcohol content than the evaporated 
fermented liquid. For example, wine (9-16 % alcohol by volume, abv) when distilled 
became brandy (35-60% abv). However the limitation of the pot still was that it could 
only distill one batch of liquor at a time and only put the wash through one 
evaporation/condensation cycle. Thus a distiller’s production was limited by the size 
of his pot still, and the alcohol produced still contained impurities that could have a 
deleterious effect on the product.  
32 Mikael Hård, Machines are Frozen Spirit, 181-192. 
33 Ibid., 6. 
 
127 
                                                                                                                                            
 
34 George Philliskirk, “Pasteurization,” Oxford Companion to Beer ed. Garret Oliver 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, Online Version, 2013) Accessed April 22, 2014. 
35 Lucie Ryzova, “Egyptianizing Modernity through the ‘New Effendiya’: Social and 
Cultural Constructions of the Middle Class in Egypt under the Monarchy,” Re-
Envisioning Egypt, 1919-1952, ed. Arthur Goldschmidt, Amy J. Johnson, and Barak 
A. Salmoni (New York: American University in Cairo Press, 2005), 127-28. 
36 Ibid., 129. 
37 Watenpaugh, Being Modern in the Middle East, 16. 
38 Nancy Y. Reynolds, “Commodity Communities: Interweavings of Market Cultures, 
Consumption Practices, and Social Power in Egypt, 1907-1961” (PhD diss., Stanford 
University, 2003), 16-28. 
39 Emmanuel Akyeampong, Drink, Power, and Cultural Change: A Social History of 
Alcohol in Ghana, c. 1800 to Recent Times (Portsmouth, N.H.: James Currey, 1996), 
145-48. 
40 Ryzova, “Egyptianizing Modernity,” 190, n. 26. 
41 Will Hanley, “Grieving Cosmopolitanism in Middle East Studies,” History 
Compass 6.5 (2008): 1349-50. 
42 Michael J. Reimer, “Colonial Bridgehead: Social and Spatial Change in Alexandria, 
1850-1882,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 20 (1988): 533; 
Mohammad A. Chaichian, “The Effects of World Capitalist Economy on 
Urbanization in Egypt,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 20 (1988): 26; 
Robert Ilbert, Alexandrie, 1830-1930, 2 vols. (Cairo: Institut Français d’Archéologie 
Orientale, 1996), 758-59, cited in Nancy Y. Reynolds, A City Consumed: Urban 
Commerce, The Cairo Fire, and the Politics of Decolonization in Egypt (Stanford, 
CA.: Stanford University Press, 2012), 24; Janet Abu-Lughod, Cairo: 1000 Years of 
the City Victorious (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1971), 119. 
43 Reimer, “Colonial Bridgehead,” 533 and Chaichian, “The Effects of World 
Capitalist Economy on Urbanization,” 26. 
44 Richard Pococke, A Description of the East and Some Other Countries vol. 1: 
Observations on Egypt (London: Printed for the Author by W. Bowyer, 1743-45), 
182-83. 
45 Kamil al-Tilmissani, al-Suq al-Sawdaʾ (The Black Market), Video Recording 
(Cairo: Studio Misr, 1945). 
46 Joel Gordon, Revolutionary Melodrama: Popular Film and Civic Identity in 
Nasser’s Egypt (Chicago: Middle East Documentation Center, 2002), 59. 
47 Mohammad A. Chaichian, “The Effects of World Capitalist Economy on 
Urbanization,” 30. 
48 Owen, Cotton and the Egyptian economy, 1820-1914, 237. 
49 Mohammad A. Chaichian, Town and Country in the Middle East: Iran and Egypt in 
the transition to Globalization, 1800-1970 (United Kingdom: Lexington Books, 
2009), 138. 
50 Fahmy, Ordinary Egyptians, 28 from Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, 
Techno-Politics, Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press,1991), 60-2; and 
Joel Beinin and Zachary Lockman, Workers on the Nile: Nationalism, Communism, 
Islamism and the Egyptian Working Class, 1882-1954 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1987), 12, 26. 
51 Reynolds, A City Consumed, 24-26. 
 
128 
                                                                                                                                            
 
52 Abu-Lughod, Cairo, 118-31 and Ilbert, Alexandrie, 758-59, cited in Reynolds, A 
City Consumed, 24. 
53 Chaichian, “The Effects of World Capitalist Economy on Urbanization,” 32. 
54 Ziad Fahmy, Ordinary Egyptians, 28. 
55 His Majesty’s Agent and Consul General, Report on the Finances, Administration, 
and Condition of Egypt and the Soudan 1906 (London: Harrison and Sons, His 
Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1907), 75. 
56 “Wathaʾiq wa-Tasrihat bi-Fath Badʾ al-Hanat Rakhs Mahallat Khamur,” Egyptian 
National Archive, Dar al-Wathaʾiq al-Qawmi (hereafter DWQ), Diwan al-Dakhiliyya 
(hereafter DD), 2001-008159. 
57 Alexander Kitroeff, Greeks in Egypt 1919-1937 (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Ithaca 
Press, 1989), 73-124. 
58 Relli Shechter, Smoking Culture and Economy in the Middle East: The Egyptian 
Tobacco Market 1850-2000 (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), 32-34, 106-108. 
59 His Majesty’s Agent and Consul General, Report on the Finances, Administration, 
and Condition of Egypt and the Soudan 1904 (London: Harrison and Sons, His 
Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1905), 54. 
60 Gudrun Krämer, The Jews in Modern Egypt 1914-1952 (Seattle, Wash.: University 
of Washington Press, 1989), 88-89. 
61 Maurice Mizrahi, “The Role of Jews in Economic Development,” in The Jews of 
Egypt: A Mediterranean Society in Modern Times, ed. Simon Shamir (Boulder, CO.: 
Westview Press, 1987), 87-88. 
62 “Wathaʾiq wa-Tasrihat bi-Fath Badʾ al-Hanat,” DWQ, DD, 2001-008151—2001-
008157. 
63 His Majesty’s Agent and Consul General, Report on the Finances, 4, 55. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Doris Behrens-Abouseif, Azbakiyya and Its Environs: From Azbak to Ismaʿil, 1476-
1879 (Cairo: Institut Français D’Archéologie Orientale, 1985), 82. 
66 Zachary Lockman, “Imagining the Working Class: Culture, Nationalism, and Class 
Formation in Egypt, 1899-1914,” Poetics Today 15 (1994): 164-68. 
67 Muhammad ʿUmar, Hadir al Misriyyin aw Sirr al-Taʾakhkhurihim, ed. Majdi ʿAbd 
al-Hafiz, (Cairo: al-Maktab al-Misri li-Tawziʿ al-Matbuʿat, 1998), 61. 
68 Ibid, 183-85. 
69 Ibid., 250. 
70 For discussion of this work, see Muhammad al-Muwaylihi, Hadith ʿIsa ibn Hisham, 
translated as A Period of Time, trans. Roger M.A. Allen (Reading, U.K.: Middle East 
Centre, 1992), 72. 
71 Muwaylihi, A Period of Time, 258. 
72 Ibid., 307. For an in-depth discussion of ʿAtaba see Reynolds, A City Consumed, 
31-36. 
73 Muwaylihi, A Period of Time, 316. 
74 Ibid., 308. 
75 Reynolds, A City Consumed, 38. 
76 Muwaylihi, A Period of Time, 329. 
77 Karin van Nieuwkerk, A Trade Like Any Other: Female Singers and Dancers in 
Egypt (Austin, Tex.: University of Texas Press, 1995), 182. 
 
129 
                                                                                                                                            
 
78 Wilson Chacko Jacob, Working out Egypt: Effendi Masculinity and Subject 
Formation in Colonial Modernity,1870-1940 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 
2011), 202. 
79 Ibid. 
80 “Alcohol Merchants”, The Egyptian Directory of the United Arab Republic 75 
(1961). 226-228. 
81 “Johnnie Walker Showcard, trademark certificate, 1911,”Typed, Johnnie Walker 
Archives. 
82 Al-Ahram, Thursday 10 January 1933. 
83 Al-Ahram, Sunday 5 August 1928. 
84 House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, “An account of the quantity of ale and 
porter exported to foreign countries from the United Kingdom, for the years 1839 and 
1840; distinguishing each year separately, and the countries to which exported,”1841, 
Proquest, http://gateway.aa1.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-
2004&res_dat=xri:hcpp&rft_dat=xri:hcpp:rec:1841-019826 (Accessed 20 August 
2012); Ralph Hattox, Coffee and Coffeehouses: The Origins of a Social Beverage in 
the Medieval Near East (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1985): “Boza is a 
drink closer to a solid than a liquid, resembling nothing more than cool, slightly 
fermented farina...123. 
85 M.P. Cozzika, “La Distillerie de Tourah,” L’Egypte Contemporaine  29 January 
1917:44 
86 Ibid., 45. 
87 Kitroeff, Greeks in Egypt, 155. 
88 Cozzika, “La Distillerie de Tourah,”46-7. 
89 Ibid., 46. 
90 Ibid., 46. 
91 Ibid., 47. 
92 Athanase G. Politis, L’Hellénisme et L’Égypte Moderne: Contribution de 
l’Hellénisme au développement de l’Égypte moderne, 2nd Edition (Paris: Libraire 
Félix Alcan, 1930), 357. 
93 Ibid., 358. 
94 Ibid., 358. 
95 DWQ, Maslahat al-Sharikat (Department of Companies Archives (henceforth MS), 
3019-005503-0009, Sharikat Birat al-Ahram. 
96 Robert L. Tignor, “The Economic Activities of Foreigners in Egypt; 1920-1950: 
From Millet to Haute Bourgeoisie,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 
22(1980): 427. 
97 Owen, Cotton and the Egyptian economy, 281. 
98 Ibid., 6-7. 
99 Uri M. Kupferschmidt, Henri Naus Bey: Retrieving the Biography of a Belgian 
Industrialist in Egypt (Brussels: Academie royal des sciences d’outre-mer, 1999), 
110. 
100 Tignor, “The Economic activity of Foreigners in Egypt,” 428. 
101 Henry de Saint-Omer, Les enterprises belges en Égypte: rapport sur la situation 
economique des Societes belges et belge-égyptiennes fonctionnant en Égypte 
(Bruxelles: Imprimerie G.Piquart, 1907), 153. 
 
130 
                                                                                                                                            
 
102 British Chamber of Commerce of Egypt, List of Companies Established In Egypt 
Fourth Edition (Alexandria: British Chamber of Commerce, 1905), 27. 
103 Ibid., 40, 45, 50. 
104 Ibid., 23,31. 
105 Politis, L’Hellénisme et L’Égypte Moderne, 360. 
106 Stefano G. Poffandi Indicateur égyptien administratif et commercial (Imprimerie 
Générale: Alexandria) 1902, 236; Stefano G. Poffandi, Indicateur égyptien 
administratif et commercial (Imprimerie Générale: Alexandria, 1904) 88.   
107 Hård, Machines are Frozen Spirit, 184. 
108 Politis, L’Hellénisme et L’Égypte Moderne, 362. 
109 de Saint-Omer, Les enterprises belges en Égypte, 112. 
110 Ibid., 184. 
111 Ibid., 362 
112 Charles W. Bamforth, “Top Fermentation,” Oxford Companion to Beer, ed. Garret 
Oliver (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Online Version, 2013) Accessed April 21, 
2014. 
113 Nick R. Jones, “Ale”, Oxford Companion to Beer, ed. Garret Oliver (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, Online Version, 2013) Accessed April 23, 2014. 
114 Hård, Machines are Frozen Spirit, 184. 
115 de Saint-Omer, Les enterprises belges en Égypte,153. 
116 Ibid.,111. 
117 Politis, L’Hellénisme et L’Égypte Moderne, 360 
118 Ibid., 360 
119 Owen, Cotton and the Egyptian Economy, 283. 
120 Ibid., 283-5. 
121 Edouard Papasian, L’Egypte Economique et Financiere (Cairo: Impr. Misr, 1926), 
384. 
122 “Rapport de Monsieur H. Faivre sur l’Egypte,” 4 Juin 1935, typed, p.14 NL-SAA-
191213, 2.2.9.2.5-Africa, 834-Archives of Heineken NV, Stadsarchief Amsterdam.  
123 Robert L. Tignor, State, Private Enterprise, and Economic Change in Egypt. 1918-
1952 (Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press,1984), p.41 
124 Politis, L’Hellénisme et L’Égypte Moderne, 363 
125 Politis, L’Hellénisme et L’Égypte Moderne, 363 
126 Reynolds, A City Consumed, 143 and Hård, Machines are Frozen Spirit, 200-1. 
127 Chris Holliland, “Rice,” Oxford Companion to Beer, ed. Garret Oliver (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, Online Version, 2013) Accessed April 21, 2014. 
128 Athanase G. Politis, L’Hellénisme et L’Égypte Moderne, 362 
129 Tignor, State, Private Enterprise, 49; G.H. Selous, “Report on Economic and 
Commercial Conditions in Egypt” (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1937), 
94-5.  M.G.P.A Jacobs, W.H.G Maas, Mark Baker, The Magic of Heineken 
(Amsterdam: Heineken, 2001), 8.4. 
130 8 League of Nations Treaty Series, “Convention Relating to Liquor Traffic in 
Africa and Protocol, Signed at Saint-Germain-En-Laye 1919,” 1922, HeinOnline, 
http://proxy.library.upenn.edu:2445/HOL/Page?handle=hein.unl/lnts0008&div=3&co
llection=unl&set_as_cursor=7&men_tab=srchresults&terms=liquor&type=matchall#
17, 17 (Accessed 3 Oct 2012). 
 
131 
                                                                                                                                            
 
131 Justin Willis, Potent Brews: A Social History of Alcohol in East Africa, 1850-1999 
(Oxford: The British Institute in Eastern Africa, 2002), 97. 
132 8 League of Nations Treaty Series, “Convention Relating to Liquor Traffic in 
Africa,” 17. 
133 For a history of East African Brewing, see Willis, Potent Brews; For Nigeria, see 
Simon Heap. “Before “Star”: The Import Substitution of Western-Style Alcohol in 
Nigeria, 1870-1970,” African Economic History 24(1996): 69-89. 
134 Tignor, State, Private Enterprise, 33. 
135 The brewery was one of the first modern factories in Istanbul and became such a 
recognizable landmark that the neighborhood in which it was located, to this day, 
bears the name Bomonti. 
136 Fredrick George Banbury, “Report from the Select Committee on Navy and Army 
Canteens together with minutes of evidence and appendices,” House of Commons 
Papers; Reports of Committees, 1924, Proquest, http://gateway.aa1.proquest.com/ 
openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:hcpp&rft_dat=xri:hcpp:rec:1923-025864 
(Accessed 7 September 2012). 
137 Papasian, L’Égypte Economique et Financiere, 384. 
138 G.L. Montera, Handbook of Egyptian Securities (Alexandria, Published by 
Mortera, G.L. Firm, Brokers, 1922-1939).  
139 Ibid. 
140 “Rapport de Monsieur H. Faivre sur l’Égypte,” 4 Juin 1935, typed, 7, NL-SAA-
191213, 2.2.9.2.5-1053- Reisrapporten inzake Egypte, Soedan, Palestina en Syrie, 
834-Archives of Heineken NV, Stadsarchief Amsterdam. 
141 Ibid., 7.  
142 Ibid., 35. 
143 Ibid., 5.  
144 Ibid., 35. 
145 Ibid., 10. 
146 Ibid.  
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid.,11.  
149 Ibid.,11. 
150 Ibid.,10. 
151 Ibid.,15. 
152 Ibid., 12 
153 Ibid., 10. 
154 Ibid., 12. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Ibid., 45. 
158 Ibid., 39.  
159 Ibid., 40. 
160  Ibid. 
161  Ibid., 41. 
162  Ibid., 11. 
163  Ibid., 41. 
164  Ibid., 48. 
 
132 
                                                                                                                                            
 
165  Ibid., 54. 
166  Ibid., 45. 
167  Ibid., 23. 
168  Ibid., 116. 
169 Ibid., p.7.  
170  Ibid., 90-1. 
171 Ibid., 86.  
172 Ibid., 86. 
173 Ibid., 87. 
174 Ibid., 82.  
175 Ibid., p. 50. 
176  Ibid., 5. 
177  Ibid., 5. 
178  Ibid., 6. 
179  Ibid., 89. 
180 G.H. Selous, “Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in Egypt” 
(London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1935), 42. 
181  “Rapport de Monsieur H. Faivre sur l’Égypte,” 94.  
182Ibid., 5. 
 
133 
Chapter 4: Daily Dose or Devil’s Drink: The Religio-Medical Battle Over 
Beer in Egypt 1923–1935 
 
Introducing a modern beer industry in Egypt met with challenges. Beer companies 
like Pyramid and Crown breweries faced the challenge of brewing in an unfamiliar 
climate and the competition of numerous other companies trying to sell alcohol in a 
burgeoning market. Nevertheless, both companies were able to weather the initial 
storm and establish strong bases within Egypt.  This chapter examines how these two 
beer companies, along with major international brewers like Amstel and Guinness, 
angled to sell beer to Egyptians who were looking to express their modernity through 
the consumption of alcohol.  By examining beer advertisements from the period from 
1923 to 1935, this chapter argues that the companies and advertisers that succeeded in 
selling beer to Egyptians did so by focusing on the drink’s health benefits. 
Appropriating rhetoric as old as advertising itself, these beer advertisers cast the 
beverage as a new patent medicine or nostrum. According to the rhetoric of the 
advertisements, the benefits of drinking beer included not only the properties typically 
associated with beverages, such as the powers of refreshment and revivification, but 
also the added powers of curing illness and relieving the stresses of modern life. 
These salutary properties were closely associated with the beverage’s purity and 
cleanliness, characteristics that distinguished modern, industrially produced beer from 
its artisanal cousin būẓa. 
Advertisers were not alone in their focus on the curative properties of beer; 
also interested were Islamic modernists, a growing group in Egypt at the time. These 
Islamic modernists aimed to use the most current techniques and technologies to 
return Egypt to its proud Islamic roots. A subset of these Islamic modernists was 
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extremely concerned with Egyptians’ growing alcohol consumption habit and saw it 
as one of many deleterious effects of the colonial presence on the population. Islamic 
modernist thinkers like Muhammad Rashid Rida, Ahmad Ahmad Ghalwash, and 
Muhammad Farag al-Sanhuri were particularly galled by the attribution of medicinal 
properties to alcoholic beverages like beer. For them, this attribution provided modern 
justification for the consumption of a beverage that they deemed religiously 
forbidden. Thus they welded their own Islamic temperance tradition with a larger 
temperance movement that was percolating internationally at the time. These Islamic 
modernists linked the Islamic tradition to temperance, which was very much couched 
in Christian triumphalism, and subverted it so that the West and Christendom were 
the ones that needed to catch up. As this chapter will argue, although Islamic 
modernists of the early twentieth century crafted a temperance ideology that was 
noteworthy for its ability to bridge two traditions, they ultimately lost the battle 
against beer. The temperance movement in Egypt was too poorly supported to 
overcome the trend of alcohol’s acceptance and consumption among Egyptians.  
In making this argument, the chapter looks at the techno-medical battle 
between advertisers and Islamic modernists over the depiction of beer as well as at the 
activities of each to try to sell their message to the Egyptian public. The first section 
details the techno-medico rhetoric of beer advertisers in this period, showing how 
they try to portray beer as refreshing and healthful in order to sell it to a new middle-
class audience. The second section traces the roots of the Islamic modernist 
movement and the intellectual bases for the temperance of the Islamic modernist 
movement. The third section examines the Anglo-American Temperance movement, 
its effects on the Islamic Modernists, and the convergence of Islamic modernists with 
Anglo-American temperance in the Egyptian Temperance Association. Finally, the 
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chapter looks at the legislative impact of temperance in Egypt. As this chapter will 
show, despite the best efforts of Islamic and Christian temperance activists, beer, with 
the help of advertisers, became the refreshing and healthful drink of the effendi.  
 
Commercialization 
 In 1923, Egypt’s alcoholic beverage market was a crowded one, as locally 
based limited liability companies like Crown and Bomonti-Pyramid Brewery vied 
with importers and distributors of foreign products for the money of the emerging 
class of Egyptian drinkers. In this section I analyze the techno-medico rhetoric of the 
period’s beer advertisements in order to show how beer companies attempted to 
differentiate themselves from the rest of the beverage producers on the market.  
Before 1934, Crown and Bomonti-Pyramid breweries, despite operating on a 
much larger scale than their pre-colonial predecessors, were primarily local ventures.  
Both the production and sale of beer were focused in the two population centers of 
Egypt, Alexandria and Cairo, with Crown Brewery laying claim to the Alexandria 
market and Pyramid controlling Cairo. As I have discussed previously, prior to World 
War I these companies were primarily concerned with assuring their own survival 
rather than dominating the Egyptian market. This all changed after World War I, as 
both companies enjoyed a boom period. With the profits of this boom and the new 
ability to control and coordinate the Cairo and Alexandria markets, these companies 
aimed to make beer a national industry. The main avenue through which Crown and 
Pyramid Breweries sought to pursue this new national scale was through the medium 
of print, which was concurrently enjoying its own explosion in popularity.  
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As Relli Shechter has shown, prior to World War I, Egypt had neither a 
medium with a wide enough circulation nor a population with enough literate 
members to sustain an effective print advertisement campaign.1 However, after World 
War I, an increase in the number and circulation of newspapers and other periodicals 
enabled the print advertisement business to see sustained growth. By 1928–29, the 
“circulation of [the] Arabic press was estimated at 180,000 daily.”2 This expansion 
reflected both growth in literacy, especially among the effendiya, and decrease in the 
cost of production.3 Print advertisement was not limited to newspapers; it also 
encompassed magazines, calendars, menus and drinks lists.4 
In line with Pyramid’s aggressive business policy, it participated in yearly 
advertisement campaigns. In 1934, for example, the company spent 200,000 piasters 
on a campaign in Cairo that included newspapers, magazines, calendars, menus, and 
drinks lists, as well as cinema advertising. This came after spending nearly half a 
million piasters on advertising in the three years beforehand. The company erected 
tents at forty-four of their clients’ sites, including the Anglo-American Bar, and 
supplied mirrors, flashing signs, and billboards with the company’s name emblazoned 
on it.5 Evidence of this gaudy advertising is found in a 1928 issue of al-Ahram, one of 
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Egypt’s oldest and most famous dailies. Titled “Bières Crown Pyramides,” the image 
portrays an old man, a young man, and a woman drinking from an oversized, foamy 
mug. The three people, attired in Western dress, are ethnically ambiguous. At the 
bottom of the advertisement, an Arabic line reads: “The Beer of Pyramids and 
Ibrahimia in Egypt.”  This bilingual advertisement is designed to accomplish a great 
deal in a small space. By using a French splice of the two recently linked breweries, 
the advertisement reinforces the connection between the two companies and 
capitalizes on any brand loyalty among Francophones.  The middle image portrays the 
beer as both delicious (frothy, overflowing) and “modern” (read: suitable for 
westernized, secular, and liberal citizens), by having the young and old, male and 
female, enjoy the delicious beer together. The image trades on the idea that the 
consumption of a modern product makes the consumer modern. Finally, the script at 
the bottom appeals to the Egyptian nationalist by using Arabic, and uses the names of 
the major breweries themselves in order to show that this beer is “Made in Egypt.”6   
Due to the Bomonti-Pyramid’s local presence in Egypt, their advertisements 
could rely primarily on the resonances of images (frothy mugs, men and women 
drinking together) to sell their beer. People, especially residents of Cairo and 
Alexandria, could associate the brand with a concrete structure within Egypt. 
Moreover, with Bomonti’s linkage of the companies, these breweries had, for a time, 
come to dominate the “local” beer market. In 1934, these two breweries sold seventy-
seven percent of the beer purchased from local brewers.7 The breweries sold a more 
affordable product than their foreign competitiors. Whereas the importers would sell 
foreign beers anywhere from 170 to 220 piasters per case of forty-eight, the beer sold 
by the breweries generally stayed between 100 and 150 piasters per case.8 Foreign-
based brands, by contrast, had to pack more meaning into their advertisements 
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because they had to counter their lack of a physical presence in Egypt, contend with 
competition from many others vying for the status of “the” foreign beer, and justify 
the higher price of their imported beer. However, these companies were up to the task, 
as their resources allowed them to produce advertisements that were greater in size 
and featured more design work than those of local companies. 
One excellent example of an information-rich advertisement from a foreign 
beer company is a 1928 ad for Kupper Beer. Underwritten by Sander & Sanderkuk, 
the design features the name “Kupper Beer” in English above a picture of its bottle, 
and a large selection of Arabic text adjacent to the image. This advertisement, like 
most of the advertisements for foreign brands, has a distinct collage aesthetic. The 
Arabic text appears to have been superimposed next to the picture of the bottle and 
the English title. As discussed previously, this bricolage approach was an excellent 
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way to tailor the message to the Egyptian audience while keeping down advertising 
expenses.   
What is immediately apparent in looking at this advertisement, even to the 
non-Arabic reader, is the prominent placement of the bottle.  It is the icon that defines 
this advertisement.  The primacy of the bottle is no doubt attributable to the fact that 
at the time, the glass bottle was, in addition to refrigeration, another major technical 
innovation in the modern beer industry.  In mid-nineteenth century Europe and 
America, the glass bottle became the preferred container for beer as the business 
transitioned from a cottage industry that relied on serving beer from casks and kegs 
into a full-fledged industry that aimed to sell products beyond the confines of where 
they were produced. In a similar process to what occurred in the refrigeration 
industry, the beer industry provided a strong motive for innovation in the glass-
making industry.  
Prior to the 1900s, glass bottles were, like all glass products of the time, hand-
blown by craftsmen. As the beer industry grew, this artisanal production proved to be 
a major bottleneck for the industry, as the scarcity in bottles limited the volume and 
quantity that brewers could sell.  The demand for glass bottles pushed entrepreneurs 
to attempt to automate the glass-blowing process, and it was in 1903 that Michael 
Owens, working for Edward Libby at the Toledo Glass company, was able to perfect 
an automated machine that could produce 18,000 pint bottles a day.9 This innovation 
was soon internationalized, so that by the time these advertisements were being 
created (1923–1940), the beer bottle had become an integral part of the beer industry. 
The beer bottle was indeed an extension of “total control” brewing described above, 
an approach that was predicated on the (often misguided) belief that using the most 
current techniques and technologies would enable brewers to control all variables and 
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remove all “foreign” bodies from the brewing process, and thus produce a consistent 
and standardized product.  No wonder, then, that the iconography of this 
advertisement, and of most other advertisements discussed in this chapter, traded in 
the fetishization of the beer bottle.  
In addition to the primacy of the bottle, what is also immediately apparent, 
almost jarring, about the advertisement is the mass of Arabic text that sits adjacent to 
the bottle. This advertisement exemplifies the information-rich advertisements that 
foreign beer companies produced, and the large mass of text indicates the arguments 
that these foreign companies used to sell their beer to the Egyptian public. As the 
advertisement notes, 
There needs to be a reason for residents of tropic (al-manātiq al-ḥārra) 
or sub-tropic areas to drink beer. The most important reason to do so is 
that beer does not upset your natural balance nor cause you to switch 
from one state to another. Likewise, for one to drink beer it needs to 
contain the best elements to quench the thirst and refresh its 
drinker. ِAll of these characteristics come together perfectly in Kupper 
Beer. As a result it has, for many years, been the choice of beer for the 
Egyptian people.10 
 
Immediately noticeable is the classification of Egyptians as residents of tropic or sub-
tropic areas. This division of the world into geographical zones based on climate 
originates with Aristotle, for whom these geographic zones not only determined the 
flora and fauna that were present in a region, but also the physiognomy and 
temperament of the people who lived there. This geographic determinism, as with a 
great deal of Aristotelian thought, was absorbed by classical Arabic thought and then 
transferred to medieval European thought.11 As an example of this way of thinking, 
the arguments both for and against the inferiority of blacks in pre-1800 Arabic 
literature were often grounded in climatic reasoning. By the 1920s, the division of the 
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world into geographical zones had regained prominence with the work of a Russian 
climatologist and amateur botanist, Wladimir Kōppen, who published Die Klimate 
der Erde in 1884 and revised it in 1918 and 1936. Kōppen divided the world’s 
climates into five different regions: tropical, dry, temperate, continental, and polar. 
His classification system was less deterministic than Aristotle’s in its evaluations of 
the people who lived in each region.12  
In any case, the turn of phrase in the advertisement evokes scientific authority 
as it situates Egyptians in a separate group from the Europeans and explains why they 
should drink beer. The Kupper advertisement appears to draw more from Aristotle’s 
ideas of climatological determinism than Kōppen’s, as it is followed by a message 
about upsetting natural balances and temperaments that are inherently different from 
those of the Europeans.  This message clearly appealed to those trying to sell beer to 
Egyptians, for a similar statement is made in a 1938 advertisement for another 
German beer, Dressler: “There is nothing better for residents of the tropics like a 
refreshing (munʿish) drink.”13  
The idea that beer provides refreshment (the Arabic root nūn-ʿayn-shīn) is 
another shared feature of the two advertisements. In fact, beer as a refreshing 
beverage, and the corollary that beer quenches thirst (taṭfī al-ʿaṭsh), is one of the most 
persistent descriptors of the beverage in these advertisements.  Dressler was 
particularly enamored with this angle. For example, another of their advertisements 
states, “When the midday sun is at its most intense and the temperature rises, there is 
no drink that quenches the thirst and refreshes the spirit like the beer with the most 
beautiful pure color, Dressler beer. It is crafted expertly and without any harmful 
(ḍāra) chemicals.”14 The portrayal of beer as a refreshing drink is premised on two 
distinct features of the beverage. The first is the effervescence of the beverage, a 
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byproduct of the fermentation process. The supposed rejuvenating power of 
effervescence was widely assumed among Europeans back to the Middle Ages.15 The 
drive to produce water that contained effervescence similar to what occurred in nature 
was the main driving force of beverage technology in the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. One of the European beverage industry’s first major success 
stories, Schweppes, was built on this research.16 Brewers went to great pains to 
maintain beer’s effervescence, filling bottles using a counterpressure device that kept 
the pressure within the bottle high enough to prevent foaming (loss of CO2) when the 
beer was poured in.17 Thus, the glass bottle and its cap were essential in maintaining 
one of the key components of beer’s refreshing nature.   
The second distinct feature of beer was its temperature.  As discussed above, 
the linkage between the refrigeration and beer industries was strong, with the beer 
industry being at once a prime innovator in and consumer of refrigeration technology; 
beer companies often supplemented their sales of beer with the sale of refrigeration 
technology. This strong connection meant that if there was any industry that could 
provide beverages at below room temperature, it was the beer industry. Although the 
relationship between chilled beverages and refreshment might seem axiomatic, in 
France and other parts of Europe up to the sixteenth century, such drinks were viewed 
as deleterious to the health, exemplary of monarchal profligacy, and suitable for 
hiding poisons in.18 Still, the Middle East had a strong tradition of consuming chilled 
beverages and having faith in their salubrious effects. For example, in a Baghdadi 
cookbook from the second half of the tenth century, Ibn Sayyar al-Warraq writes, 
“Water chilled with ice, or water which of itself is as cold, will awaken and arouse the 
drinkers if taken first thing in the morning. It is also good for cooling the liver.”19  
The Ottomans and Mamelukes, too, who ruled Egypt before the invasion of the 
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French, had a predilection for chilled beverages and their restorative properties.20 
Surely, the high temperatures in the region contributed to the longstanding cultural 
preference for chilled beverages.  
The ability to control temperature allowed companies to sell beer that was not 
only cool and refreshing, but also limpid and golden. One of the distinct features of 
industrially produced lager beer is its clear yellow color, which results from both the 
bottom brewing (yeast tended to collect at the bottom), and the filtering process used 
on the beer, which removes all the particulates that could make a beer cloudy. 
Dressler also used this quality to great effect: 
[b]rilliant yellow, as if it was made of amber (kahramān), it beams in its glass 
and gladdens anyone who gazes on it, drinks it, or tastes it. This power makes 
Dressler beer perfect for those hot days, as it can refreshe and renew your 
strength.21    
 
In this passage, Dressler beer’s brilliant yellow color is equated with refreshment, as 
the consumer’s refreshment begins when he or she looks upon the amber-colored 
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beverage. Like the others discussed above, this advertisement portrays beer as the 
ideal drink in Egypt’s hot climate.  
But the pure yellow color was more than a signal of refreshment; it was also a 
sign of quality. Another advertisement notes, “Dressler beer is carefully crafted from 
the finest varieties of barley and is blended oats to improve its taste and to preserve its 
limpid color permanently.”22  The emphasis on quality ingredients and quality 
production was a way to differentiate this product from beer’s cheaper cousin, būẓa. 
Because the consumption patterns of the lower classes were driven by price concerns, 
relying on the lower classes was a losing proposition for the beer industry.23 No 
matter how efficient production and distribution were, beer could not compete with 
the price of būẓa produced in cafes and homes.  Therefore, the beer companies took 
the strategy of presenting beer as the drink of the modern Egyptian man (effendi).  
In the Dressler advertisement, the images that accompany the slogan 
exemplify the beer companies’ target audience of effendiyya (sing. effendi, English, 
effendi). The effendiyya, who have recently received a great deal of scholarly 
attention, and whom I discussed in previous chapters, were a group of young 
Egyptians who were distanced from the average Egyptian by their education, their 
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“culture,” i.e. western manners and dress, and their secular worldview.24 They 
remained distinct from the Turco-Egyptian elite due to their lesser financial status and 
humble backgrounds. Although they sat between two worlds, they were not an 
Egyptian middle class, per se, but rather occupied a liminal place between the lower 
and upper classes; “the crucial feature of effendi identity was not a desire to create a 
conceptual middle, but the desire to be upwardly mobile.”25 Due to their western 
education, they were fully versed in the concept of modernity, which placed them 
behind Westerners intellectually, culturally, and technologically. It was the effendiyya 
who penned the articles about Egypt’s deficiencies vis-à-vis the West and historicized 
Egypt’s past to fit into the teleology of progress.26  
The image depicts an effendi couple (the man dressed in a suit and fez, the 
women in a hat and a overcoat) enjoying a large bottle of beer that they have just 
purchased from a uniformed drink seller plying his wares at a mobile drink stand. 
Beneath that scene are two hands, one holding a glass and the other pouring a bottle 
of Dressler beer into the glass. Reading together the slogan, “Dressler beer is carefully 
crafted from the finest varieties of barley and is blended oats to improve its taste and 
to preserve its limpid color permanently,” and these two images, the story that 
emerges is one of the imagined Dressler consumer: an effendi couple who, after 
enjoying a day out in the hot sun, perhaps at one of Cairo’s modern parks, are looking 
for a drink of assured quality and purity that can quench their thirst. The only option 
for them, at least in the narrative of the advertisement, is Dressler Beer.  
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The targeting of effendi is fully realized in the advertising campaign of 
another foreign beer company, Amstel, whose advertisements feature only Arabic text 
and images that evoke the luxury of foreign products while maintaining connection 
with the local culture.  One advertisement, for example, shows a pair of dark hands, 
between lines of Arabic, pouring an Amstel into a glass—label out, of course. 
The use of dark hands implies luxury because, as Eve Troutt-Powell has 
expertly shown, race and class were strongly linked in Egypt at this time.27 In this 
instance, the dark hands depict the hands of either a Nubian or Sudanese servant who 
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would most likely be in the employ of a wealthy Egyptian.  This implication is made 
explicit in two other Amstel advertisements: one portrays a caricatured black servant 
in traditional dress pouring an oversized bottle of Amstel, which he carries like a 
heavy piece of furniture, into an oversized glass on which the phrase is inscribed;28 
the other depicts a more realistic black servant wearing a table server’s (sufragī) 
outfit, holding a tray with an Amstel on it in one hand.29  
 
 
 
 
These advertisements traded on the social dynamics of Egypt in order to evoke 
the luxuriousness of their product and appeal to their potential customers’ sense of 
modernity. Drinking beer signified one’s identity as a member of a certain class. For 
example, in the first Amstel advertisement above, the image is framed by the slogan 
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that Amstel is “the beer of those in the know.” The phrase makes beer exclusionary 
and aspirational. But what was the secret knowledge that encouraged the modern 
Egyptian to drink it? A line from the first advertisement, the one with the darks hands 
pouring, gives a hint: “The purity of Amstel beer reflects its choiceness, freshness, 
and lightness.”30  The slogan invokes the beer’s industrialized and standardized 
production, which can produce a cool and impurity-free beer, in order to inspire the 
modern Egyptian to drink it. Brewers took great pains to ensure that their beer was 
pure, and again, this purity depended upon the technological innovation of the glass 
beer bottle. Brewers washed the bottles assiduously, sterilizing them to remove any 
possible contaminates.31 Then, after capping the bottles and creating the vital seal, the 
brewers sent the bottles through a pasteurization process, where the bottles would be 
heated to 60–65°C to eliminate any microorganisms that may have survived previous 
stages of the process.   
Companies were not content to portray their beer as merely refreshing and 
unadulterated, however. They also aimed to invest it with curative powers. In the 
Amstel advertisement that depicts the sufragi holding the beer bottle on the tray, the 
text states, “Amstel Beer: it cures the sick, and removes the cares and worries of a 
person’s life.”32 A similar allusion to the drink’s curative powers is seen in the 
advertisement of another foreign beer company, Guinness. An advertisement whose 
title can be translated “Guinness is Good for You” (Fig. 3) features is an 
anthropomorphized pint of Guinness smiling, and at the bottom are lines of Arabic 
arranged in the two-hemstitch line form of a qasīḍa (ode):     
Guinness is good for you, Guinness frees you 
From worry and weakness, Guinness cures  
what ails you 
Guinness is good for the celebrating youth 
 Ask your doctor about how Guinness can set you right 
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Drink Guinness in the morning  
And the night saying: 
 Guinness, the original stout.33  
 
This advertisement is an excellent example of the trend, discussed by Relli Shechter, 
of foreign companies using translated advertisements to keep down overhead and 
maintain their “winning formula.”34 The highly successful “Guinness is Good for 
You” campaign, started in 1928 in Europe, was based on advice solicited from 
doctors and emphasized the healthful benefits of Guinness.35 While the translation 
may have been simply a matter of economic expediency, there was precedent in the 
Arabo-Islamic tradition for using alcohol as a curative. The prioritization of the 
medicinal properties of Guinness is, in fact, in line with the juridical opinion of many 
Hanafi scholars who believed that alcohol could be imbibed if medicinal.36 Indeed, 
the exhortation to drink beer in the morning echoes a fifteenth-century Cairene 
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theologian, Shams al-Din al-Nawaji, who compiled an anthology of anecdotes and 
poetry that praised the sabūḥ (the morning draught of wine).37   
 The focus on alcohol’s curative powers actually originated early in the history 
of advertisements. A great deal of advertisement prior to the nineteenth century in the 
West was focused on selling patent medicines and nostrums that were purported to 
cure all matter of diseases and health problems. It was only in the late nineteenth 
century that advertising underwent a major shift as allopathic medicine gained 
unprecedented legitimacy and medical crusaders were able to show that these patent 
medicines and nostrums were composed of questionable ingredients and had 
questionable effects.38  With the professionalization of the advertising industry, 
advertisers tried to distance themselves from these disreputable products, preferring to 
focus instead on other, less questionable products. Nevertheless, the regenerative 
rhetoric that was a mainstay of patent medicine advertisement was merely transferred 
to new, less disreputable products.  As Jackson Lears puts it, “Rather than deriving 
restored vigor from nerve foods, blood purifies, tonics, and exhilarates, target 
audiences were urged to turn toward Coca-Cola, Quaker Oats, or Welch’s Grape 
Juice.”39 
The turn to the medical was aided by the technological innovations in glass 
bottling. After the bottle received its cap and was pasteurized, it became the 
impermeable protective barrier upon which the modern beer industry and “total 
control” brewing relied.  If the bottle maintained its seal, brewers across the world 
could deliver a consistent product that could be irrevocably tied to the company’s 
brand. In the sealed glass bottle, brewers had the physical embodiment of the total 
control process, and thus had a sense, sometimes incorrect, that they could assure that 
their product reached the consumer pristine and free of all contaminates.  It is an easy 
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jump from imaging your drink as pure and refreshing, to believing is has curative 
powers.   
Islamic Modernism  
Advertisers were not the only ones concerned with beer’s medicinal 
properties, or lack thereof. Among those who opposed beer on religious grounds, one 
particularly concerned Egyptian, Ahmad Ahmad Ghalwash, argued that “anyone 
foolish and stupid enough to believe that one can get nourishments from beer would 
ultimately end up weak and enfeebled.”40 Ghalwash had a vested interest in arguing 
against beer, as he was part of a group of Islamic modernists who considered the 
glorification of this beverage, and of alcohol in general, to be wholly at odds with 
modernity in Egypt.  As this section will discuss, these Islamic modernists tapped into 
and repurposed the long Islamic temperance tradition to fight against beer and alcohol 
in general.   
In using the term “Islamic modernists,” I am referring to those Egyptians who 
believed that Islam was an inseparable part of Egyptian modernity. As I have 
discussed previously, modernity at this time period was a performative act that 
involved the use of new media, new social spaces, and new consumer goods to make 
“being modern observable and reproducible.”41 Modernity was performed through the 
consumption of new materials and through the absorption and appropriation of 
Western techno-scientific ideas and concepts, which reshaped the temporal frame of 
the country.42 Internalizing this new time frame, Egyptian thinkers of this period came 
to view their country as “delayed” in the linear and inexorable progress of 
civilizations toward modernity.  
Modernity in Egypt in this period was particularly important to a newly 
forming group of the effendiyya. The modernity that the effendiyya performed was not 
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monolithic. For some, modernity was found at the bottom of a bottle of beer as they 
chatted with their friends and colleagues at the bar or brasserie.43 For others, 
modernity had a more Islamic bent. The main progenitors of this Islamic modernity 
were two of the Middle East’s most influential thinkers, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani 
(1838–1897) and Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905). Both men were deeply concerned 
with the Islamic world’s response to the ever-expanding colonial enterprise. Al-
Afghani believed that the Muslims’ response to colonialism should be primarily 
political, with an Islamic revival serving as a main force to repel the colonial 
interlopers.44 Abduh, one of al-Afghani’s students, took a longer view, believing that 
the reformation of the Islamic populace through education and legal renewal was the 
path forward for the Islamic world.45  
Abduh’s renewal project was guided by the principle that Islam was not a 
static tradition that had to be abandoned on the path to modernity, but that it was, 
rather, the defining characteristic of a country like Egypt. Abduh declared that the 
religion had to be renewed (tajdīd), through a reformation of both educational 
practices and legal thinking, in order to make Egypt modern and stave off the morally 
deficient westernization (taghrīb) that threatened Egypt.46  As renowned and 
respected Islamic legal scholar, Abduh’s thinking had a massive impact on the 
country. In the 1890s, he was appointed to the head of a committee charged with 
reforming al-Azhar. Although he was unable to force all the changes he wanted, the 
very fact that he received the position attests to his reputation.47 Abduh’s greatest 
legacy was to inspire a generation of scholars, including Muhammad Rashid Rida and 
Mustafa Abdul Raziq, who took up his Islamic modernism while nevertheless 
interpreting it in very different ways. 
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For Islamic modernists, one of the clearest examples of the immoral lifestyle 
that Europeans were importing into Egypt was the increasing consumption of alcohol 
among Egyptians. These thinkers were inspired by a tradition of Islamic temperance 
(that is, the abstention from alcohol) to fight this “immorality” that stretched back to 
Islam’s earliest days. Islamic theologians traced the tradition back to the Quran, which 
seemed to deem alcohol illicit (ḥarām) in verses like Sura 5:90-1 (Al- Māʾida):  
Oh you who believe! Wine (ḫamr), gambling (maisir), idol-worshipping 
(anṣāb), and divination arrows (azlām) are an abomination (rijs) from the 
acts of Satan. Keep away from them, so that you may prosper. Satan only 
wants to create enmity and hatred among you with wine and gambling, 
and to divert you from the remembrance of God, and from prayer. Will 
you not abstain?48  
 
When read in a certain way, this passage, along with the rest of the Quran, seems only 
to deem khamr (best defined as wine made either from dates or grapes) to be illicit.49   
The logical jump for all Islamic temperance writing that followed was to show that all 
intoxicants were equivalent to khamr. This differentiation was not merely pedantic.  
There was, for example, a lively debate among the fuqahāʾ (Islamic legal scholars) 
over the permissibility of the consumption of nabīdh.⁠50 Nabīdh was a 
“comprehensive designation for in-toxicating drinks … such as mizr (made from 
barley), bitʿ (from honey or spelt) and faḍīkh (from dates).”51 ⁠In fact, several hadith 
collections mention that nabīdh was one of the drinks prepared for Muhammad by his 
wives.⁠52 
 A literature nevertheless developed that aimed to use the Quran, Quranic 
exegeses, hadith, and poetry to expand the definition of khamr to cover all intoxicants. 
Kitāb al-Ashriba (The Book of Drinks) by Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (780–855) is one of the 
earliest and best examples of this temperance literature. Other authors, like Ibn Abi 
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Dunya (823-894) in his Dhamm al-Muskir (Censure of Intoxicants), and later Aqfashi 
ibn al-ʿImad (1349-1405) in his Ikrām Man Yaʿīsh bi-Taḥrīm al-Khamr wa-l-Hashīsh 
(The Honor of Those Who Live while Deeming Wine and Hashish Sinful), built upon 
the legacy of Ibn Hanbal. 
Islamic modernists found these works to be extremely useful in their goal of 
repurposing classical Islamic legal thought for a modern Egypt. Exemplary of this fact 
is a 1907 article that Muhammad Rashid Rida published in his Arabic monthly, al-
Manar, entitled “Man Harrama al-Khamr (Those who deem khamr illicit).” In this 
article, Rida reproduces poetry from the three pre-Islamic poets in the qiṭʿa form. This 
means that rather than more typical poly-thematic qasīdas, the poetry consists of 
either short monothematic poems or excerpts from longer qasīdahs. Regardless of the 
form, all the poems abide by the Classical poetic system, exhibiting specific meters 
and end-line rhyming.53  These four poetic selections (one author is cited twice) each 
decry the use of khamr. The poet Afif b. Ma’dikirab, for example, deems wine illicit 
by saying, 
 
 And she said to me: come to deception 
  I have refrained from what you know of us 
 I have take leaven of diving arrows having seen my self 
  Wounded and enslaved in endless time (eternity) 
 I have forbidden myself wines so that 
  I am buried in a deep trench, buried.54 
 
 While, as in all good poetry, the meaning of these lines is ambiguous, for Rida 
the most important fact is that this poet and the other poets mentioned deemed khamr 
illicit. This action was important because, according to Rida, pre-Islamic Arabs were 
typically “slaves to pleasure and prisoners to delight” and notorious for their addiction 
to wine.55  This habit grew out of the fact that there was no religious condemnation of 
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alcohol. Thus, those pre-Islamic Arabs who deemed it illicit, like the poets he cites, 
did so because they “could see the evil of the drink.”56  In essence, Rida is arguing 
throughout these four poetic sections that alcohol is unequivocally evil and that Islam 
is universally valid. As he mentions, even at time when alcohol was not only 
permitted, but accepted, intelligent people already understood what Islam would later 
explicate: that alcohol is an evil substance. 
 The most interesting feature of Rida’s argument, however, is that it draws 
from the pre-modern Islamic temperance tradition discussed above. If we compare 
this article to one of the earliest and most famous treatises, Ibn Abi Dunya’s Dhamm 
al-Muskir, we see that the three poets whom Rida cites are likewise held up by Ibn 
Abi Dunya in his treatise as pre-Islamic poets who deemed khamr illicit. Ibn Abi 
Dunya also includes their respective poems, albeit with some slight variations and 
omissions. Even the presentation of the poetry is similar. Like Ibn Abi Dunya, Rida 
frames each poem with an isnad (the list of those who transmitted the poetry), and 
with the simple statement: “so and so from the Jāhiliyyah forbid/declared unlawful 
(ḥarrama) wine (khamr).” This rather sparse passage is atypical; poems in Arabic 
poetic compilations are usually preceded by a story or explanation of why the poem 
was composed. The lack of framing signals that this group of poems represented a 
stock response in the discussion of the pre-Islamic Arabs’ treatment of wine. My view 
is given credence by the fact that we find this grouping of Jāhilī poetic fragments in 
other poetic compilations as well. For example, in the most prolific tasnīf of wine 
poetry, entitled Quṭb al-Surūr fī Awṣāf al- Anbidha wa al-Khamūr (The Axis [Tent 
Post] of Joy in the description of Intoxicants), written by a secretary of a 10th-12th 
century North African dynasty (the Zirids), Abī Isḥāq Ibrāhīm al- Raqīq al-Nadīm’s 
(d.1027-8), we find these poems grouped together in a similar order in a chapter 
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entitled, “Mention of those who deemed khamr illicit in Pre-Islamic Arabia,”57 which 
is strikingly similar to the title of Rida’s article. 
 Rida’s borrowing of the poetic examples exemplifies how Islamic modernist 
authors’ arguments against the consumption of alcohol were grounded heavily in the 
sources that undergirded Islamic legal writing: the Quran, hadith, poetry, and the 
rulings of previous Islamic jurists.  These Islamic modernists were deeply troubled by 
beer because it was an alcoholic beverage that could slip through this Islamic 
reasoning. For example, Shaykh Muhammad Farag al-Sanhuri, an Egyptian religious 
scholar whose opinions of būẓa I have already discussed, recognized the unique threat 
posed by beer. As he states in 1917 tract, Al-Muskirāt (Intoxicants58) in which he 
documented, described, and ruled on the legality of the alcohol present in Egypt at the 
time,  
Beer (al-Jiʿa) contains alcohol, but less than alcohol products, vinegar, 
perfume extracts, flour, and the bodies of animals and plants. There are 
varieties of beer that have less than 3 percent alcohol by weight. So 
one does not need to fear intoxication unless one drinks a great deal.  
The concession that beer has a low alcohol content and must be consumed in large 
quantities in order to cause intoxication is very significant in the context of Islamic 
discussions of temperance. As I have shown, the Qur’an was not ironclad in its 
condemnation of all intoxicants. One of the four schools of Islamic legal thought, the 
Hanafis, took this ambiguity to its logical conclusion, arguing that certain alcoholic 
beverages were permissible for consumption as long as they did not intoxicate.59 
This line of thought was obviously troubling for Islamic modernists, and they 
worked hard to combat it. In his journal al-Manar, Muhammad Rashid Rida issued 
two fatwas declaring beer-drinking illicit (ḥarām). The first, published in 1905 and 
entitled “Drinking al-Ji‘a (beer in Arabic) called Beer,” is quite short and simple in its 
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argumentation. Rida cites a ḥadīth that states that even a little bit of something that 
can intoxicate a great deal is illicit (ḥarām), thus establishing the illicitness of beer, 
which, according to Rida, can intoxicate a great deal.60  The second fatwa, entitled 
“al-Jiʿa (beer) is Khamr and drinking it is Illicit,” published in 1929, is much longer. 
In it, Rida explicates how the logic of the hadīth discussed above applies directly to 
beer. For Rida, because this hadīth rests upon the fact that the beverage must be 
highly intoxicating, one can only call a beverage khamr, illicit, when it fulfills this 
criterion. Because beer can intoxicate a lot, it is thus illicit and can be khamr as laid 
out in the tafsir of the Quranic verse, Al-Maida (The Table).61  
 Having made this point, Rida goes on to discuss a worrying trend he has seen 
in Egypt: people making non-alcoholic beer for the purpose of improving urination. 
Rida believed that the drink in and of itself was acceptable as long as it was like the 
nabīdh that the Prophet and the Companions of the Prophet used to drink, a liquid 
made from dates and grapes steeped in water but not fermented. However, this non-
alcoholic beer could be susceptible to the same issues as nabīdh. As Rida states, after 
the time of the Prophet, there arose licentious kings, princes, and elites who would 
drink nabīdh after it had fermented. Not only did they drink it, but they also 
encouraged a group of deviant legal scholars from Kufa to affirm that the drinking of 
the alcoholic beverage was not illicit in itself; the one illicit sip was that which 
brought the drinker to intoxication. Thus, according to Rida, these scholars deluded 
themselves that one could drink until intoxication because one could never know 
which sip would bring on intoxication.62  
 This anecdote, like the hadith-based reasoning that preceded it, is another 
example of the repurposing of the Islamic tradition for modernist goals. Rida recounts 
the tale of the profligate elites using the permissibility of nabīdh to justify their 
 
158 
drinking, and he uses this tale to decry those of the present who would do the same 
thing with beer. It is no coincidence that the elites at the time of the Prophet received 
special rebuke; this is a reflection of Rida’s contemporary targets. As has been 
discussed above, the Egyptian elites were among the primary consumers of beer. My 
view that this anecdote was meant to strike out at contemporary targets is given 
further credence by the fact that this is the second fatwa that Rida felt compelled to 
publish in his fatwa against beer consumption. Clearly his call in 1905 to stop 
consuming beer met enough resistance that he had to rehash and expand on his 
arguments against beer over twenty years later. 
 Further evidence of beer’s new cultural role in Egypt is that Muhammad Farag 
al-Sanhuri also attempted to argue against beer.63   His argumentation in al-Muskirat, 
like early temperance treatises, used precedent to counteract the claims in support of 
beer: 
 
The Shi’a, the Malikis, the Shafiʿis, the Hanbalis, and Muhammad ibn al-
Hasan, a disciple of Abu Hanifa deem beer, būẓa, and all other fermented 
beverages illicit. The Shi’a, the Malikis, and the Hanbalis rule that the 
ḥadd punishments must be enforced for consumption of these beverages, 
but not the Shafi‘is and the Hanafis.64 
 
Al-Sanhuri based his condemnation of beer and other cereal beverages like būẓa on 
the precedents set by three (Maliki, Hanbali, and Shafiʿi) out of four Sunni Schools of 
Jurisprudence, the Shi’a School of jurisprudence, and a student of the Hanafi school.65  
Al-Sanhuri’s citation of the opinions of a student of Abu Hanifa was a way to work 
around the Hanafi School’s treatment of alcohol and fermented cereal beverages, 
which were problematic for Islamic modernists. He also has to concede in the last line 
of this passage that two out of the four schools (Shafiʿi and Hanafi) do not insist on 
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the enforcement of the ḥudūd penalties for consumers of the beverage. The hudud 
penalties were the penalties for crimes that were regulated by the Qur’ān (i.e. 
adultery/fornication, wrongful accusation of adultery/fornication, drinking alcohol, 
theft, and highway robbery).66  
Temperance Enters Egypt 
 
 Islamic modernists not only repurposed the Islamic “tradition” to fight against 
the growing consumption of beer; they also found new inspiration from the 
international Anglo-American temperance movement that was occurring during this 
time period, 1923–1935. In this section, I show how Islamic modernist thinkers co-
opted Christian temperance thinkers’ techno-scientific arguments against alcohol 
consumption. In addition, I demonstrate how they used the success of the world 
temperance movement in places like the United States as evidence of the 
transcendental perfection of Islam.67 By linking temperance to the Islamic tradition, 
Islamic modernists took a movement that, as discussed above, was very much 
couched in Christian triumphalism and subverted it so that the West and Christendom 
were the ones that needed to catch up.      
Perhaps the most significant example of this Islamic modernist trend in 
temperance thought was an organization dedicated to fighting the spread of 
intoxicants in Egypt, the Egyptian Temperance Association (Jamʿīyat Manʿ al-
Muskirāt li-l-Quṭr al-Miṣrī, (ETA). Its headquarters were located in Alexandria, and it 
had a fourteen-member executive board on which each member served a two-year 
term.  It also had branches outside of Alexandria in Cairo, Damanhur, Qena, Ismailia, 
and al-Sinta (outside Tanta). Each branch was referred to as a “Temperance club of 
___” and had its own executive board.68 While membership numbers are not 
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available, the clubs in Damanhur and Qena were the most active outside the main 
headquarters.69 The ETA’s main sources of revenue were membership fees and 
donations, with fees making up the majority of the funds. Expenses primarily fell into 
five groups: rents for the meeting places; employee compensation; office supplies, i.e. 
printings, mailings, writing utensils, and office furniture; telegraphs; and 
transportation for the Association’s workers.70   
The ETA’s most famous member was Prince ʿUmar Tusun (1872-1944), 
Egypt’s “[p]rince, scholar, and philanthropic landowner.”71 He was the grandson of 
Muhammad Saʿid and a member of the Egyptian royal family. Tusun, a fascinating 
character, showed a strong commitment to Egypt through his numerous scholarly 
writings on the country, his support for the country’s nationalist movement, and his 
heavy participation in benevolent and social organizations.72 Tusun was a bit of a 
reformist gadfly, serving as president, honorary president, or member of over eighty 
benevolent and social organizations.73 Tusun’s relationship with the ETA began with 
its founding in 1905 and continued through the 1930s. He even served a term as 
honorary president in 1922.  Prince ʿUmar was committed to the cause of temperance. 
In 1932, he used his position as President of the Royal Agricultural Society to prevent 
wine growers from showing their product at the Society’s yearly exhibition.74 He is 
alleged to have helped close nearly 1700 wine shops.75 Tusun’s main contribution to 
the ETA, though, was financial; his twenty-five pound-per-year pledges made him the 
Association’s chief patron.  When it came to the actual operation of the organization, 
however, it was the organization’s founder, Ahmad Effendi Ghalwash, who was in 
charge.  Ghalwash was the preeminent figure in the ETA and, after founding it in 
1905, he served as the organization’s president and chief ideologue until his death in 
the 1960s.  
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We can get a sense of the ETA’s ideology from a 1924 report that the 
organization sent to the king of Egypt, Ahmad Fuʿad. The report’s discussion of 
temperance trades heavily in the idiom of Islamic thought: the ETA refers to the fight 
against the consumption of intoxicants as a jihad, Egypt as an umma (community), 
and, most significantly, the end of the liquor trade in Egypt as the purification (taṭhīr) 
of the country from the filth (rijs) of intoxicants.76 This last sentiment, in particular, 
evokes the Quranic treatment of alcohol with its use of the word rijs, which features 
prominently in the Qur’an verse 5:90-1 (as mentioned earlier).   
While the ETA’s arguments for temperance may have used Islamic language, 
it would be incorrect to label them as merely outgrowths of the Islamic temperance 
tradition. A qualitative difference is evident between the rhetoric of the ETA and that 
of contemporary works like Shaykh Muhammad Farag al-Sanhuri’s treatise, al-
Muskirāt. The sources that the ETA cited in its report to the king came not from the 
Islamic tradition, but rather from contemporary Western sources on temperance. For 
example, the ETA believed that William Tyler’s 1895 The Physiological Side of 
Temperance: Why and How it Should be taught and John Arnold Hunter’s 1918 
Alcohol and Life: A manual of Scientific Temperance Teaching for Schools should be 
included in the Egyptian national curriculum. These textbooks, meant for children, 
supported calls for temperance by using “science” to demonstrate the deleterious 
effects of alcohol on the mind and body of the individual. For example: 
All cells are really alike and all poisons such as alcohol act on all cells 
in the same way. If we put this tiny animal [the cell] into four 
tablespoonfuls of water (that is, nearly 1000 drops) and add one single 
drop of alcohol we find that it causes it to curl up slowly, that it is 
poisoned for the time being and stops moving.77  
 
 
162 
The ETA clearly found purchase in the techno-scientific justification for temperance, 
for, as they stated, temperance would “aid the government in cultivating widespread 
peace in the country as well as putting at the fore the issues of health and proper 
etiquette.”78  
 The ETA drew inspiration not only from the latest techno-scientific arguments 
for temperance, but also from prohibition in the United States. For the ETA, the 
Eighteenth Amendment and the subsequent Volstead Act were prime examples to 
other countries of the benefits of temperance. The ETA were so sure of the positive 
effects of prohibition on the United States that they spent several pages in their 1924 
report debunking the anti-temperance rhetoric that was starting to percolate after the 
enforcement of prohibition. In particular, the report contains the response of Ahmad 
Ghalwash to an article that claims prohibition led previously sober-minded Americans 
into drunkenness by limiting their freedoms and thereby stimulating resistance.79  
Ghalwash explained why this thinking was flawed and why prohibition was an 
extremely positive development “in the most advanced country in the world.”80 
Ghalwash argued that drinking alcohol had no relationship with personal freedom. He 
reasoned that the consumer of alcohol was not entitled to rights, like personal 
freedom, because alcohol clouds the mind, causes people to act recklessly, and leads 
them to take the importance of order in life lightly. Thus a drinker cannot perform the 
duties that are incumbent on a citizen to receive his rights. More importantly, because 
one of the prime duties of the nation was to protect its citizen from harm, it was 
within the country’s rights to circumscribe alcohol consumption, on the grounds that 
it was a harmful activity.81  
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 As is obvious from his argument, Ghalwash was heavily versed in Western 
temperance writing, with a special predilection for the pseudo-scientific. This 
familiarity should come as no surprise considering the relationship he had with 
temperance advocates like Pussyfoot Johnson and Morton Howell; both reviewed one 
of his books. Moreover, Ghalwash had lived in Europe for many years and acquired a 
Ph.D. from the University of Brussels and a Litt.D. from the University of Helsinki.82 
His commitment to bridging the intellectual gap between the West and Egypt was so 
strong that he penned a series in the Majallat al-Azhār (al-Azhar’s Official Magazine) 
entitled “The Religion of Islam” that attempted “to give to English readers a concise 
and fair history of the Prophet Mohammad and to present an accurate account of the 
religion of Islam wrongly called (Mohammeddanism [sic]).”83 However, the most 
proximate and prominent sources of Western temperance thought in Egypt at the time 
was the international wing of an American temperance organization, the Woman’s 
Christian Temperance Union (WCTU).   
 
Christian Temperance 
The Anglo-American temperance movement entered Egypt under the direction 
of Mary Clement Leavitt, “a former Boston schoolteacher and the mother of three,” 
who embarked on a mission of reconnaissance for the World Woman’s Christian 
Temperance Union (WWCTU), the international wing of the WCTU, in 1884.84 Her 
entry into Egypt, and Christian temperance’s entry in general, was not a reflection of a 
population clamoring for aid from the West in battling the evils of intemperance. 
Rather, as I will show in this section, Christian temperance came to Egypt because of 
temperance activists’ desire to further validate their movement by internationalizing 
it. This desire to export the good message of temperance fit neatly with the imperialist 
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ventures of the West in Egypt, which eased the access of Christian missionaries to the 
country, protected them from violent responses, and provided them with an audience 
for their message.   
The WCTU’s push to internationalize the temperance movement was both an 
outgrowth of the Protestant millennial vision, in which the world must be made a 
welcoming place for “the word of the Lord” before the end of days, and the 
recognition by the WCTU’s leader, Frances Willard, who took over in 1879, of the 
opportunities that internationalism, and specifically an Anglo-American alliance, 
offered the WCTU.85 By tying their cause to the British through appeals to racial and 
cultural solidarity between Great Britain and America, the WCTU had the opportunity 
to spread their message in a world that the British Empire was making more 
connected.86 This strategy proved prescient as the increased interference of colonial 
powers in Egypt and other Ottoman territories, especially those of the British Empire, 
provided an “armor of imperial power” for Christian evangelicalism in Islamic lands, 
where it would otherwise have been met with tremendous hostility.87  
The international work of the WCTU, where the temperance activists 
attempted to spread “the white ribbon” around the world, generally took two forms: 
the intrepid temperance fighter sent out to travel the world and spread the message of 
temperance, and the local union composed of internationally based missionaries who 
supported the WCTU’s mission. Leavitt’s work is emblematic of the first form. In the 
course of her globe-spanning eight-year trip, she spent three months in Egypt, 
stopping in both Cairo and Alexandria and speaking fifteen times with “all but four 
meetings being for natives.”88 Besides being an opportunity to collect useful data on 
the worldwide temperance movement, these temperance tours were also, ideally, 
supposed to effect change by preaching about the evils of intoxicants at conferences 
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and lectures.89 However, these speaking tours had limited potential for results, as the 
majority of the audience members were those already in support of temperance. The 
WCTU itself was aware of the limited capabilities of these tours, recognizing that 
they were often “wholly inadequate to accomplish the work which [wa]s so sorely 
need[ed].”90   
The formation of a temperance union of locally based missionaries was the 
primary way the WCTU sought to counter the superficiality of the work of what I call 
the “temperance tourist.” However, these unions were still linked to the temperance 
tourist, as it was the tourist who often established the unions. In this regard, Leavitt 
was also quite active, working with the American Presbyterian Mission to found the 
first WCTUs in Cairo and Alexandria, under the auspices of the World’s Woman’s 
Christian Temperance Union (WWCTU). It was she who appointed their presidents. 
The work of Leavitt and the WWCTU was bolstered in 1928 when Agnes Slack, then 
Secretary of the WWCTU, toured Ottoman Syria and Egypt, founding a WCTU in 
every city in which she landed but did not find a union: Beirut, Alexandria, Fayoum, 
Beni Suef (Egypt), Minia, and Assiout. Emblematic of the disconnect between the 
desires of WCTU members and the populations themselves, this spree continued 
despite the fact that the Cairo WCTU was struggling with a membership of no more 
than twenty-five people.91 
In Egypt, the WCTU was intimately tied to the American Mission in Egypt, 
supported by the United Presbyterian Church of North America (UPCNA); most of its 
members were either missionaries for the UPCNA or Egyptian converts who were 
trained in one of the Presbyterian schools. This relationship with the Presbyterian 
denomination did not prevent the WCTU from working closely with members of 
other congregations in other Ottoman lands. For example, the WCTU in Egypt had a 
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close relationship with Mildred White, a Quaker and head of the Ramallah WCTU.92  
The ecumenism of the WWCTU appears to have been an organization-wide principle 
of the group, especially after 1890, when there was a strong push to use foreign 
missionaries as temperance organizers.93  Ecumenism was certainly one answer to the 
problem of low membership numbers.  
   The issue of low membership sorely affected the WCTU in Egypt, much to 
the chagrin of its members and the home base in America.  For example, in 1930, the 
membership comprised forty in Cairo; one hundred and fifty in Assiut; thirty-five in 
Luxor; and twenty in Alexandria. These numbers represented total numbers, not 
active members, and even included young girls who became members while they 
were students at missionary schools.94 These numbers must be further qualified by the 
fact that the WCTU records state that only about five to ten women participated in the 
planning of its activities in Egypt and, in general, operations relied on one missionary 
for the UPCNA, Anna Young Thompson (1851–1932).   
Until recently, the work of Thompson’s male counterparts has overshadowed 
her work in Egypt, largely because, despite keeping immaculate records, Thompson 
never produced a scholarly work or missionary history.95 In recent years, however, 
the monographs American Evangelicals in Egypt and She Sat Where They Sat: A 
Memoir of Anna Young Thompson of Egypt, as well as the dissertation “Anna Young 
Thompson: American Missionary, Cultural Ambassador and Reluctant Feminist in 
Egypt 1872–1932,” have all done much to establish Thompson’s place among the 
most influential missionaries in Egypt.96  
Her temperance career began twenty years after she arrived in Egypt as an 
unmarried missionary for the UPCNA in 1871. It was not long after she started 
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attending meetings of the WCTU in the 1890s that she was chosen as the recording 
secretary. In 1895, the WCTU in Egypt sent her as their delegate to the WWCTU 
Conference in Edinburgh, Scotland.  Around the turn of the century, she became 
president of the National and Cairo WCTU and would serve in these positions until 
1931.97  Thompson was both a tireless worker and excellent Arabic scholar, picking 
up Arabic so quickly that she became an Arabic proficiency evaluator for the 
mission.98 The positive effect of her hard work and Arabic skills cannot be overstated, 
for they provided a recognizable face, who could easily communicate with foreigners 
and Egyptian alike, for the temperance movement.  
During her presidency, Thompson oversaw the meetings of the Cairo WCTU 
and National WCTU at irregular intervals. As evidenced by the title, the National 
WCTU was the union with providence over the entire country. It was, however, also 
located in Cairo, headed by Anna Young Thompson, and its membership had almost a 
complete overlap with the Cairo WCTU. For example, Mrs. Zwemer, the wife of the 
controversial and prominent missionary figure Samuel Zwemer, was a member of 
both organizations. 99  Thus, for clarity’s sake, in the rest of this chapter I will use the 
term “WCTU of Egypt” to refer to not only to the WCTU in Egypt generally, but also 
to refer to the specific branch in Cairo.  
Despite the efforts of Anna Young Thompson, membership in the WCTU of 
Egypt was so low that the meeting schedule was entirely reliant on the whims of its 
members. Meetings were cancelled if one or two members were sick or travelling.100  
Although the WCTU of Egypt was a foreign and poorly supported imposition rather 
than the organic outgrowth of a population demanding temperance, it had a significant 
impact on Islamic modernist thinkers like Ghalwash. As this section will show, 
despite their differing ideologies and membership, the message and activities of the 
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WCTU of Egypt had profound impact on the ideology and actions of Ahmad 
Ghalwash and WCTU. 
For the WCTU of Egypt, temperance was an essential feature of modernity. 
The equating of temperance and modernity was supported by pseudoscientific 
research that showed intoxicants to be a physiological danger to the human body. For 
the WCTU, this research came together in a curriculum that they referred to as 
Scientific Temperance Instruction (STI). STI was a curriculum devised by Mary H. 
Hunt, a schoolteacher from Boston who embraced total abstinence and “temperance 
physiology,” and who taught about the mental and physical health risks of drugs and 
alcohol.101 The list of the books on the curriculum show the underpinnings of this 
mode of thinking: “Evils of Intemperance,” “Alcohol and the Human Body,” 
“Alcohol in Experience and Experiment,” and “Science and Human Life and the 
Alcohol Problem.”102  
 The science behind STI may have not been rigorous, but it did not have to be. 
The message of STI was not aimed at the scientific community, but rather was 
intended to be part of school curricula. For example, the WCTU of Egypt badgered 
the Minister of Education in Egypt for many years to incorporate STI into Egypt’s 
schools.103 Likewise, the science itself was not as important as the ancillary benefits 
of showing any scientific basis for temperance. By establishing the supposed 
scientific basis for their temperance stance, these Anglo-American temperance 
crusaders were hitching their ideology to the techno-scientific ideals of progress, 
cleanliness, and sterility that were important parts of the European discourse of 
modernity at the time.  
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As I have shown above, although Ghalwash did not use the exact term “STI,” 
he did believe strongly in the concepts that it entailed. He also believed in its 
application by the ETA. Although they did not attach the same name to the group of 
books they aimed to insert into the Egyptian curriculum, they did support the 
incorporation of pseudo-scientific temperance into the national curriculum. However, 
where the WCTU of Egypt was an entirely separate curriculum, the ETA envisioned 
this temperance instruction as an important addition to the religious teachings that 
were already part of the Egyptian curriculum.  
The transfer of ideas between the two organizations was aided by the Arabic 
Branch of the WCTU, which was in effect the “Egyptian” WCTU as it was composed 
entirely of Egyptian Christian women. Two of the group’s most prominent members 
were Regina Khayyat, who served as the president of the Arabic Branch for several 
years, and Esther Fahmy Wissa. Both women were from prominent, upper-class 
Egyptian Christian families, were educated in Presbyterian schools in Upper Egypt, 
and worked with the YWCA.104 Wissa was particularly active in philanthropic work 
in Alexandria, founding in 1924 an organization called the Work for Egypt Society 
(Jamʿīyat al-ʿAmal li-Miṣr) that did work for the poor in various capacities.105  While 
the other members of the Arabic Branch were not as famous as these two 
philanthropists, they all seemed to share three characteristics with Wissa and Khayyat: 
all were upper class, Egyptian, and female. The prominence of elite Egyptian 
Christians in this movement was typical of the Christian reform movement that took 
place in Egypt during this period (1880s–1930s).106  
The Arabic branch met separately from the WCTU of Egypt, and the meetings 
were better attended than the meetings of the WCTU of Egypt, with attendance 
ranging from the low teens to the forties.107 This WCTU was semi-autonomous, 
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carrying its own Arabic name, Jamīʿyat al-Sayyidāt al-Masīḥīya li-Manʿ al-Muskirāt 
wa-l-Mukhaḍḍarāṭ bi-l-Quṭr al-Miṣrī (The Union of Christian Women Fighting 
against Drugs and Intoxicants in the Land of Egypt). The organization also had its 
own board, on which a member of the “mother” WCTU sat. Most important for this 
discussion, the Arabic branch of the WCTU put out its own Arabic publications, and 
sponsored lectures and speeches delivered in Arabic.108  
Despite the differences in rhetoric between these two groups, the WCTU of 
Egypt and the ETA, the activities of both were quite similar. The groups were so 
close, in fact, that on two occasions the WCTU of Egypt reached out to the ETA. The 
first was a token gesture, as the WCTU of Egypt sent letters to Ahmad Ghalwash and 
ʿUmar Tusun thanking them for their work on temperance.109  The second was more 
substantial, as Agnes Slack, a temperance tourist and Secretary of the WWCTU, met 
with Ghalwash and Prince Tusun and had tea with ʿUmar Tusun’s wife during her 
weeklong stay in Egypt in 1929.110 The ways in which the WCTU reached out to the 
ETA, through letter writing and face-to-face meetings, were ways that both of these 
organizations tried to effect change in Egypt.  
Both groups also recognized the new power of advertisements. The ETA 
asked newspaper publishers, especially those whose worked for Islamic newspapers, 
not to publish advertisements for alcohol.111 This was a legitimate worry, as alcohol 
companies were one of the primary underwriters of advertisements in newspapers and 
on billboards.112 This call grew out of an organizational recognition of the power of 
advertisements, which during the 1920s and 1930s had become more professional and 
had taken on a greater cultural importance.113 The ETA even sent a letter to the person 
in charge of the Egyptian railways to put up anti-alcohol advertisements in train cars 
and stations.114 The WCTU of Egypt, also cognizant of the newfound power of 
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advertisements, requested similar restrictions on the publication of alcohol 
advertisements in newspapers and on government property and asked for the public 
posting of materials that decried the evils of drink.115  
Although there was great unanimity between the ETA and the WCTU, it 
would be a false dichotomy to place Ghalwash, the ETA’s main ideologue, and 
thinkers like al-Sanhuri at different ends of the temperance spectrum, with Ghalwash 
as the representative of “Western/secular” temperance and al-Sanhuri as the 
representative of “Islamic/religious” temperance. For example, in al-Muskirāt, al-
Sanhuri was not only aware of contemporary temperance activities abroad, but 
provided details about them.  He found great joy and amazement in these activities 
because Westerners had to overcome their long cultural history with alcohol to arrive 
at the “work that comes from the True Religion (Islam) and A Purified Shari‘a 
(Islamic Law).”116 In addition to this delight in the West finding the correct path, al-
Sanhuri was also willing to supplement standard Islamic sources with the science of 
the day to argue that all intoxicants were illicit. His treatise, al-Muskirāt, had sections 
dedicated to the physical, mental, and social dangers of alcohol. The physical danger 
section was further divided into six subsections, with each focusing on alcohol’s 
deleterious effects on certain parts and functions of the body (digestion, liver, eyes, 
nervous system, respiratory and urinary tracts, and general physical strength). Al-
Sanhuri approached these sections with the same rigor with which he approached the 
sections that dealt with the Quran, hadith, etc., and, when appropriate, he cited 
sources. For example, in his section on digestion, he stated, “The work of Dr. Claude 
Bernard has established that the functions of the stomach come to a halt when it 
contains alcohol.”117 
 
172 
Moreover, it would be incorrect to describe Ahmad Ghalwash as a temperance 
thinker who was wholly disconnected from the Arabic tradition. As shown above, he 
was a frequent publisher in the official magazine of al-Azhar, a fact that signals at 
least a familiarity with Islamic thought of the day. Moreover, in an article published in 
English in the al-Azhar journal Muslim Ethics and Moralities, he translated Sura 5:90-
1 (Al- Mā’ida), mentioned above, as, “Wines (including all intoxicating liquors) and 
games of chance and idols and divining arrows are but an abomination of Satan’s 
mischief, avoid them, therefore, that you may prosper.”118  It is clear from this 
translation, especially the first line, that Ghalwash was very familiar with the logical 
leap that undergirded all Islamic temperance writing, namely that khamr equals all 
intoxicants. What both these temperance writers represented was not Western or 
Islamic temperance, but rather “modern” Egyptian Temperance. 
We see the articulation of modern Egyptian temperance in the arguments of 
Ghalwash and Rashid Rida against beer. In Ghalwash’s treatise on alcohol, Athar al-
Khumur fi al-Hayya al-Ijtimaʿiyya (The effect of alcohol on a Society), he places beer 
in a category of beverages that derive from the rotting of intoxicating grains like 
barley, wheat, and rice, and that can carry the name būẓa or, as the pre-Islamic Arabs 
referred to it, mizr.119  Ghalwash was mainly concerned with debunking the claims 
that beer could nourish the body and help people to do good work.  
Ghalwash argued that the amount of nutrients (sugars and proteins) contained 
within beer was so small that to get any nutritional value from the beverage, one 
would have to drink a tremendous amount. This over-consumption would counteract 
any benefits that beer may have because of the large amount of alcohol, which 
poisoned the flesh that would come along with it.120  This is not to mention the fact 
that it cost twenty dirhams to pay for the amount of beer that one would have to 
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consume in order to equal the amount of nourishment contained in one loaf of bread, 
which only cost one dirham. So, for Ghalwash, a person would be extremely stupid 
and wasteful to try to subsist on beer.121 To further show the ridiculousness of this 
idea, Ghalwash then discusses alcohol’s deleterious effects on the digestive tract. He 
states that “science has declared alcoholic beverages have a negative effect on 
digestion and absorption” of nutrients like calcium, phosphorous, and nitrogen that 
are necessary for bone, brain, and muscle growth, because alcohol irritates and 
disturbs the stomach, causing ulcers and inflammation.122 Ghalwash closes with the 
statement that everything he has said is “the absolute truth and what is beyond this 
truth is error (ḍalāl).”123 
Muhammad Rashid Rida makes a similar argument against the healthful 
properties of beer by reproducing and commenting on a letter from a fan in his journal 
al-Manar. In the letter, Dr. Nasr Effendi Farid, an ophthalmologist in Mansura, 
targets Rida’s concession in a previous issue that drinking alcohol might aid in regular 
urination.124 For Farid, this is an unacceptable incitation, and he spends the rest of his 
letter showing the dangers of alcoholic beverages and debunking this myth. For Farid, 
alcoholic beverages only have medicinal properties in rare cases, and these are 
outweighed by the innumerable cases where it is insalubrious (wabīl). As Farid notes, 
doctors in Europe had similarly shown how the ills of alcohol (it could cause insanity, 
general paralysis, and disease of the liver, kidneys, stomach, and heart) outweighed 
the good.125 And it is with this knowledge that European countries of the time pursued 
temperance. For Farid, the claim that beer could activate (tahyīj) and flush out (al-
iḥtiqān) the kidneys was truly dangerous because it led doctors to use beer more and 
more for this purpose. Farid reported that instead of flushing the kidneys, alcohol was 
actually causing their failure and leading to death.126 For Farid, beer was both a moral 
 
174 
issue and a public health issue. Rida closes the piece by thanking the good doctor and 
warning his readers not to be led astray by doctors commanding them to drink nabīdh 
(read beer) to cure what ails them. This practice would be to blindly ape (taqlīd) the 
ornament (zukhruf) of secularism (madiniyya). Readers had to be particularly careful 
because a large number of doctors practiced this deception in order to sell alcoholic 
beverages (khumūr). 
What is noticeable about Farid’s article is that despite the certainty with which 
Rida and the Doctor talk, the actual science behind the argument is rather flimsy. Not 
only did Farid not specialize in nephrology (the study of the kidneys), but also he 
provides no concrete proof of the dangers of alcohol. Rather, Farid simply states that 
some people, unnamed, who have used beer to flush out their kidneys, have caused 
serious damage. Regardless, as I have discussed above, the actual science is not as 
important in these techno-scientific polemics against alcohol as the attachment of 
titles (Doctor) and terminology. Rida obviously found no issue in this, as his closing 
statement is quite strong. His condemnation of doctors prescribing alcoholic 
beverages as medicine is particularly interesting.  He saw this as a result of two 
problems with Egyptian doctors, their blind and unquestioning adoption of secularism 
and their willingness to make money from the moral degradation of other Egyptians. 
As discussed above, it was these two problems, the aping of European (read: un-
Egyptian) habits and the moral degradation of the Egyptian, against which the Islamic 
modernists strongly fought. The techno-scientific temperance of Anglo-American 
Temperance thus provided the idiom for Islamic modernists to fight against the 
healthful properties of alcohol. 
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Legislative Failures 
Despite the powerful rhetoric that bridged two traditions, Egyptian 
Temperance did not really take off in the period from 1925 to 1935. This lack of 
success can be attributed to the fact that neither the Egyptian nor the Anglo-American 
temperance movements enjoyed massive popular support. The limits of the WCTU of 
Egypt’s message have been made patently clear, but the ETA suffered from a lack of 
a popular base as well. In their 1924 report, the ETA conceded that their efforts to 
establish branches in Mansura and Nagʿ Hammadi had failed. In Mansura, the venture 
never got off the ground, and in Nagʿ Hammadi, the president resigned after he could 
not sign up enough members. The ETA attributed these failures to “politics,” but the 
most likely cause was a lack of popular support among the Egyptian population.127 
The popularity of the temperance movement was surely hampered by the long 
indigenous tradition of alcohol consumption that had its origins in Pharaonic times 
and stretched into the 1920s and 1930s.128 Due to the lack of popular support for 
temperance, the WCTU of Egypt and the ETA had to turn to the government to pass 
any temperance legislation. Unfortunately, the government proved unwilling or 
unable to take on the cause of temperance. 
 Perhaps the greatest achievement of the WCTU of Egypt and the ETA was to 
get some elements of scientific temperance instruction (STI) included in the state 
school curriculum.  As Alice Goubran reported in 1930, the Minster of Education 
stated that he would begin including temperance education in the national 
curriculum;129 this was an unqualified success for the temperance movement in Egypt. 
The Egyptian government also implemented the ETA’s request to eliminate new 
licenses for selling alcohol, although this concession was marked with a massive 
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caveat. Yes, the Egyptian government would try to limit new licenses for selling 
liquor, but this legislation did not apply to the European Districts (al-Akhṭāṭ al-
Urūbīya) in five cities—Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said, Ismailia, and the Suez, which 
were hubs of the alcohol trade.130 The exceptional nature of these districts was not 
limited to this one piece of legislation, but was a persistent feature of all Egyptian 
legislation in this period.131 The presence of these exceptional districts made the job 
of the WCTU of Egypt and the ETA even harder, for in addition to not having 
massive popular support, they had a government that could only enact toothless 
temperance reform. The ETA was fully aware of this problem. They lobbied the 
government to end these exceptional districts, and their arguments for temperance 
always accounted for them.132 It is not clear whether the WCTU of Egypt was equally 
cognizant of this impediment, but they suffered equally from it. 
Nevertheless, they were fighting a losing battle. Whereas the temperance 
movement was supported by the work of hundreds, maybe thousands in Egypt, there 
was a market of hundreds of thousands who were looking to consume alcohol, 
especially beer. A 1934 study on the beer market in Egypt reasoned that there were 
more than three hundred thousand Egyptians and “foreigners” who drank beer.133 
These “foreigners” were comprised primarily of Mutamaṣṣirūn (Egyptianized 
Foreigners).134 This grouping did not include the seventy-five hundred British soldiers 
who were stationed throughout Egypt. The analyst separated them from the rest of the 
foreigners because their consumption was rather prolific. They consumed 
approximately 17,000 hectoliters per year, which put their per capita consumption at 
220 liters per year.135    
Despite being a minority of the population of roughly fourteen million people 
living in Egypt, this group of beer drinkers was a profitable market. For example, in 
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1929, residents of Egypt drank more than 130,000 hectoliters of beer, of which more 
than 70,000 came from local brewers.136  In that same year, the net profit of Crown 
Brewery and Bomonti-Pyramid Brewery was around 280,000 pounds.137 These would 
be high water marks for nearly a decade, as the Great Depression would hit in that 
same year. By 1933, total beer consumption had dropped to its lowest level during the 
decade, at 71,000 hectoliters, with local production making up roughly 42,000 
hectoliters.138  Despite the continuing poor economic conditions, consumption would 
only rise from 1933 to the end of the decade.  
 Of the breweries that were selling their beer in Egypt, it was Crown and 
Bomonti-Pyramid that supplied the majority of the beer consumed. For example, in 
1934, these two breweries sold 59% of the roughly 85,000 hectoliters that were 
consumed in the country, of which Bomonti-Pyramid sold 33%.139 When we look at 
consumption of non-British Army personnel, the Crown and Bomonti-Pyramid 
dominance becomes even starker. In 1934, non-British army personnel consumed 
more than 68,000 hectoliters of beer. Bomonti-Pyramid and Crown of the Egyptian 
market sold 77% percent of this beer, with Bomonti-Pyramid accounting for 44%.140      
 It is hardly surprising, then, that Bomonti-Pyramid did quite well during the 
Depression. That is not to say that the breweries weathered the Depression unscathed. 
In order to maintain investment in the company during this time, it had to offer a 
dividend that paid six percent, which impeded its ability to replenish its reserve 
capital and made the company financially vulnerable.  However, outside of the three-
year period from 1930–03, the company maintained a relatively stable rate of profit 
between 4.5 and 6 percent.141 It is important to remember that while the Bomonti-
Pyramid Brewing Company was consistently profitable during this period, it was 
arguably less profitable than other “core” industries like the Egyptian Salt and Soda 
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company, which was capitalized at 485,347 Egyptian pounds in 1937 and saw profits 
at 11.3 percent, as compared to the 192,875 Egyptian pounds of Pyramid Brewing 
company and its six percent profit margin.142 
Beer was not only making a strong economic impression in Egypt, but a 
cultural one as well. A prominent example of the growing cultural presence of beer in 
Egypt is the appearance of a beer-centered ritual in Egyptian nightclubs. As Karin van 
Nieuwkerk describes, inside clubs in the 1920s and 1930s, female entertainers were 
tasked with the fatḥ (Arabic Opening), whereby the entertainers would walk from 
customer to customer and ask if he would like to drink with her. This fatḥ would often 
turn into a competition between men to exhibit their wealth and masculinity, with the 
beer bottle serving as the ostensible measure of power. A male customer might, for 
example, order a dozen bottles of beer and have them brought by a train of attendants 
in order to show off.143 
However, temperance in Egypt not only faced governmental and cultural 
issues, but the fading power of the temperance movement internationally, which 
started to falter almost immediately after the passing of the Eighteenth Amendment 
and the Volstead Act in the United States. This loss of support was deeply troubling 
to temperance crusaders abroad, so it is not surprising that the ETA weighed in on this 
very issue.144 In their 1924 report, Ghalwash specifically addressed the claim that 
Prohibition was failing in America because it did not reflect the wishes of the people. 
He countered this argument by pointing out that 1919 was not the origin of American 
temperance; there had been temperance legislation dating back to 1808, but merely 
the date in which thirty out of forty-eight states approved the measure. He then quoted 
Charles W. Eliot, president of Harvard at the time, on the positive impact of 
Prohibition on the spirit, health, morals, and manners of the country. Ghalwash 
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claimed that American factory workers had become healthier and more productive 
because they had replaced beer with the more healthful beverage of milk, and that 
America, in general, had become the healthiest nation in the world. Ghalwash noted 
that Prohibition had helped the American mind as well as body; cases of insanity 
dropped three percent in New York after 1920.145 Despite the protestations of 
Ghalwash, the international temperance movement went out with a whimper in Egypt 
after the American temperance movement suffered a fatal blow with the repeal of the 
Eighteenth Amendment in 1933. Although both organizations continued to exist after 
this date, with the ETA surviving until the present day, their moment of international 
and domestic relevance had passed. 
 
Conclusion 
It appears that over the period 1923 to 1935 in Egypt, supporters of the 
production and sale of beer within the country claimed victory over those who 
opposed the modern beer industry. Despite the strongly reasoned arguments by 
Islamic modernists such as Muhammad Rashid Rida, Ahmad Ahmad Ghalwash, and 
Muhammad Farag al-Sanhuri, the Egyptian government and the Egyptian people were 
unwilling to concede that beer was without benefit and that they should abstain from 
it. Drinking beer, with all its meanings, was highly important to foreign soldiers, 
Egyptianized foreigners, and a growing group of educated middle class and elite 
Egyptians. Although advertisers’ claims of the healthful properties of beer appear 
exaggerated when viewed through the lens of our own day, their positioning of beer 
as an essential part of a “modern” life clearly had some resonance of a kind that 
endures even today. As we will see with later Stella advertisements, the idea that beer 
was a modern drink intended to refresh and revive drinkers not only survived, but also 
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came to shape the consumption patterns of more and more Egyptians who drank it.  
Nevertheless, this defeat should not be interpreted as an indictment of Islamic 
modernist thought. As I have shown, when it came to temperance, Islamic modernist 
thought was able to absorb techno-scientific arguments of an Islamophobic 
movement, the WCTU, and graft it onto the Islamic tradition to produce a powerful 
argument against beer. Indicative of how Islamic modernist thought would come to 
dominate in Egypt, this movement was able to subvert the narrative of Western 
dominance and position Islam as the way forward. 
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Chapter 5: Crowning the Pyramid: The Egyptian Beer Industry’s 
“Mature” Period (1940–1952) 
  
By the late 1930s, beer had become a significant, though contentious, element 
of “modern” Egyptian culture.  The ascent of beer corresponded to a transformation in 
Egypt’s beer production from artisanal craft to well-developed industry. This chapter 
looks at the two companies that came to dominate the beer industry in the 1940s, 
Crown Brewery and Bomonti-Pyramid Brewery. As they enter what I call their 
“mature period,” which spanned from 1940 to 1952, these companies took the form 
that they would maintain until 1963: that is, a partnership with converging executive 
structures, shareholders, and business practices. This convergence was spearheaded 
by the Amsterdam-based multinational corporation Heineken Brewing Company 
(Heineken Bierbrouwerij-Maatschappij), hereafter Heineken. Heineken had targeted 
the Crown and Pyramid breweries for inclusion in their ever-expanding empire after 
having seen the developments and profits of these two companies up to 1940. A third 
feature of the companies’ mature period, in addition to being characterized by 
partnership and by Heineken’s influence, was their struggle to maintain their hybrid 
identities as truly trans-national ventures. The companies could not be classified either 
as strictly Dutch or Egyptian ventures. This hybrid state was crucial to the companies’ 
success prior to 1940, but it became problematic in the 1940s as the world that was far 
less accepting of ambiguity in nationality and economics. 
 The transformation of the companies from relative autonomous entities to 
Heineken guided ventures stemmed from a single catastrophic event: World War II, 
the largest war that the world had yet seen. Heineken’s push to consolidate Crown and 
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Pyramid Breweries represented its unwillingness to continue to suffer the 
inefficiency, of which it had become acutely aware of during the war, of being a 
passive shareholder a continent away. After the war, Heineken sought greater control 
over its assets to maximize profits and ease the exploitation of the Egyptian market. 
This meant that not only would Crown and Pyramid be more closely tied together, but 
also that Heineken would play a larger role in the activities of both companies. These 
actions reflected Heineken’s attempt to transform these companies, in the words of 
Robert L. Tignor, from being loosely administered firms to tightly controlled firms.1   
 Heineken was not the only party that was inspired by the extraordinary 
circumstances of the war to demand greater control of the breweries. The Egyptian 
government, too, came to interact and control businesses in a way that it had never 
before. Since the 1920s, there had been growing demand among Egyptian politicians 
for greater control of their economy, especially vis-à-vis the “foreign” elements 
present. These two trends, toward greater control and targeting the “foreign” element, 
converged in 1947 in the Company Law, which granted unprecedented powers to the 
Egyptian government to deal with joint-stock companies that it classified as “foreign.”  
Whereas in the 1920s and 1930s these companies and their actions had been relatively 
unsupervised, starting in 1947, they had to reckon with a more invasive and self-
assured government that had a very narrow idea of what an Egyptian company was. 
 As both of these forces, Heineken and the Egyptian government, exerted 
greater control over Pyramid and Crown breweries, they did not sit passively. Rather, 
they fought both actively and surreptitiously against outside control. In both 
companies’ interactions with Heineken, they used the geographic distance between 
them and the Amsterdam headquarters in order to reject or slow down actions that 
they found distasteful; thus, they were able to negotiate from a position of weakness. 
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In the breweries’ interactions with the Egyptian government, despite the rising 
political tide of economic nationalism, they were able, with the aid of their Dutch 
backers, to maintain their hybridity.   
The argument of this chapter proceeds in five sections. The first section looks 
at how cinematic portrayals of beer signaled a new cultural acceptance of the 
beverage. The following section examines how Heineken entered the Egyptian beer 
industry. The third and fourth sections look at how the new conglomeration of 
Heineken, Crown, and Pyramid dealt with external factors. Section three discusses 
how these three entities managed Egypt’s involvement in World War II and its 
aftermath. The fourth section then looks at how Heineken, Crown, and Pyramid 
grappled with a more invasive Egyptian government pushing Egyptianization. Finally, 
this chapter closes by looking at how the demographics of the shareholders of Crown 
and Pyramid’s exemplified their statuses as endangered transnational enterprises in an 
increasingly “nationalistic” Egypt.  
 
Celluloid Consumption 
In tracing the place of beer in Egyptian culture, film is an excellent place to 
look, as its development in Egypt tracked a parallel path to the development of the 
nation’s beer industry. Film entered Egypt before the beer industry, in 1896.2 Both 
Egypt’s beer industry and its film industry adopted technological advances from 
Europe. The first films, recorded on a cinematograph by the Lumière brothers, 
Auguste and Louis, had been played for Paris audiences in 1895.3 Less than thirty 
years later, the first films appeared in Egypt. The first full-length film produced in 
Egypt, Fi bilād Tut ʿAnkh Amūn (In the Land of Tutankhamen), premiered in 1923.4  
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This section traces how cinematic portrayals of beer signal a new cultural acceptance 
of the beverage in Egypt.  
By the 1930s, the film industry, like the beer industry, had become what 
Europeans would call a modern industry; and by the 1940s, it had become a powerful 
force in Egyptian culture. Between 1945 and 1952, the film industry produced over 
four hundred films.5 It was in this same period that film became an art form that was 
crafting a new “middle-class bourgeois nationalist identity.” 6  It stands to reason that 
beer would appear in films, as it too was becoming a cultural force in this period. 
Indeed, from 1940 to 1952, the beer industry experienced sustained success. After 
1923, other industries, like hard manufacturing, food production, and textiles would 
overtake the beer industry, but never the latter lost its profitability. In 1946, for 
example, Crown Brewery’s net profits totaled the significant sum of 106,000 LE.7  
The films discussed in this section tend to show that beer drinkers were 
coming from the old groupings of the effendiya and the urban underclass. However, as 
Lucie Ryzova notes, the boundaries of these groupings had shifted by the 1940s. The 
effendiya, the urban office class, in the period following Egypt’s semi-independence 
in 1922 came to represent, at least for the liberal nationalists, the perceived middle of 
Egyptian society. The effendiya were the bearers of the national mission, and they 
were distinct from the awlād al-balad (native sons, “the good guys”), the fellahin, and 
the awlād al-dhawāt (Arabic, sons of distinction, the “elite”).8 In practice, to be an 
effendi was to inhabit a liminal place between the lower and upper classes, to be a 
secular, modern, and liberally educated person who strove for the modern, secular, 
elite lifestyle, but whose background and financial status kept one separate from that 
elite.9  
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With this shift from broad to specific characterizations, the effendiya became 
distinct from the classes above and below, at least in the minds of intellectuals. 
Whereas previously the effendiya included both the elite and the Western educated 
non-elite, the term came more and more to refer to those urban subalterns who had 
undertaken “effendification,” while the Westernized elite took the name of awlād al-
dhawāt.  Likewise, with most of the new effendi transitioning from the urban 
subaltern, what it meant to be a non-effendi resident of a town or a city came to be 
encapsulated in the concepts of the awlād al-balad and al-futūwwāt (Arabic, youths). 
As Wilson Chacko Jacob has shown, despite the term futūwwa’s multivalent and 
complicated history, by the 1930s, the term was divested of much of its positive 
characteristics and came to resemble the concept of al-balṭagī (thug, tough, etc.).10  
Similar to the depiction of cigarettes in films, it was these imagined groups 
(awlād al-dhawāt, awlād al-balad, futūwwāt, and the effendiyya) that shaped 
depictions of beer consumption in Egypt in the post-independence period.11 For the 
elite, their consumption of alcohol was assumed and unquestioned. Many movies 
from the period 1930 to 1950 show upper-crust men and women dressed in fine 
Western clothing, listening to music and dancing while enjoying alcoholic beverages. 
While generally the type of alcohol remains obscure, in a few notable exceptions, beer 
takes center stage. For example, in al-ʿAzima (Determination, 1939), as ʿAdli Bey 
(Anwar Wagdi) talks to Muhammad Hanafi (Hussein Sidky) about their joint business 
venture, using a phone located in a bar, a Stella advertisement sits prominently in the 
background.12 The advertisement is so legible and prominent that it can only have 
been intentionally placed in the frame.  
In an even more prominent example, from the movie ʿUsta Hasan (Boss 
Hasan, 1952), the rich Svengali, Kawsar (Zuzu Madi), has a refrigerator stocked with 
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beer bottles bearing the unmistakable star logo of Stella beer.13 The bottle is 
fetishized, with the camera making it one of the most prominent images on the screen. 
In addition, the bottle is used as a metonymy for beer and alcohol more generally. 
This ability to have the branded bottle serve as a signifier of alcohol in general is 
evidence of the effectiveness of the beer advertisements of the 1930s. By the 1940s, 
these advertisers had achieved what they desired: the bottle, a symbol of what I call 
total control brewing, had entered Egyptian culture as the symbol of beer.  Total 
control brewing was the idea that a company could produce a standardized, sturdy, 
and sanitary product by assiduously applying the latest in brewing technologies. The 
scene in ʿUsta Hasan is important in showing the cultural footprint of the beer bottle, 
and of beer in general. The film again links the consumption of beer to the elite, 
although it adds a layer of complexity by portraying upper class women’s 
consumption of it as normative. This portrayal was atypical for the time, as alcohol 
was still generally reserved for men.   
Egyptian films also portrayed urban subalterns as drinkers of beer. The two 
most prominent examples of such characters are Hamida (Shukri Sarhan) in Ibn al-Nil 
(Nile Boy, 1951) and Hasan (Farid Shawqi) in ʿUsta Hasan.14 In Ibn al-Nil, whose 
very title evokes the idea of the awlād al-balad, a fellah named Hamida travels to 
Cairo to escape his life in the village. Fresh off the train, Hamida searches for a place 
to spend the night and ends up in a dance club. Unsurprisingly, he is enticed by the 
vices of the club, and in an act that sets off a terrible chain of events, he succumbs to a 
dancer and to beer, and eventually loses all of his money. In the scene, beer, depicted 
in an overflowing stein, is closely associated with the dancer (Samiha Tawfiq) 
through interspersing of images of the frothy mug with her gyrating.  In the case of 
Hasan, Kawsar entices him to abandon his humble lifestyle and become her paramour 
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with gifts and plentiful food and drink. In one of the film’s pivotal scenes, in which 
the protagonist begins to realize the pleasures possible in this new life, Hasan gorges 
himself on a whole turkey and drinks three bottles of beer.  This plenty appears in 
stark contrast to the penurious lifestyle he lived in his humble home.  
The blatant consumption of beer in the film is not without consequences for 
the two main characters. A common refrain in these and other pre-1960s Egyptian 
films is that the ibn al-balad who drinks ultimately suffers for doing so. In the case of 
Hamida, his first night of drinking transforms him from the naïve yet authentic ibn al-
balad into a cynical and violent futūwwa. Eventually, his new lifestyle leads him to 
jail, although he is later freed and returns home. As for Hasan, beer marks an even 
more tragic transformation. He leaves his life as hard-working mechanic to become a 
morally corrupt bon vivant. There he has two unhappy relationships (with his wife and 
Kawsar), and sees his son come to physical harm and Kawsar get murdered. Hasan is 
only freed to learn from his mistakes and resume his original life because of the 
surprise confession of Kawsar’s invalid husband to the woman’s murder. These 
details from the film Ibn al-Nil, which emphasize the dangers of modernity to the 
uneducated but authentic awlād al-balad, the transformative power of beer emerges as 
a key theme.  In each case, alcohol has caused the protagonist to make the incorrect 
transition. Neither character has moved from authentic native son to hard working and 
respectable member of the middle class. Instead, they both transition to more 
profitable but morally bankrupt phases. This narrative of the drinking-led downfall for 
the ibn al-balad is echoed in other media as well. For example, we see this narrative 
in Bayram al-Tunsi’s zajal poems, “rhymed strophic poems composed in non-
classical Arabic based rhythmically on metrical patterns adapted from the classical 
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tradition.”15 In his massive 1924 zajal poem Il Baladi, “Abd al-Salam, the writer, is 
brought down by his ever increasing consumption of beer and whiskey.”16     
The idea that the consumption of beer and alcohol is dangerous in general is 
supported by the depiction of the effendiya in movies, who generally remain 
teetotalers.  For example, the main protagonist (and arch-hero) of al-ʿAzima, 
Muhammad Hanafi, avoids drinking even when he visits his good friend, the elite 
playboy ʿAdli, in a bar.  This abstemiousness is seen in other effendi protagonists like 
Hamid (ʿImad Hamdi) in al-Suq al-Sawdaʾ (Black Market, 1945) and Taha Effendi 
(Yusuf Wahbi) in Ibn al-Haddad (Son of the Blacksmith, 1944).17  The middle class 
protagonist is not always strictly abstemious; for example, Munir (Farid al-ʿAtrash) in 
Ahebbek Inta (I Love You Only, 1949) is a telegraph operator and part-time singer, 
who in the course of his work consumes alcohol. In this role and many others, Farid 
al-ʿAtrash’s characters are notable for their entirely normative relationships with 
alcohol.18   
The differences in the films’ treatments of alcohol can be attributed to 
differences in the films’ respective purposes. The difference between the 
“commercial/melodramatic” film and the “art/realistic” film in Egypt may not have 
been as sharp as some critics would imply, as Walter Armbrust and Joel Gordon have 
argued, but the difference still did exist.19 In films like al-Suq al-Sawdaʾ (The Black 
Market, 1945), ʿUsta Hasan (Boss Hasan, 1952), al-ʿAzima (Determination, 1939), 
and other realistic films, directors portrayed, with varying degrees of success, Egypt 
as it existed in everyday life. While the melodramatic films starring Muhammad ʿAbd 
al-Wahab, Farid ʿAtrash, and Abd al-Halim Hafiz, certainly reflected some aspects of 
the Egyptian reality, the films aimed more to entertain than to faithfully reproduce the 
social conditions of contemporary Egypt. This meant that these films depicted alcohol 
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consumption as a part of the aspirational lifestyle that the films glorified. This 
depiction contrasted to realistic films, in which alcohol consumption was cited along 
with gambling and sex as a symptom of corruption wrought by mimicking the West.  
The different depictions of alcohol consumption vis-à-vis the imagined middle class 
or effendiya reflected Egyptian intellectuals’ uncertainty over what the ideal mix of 
modern and traditional should be, particularly for the group whom they envisioned to 
be the true bearers of Egypt’s future.20  
 
Consolidation 
While the depiction of beer and alcohol in film was somewhat ambiguous, 
there was no ambiguity about who controlled the beer industry in Egypt in this period, 
it was Heineken. How it came to dominate was a convoluted process emblematic of 
greater changes in the Egyptian economy. The Bomontis’ purchase of Pyramid 
Brewery marked a distinct break in the history of the beer industry in Egypt. After 
1923, the beer industry was subject to two trends particular to the Egyptian economy 
between 1918 and 1950: consolidation and Egyptianization.  The consolidation 
process began with the Bomontis who combined three companies into Bomonti-
Pyramid Brewery in 1923. Before even consolidating all of their holdings, Bomonti-
Pyramid had worked out a sales agreement, as detailed in chapter 3, with their main 
competitor, Crown Brewery in 1921.  This sales agreement proved very lucrative for 
both firms. For example, they sold more than 75,000 hectoliters of beer in Egypt in 
1928.21 
Their success caught the eye of Rene Gaston-Dreyfus, the son of a wealthy 
French banker, who had established a brewery in Morocco, Brasserie du Maroc, in the 
1920s. Thus in 1928 he started overtures to try to enter into the Egyptian beer market. 
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Gaston-Dreyfus initially went to Charles Cantoni, who was serving as the head of 
Crown Brewery, with grand plans of buying the entire local industry. However, when 
Cantoni only offered Gaston-Dreyfus 3,000 shares, a small non-controlling stake, he 
decided to look for other ways to achieve his goals. Gaston-Dreyfus settled on 
Bomonti-Pyramid, when one of his business contacts alerted him that Jacques Ruch, 
who owned 45% of Bomonti-Pyramid stock and was the largest shareholder, was 
willing to sell. After an initial rebuttal, Gaston-Dreyfus was able not only to buy 
Ruch’s shares in Bomonti-Pyramid, but those in the Istanbul based-brewery Bomonti-
Nectar. With these interests now added to his Cairo, and Moroccan interests, Gaston-
Dreyfus now had a small multi-national venture, which he incorporated and named 
Société Fináciere Brasseries (Sofibra) in 1929.  
After buying into Bomonti-Pyramid, Gaston-Dreyfus set out to “purify” the 
board of the company. Although Bomonti-Pyramid had been successful, it appeared 
to Gaston-Dreyfus that Curt Bomonti, the son of the eponymous founder Walter, and 
his cousin Rudolph Yost, had placed the company on a dangerous path. Gaston-
Dreyfus saw Curt, who was the chairmen of the board, as a dimwitted clod who 
preferred to spend nights out on the town rather than do any work. The only reason he 
maintained his position was due to the fact that his family held so many shares. Yost, 
who was the managing director, in Gaston-Dreyfus’ view had enriched himself off the 
company, but had done very little for it. As a result of their mismanagement, 
Bomonti-Pyramid was unable to have production meet up with the growing demands 
of the Egyptian population and thus had to sell inferior beer that would have 
otherwise been tossed away.22 Thus by 1932, Gaston-Dreyfus, through some clever 
maneuvering, was able to excise both Bomonti and Yost and replace them with Rene 
Ismalun and Pierre Geisenberger, respectively. Gaston-Dreyfus was familiar with 
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Geisenberger and his work at brewery in Dakar, while Ismalun, who was part of the 
Egyptian Jewish community, cam highly recommended by one of Gaston-Dreyfus’ 
associates. Gaston-Dreyfus, showing his imperial chauvinism, did not have a high 
valuation of Ismalun. He believed that he was lazy and “not a genius,” but he was, 
most importantly, honest.23  
After reorganizing Bomonti-Pyramid, Gaston-Dreyfus set about taking control 
of Crown. He found his way in with a stockholder named Mr. Rollo.  After 
convincing him to sell his 4,000 shares, he was able to manipulate him and Crown 
and raise his stock holding to 9,000 shares. He would have been able to take a 
majority over the company by buying the 3,000 shares from Cantoni, were it not for 
the intervention of Constantine Mouratiadis. As discussed in chapter 3, he was the 
tangible link between Crown and Pyramid under the Bomontis, as he ran the sales 
operations for both breweries in Cairo and was a major stockholder in Crown. Seeing 
the aggressive maneuvering of Gaston-Dreyfus and fearing for the lucrative life he 
had carved out for himself, he entrenched himself both within the operations with 
Cairo and in the Crown Brewery board. Thus before Gaston-Dreyfus could have the 
chance, he was able to become the Chairmen of the Board of Crown and the majority 
shareholder in Crown.24  
Gaston-Dreyfus, sought the advice of his men on the ground, like 
Geisenberger, on how to proceed to the first real roadblock to his control of the 
Egyptian beer industry. They advised Gaston-Dreyfus that if Sofibra engaged in open 
warfare with Mouratiadis, they would be embroiled in a ruinous war that would 
fracture the excellent working relationship between Crown and Pyramid and cost 
Bomonti-Pyramid a great deal of money.25 They rather advised Gaston-Dreyfus to 
come to an agreement with Mouratiadis, which granted his desired autonomy in the 
 
197 
Alexandria, so that he and Sofibra could work together and maintain the profitability 
of the two breweries. This détente not only avoided a costly conflict, but allowed 
Bomonti-Pyramid to build up enough reserves that if Mouratiadis proved himself a 
problem they could engage in open warfare with him. However, it never came to that 
as after the initial bit of posturing they settled into a workable and profitable 
partnership.  Gaston-Dreyfus cultivated an excellent relationship with their respective 
administrations. Although he was based abroad, in Paris, he spearheaded close 
collaborations between the boards and encouraged unanimity in the breweries’ 
goals.26  Gaston-Dreyfus had such a positive influence that when Heineken bought 
him out, members of the Crown Brewery board asked him to stay on as an executive 
member.27  
The foreign-backed consolidation of the beer industry in Egypt was typical of 
the Egyptian joint stock companies of the time. As Relli Shechter shows in Smoking, 
Culture and Economy in the Middle East, the Egyptian tobacco industry underwent a 
similar process of centralization driven by the multi-national British-American 
Tobacco Company (BAT). In the period that Bomonti-Pyramid was consolidating the 
beer market, BAT rapidly expanded in Egypt. By 1927, it owned six tobacco factories 
in Egypt and had become the second biggest tobacco company in the country. In that 
same year, it merged with the largest tobacco company in Egypt, Matossian, and 
renamed the conglomeration Eastern.  At that point Eastern owned 90 percent of the 
tobacco market.28 Likewise, Robert L. Tignor describes how a few, “heavily 
capitalized, vertically integrated, and politically powerful firms” took control of the 
textile industry in Egypt in the 1920s.29  The push for consolidation in all of these 
industries was spurred on by the tariff reforms of 1930.  Local leading business 
magnates saw these reforms, which were meant to limit imports, as their opportunity 
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to dominate their respective sectors. They thus aimed to establish “large and powerful 
firms in the late 1920s” to make it difficult for new firms to enter.30 
After buying into Crown and Pyramid, Gaston-Dreyfus continued to look to 
expand his international holdings. His main project after Crown and Pyramid was 
increasing his presence in Indonesia by establishing a brewery in Java.31 Since it was 
a Dutch colony at the time, Gaston-Dreyfus aimed to partner with a Dutch brewery in 
the venture. He found a willing partner in Heineken Brewing Company, one of the 
largest brewers in the world, and its representative in the area, Jonkheer Pieter R. 
Feith. When Sofibra and Heineken went to Java they agreed that the only place 
suitable for a new brewery was the city of Surabaya. Unfortunately another company, 
Coloniale Brasserie (Cobra), had purchased land there in hopes of building their own. 
Although they were initially discouraged, Sofibra and Heineken came upon a solution 
when, in the 1930s, they came in contact with another multinational brewing interest 
looking to expand its brand, Société Anonyme Internationale de Brasserie (Interbra). 
This Belgian company, had interests in Belgium, France, Belgian Congo, and Angola 
and, incidentally, owned Coloniale Brasserie (Cobra).32 
In line with Heineken’s aggressive international expansion plan of the 1930s, 
the brewing giant purchased all three of the companies (Sofibra, Intebra, and Cobra). 
With regard to Egypt, the investment in Sofibra provided an entrance into a market 
that it coveted; the chairman of Heineken had visited Egypt after the First World War 
and was impressed by the rapid development that the beer companies had made 
during that time.33  Heineken’s entrance into the Egyptian beer industry thus began in 
1937 and was spearheaded by the investment company Cobra, re-named N.V. 
Koloniale Brouwerijen, which relocated to Amsterdam.34 Cobra had become, after the 
purchase of and incorporation of Sofibra and Interbra, the main vector for Heinken’s 
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international expansion. It had investments not only in Egypt, but also in Indonesia 
(Heineken Netherlands-Indonesian Brewing Company in Surabaya), Singapore 
(Malayan Breweries), and Brussels (Société Internationale de Brasserie). This last 
brewery even had its own international holdings in France (Metz and Tours) and in 
Belgian Congo (Leopoldville).35  
Instead of purchasing the breweries outright, Cobra bought a large number of 
shares in Bomonti-Pyramid and Crown Brewery.  Although this might sound like a 
rather straightforward process, the acquisition of the shares was a multi-step venture. 
Heineken, acting through Cobra, as a Dutch company, bought shares in companies 
whose main bases of operation were in Egypt, but that were registered as Belgian 
companies in Brussels.  The multinational nature of the new enterprise meant that the 
movement of information was not a frictionless process and was often held up by 
language barriers. For example, if Heineken wanted to implement a new policy on the 
ground in Cairo, it had to go through a multi-step and multi-lingual process. 
Heineken, located in Rotterdam, would send a directive to Cobra, located in 
Amsterdam, via a letter written in Dutch. Cobra would then relay this information to 
the CEOs of Crown and Pyramid Breweries, who were located in Alexandria and 
Cairo, respectively; this communication would again go by letter, but this time in 
French. The CEOs would then relay the message to their respective boards in 
Brussels, through letters or telegrams in French. Finally, after approval by the boards 
in Brussels, the policy would be implemented through the aid of workers who had 
been informed of the plan either orally or through written Arabic.  
The difficulties in communication in this new setup were exemplified by one 
of Cobra’s first attempts to attend a general meeting of Crown Brewery’s shareholders 
in Brussels. Because the relationship between Cobra and Crown had not yet been 
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formalized, Cobra put one thousand shares of Crown in the trust of an agency, the 
Netherlands Trading Society (Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschaapij) in Amsterdam, 
which then sent an agent to represent Cobra at Crown’s shareholders’ meeting. All the 
while, Cobra had to communicate these steps to all the parties involved (Heineken, 
Crown and Pyramid, Netherlands Trading) in French and Dutch.36 
Despite the added layer of administrative inefficiency, the involvement of one 
of the largest brewers in the world was a positive development for the Egyptian beer 
industry. This relationship provided Pyramid and Crown access to the expertise of 
Heineken, which was on the cutting edge of brewing. In addition, Heineken was a 
multinational company with worldwide business interests and thus was well 
acquainted with the particularities of brewing in all manner of climates and regions. 
The benefits of this relationship became apparent when, for example, Crown Brewery 
invested in kegs. Kegs, like bottles, were a beer-delivery method within the total 
control brewing system.  The keg was the physical embodiment of the modern 
brewer’s belief that the application of the most cutting-edge technology would enable 
him to deliver a standardized and durable product to customers. As such, the keg 
established two impermeable boundaries; one between the outside world and the beer 
and one between the beer contained within the keg and the keg itself.  
The first impermeable boundary separated the contents of the keg from the 
outside world. Like glass bottles, kegs had to prevent any microorganisms or other 
foreign bodies from entering from the environment. After these kegs had been filled 
they would be pasteurized, in a similar process to that used on bottles, to assure that 
no foreign bodies were present. Unlike glass bottles, however, kegs had to carry a 
much larger amount of beer. Whereas bottles contained no more than 750 ml of beer, 
kegs could house thirty liters or more. This large size meant that the keg was as much 
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a storage device as it was a delivery device, and that it thus had to have a second 
impermeable boundary. Besides keeping the outside world away from the beer, they 
also had to not react with the beer held inside.  Any seepage from the kegs into the 
beer would add flavor. This was not such an issue when the kegs were made of wood 
(most often referred to as barrels or casks) because they would impart a natural woody 
flavor that could change the flavor profile, but would not ruin it. However, by the 
1930s wooden barrels had been replaced by metal kegs, as metal was sturdier, more 
easily shipped, and could be reused more often, and seepage became a serious issue. 
Not only could the metal alter the taste of the beer by adding an unappealing metallic 
taste, but the beer, due its carbonation, could start corroding the inside of the keg.37 
Thus, not only did this seepage ruin the product, but it also required the replacement 
of the keg, a double loss. 
Given the importance of kegs to the overall brewing process, when Crown 
wanted to purchase kegs in 1938, they turned to their new multinational partner for 
their expertise.  Heineken, speaking through Cobra, offered two recommendations for 
companies from whom Crown Brewery could purchase their kegs: a Dutch firm, T. 
Knape, located in Wassenaar, Netherlands, and a German firm, Rosista, located in 
Dortmund.38  
Beyond merely suggesting the two firms from which the brewery could buy its 
kegs, Heineken also advised them on the potential considerations associated with 
buying from each. One major issue with T. Knape’s kegs was that although they were 
cheaper, they were made from untreated iron, meaning that the breweries would have 
to buy lacquer from another company and apply a layer to the keg themselves before 
the kegs could be used.  Heineken was willing to recommend other companies who 
could provide the lacquer, but advised Crown against this option. From its experience, 
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the application of the lacquer was a truly labor-intensive and difficult process that 
required assiduous adherence to instructions as well as absolutely ideal conditions.39 
If these strict conditions were not met, the results were always poor. In addition to the 
lacquering issue, T. Knape’s kegs did not come with their own bung, the stopper that 
closed the opening through which the keg was filled.  Thus the company had to buy 
them separately and, besides the additional cost, this too could cause serious issues.  
As Heineken noted, when beer was pasteurized in kegs, everything expanded; 
however, the beer did so faster than the keg. The end result was that if the bung was 
not fitted perfectly or the keg was overfilled, the bung, already loosened by the 
expanding metal of the keg, would be placed under tremendous pressure. This would 
often lead to the failure of the bung and the loss or degradation of the product.  
For all of these reasons, Heineken suggested that Crown go with the much 
more expensive kegs from Rosista in Dortmund.  Despite the more significant 
financial outlay, Rosista’s kegs were made from stainless steel, meaning that they did 
not require any pre-treatment before they could be used. The stainless steel was 
already treated to prevent any corrosion or metal seepage. Another benefit of the 
Rosista model was that it came with its own specially designed method of closing the 
keg.40 Although this suggestion came with the implication that Crown was not up to 
the task of meeting the demanding conditions required for the T. Knape’s kegs, 
Crown Brewery proved very receptive to the advice of Heineken. They reckoned that 
the T. Knape kegs would be more trouble than they were worth and asked Heineken 
to inform Rosista that they would examine bids on their services.41   
This interaction between Heineken and Crown illustrates how Heineken’s 
investment in Crown and Pyramid Breweries paid significant dividends for the 
Egyptian companies. The interaction also illustrates the positive effect that the 
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presence of multinational companies had on businesses in Egypt. Being a part of a 
multinational corporation gave the breweries access to the latest in brewing 
technology and techniques and thus allowed for the smarter importation of 
technologies. The breweries were able to tailor their imports to the particularities of 
the country before spending any money, in contrast to previous attempts by 
entrepreneurs to bring technology into Egypt. Such entrepreneurs often assumed that 
the import process would be frictionless, only to find difficulties in applying 
technology. But Crown, instead of going for the “cheaper” keg option and suffering 
from their false economy, chose the “more expensive” option that was better suited to 
their needs.       
Heineken’s advice to Crown did not arise solely from a desire to build up the 
Egyptian beer industry; it also came from its desire to preserve the bottom line for an 
investment that was almost immediately profitable. In 1939, Heineken received a total 
divined payment of over 23,000 pounds sterling from the 8968 shares it owned in 
Crown Brewery.42 Admittedly, as with every other aspect of doing business in the 
early years of this new multinational interest, receiving the money was not 
straightforward. The impediment in this case was the global conflict that was slowly 
starting to engulf the world, what would eventually be called World War II. One of 
the war’s primary combatants was Britain, which still treated Egypt as a de facto 
colony and was highly concerned that any money flowing out of Egypt did not go to 
enemy countries. In order to comply with government regulations, companies had to 
show that any money leaving Egypt was not going to enemy subjects.43 This 
requirement necessitated the authentication of all money recipients, thus hampering 
money transfer. This was especially true with a money transfer as large as this 
dividend payment, which was going to Belgium, a country that had been occupied by 
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the Germans in 1940. In fact, Cobra—which was, per usual, serving as the 
intermediary between Heineken and the beer companies—was surprised that the 
Egyptian government, not knowing who the final recipient of the money would be, 
had even allowed the transfer process to begin.44 Unsurprisingly, even with the help 
of Pyramid Brewery and a Belgian Bank called the Société Générale à Bruxelles, 
Crown was unable to transfer the money.45  This blockade on dividends remained in 
effect until 1948.46 
 
World War II 
 
The inability to transfer dividends from Crown Brewery to Heineken was one of 
the numerous difficulties that the new multinational beer conglomerate faced during 
the war. Another difficulty included the loss of German employees; after the war 
began, Crown very quickly lost its German brewmaster and its cooper (the man in 
charge of making wooden barrels or casks for aging the beer), as both abandoned their 
jobs to return to the their homeland.47 An even greater difficulty that Crown faced 
after the outbreak of the war was that all of its activities involving the governments or 
citizens of any occupied countries (e.g. Belgium, the Netherlands, and France) came 
under the purview of an Egyptian governmental body created during the war, the 
Office of Occupied and Controlled Territories (Fr. Office des Territoires Occupés et 
Contrôles, Ar. Maktab al-Bilād al-Muḥtala wa al-Khāḍīʿ li-l-Riqāba, henceforth, 
OTOC).48 It was this body that Crown had to deal with when, as discussed above, it 
wanted to disburse its dividends, and it was this body that decided to put a hold on 
any dividend payments. The OTOC served as a watchdog of any action the breweries 
took with regard to Belgium or the Netherlands and also had full control of Crown 
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and Pyramid’s transactions with these countries. For example, during the war, the 
OTOC not only blocked any Crown funds going from Egypt to Holland, but also kept 
them in their own coffers.49 Thus, in 1945, when the OTOC informed Crown that it 
could start paying out to its stockholders, the money came from the OTOC.50 When, 
in 1948, the OTOC did unblock funds flowing to Holland, an agreement between the 
Egyptian and Dutch governments enabled the Egyptian government to control the 
bases through which companies could transfer the money from one country to the 
other. In total, the OTOC held nearly 48,000 pounds sterling during the war that was 
meant to be transferred from Crown to Cobra.51   
The OTOC’s involvement with Crown was emblematic of how World War II 
allowed governmental bodies in Egypt to become more involved in private businesses 
in the name of national interest.  An even clearer example of the Egyptian 
government’s new relationship with Crown Brewery was the instance of Crown’s 
moving its headquarters to Egypt. Since its establishment in 1897, Crown Brewery 
had been a multinational venture. While its main operations—the production, 
transportation, and sale of beer—took place in Egypt, the company maintained a small 
headquarters in Brussels. Despite the numerous changes in ownership, including the 
involvement of the Bomontis, Rene Gaston-Dreyfus, and Heineken, the staff in 
Brussels remained relatively stable. Emblematic of this stability was a Belgian 
industrialist, Arthur Roland, who helped lead Crown Brewery in Brussels from its 
beginnings in 1897 until 1943.52 The resiliency of the European headquarters was 
challenged, however, by the German invasion of Belgium in 1940. According to both 
Egyptian Martial Law and Belgian law, Crown Brewery was required to move its 
headquarters to Alexandria upon the arrival of the Germans.53 Also due to martial 
law, the headquarters had to have all of their expenditures approved by the Egyptian 
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Ministry of Finance. The headquarters would remain at Alexandria until 1945. 
Despite the disruption of having to move its headquarters, Crown Brewery was still 
able to maintain its financial viability. In an internal memo, one of its administrators 
noted that during the war Crown used its brewery machinery nonstop.54 
Although the occupation of Belgium ended in 1944, Crown’s problems did not. In 
fact, the issues that Crown would face after 1945 were linked to those of the larger 
world, particularly Egypt and Belgium, as it attempted to recover from World War II. 
In the postwar period of normalization, the Ministry of Finance of both countries 
aimed to make up for time lost in the war. In this situation, Crown Brewery’s 
multinational nature became a liability. As a Belgian company whose main operations 
were in Egypt, Crown was expected to pay back taxes on its capital and profits for the 
period from 1935 to1940 in both Belgium and Egypt. This reality was a shock to 
Crown, as this double taxation, at least in their eyes, threatened the very existence of 
the company.55 The total for the Belgium taxes would have totaled seventeen million 
Belgian francs.56 The company did not have the money to pay this enormous fee, as 
any profits that they had made during the period in question had already been 
distributed. Crown did not want to dip into its reserves, as that money was needed to 
bring its machinery up to date. Most of the equipment that it was using in 1945 dated 
from the early days of the breweries and was at least forty years old.57    
Facing this intractable tax situation, Crown turned to their Dutch investor, 
Heineken, in hopes that the large corporation could use its own expertise to solve the 
problem. Heineken, recognizing that one of its newest assets was distressed, did its 
best to resolve the issue. It sent Dirk Stikker, the head of Cobra, to Alexandria to 
evaluate the Crown situation, and it enlisted the service of Paul Bodart, a doctor of 
law and the head of Interbra (one of the brewing companies it acquired around the 
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same time it bought into Crown and Pyramid Brewery), and Carlo de Mey, an expert 
in fiscal law, to consult with the Crown leadership and find a workable solution to the 
tax issue. All of these parties spent over a year working on the problem, studying 
Belgian law in hopes of lessening the company’s tax burden.  
One solution, suggested by Carlo de Mey, that gained a good deal of traction was 
to abandon the headquarters in Brussels and move all operations to Egypt. In de 
Mey’s estimation, the law that had forced Crown’s move to Egypt had not been 
abrogated; thus, Crown could claim that the company needed to remain there. 
Because all of Crown’s business activities were located in Egypt, this argument was 
feasible.  Making the argument would require eliminating any connection between 
Crown and Belgium.  By making this switch, the company could hope to evade the 
Belgian tax authorities and only have to reckon with the taxes in Egypt.58 Although 
the company had been founded as a Belgian enterprise and had been connected to the 
country for more than fifty years, this transition seamed feasible in the extraordinary 
context of the war. An additional point in Crown’s favor was that it had allowed the 
presidency of the head of the Belgian operation, Arthur Roland, to expire in 1943 
without finding a replacement.59  
Nevertheless, not everyone at Crown was in agreement on this potential solution. 
Paul Bodart, the other legal expert whom Cobra had charged with the task of finding a 
solution, was less than sold on the proposal. While Bodart recognized the cleverness 
of de Mey’s thinking, he was extremely worried about how the Belgian government 
would react to what was a relatively cynical tax-avoidance maneuver. Yes, this move 
could exempt Crown Brewery from an onerous tax burden, but the Belgian 
government could also force Crown to pay for the liquidation of the company in 
Brussels.60  Likewise, while it may have been easier to never return to Brussels than 
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try to argue down the taxes, there may have been other challenges if the Belgian 
government proved unwilling to negotiate with the Egyptian government.61  
Bodart was not alone in his skepticism of de Mey’s scheme. Before de Mey made 
his suggestion on moving operations, the executive board of Crown was fully 
committed to returning to Belgium after the war. Even though the company was going 
against his judgment, he offered some reasonable final suggestions in a memo to 
Crown. The first was that Crown should affirm that, since the beginning of the war, 
the administrative seat of the company had been in Egypt and was always meant to 
stay there. Bodart’s second bit of advice was to hold an Extraordinary General 
Meeting, in Alexandria of course, to confirm that the headquarters of the company 
would remain in Egypt.62  The company did not heed his advice, instead opening up 
the decision to an Extraordinary General Meeting in Brussels. Fortunately, the 
executives in attendance recognized that there was “technical or geographical reason 
for maintaining the place of General Meetings in Alexandria.”63 
Thus, having made its decision, Crown Brewery officially moved its headquarters 
to Alexandria in 1946. Notwithstanding the worries of Paul Bodart, Crown does not 
appear to have had issues with the Belgian government after this point. For example, 
at meeting of shareholders in 1947, there was no news about the Belgian response to 
Crown’s gambit.64 The Belgian government’s indifference to the movement of a beer 
company whose sales and production was limited to a foreign country was only 
natural, as this country, like the rest of Europe, was at that point primarily concerned 
with recovering from the war.  Still, it is important to note that, despite some token 
mention by both de Mey and the Crown executives about becoming an Egyptian 
company, Crown did not proceed with any type of Egyptianization after moving their 
headquarters. In fact, the company changed remarkably little after the move. For the 
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executives of both Crown and Cobra, the company continued to function as a 
“foreign” company within Egypt.  
Crown’s break with Brussels was not a completely clean one. Although Arthur 
Roland had ceased his duties as the head of the Belgian operations of Crown, some 
Crown employees still remained in Belgium. In particular, Crown had appointed 
Marcel Cuvelier, a Belgian citizen, as the company representative in Belgium for the 
transition from being a Belgian company to an Egyptian one. Also, Crown’s legal 
counsel, De May and Bodart, both operated out of Brussels. The main issue with these 
remaining employees was that, as residents of Belgium, they sought compensation in 
Belgian francs. During the war, this currency had become increasingly rare in Egypt, 
so Crown was not able to acquire enough currency to pay the wages of these three 
employees.65 Crown appealed to Cobra to provide 100,000 Belgian Francs to cover 
the wages of de Mey and Cuvelier, who were in the employ of Crown Brewery. 
Crown leadership did not believe they were responsible for Bodart, for, after 
Heineken’s purchase of Interbra, he had become an employee of Cobra. Crown 
rightfully pointed out that de Mey had come at the recommendation of the head of 
Cobra, Mr. Stikker, and had been tremendously helpful in the nationality issue, which 
could have cost Cobra a great deal of money. 66 
Nevertheless, Cobra was unconvinced by Crown’s arguments as to the necessity 
of compensating these Belgian employees. Cobra stated vaguely that it was unable to 
find a solution to the problem of the employees’ pay,67 and it provided no reason for 
why it did not want to help Crown in this matter.  The explanation was most likely not 
money, for while 100,000 Belgian francs could be a significant sum for Crown, it was 
not a problem for a massive multinational like Heineken. Cobra’s desire to not pay 
these employees was probably driven by its valuation that these employees were not 
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worth it. Cobra’s estimation of Cuvelier’s value, for one, became patently clear when, 
nearly a year after receiving this request, the company sent a representative to 
Brussels to inform Cuvelier that his services were no longer needed.68 
Tightening Control 
This anecdote about Cuvelier’s termination illustrates that, despite the general 
tenor of respect that permeated the interactions between Cobra and Crown/Pyramid, 
the relationship was characterized by a distinct power dynamic of which no party was 
ignorant. A main point of contention between the Egyptian companies and their 
multinational overseers involved the placement of Cobra/ Heineken employees on the 
Crown board. As is clear from the above discussion, the communication chain 
between Heineken and Crown/Pyramid Brewery was highly inefficient. For example, 
in the case of deciding on the nationality of Crown, Cobra had to send its head, Mr. 
Stikker, to Egypt to get a handle on the situation. Likewise, if Cobra wanted to be 
represented at shareholders meetings, it had to go through significant hurdles. As 
discussed above, it could deposit their shares with a trading company in Holland who 
would then send a representative to the meeting. Another method that it started using 
after the war was to give power of attorney to an employee of Pyramid Brewery to 
represent Cobra at Crown’s shareholder meetings.69 This method involved another 
step as, according to the regulations of Crown, this employee had to be a shareholder 
in Crown, and thus had to buy shares in Crown before attending a meeting.70 
After 1947, Cobra aimed to eliminate this inefficiency and worked to have a 
Cobra employee on the board of Crown. The placement of someone on the board was 
an attempt to transform Cobra’s beer venture from a loosely controlled venture into a 
tightly controlled venture.71 In loosely controlled firms, “foreign investors had 
considerable foreign managerial and technical involvement,” but were unable to 
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translate this involvement into domination.72 Tightly controlled firms, on the other 
hand, were carefully linked to European corporate and individual investors, and 
oftentimes served as subsidiaries and branches of the firms.73 Before World War II, 
Crown and Pyramid were undeniably loosely controlled, as the managers and 
executives on the ground in Egypt exerted the most influence. However, seeing the 
difficulties that Heineken experienced during the war, Cobra tried to change that 
practice.  
As has been discussed above, Mouratiadis and Crown had fought and secured a 
large degree of autonomy in their battle with Rene Gaston-Dreyfus. They were thus 
deeply protective of this autonomy and were not keen on any encroachment from 
Cobra, especially Cobra’s request by Cobra for representation on their board. The 
only way Crown would even consider the concession was if they were allowed to 
have a representative on the Bomonti-Pyramid board.74 This request illustrates that, 
despite the external appearance of unanimity between Crown and Pyramid, people 
within both companies viewed them as autonomous bodies. This point becomes even 
clearer when we consider the reaction of one H.G. Ivens, an employee of Pyramid 
who was representing Cobra at this Crown shareholder meeting. Ivens, reporting that 
Crown’s president, Spiro Spiridis, had, in 1947, requested representation on the 
Pyramid board in exchange for Cobra representation (and for a second time no less), 
called the request “absurd.”75 
So how did Cobra attempt to circumvent Crown’s protestations about Cobra’s 
representation on their board?  It appears that Cobra used the other brewery, Pyramid, 
against Crown. Their basic strategy was to give 4860 shares of Crown Brewery, from 
among the 8978 it owned, to the Pyramid Brewery. With control of these shares, 
Pyramid would become the largest shareholder in Crown Brewery. This was a 
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backdoor for Cobra to acquire local representation in Crown without forcing their 
hand and souring the relationship. Cobra was the largest stockholder in Pyramid, and 
because Pyramid had not been as recalcitrant to members of Cobra sitting on their 
board, it had handpicked representatives on the board of Pyramid Brewery, who were 
consulted on all major decisions.76 In particular, an executive named Oscar Adrian 
Eduard Egbert Lewe Wittert van Hoogland (who hereafter will be referred to as 
Wittert van Hoogland) had taken a large leadership role in Pyramid after his 
appointment, assuming the title of managing director.    
With these Cobra employees embedded in the upper executive realm of Pyramid, 
Pyramid’s new stake in Crown meant that Cobra now had an indirect way of 
influencing Crown. Through the classic imperialist ploy of divide and conquer, Cobra 
convinced Pyramid Brewery to go along with their plan.  Although this plan ended up 
being an elegant solution to Cobra’s problems, Bomonti-Pyramid unsurprisingly 
looked askance at the dealings of Cobra, which the Dutch company framed as an 
exchange of nearly five thousand shares of Crown for the fifty thousand shares of 
Nigerian Brewery Limited in Lagos that Pyramid owned.77  
The five main parties involved in the negotiations were Ahmed Farghali Pasha, 
Yusuf Zulficar Pasha, and Rene Ismalun, all of whom were of Egyptian nationality 
and sat on the board of Bomonti-Pyramid; Wittert Van Hoogland, who also sat on the 
Pyramid board; and G.A. Martin, a British shareholder. The three Egyptians 
represented the interests of Pyramid, while Wittert van Hoogland and Martin spoke 
for Cobra. The exchange of shares was obviously a touchy subject because Wittert 
van Hoogland was dilatory in proposing the plan to the three Egyptians. When 
Heineken had asked him to look into it on January 21, 1952, Wittert van Hoogland 
responded a week later that he had only talked to Farghali, very briefly, and could 
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provide no conclusion to the matter.78 Farghali proved an elusive figure. When 
Wittert van Hoogland did finally schedule a meeting nearly a month later, only 
Ismalun and Zulficar attended. Farghali cancelled thirty minutes before the meeting, 
insisting that he was heavily embroiled in cotton negotiations. (Farghali’s main 
business venture was the cotton company he inherited from his father).79 This was not 
the first time Farghali had proved difficult when it came to meeting with Wittert van 
Hoogland, for as Wittert van Hoogland noted, this time the excuse appeared to be 
valid; there was a Cotton Fair going on at the same time.80 
When Wittert van Hoogland met with Ismalun and Zulficar, the two men had 
different reactions to Heineken’s proposal. Ismalun was immediately on board, but 
Zulficar, despite a long conversation with Wittert van Hoogland, was reluctant, citing 
the need to hear the opinions of Farghali before making any decisions.81 Zulficar’s 
hesitation dispirited Wittert van Hoogland because if Zulficar could not be convinced, 
then convincing Farghali would be an even more difficult task.82  Regardless, because 
Wittert van Hoogland as well as Martin and Ismalun were on board, they could all 
outvote the dissenters and push through the transaction. However, Wittert van 
Hoogland thought they should avoid this tactic unless Cobra thought it was absolutely 
necessary, the better to maintain good relations. Instead, Wittert van Hoogland 
thought that a note from Cobra and Martin about the importance of the deal could 
convince the Egyptians to accept it. Wittert van Hoogland was convinced that they, 
Cobra and Heineken, would need every bit of persuasion to sway Farghali, and he was 
correct.83     
When Wittert van Hoogland was finally able to gather all of the Egyptians 
together in April at a board meeting, it was Farghali who held up the deal, doing so by 
raising questions about the deal’s fairness. Cobra would exchange the Crown shares 
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for the Nigerian shares at a price of 120 piasters per share, a sum that covered both 
Pyramid’s original investment in the shares and a three percent yearly interest on 
them. Although there would be a loss of about 863 Egyptian pounds, this was covered 
by Cobra’s one-sterling discount on the Crown shares that Pyramid was getting.84 
Farghali was unconvinced, however, and believed that because Pyramid was giving 
Cobra such a below-market price on the Nigerian stock, that the least Cobra could do 
was pay a four percent yearly interest instead of three percent.85 Wittert van Hoogland 
eventually conceded to four percent, and this concession, plus the direct contact that 
Cobra made with the Egyptians at Wittert’s request, was instrumental in getting the 
deal pushed through.86 With the deal completed, some question remained about who 
would represent Pyramid Brewery at the shareholders’ meeting for Crown Brewery.87 
Unsurprisingly, Cobra chose the man who had done so much work for them in this 
matter, Wittert van Hoogland.88 Wittert van Hoogland would have a powerful role to 
play in both of the companies from 1953 to 1957, serving as Cobra’s main man on the 
ground.89  
The great difficulty in finishing this deal, which ultimately benefited both parties, 
evinces a deeper rift between the Egypt-based entrepreneurs and their European 
counterparts. Wittert van Hoogland remarked on this rift in discussing the 
particularities of the deal. He stated, “When one proposes something to an Egyptian 
he generally thinks there is something that he does not see behind the proposal and 
therefore that he is being had.”90 From the European side, this statement speaks to the 
essentialized view that Europeans had of Egyptians. Even a relatively magnanimous 
European who was willing to accommodate Egyptian wishes for the sake of good 
relations could view Egyptians as an undifferentiated mass rather than as individuals 
who had their own distinct characteristics. Nevertheless, the statement and the actions 
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of Farghali also hint at a sense of distrust among Egyptian business elites vis-à-vis 
Europeans. This distrust would only be natural considering the legal and economic 
advantages of European businessmen in Egypt, such as the dual legal system that 
favored those with foreign citizenship.91 Of course, Farghali’s intuition may have 
been correct, as Cobra was using this deal to manipulate Egyptians, just not him. 
These hard dealings also tell us something more personal about Farghali. As he 
was arguing with Wittert van Hoogland over the percent interest on the Nigerian 
shares, he made a statement to Rene Ismalun, his fellow Egyptian on the board and a 
member of the Egyptian Jewish community: “I think we should be like the jew[sic] 
and ask Cobra to compensate us on the basis of 4% interest.”92  This bit of off-the-
cuff anti-Semitism was meant as a way to justify Farghali’s hard line, but to the 
modern reader it exemplifies how anti-Semitism, like colonial attitudes among 
Europeans, pervaded Egyptian culture at the time. In fact, the breeziness with which 
Farghali mentions “jews” as a joke signals the cultural pervasiveness of anti-
Semitism. Ismalun’s response to Farghali only affirms the point, as he notes in a 
quick rejoinder: “[t]hat would not be like the jew[sic] but like Farghaly[sic].”93  This 
response not only confirms that the anti-Semitism was expressed in jest, but that this 
was probably not the first instance in which Islamun had heard such a statement.      
 
What Heineken Controlled 
While it is clear from the above discussion that Heineken was willing to go to 
great lengths to assert its control over Crown and Pyramid Breweries, it is not 
immediately apparent what this tighter control meant. This section explores what this 
tighter control entailed because the form and function of the Heineken–Crown–
Pyramid partnership took after the deal would characterize the breweries until 1963. 
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Heineken’s main base of operations within Egypt was Pyramid Brewery. As shown in 
the above discussion, due to Heineken’s penetration of the executive branch and the 
long duration of the relations, Heineken’s control of Pyramid was much greater than 
of Crown.  
In the eyes of Heineken, its services to Pyramid came in five forms: advising, 
control, staff, yeast, and supplies.94 As shown by the keg example, Heineken had 
served the advisory role for as long as it had been involved in the Egyptian beer 
industry. However, with its push for greater control after World War II, Heineken 
came to advise on all technical matters ranging from the first step of brewing (raw 
materials used) to the last (refrigeration). Through this advisory role, Heineken 
pushed Pyramid Brewery to implement the latest innovations in brewing in the name 
of maintaining a healthy bottom line and a product befitting the Heineken label. For 
example, it advised Pyramid not only on what products (the type of malt) and 
production methods (new malting systems) they should use, but also directed them on 
how to conduct their own lab-based analysis of the raw materials and the beer 
produced.95  This advice was generally rendered in monthly technical reports 
exchanged between Pyramid and Heineken. For more complex matters, however, 
Heineken either sent a representative to Pyramid or requested that Pyramid send one 
to Holland.96 
 This system of monthly technical reports and visits was at once the means by 
which Heineken advised Pyramid and provided their second service, control.  While 
the technical reports were an important way for Heineken and Pyramid to discuss best 
practices, they were also a way for Heineken to keep constant tabs on the company. 
These reports were usually written by one of the men whom Heineken had placed on 
the board, which eliminated any chance that the report would paint a rosier picture 
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than the reality. Likewise, the visits of Heineken employees were meant not only as a 
way to advise on technical matters, but also a way for Heineken to monitor the 
operations and workers of the company. A third point of control for Heineken was 
that it had Pyramid send a monthly sample of beer to be analyzed in one of 
Heineken’s laboratories.97 This service was meant to ensure that the beer produced in 
Egypt matched Heineken’s exacting standards. 
 Heineken not only relied on reports, visits, samples, and members of the 
executive board to assure that Pyramid put out a product worthy of the Heineken 
name, but also placed a man highly trained in Heineken’s methods of making beer as 
the brewmaster. While the industrialization of beer-making allowed companies to 
produce beer with fewer well-trained workers, it did not eliminate the craft in making 
beer entirely. A person with a large knowledge base, the brewmaster, was still needed 
to ensure that the product tasted the way the company wanted.  The brewmaster was 
massively important to the direction of the company, and it is for this reason that, as I 
discuss below, one of the major boons in the nationalization of the beer industry was 
the expulsion of the foreign-trained brewmasters.  
The placement of a Heineken-trained brewmaster at Pyramid was especially 
important because of another service Heineken rendered, sending their strain of yeast 
to Pyramid. As discussed above, the greater understanding and subsequent control of 
the life cycle of yeast inaugurated the scientifcation and mechanization of brewing. 
With this new understanding, breweries could optimize the brewing process and even 
begin to breed proprietary strains of yeast. Thus, the yeast Heineken used to make its 
beer was unique to the company, a closely guarded secret that differentiated it from 
other brands. The brewmaster had to be Heineken-trained so that, having learned to 
brew using Heineken’s strain, he could maximize its output in a different setting.  
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Beyond the brewmaster, Heineken also aimed, when it could, to place people whom it 
had trained within Pyramid. 
 In addition to sending part of the workforce, Heineken also served as the 
broker for the Pyramid’s acquisition of new materials. In a similar process as seen 
above with the kegs, Heineken sent pro-forma invoices to Pyramid for any raw or 
auxiliary materials and machines and installations that were not present in the local 
market.98 When possible, Heineken’s engineers inspected anything before it was sent 
to Pyramid. For those materials available in the local market, like crown corks (bottle 
caps), Heineken insisted that Pyramid send them to Holland for inspection.99   
 As noted above, Heineken very often matched these services to Pyramid with 
a strong amount of surveillance. Even greater surveillance was demanded by the 
financial and administrative happenings of the company.  Pyramid was responsible for 
sending Heineken monthly reports on the price of beer, Pyramid and Crown sales, 
share prices, their cash situation, and meetings of the administrative board. Beyond 
these monthly check-ins, Pyramid also had to send a quarterly budget and feasibility 
study of that budget, a yearly inventory, the position and cost of any imports, any 
lawsuits raised against the company, any regulations passed by the government that 
would affect the company, and, finally, the status of Pyramid’s relationship with 
Crown.100 
 As should be obvious from the above description of the more tightly 
controlled Pyramid Brewery, Heineken was fully committed to instilling “total 
brewing” in the Egyptian company. It viewed Pyramid as an extension of the 
company and insisted it measure up to Heineken’s high standards. As I will show, 
these policies often caused a good deal of conflict between the Dutch in the company 
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on one hand and the Egyptian entrepreneurs, managers, and workers on the other. 
Still, the policies represented a well-thought out system that was designed to support a 
cutting edge brewery in Egypt.  The depths of Heineken’s demands from the company 
should come as no surprise because Heineken was a multinational brewery 
experienced with brewing outside of Holland. In fact, the procedures that it enforced 
in Pyramid were similar to those it implemented everywhere else in its beer empire.101  
Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to classify Pyramid and Crown breweries 
as “tightly controlled” firms according to the metrics of Tignor. Despite all of the 
pushes for greater control, as we saw with the negotiations with Farghali, the people 
on the ground still had a massive influence on the direction of the companies. 
Heineken and its representatives in the companies could map out whatever best 
practices they wanted; but ultimately, the decision on whether policies were 
implemented relied on the local leadership. As I discuss later, despite all of 
Heineken’s advantages, it was never able to control Crown like it did Pyramid. 
      
(Partial) Egyptianization 
Heineken’s lack of complete control over Crown and Pyramid was exactly what 
the Egyptian government of the time wanted. As Heineken was trying to transition 
Crown and Pyramid Breweries from being lightly controlled foreign enterprises to 
tightly controlled ones, the Egyptian government was instituting policies that were 
pushing private industries toward a singular goal, Egyptianization. This push grew out 
of a series of concurrent trends. The first trend was the slow erosion of the 
Capitulations and their main manifestation, the Mixed Courts. The Capitulations were 
“a set of privileges granted to nationals of certain countries that effectively exempted 
them from Egyptian law and judicial institutions.”102 The Mixed Courts was the body 
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that attempted to manage the judicial needs of two antagonistic forces in Egypt, the 
Egyptian government and the capitulatory powers. What the Courts became in 
practice was a dual legal system, in which Egyptian and foreign companies were tried 
separately. With regard to private European companies like Crown and Pyramid, this 
dual system made them practically inviolate. However, the Mixed Courts had, from 
their founding, been continually under attack by both the Egyptians and the British.103 
Opposition reached a critical mass in 1937, when the Montreux Conference 
established a phasing out of the Capitulations, which was then followed by the 
abolition of the Mixed Courts in 1949.  Without this impediment, the Egyptian 
government could now deal with foreign businesses that for so long had resided in 
Egypt as judicial blind spots that were exempt from tariffs and taxes.104  
At the same time, World War II emboldened the Egyptian government to deal 
with foreign companies in a new, more invasive way. As discussed above with the 
actions of OTOC (Office des Territoires Occupés et Contrôles, Ar. Maktab al-Bilād 
al-Muḥtala wa al-Khāḍīʿ li-l-Riqāba), the Egyptian government, acting under the 
auspices of martial law, honed its new methods in regulating businesses and their 
profits. The tactics that the government used to ensure that no money flowed to 
British enemies, i.e. requesting lists of shareholders, bank statements, and letters and 
statements from executives, were some of the same tactics they utilized to encourage 
the Egyptianization of the economy.  
The desire to Egyptianize the economy grew out of a sense of economic 
nationalism, the belief that Egyptians should run the Egyptian economy. This idea 
originated in the 1920s with the Sidqi Commission on Commerce and Industry, Bank 
Misr, and the Egyptian Federation of Industries, all of which formed during the period 
from 1916 to 1922. Bank Misr (Meaning, “Bank of Egypt” in Arabic), which was 
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founded and headed by Egyptians, seemed to be the example par excellence of 
Egypt’s new economic nationalism. However, as Robert Vitalis shows, these 
institutions were gradualist and were still intimately tied to non-Egyptian capital.  In 
the 1920s, business nationalism was merely a convenient way to support new ventures 
and garner public support for the multi-national business groups that were forming 
around certain enterprising Egyptian individuals.105   
However, beginning in the 1930s and culminating with the Joint Stock Company 
Law of 1947, the ideals of 1920s Egyptian economic nationalism became more of a 
reality. In fact, the removal of the Capitulations and the eventual abolishment of the 
Mixed Courts were framed, on the Egyptian side, by the rhetoric of economic 
nationalism.106 The Company Law of 1947, however, represented the first powerful 
push by the Egyptian government for Egyptianization. It required Egyptian companies 
(those with major bases in Egypt) “to offer 51 percent of their stock to Egyptians and 
to place Egyptian nationals on 40 percent of the board seats.”107 These moves pushed 
many multinational companies, including the beer companies, to employ more 
Egyptian citizens. With regard to the beer industry, it is indisputable that the main 
leadership became more Egyptian. The president, Chief Executive Officer, and 
primary stockholder of each of the breweries after 1950 were all native-born Egyptian 
citizens: Muhammad Ahmed Farghali Pasha for Bomonti-Pyramid Brewery and 
Muhammad ʿAziz Abaza for Crown Brewery. Both of these men were exemplary 
business oligarchs who came to dominate the private sector in the 1940s and the 
1950s.  
As Robert Vitalis has shown, a distinctive feature of the Egyptian private 
sector from the 1930s through 1950s was the business group fronted by a well-
connected business oligarch. Although business groups—individuals and families 
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organized as coherent coalitions—had been a feature of the Egyptian economy since 
the late nineteenth century, the Egyptian-led business group came to dominate in the 
period from 1937 to 1957. Vitalis identifies three distinct characteristics of these 
business groups: (1) they encompassed “a diversity of firms across different economic 
sectors; (2) [they had an] ownership-management coalition, though a single individual 
[was] often identified as the group’s leader; (3) the group’s core leadership [was] 
bound by personal, family, ethnic or other communal ties that provide[d] the basis for 
coordinating its operations.”108  
The two Egyptian entrepreneurs, Farghali Pasha and ʿAziz Abaza, and their 
business interests were very much in this model. Both were products of what Eric 
Davis refers to as the Egyptian landowning elites’ familiarization with capitalist 
enterprise through foreign capital.109 Farghali’s father was a successful Alexandrian 
cotton merchant who, with the help of foreign investors, established Farghali Cotton 
and Investment Company.  Using the connections afforded by his father’s business, as 
well as his own business acumen and a familiarity with European business practices 
gleaned from his education in England, Farghali Pasha was able to sit on many 
different executive boards. In 1946, he sat on the boards of twenty-nine different 
companies.110  ʿAziz Abaza, a member of one of Egypt’s largest landholding families 
and the head of Crown Brewery, also sat on numerous boards, including the Land 
Bank of Egypt, the Société Anonyme de Misr pour le théâtre et le cinéma (The 
corporation for Egyptian theater and cinema), and SEP (a petrol company).111  
Several other Egyptian citizens joined Farghali and ʿAbaza on these boards. 
Of the six other members on the Bomonti-Pyramid Brewery board, three were 
Egyptian citizens.112 Meanwhile, Crown Brewery had a similar percentage of 
Egyptian citizens on its board.113  Some of the board members shared a similar 
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involvement in business groups; the Jewish Egyptian Rene Ismalun of the Pyramid 
Brewery, discussed above, sat on the boards of seven other companies.114 Moreover, 
the “foreign” elements were not as foreign as the government led observers to believe. 
For example, in the cases of Xenon and Katherine Pilavachi and Spiro Spiridis on the 
Crown Brewery board, these board members not only lived in Egypt, but also spoke 
Arabic and were integral to the large Greek Egyptian community, which had ancient 
roots and had grown steadily since the 1860s.115 Thus, the “foreigners” were as 
invested in a successful and prosperous Egypt as was a man like Farghali; they also 
had a distinctly different relationship with the country than, for example, the Cobra 
representatives who sat on the Pyramid board. A useful term for them is the 
mutamaṣṣirūn, those “people of foreign origin who had become permanent residents” 
and in their language and habits had become "Egyptianized."116  Nevertheless, the 
mutamaṣṣirūn did not have Egyptian citizenship, and thus the government grouped 
them with men like Wittert van Hoogland, Kettner, and Feith.   
The Egyptian government’s grouping the mutamaṣṣirūn with foreign-born 
industrialists like Wittert van Hoogland and Kettner, was based on two factors: the 
transnational character of the mutamaṣṣirūn and the citizenship process as it existed 
from the 1930s to 1950s. As Gudrun Krämer shows, until the late 1930s the prospects 
of legal and fiscal exemption through the Capitulations and the Mixed Courts made it 
much more attractive for local minorities to apply for foreign rather than Egyptian 
nationality.117 As a result, there was a mass of residents in Egypt who had spent their 
entire lives in the country but were not citizens. This trend was particularly 
pronounced among the religious minority communities; as Krämer notes “the majority 
of Jews living in Egypt in the twentieth century did not have Egyptian citizenship.”118  
An excellent example of such residents is the Suareses, a prominent Jewish family 
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who were also Italian citizens.119  The linguistic, cultural, and economic heterogeneity 
of this mass of residents makes any attempts to place them into the “foreign” or 
“Egyptian” dichotomy reductive. However, that is exactly what the Egyptian state, 
with legislation like the Company Law of 1947, attempted to do.  
As a result of this legislation, these mutamaṣṣirūn and the companies that 
employed them were faced with the dilemma that one of their greatest strengths—
their cultural dynamism and multi-cultural familiarity—had become a major threat to 
their employment.120 For the individual citizen, in order to save his job he often had to 
seek Egyptian citizenship. As Simon Shamir shows, the path to Egyptian citizenship 
for these local minorities before 1947 was very difficult.121 In particular, despite the 
1929 Nationality Law’s Western liberal basis, the burden of proof need to become a 
citizen and the institutional bias against mutamaṣṣirūn prevented many minorities 
from gaining Egyptian citizenship even if they wanted it.122  Despite pressure from 
the government, the breweries were able to avoid any traumatic losses of executives 
or employees. In fact, prior to 1952, the companies had some success with their 
employees gaining, or rather confirming, their Egyptian citizenship. For example, 
Crown Brewery’s auditor, Hanna Yusuf Hanna, a Coptic Christian, whose declaration 
of state-recognized Egyptianness is contained in the Pyramid breweries records, did 
succeed in gaining citizenship.123  However, citizenship would become less attainable 
after the ascension of the Free Officers, as they would take what had been laid down 
in 1947 and build upon it until they had removed all of the “foreign” elements.  
Shareholders 
 
The greatest example of the partial Egyptianization of the beer industry was its 
stockholders. Shares in the companies were an ambiguous entity that, depending on 
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the number owned, could mean a great deal or very little. The great majority of 
shareholders were passive investors with a small number of shares, usually less than 
one hundred, who had little to no say in the day to day management or future planning 
of the companies. For example, the Bomonti family, who after the Heineken buy-in 
had no say in the future of Pyramid, was still stockholders until 1960, owning more 
than nine thousand shares.124  Likewise, some of the families of the early Belgian 
investors had a stake in the companies until full nationalization in 1962.125 Generally, 
a small minority of the shareholders owned the great majority of the shares, which 
reflected their involvement in the companies.  
When the shares of Pyramid and Crown were taken together, which the 
Egyptian government did before it nationalized both companies, the largest 
shareholder was Heineken Brewery. By 1963, Heineken owned forty-four percent of 
the Crown and Pyramid together.126 As this chapter has shown, from the time it 
purchased its first share, Heineken worked, through Cobra, to put Crown and Pyramid 
under tighter control. Heineken would stay invested in the beer companies till the 
bitter end refusing to give up its shares until the Nasser government forced them to. 
Of the remaining sixty-six percent of the stock, those with Egyptian citizenship 
controlled thirty-five percent. Of this thirty five percent, the majority was in the hands 
of the Farghalis.127 Crown and Pyramid breweries were truly a family business as the 
largest shareholders besides Muhammad Ahmad Farghali were his wife, his brother, 
his daughters, his sons, and his cotton company.128 The concentration of stock in the 
hands of certain families, however, was not limited strictly to decision makers like the 
Farghalis. For example, the Tawfiq family (Hatim, Hazim, Hasan, and Hisham 
Tawfiq) each owned twenty-five shares.129 For small investors this family model 
often was the result of a father investing in stock for himself and his family, so that 
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they would have a revenue stream to either supplement their future income or as part 
of the safety net upon the father’s death. For example, there were numerous 
stockholders listed as al-armala (the widow) of Mr. So-and-So.  
As for the remaining 31 percent of shareholders, they came from North 
America, all over Europe (Britain, Italy, Austria, France etc.) and the Middle East 
(Syria, Lebanon, Iran, Turkey, etc.).130  Most of these foreign stockholders, like 
stockholders generally, were of the small variety owning less than a hundred shares 
with little to no say in the functioning of the companies. While the nationalist 
narrative would argue that this was an example of foreign influence, these small 
shareholders were indistinguishable from the Egyptian shareholders except for where 
Crown or Pyramid sent their dividend check.  Included also among this “foreign” 
contingent were the mutamaṣṣirūn), who had an entirely different relationship with 
the companies.  Although none of their share numbers could compete with Farghali, 
shareholders like the Pilavachi’s and Mouratiadis’ had a significant impact on the 
direction of the company. They attended shareholder’s meetings and were often in the 
employ of the company. These “foreign” stockholders likewise seemed to follow the 
family investment plan, with husbands, wives, and children often owning shares 
together. 
What has been noticeable from the above discussion of the inner 
developments of Crown and Pyramid Breweries has been the complete lack of 
women. However, in the case of shareholders, the presence of women was striking. In 
the listing of shareholders of the two companies in 1963, there were eighty Egyptian 
women listed as stockholders of Crown and Pyramid Breweries, one of whom, Rose 
Basili, was the only person outside of the Farghalis to own more than a thousand 
shares.131 It is not clear if women’s ownership of stock was a path to real influence or 
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merely a way to avoid the appearance of the concentration of stock in a paterfamilias’ 
hands. One significant example of the power shares could provide women was 
Katharine Pilavachi.  
While in 1963 she only owned around 400 shares, in the 1950s she owned 
more than five thousand shares.  This large stockholding meant that between the years 
1954 and 1959 Pilavachi sat on the board of Crown Brewery with her husband, 
Xenon.132 She was also an active participant in the shareholders’ meetings. One of the 
particularities of shareholders’ meetings is that for ease of function certain people 
served as representatives for a group of shareholders. This grouping of stocks allowed 
decisions to be made more quickly because one person could speak for many or 
represent shareholders who were not in Egypt, while still maintaining a quorum. For 
example, Wittert van Hoogland would often represent himself, Feith, Kettner, Cobra 
and Crown depending on the meeting. This grouping of stock also showed who really 
was in charge of the stock. So, for example, despite a whole family owning stock, it 
was usually the father who represented everyone at the meeting. All of this makes the 
fact that Katharine Pilavachi attended the shareholders meeting, in person, exemplary 
of the active role that she aimed to play in the company.133 
An even better example of her active role in the company was her and her 
husband’s recalcitrance to fall in line with the demands of Pyramid. When Eric Karl 
Kettner, who I will discuss at length in the following chapters, took over for Wittert 
van Hoogland as the managing director of Pyramid in 1957 one of his first targets was 
Crown, who, in Kettner’s eyes, was putting out an inferior product and was not doing 
enough to sell that product.134  He found the beer that Crown was putting out lacking 
in its taste, brilliance, and foam stability.135 These were cardinal sins because, as 
discussed above with reference to beer advertisements in Egypt, these were main 
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selling points of beer in the Egyptian market. This poor maintenance of the brand was 
coupled with poor sales in Alexandria, which he believed was the fault of Crown not 
trying hard enough to sell the product. He was so distressed at how this non-
standardized beer was affecting the sales of Stella in Egypt that he suggested the 
replacement of the man in charge of beer production at Crown, Michel Mavroviti.136 
However, all of this grandstanding was not met with compliance, but a rather 
impertinent response. Spiro Spridis, the managing director at Crown, boss to 
Mavroviti, and employee of the Pilavachis, who sat on Crown’s board, said to Kettner 
that the difference in quality was merely a matter of appreciation.137 Crown’s 
customers in Alexandria have never ever commented on the beer, which fits perfectly 
to their taste. Not only that, but these same customers said they preferred beer made in 
Alexandria to the one made in Cairo.138  This intransigency on the part of Crown, 
grew out of their distance from Cairo and Crown’s history of autonomy from 
Bomonti-Pyramid, which stretched back to the 1920s with Constantine Mouratiadis. 
Emboldened by these two factors the Pilvachis (Xenon and his wife Katharine), who 
were both large shareholders and sat on the board of Crown, felt no need to listen to 
what Pyramid had to say in Cairo, even if they were backed by Heineken.139 This 
discord between the breweries would continue until 1961, when Heineken decided the 
only way Crown would start selling the same beer was by having Pyramid buy the 
4118 shares that Heineken, through the holding company Cobra, was holding in 
Crown and then send a Heineken approved brewmaster.140  This plan never came to 
fruition, as the Egyptian government nationalized the company before they could 
carry through the plan and as I will show in the next chapters Crown remained a thorn 
in Pyramid’s side. 
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Conclusion 
 This chapter has tracked the maturation of the Pyramid and Crown Breweries 
before, during, and after World War II. This phase was marked by two new sources of 
power and intrusion, Heineken Brewing Company and the Egyptian government. 
Heineken’s involvement went from investment in an attractive asset to active 
participation in the beer companies’ daily operations. Although Heineken ultimately 
acted like other imperialist multinationals, prioritizing their interests over those of the 
local companies, its dealings with Pyramid and Crown Breweries were generally 
conducted diplomatically and with an eye toward consensus. Heineken was more than 
willing to volunteer, rather than force, its expertise upon Crown and Pyramid, and 
these two breweries benefitted from the technical expertise of the multinational. The 
balanced dynamic is noteworthy considering the significant power differential 
between the multinational and the Egyptian beer companies. The relative balance of 
power can be attributed to the Egyptian breweries’ control of the situation on the 
ground, and to the fact that the parties ultimately shared the same goal of profiting 
from the sale of beer in Egypt.  
As for these companies’ relationships with the Egyptian government, these were 
not based on mutual interest; rather, they were characterized by tension that arose 
from opposing desires. As the government pushed for a more Egyptian economy, the 
beer companies had a vested interest in maintaining a hybrid and ambiguous national 
identity. In this case, it was the beer companies that had the advantage: they had a 
decades-long history of government non-interference as well as multinational 
connections to deal with the demands of the newly empowered government. 
Meanwhile, the government was only just starting to escape its colonial/semi-colonial 
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past, and was only beginning to map out what it could demand from these “foreign” 
businesses that for so long had remained inviolate. 
The remaining chapters will discuss these three actors—the Crown–Pyramid 
Breweries, Heineken, and the Egyptian government—as their relationships changed 
between 1953 and 1970. The next chapter will look at how the synergy of the 
Egyptian breweries and Heineken reached a high point as they consolidated a durable 
and potent identity, which dominated the Egyptian beer industry until the 1970s. At 
the same, the Egyptian government, fully emboldened by the Nasserist takeover, 
asserted itself in a way not previously seen, which had major consequences for the 
private sector of the Egyptian economy.    
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Chapter 6: Stella is Always Delicious: Selling Beer in the Time of 
Nasser, 1952–1958 
 
 The period from 1952 to 1958 in Egypt was one of massive change. During 
this time, the newly installed government of Gamal Abdel Nasser worked to punish 
the “foreign” capitalists and their Egyptian conspirators, who, in Nasser’s eyes, had 
stifled the progress of the country. The government also worked to assert Egypt’s 
place in the world, a pursuit that involved political posturing (the Suez Crisis), 
economic restructuring (land-reform and nationalization), and grand architectural 
ventures (the Aswan High Dam). For the two major Egyptian beer companies, Crown 
and Pyramid Breweries, this was one of their most successful periods as they 
witnessed banner profits and brand consolidation behind the breweries’ flagship 
product, Stella Beer. Behind the success, though, the company was troubled by 
internal conflicts among its Dutch technocrats, who had been sent by Heineken to 
make sure the company ran “properly,” and the Egyptian managers and executives. 
These conflicts grew out of the policies of an activist Egyptian government that was 
overt in its favoritism for Muslim Egyptians and that framed all business interactions 
as struggles between the “foreign” and the “Egyptian.”  During Nasser’s turbulent 
early years of rule, the beer companies’ external success managed to coexist with 
internal strife. 
 This chapter’s analysis proceeds in five parts. The first section examines the 
beer companies’ initial reaction to the Free Officers Movement. The second section 
looks at the internal restructuring of Pyramid that followed the Free Officers 
Movement. The third section examines the interactions and conflicts between Dutch 
and Egyptian management that framed this restructuring. The fourth section looks at 
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how Pyramid and Crown formulated their flagship brand, Stella, both technically and 
through advertisements after this restructuring. Finally, this chapter looks at the beer 
companies’ attempts at brand management, which included squashing an ill-fated 
competitor to the Pyramid–Crown partnership, Nile Brewery. 
 
Egyptianization 
 The year 1952 was a traumatic one for Egypt. On January 26, 1952, anti-
regime protestors rioted and set fires throughout the city of Cairo, the beating heart of 
the country. In total, twenty-six were killed, five hundred were wounded, and the cost 
of the damage was fifteen million Egyptian pounds.1 These fires meant not just 
protest, but violent reaction against the perceived pernicious influence of “foreign” 
elements in Egypt.2 Many of these protestors were members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Young Egypt, or at least sympathized with the groups’ core belief 
that the “foreign” presence in Egypt needed to be excised in order for the country to 
return to greatness. Many protestors directed their attacks at establishments that were 
symbols of the foreign presence in Egypt, especially British. Not coincidentally, many 
of these “foreign” places under attack, such as sports clubs, bars, hotels, and dance 
halls, also sold alcohol.  These fires represented the literal and figurative explosion of 
the jingoistic, nationalistic, Islamic modernist feelings that had been bubbling in 
Egypt since the 1920s, and they also signified the demise of the monarchal 
Muhammad ʿAli regime in Egypt.  Later that same year, in July, a small group of 
young, mid-level military officers seized power. In what would come to be called the 
Free Officers Movement, this group of ninety to one hundred officers seized control 
of the country from King Faruq and set out to dismantle the regime and its elite 
support, which they deemed to have been exploiting the country for too long.3 
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While Egypt experienced monumental changes in 1952, what is remarkable about 
Crown and Pyramid Breweries at that time is how little they were affected by these 
changes at first. One of their first orders of business, in the wake of the Free Officers’ 
ascent to power, had little to do with the new reality in Egypt and much to do with the 
companies’ own convergence. After Pyramid’s 1953 investment in Crown, all 
operations in Cairo came under the auspices of Pyramid Brewery. The breweries were 
thus left with a superfluous piece of Nile-front property, which Crown brewery 
planned to use as a spot for a new Cairo-based project.4 After a search, they were able 
to secure a buyer, Egyptian Hotels Limited. 
In the course of the fire that burned through Cairo, one of the most iconic hotels in 
Egypt, the Shepheard, burned down. As a result, the owner, Egyptian Hotels Limited, 
which also happened to be a part of the Empain Group, was looking for land to re-
build. Crown’s parcel happened to be adjacent to Egyptian Hotels’ other famous 
hotel, the Semiramis, and Egyptian Hotels Limited determined that this piece would 
be the perfect spot for the new Shepheard.5 Egyptian Hotels offered Crown forty-two 
Egyptian pounds per square meter of land, which was nearly ten pounds per square 
meter more that the bank had valued the land; the bank believed that thirty pounds per 
square meter was a fair price and that the land was worth, at most, thirty-five pounds 
per square meter.6 The companies were of course thrilled with the deal because they 
stood to make around 200,000 Egyptian pounds on the sale, nearly 140,000 pounds 
more than the land’s value according to Crown’s budget.7  
Unsurprisingly, Cobra, the Heineken-owned investment company that owned a 
significant amount of stock in each company, approved the sale of the land and 
looked forward to the positive effect the sale would have on the yearly dividend. One 
of the men who brokered this sale was a familiar figure, the president of Pyramid, 
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Ahmad Ahmad Farghali, who collaborated with Spiro Spiridis, a Greek Egyptian and 
managing director of Crown, to arrange the sale. The boards of the companies 
rewarded Farghali and Spiridis six thousand Egyptian pounds for their work selling 
the land. This sum was recompense for securing a buyer and pushing through the land 
sale while keeping brokers out of the dealings.8  
Immediately after the Free Officers Movement, the breweries managed to 
continue business as usual and even to remain profitable. Crown made a profit of 
23,000 Egyptian pounds in 1953.9 Most of this profit, 22,000 pounds, came from the 
sale of beer, which at the time was going at thirty-four Egyptian pounds per hectoliter. 
This figure puts Crown’s sales at about 650 hectoliters in 1953. From this sum, the 
company was profitable enough to distribute a dividend of 203 piasters, making 
Cobra’s income from Crown in 1953 around 30,000 Egyptian pounds.10 Still, this 
profit was less than the company was expecting, a fact that is surely attributable to the 
country’s volatility at the time. 
It was not long before Egypt’s new reality would have a substantive effect on the 
breweries. In 1954, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), the ruling body 
formed by the Free Officers movement, passed a new law regarding limited liability 
companies. In order to comply, Crown had to appoint a new Egyptian member of the 
board. The person chosen was Sameh Mohamed Moussa, a lawyer who served as a 
member of the boards of several other limited liability companies. Importantly, he 
was a friend of Ahmad Farghali.11 While Cobra did not realize it at the time, nor did 
Oscar Adrian Eduard Egbert Lewe Wittert van Hoogland (hereafter referred to as 
Wittert van Hoogland)—Cobra and Heineken’s representative on both Crown and 
Pyramid Breweries’ board—the placement of a good friend of Farghali on the Crown 
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board was a signal of the new hiring practices that the breweries would come to adopt 
under the Nasser-led government. 
 This new hire, the lawyer Moussa, also signaled a new trend in the post-Free 
Officers economy, one of which Cobra and Heineken were well aware: 
Egyptianization. Prior to the Free Officers movement, the breweries had taken the 
first steps towards Egyptianization due to what they viewed as extremely onerous 
demands for back taxes from the post-World War II Belgian government. Hoping to 
avoid these back taxes, the breweries decided in 1947 to sever their ties with Belgium 
and keep their headquarters in Egypt, where they had relocated during World War II. 
However, this decision was not accompanied by any other changes that resembled 
“Egyptianization.”  
In 1953, Heineken started to formulate a policy for Egyptianizing both companies. 
This move did not come out of any sense of nationalism, but from Heineken’s worry 
that as long as the companies were not officially Egyptian, they might have to pay the 
150,000 Egyptian pounds they owed to the Belgian fiscal authorities.12 Heineken, 
therefore, reached out to Pyramid, and specifically Wittert van Hoogland, in hopes 
that he could spearhead an effort to Egyptianize both companies.  
What Crown’s Egyptianization meant for Heineken in practical terms was the 
liquidation of Crown in Belgium (what they called Crown 1897), and the creation of a 
new Egyptian Crown (called Crown 1954).13  Despite the name difference, Crown 
1954 would simply be a reconstituted version of Crown 1897 with all of the same 
assets and liabilities, but with a headquarters in Egypt.14 The maneuver of 
reconstituting the company was meant to enable Crown to consolidate its debt with 
one debtor, the Egyptian government. Heineken imagined that the Egyptian 
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government would expect a tax payment on both the liquidation and reconstitution of 
the company, but that the total would be less than what was owed to the Belgian fiscal 
authorities. By paying this sum to the Egyptian government, Crown would be willing 
to deflect any attempts by the Belgian authorities to claim the money they were owed. 
In this instance, Heineken was reading the new reality of post-1952 Egypt. The 
corporation recognized that the Egyptian government under the RCC was not only a 
much larger threat than a war-weakened Belgian fiscal authority, but also that this 
government was steadfastly working to remove the “foreign” elements in the 
Egyptian economy.15  
While Heineken hoped for the Egyptianization of Crown by 1954, they requested 
that Pyramid implement a similar plan immediately. Despite Heineken’s insistence, 
the leadership of Pyramid and Crown had made little progress toward the goal in 
1955, when the Egyptian Federation of Industry issued a pronouncement on the 
Egyptianization of foreign limited liability companies in Egypt. Per this 
announcement (Law No. 315), all of the following were only authorized to continue 
operations in Egypt if they became Egyptian limited liability companies: foreign 
limited companies, companies limited by shares, and limited liability companies, 
whether foreign or Egyptian. A company’s conversion into an Egyptian limited 
liability company required the publication of two copies of the company’s financial 
records, the movement of their headquarters to Egypt, a payment of a fee to the 
government, and the the Egyptian government’s authorization of the distribution of all 
shares.16  
The promulgation of this new law very quickly convinced the leadership at Crown 
that they needed to Egyptianize, so they began the process almost immediately. This 
Crown-led Egyptianization came as shock to Heineken, however. While Heineken 
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was not opposed to the decision, the company disliked not being the one to dictate 
terms. The company wrote to Crown pleading for them to wait and meet with Wittert 
van Hoogland so that he could carry out the Egyptianization of the company 
according to Heineken’s liquidation and reconstitution plan.17 Crown, recognizing the 
nature of their relationship with Heineken and Cobra, did not flatly reject the pleas; 
they even met with Wittert van Hoogland, but they made clear that they were going 
through with the conversion without Heineken’s help.18 The lack of communication 
between Heineken and Crown was evident from the fact that Cobra and Heineken had 
to ask Wittert van Hoogland to provide them the bylaws of the proposed Egyptianized 
Crown so that they could weigh in on the process at the next shareholders meeting.19     
When Heineken was finally able to take a look at the new bylaws, the company 
approved the decision and deputized Wittert van Hoogland as their proxy to vote in 
favor the Egyptianization.20 However, their authority was not most important in 
giving approval to the Egyptianization of the company. That authority belonged to the 
new President of the Republic, Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918–1970). Although the Free 
Officers Movement was spearheaded by a coterie of discontented army officers, it 
was the charismatic and clever Nasser who between 1952 and 1954 emerged as the 
voice of this Egyptian revolution.21 His main challenger for political prominence was 
Muhammad Naguib (1901–1984), who had been installed as the nominal leader of the 
Free Officers Movement, first as the premier, war and naval minister, commander-in-
chief of the army, and governor general, and then later as president in 1953–54. The 
battle over leadership began when Naguib, having fought with the RCC over the 
direction of the country, resigned from the government.22  Upon his resignation, there 
was an outpouring of sentiment among military, paramilitary, and other political 
forces that Naguib should return to his post. However, Nasser, recognizing the real 
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threat that Naguib posed to a movement that he largely drove behind the scenes, 
engineered mass strikes in March 1954, bringing the country to a halt and eventually 
orchestrating Naguib’s removal.23 Nasser’s use of the labor movement as a cudgel no 
doubt encouraged him to further pursue the government’s encroachment on the 
private sector that had begun in the 1940s.24 It was in 1955 that Nasser began to 
implement the policies such as the law discussed above, whereby he would break the 
grip of “monopolists and feudalists” over the Egyptian private sector.25  
The most telling sign of the activist bent of the Nasser regime vis-à-vis the private 
sector was his nationalization of the Suez Canal Company in 1956. Since the hand 
over of control to the British in 1875, the Canal had served as a constant reminder to 
Egyptian nationalists of the economic control that foreign interests maintained in 
Egypt. There was thus broad consensus in Egyptian society at the time of the Free 
Officers Movement that the Suez Canal Company’s control of the Canal must 
eventually come to an end.26 While the issue of the Canal’s nationalization was 
openly discussed, Nasser’s desire to use revenues from the Canal to fund the Aswan 
High Dam project accelerated the timeline of that nationalization.  In particular, the 
British, American, and World Bank’s initial overtures to help fund the project and 
then quick turnaround may have spurred Gamal Abdel Nasser, who by that time had 
seized power from the RCC, to nationalize the Suez Canal.  
Of course, the British and French did not accept lying down the 
nationalization of one of their most profitable assets, and the policy response they 
pursued was one of economic deterrence, employing banking and currency 
restrictions.27 Their most audacious countermeasure was a failed tripartite (British, 
French, and Israeli) military excursion that involved the bombing of Port Said and the 
advancement of troops into the Canal Zone.28 The invasion only emboldened the 
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Nasser government to expand its nationalization plans.  After the failed invasion, the 
Egyptian government sequestered and then nationalized the companies that had 
significant British or French capital. This move was accompanied by actions aimed at 
expelling all British, French, and Jewish residents from Egypt.29 What really marks 
1956 as the start of the new era, though, was what Robert L. Tignor called a 
“rupture,” as the Nasser government extended these policies to the rest of the 
Egyptian private sector.30 The government, backed by “socialist” laws that gave them 
unchallenged power in the corporate sector and headed by the Egyptian Economic 
Organization (al-Mu‘assa al-Iqtiṣaḍiyya), sequestered and nationalized over 250 
million pounds’ worth of assets from the private sector.31     
In this context, it was more than merely a formality when in 1957 the President of 
the Republic granted permission to the Crown Brewery to continue to function as an 
Egyptian limited liability company.32 At this moment, the company faced—and 
eluded—an existential threat. It is not exactly clear why the government granted 
Crown this permission to continue existing; perhaps it was the company’s proactive 
Egyptianization, the government’s hesitancy to assume control of an alcohol 
company, or simply good luck at avoiding the eye of the Egyptian government. 
Whatever the reason, even though Cobra and Heineken did not realize it at the time, 
this moment of forced-through Egyptianization, which aligned with the desires of the 
Dutch company, would be the last time the Egyptian government and Heinenken 
would operate under shared goals.  
 
Reorganization 
From 1957 onward, Cobra, Crown, and Pyramid tried to avoid the fate of 
nationalization by adhering to all of the regulations put forth by the Egyptian 
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government. The breweries were so cautious because, as one Dutch board member of 
the Pyramid brewery said, they did not want the brewery go the way of the Suez 
Canal.33 The most pertinent example of the companies’ commitment to avoiding the 
watchful eye of the government was their willingness to comply with the multiple 
updates and amendments that the Nasser government made to the Company Law of 
1947, which required Egyptian companies (those with major bases in Egypt) “to offer 
51 percent of their stock to Egyptians and to place Egyptian nationals on 40 percent of 
the board seats.”34   
 In 1955, the government modified the Company Law by requiring anyone 
who sat on the board of companies (administrateur) to retire at the age of sixty, unless 
otherwise approved by the government. This law was intended to free the economy 
from the domination of “predatory” capitalists.35 In 1958, another modification 
required the boards of companies like Pyramid and Crown to abide by several 
provisions: a board could only have seven members; no directors (directeurs) or 
employees (employés) could sit on the board; and the majority of the board had to be 
Egyptian. Individuals who sat on any board were subject to various restrictions: they 
could only be a member of two boards; they could not be the managing director 
(administrateur délégué), which implied a level of control and involvement beyond 
that of a typical board member, of more than one company; and they had to be under 
the age of sixty unless approved by the government.36  
 These new provisions had a powerful impact on Pyramid, because when they 
appeared in 1958, the company was in violation of nearly every one of them. Their 
board had eight members, two of whom, Emil Natti and Ismaʿil Hafez were directors 
in the company; two members of the board were beyond the age of sixty; and the 
eight-member board was divided equally between four Egyptians and four non-
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Egyptians. On an individual level, Ahmad Farghali, the most important Egyptian 
figure at Pyramid, was in violation of all the statutes as well. He was not only 
approaching the age of sixty, but as late as 1946 he sat on the boards of 29 different 
companies37; in addition, he was managing director of both Pyramid and Farghali 
Cotton and Investment Company, the company he inherited from his father. 
 As the head executive of the company, Farghali was the public face of the 
industry to both the Egyptian government and other bodies that wanted to deal with 
the beer companies in Egypt. In this role, he travelled in 1957 to Prague, Moscow, 
Switzerland, France, and Italy doing business in several of these countries.38  These 
travels were emblematic of Farghali’s position as a sort of jet-setter, although private 
jets would still be years away. In another instance of Farghali’s internationalism, he 
held talks with his friends at the Chinese Embassy in Cairo and with the Chinese trade 
mission over the possibility of Pyramid importing hops from China.39 This possible 
agreement was an example of the practical upshot of the Nasser government’s push to 
align with the Communists in the Cold War geopolitical struggle between the United 
States and the Soviet Union.     
It is thus not surprising that in 1958, Pyramid thus needed to make major 
changes in order to bring itself in line with the government’s demands. The task of 
overseeing the necessary changes primarily fell on the man in charge of the day-to-
day operations of the company, the Dutch managing director.  From Heineken’s first 
involvement in Pyramid in the late 1930s, Wittert van Hoogland served in this 
position. However, in 1957, due to his excellent work with the company in Egypt, he 
was appointed to a better position as head of Cobra. 40 Although Wittert van Hoogland 
remained on the executive board of Pyramid, he was able to return to Amsterdam to 
serve as an adviser for breweries worldwide. He would cede his role as managing 
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director and representative of Cobra in Egypt to Eric Karl Kettner, another Dutch 
national who had trained at Heineken in the beer business. He was a true technocrat 
and was fully committed to what I call “total control” brewing; that is, the application 
of the most cutting edge techniques and technology to create a standardized and 
durable product that could be delivered uniformly to all of its consumers.  
Emblematic of Kettner’s commitment to the product’s quality was his response 
when he once spotted imported Heineken beers in an Egyptian market. He bought 
four and put them through a blind testing to see if they lived up to the standards of 
Heineken beer. During the test, he discovered that the bottles of Heineken, when 
turned, would produce a cloud of particulate that whirled around inside the bottle.41 
This occurrence was deeply troubling to Kettner because it violated a major selling 
point of beer in the Egyptian market, that it be clear, clean, and free of particulates. 
Although the cloud was benign from a health perspective, modern Egyptian 
advertisements’ focus on the “purity” of industrially produced beer meant that this 
cloud was a symbol of “impurity” and a deterrent to purchase. In response to this 
violation of the “total brewing” ethos, Kettner asked the Heineken representative, who 
happened to be Wittert van Hoogland, if he should buy back all of the Heineken that 
was on the market.42 
Kettner brought the same single-minded commitment to resolving the issues 
that arose from the newly bolstered Company Law. He saw the troubles not as 
setbacks but as opportunities to reorganize the company into better alignment with 
“modern” practices. In fact, he related to his new superior, Wittert van Hoogland, that 
he took great pleasure in looking over the new Company Law to devise ways for the 
company to make the laws work best for them. He believed it was imperative for 
Pyramid to take full advantage of every possible loophole in the law. As Kettner 
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envisioned it, in the interim between when the amendment was promulgated in late 
1958 and when it went into full effect on January 1, 1959, two of the four Egyptian 
members of the board would leave. One, Abu al-Enein Salim, who was over sixty, 
would retire, and the other, Ahmad Farghali, would take a similar position at the 
National Bank and leave Pyramid.43 Abdel Hamid Sharif, another Muslim Egyptian, 
would replace Farghali as president. For Kettner, the departure of Farghali was the 
best way to truly clean house at Pyramid.44 If neither left—a possibility which Kettner 
deemed remote—then Ismaʿil Hafez would be removed from the board, as he was the 
most recent addition.  
Surprisingly, both of Kettner’s plans would leave a foreign majority on the 
Pyramid board. Kettner was well aware of this imbalance and wanted to maintain the 
foreign majority, which included, along with himself, two Heineken higher-ups 
(Jonkheer Pieter Rutger Feith and Wittert van Hoogland) and an Italian protégé, Emil 
Natti, until the end of December. He was, perhaps foolishly, quite comfortable with 
possibility of having these four being only accompanied on the board by two 
Egyptians. He even had one of the company lawyers, Alber Tagher, look into the 
possibility of having Cobra serve as a member of the board of directors.45 Farghali 
had some choice words about Kettner’s plan. When Kettner presented the plan, 
Farghali slapped himself on the thigh, roared with laughter, and exclaimed in French, 
"Yes, you have a dog's life, a dog's life, ha ha ha."46 In French, the idiom “a dog’s 
life” means a difficult life, and while Farghali was no doubt jesting, his remark 
actually proved to be quite prescient when it came to the enforcement of the new plan. 
Very soon after putting forward the plan, the constituent parts began to fall apart. The 
first piece to fall was, Farghali himself, as the Egyptian government, emulating the 
French model of business, made a strong push to make the president of joint-stock 
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companies the most powerful person in these companies at the expense of the 
managing director.47  
With the possibility of the president assuming an even greater role in running 
the company, both Kettner and Wittert van Hoogland agreed that they could not 
appoint Abdel Hamid Sharif as president. Wittert van Hoogland went as far to say that 
they should never appoint him president.48 Kettner thus had to turn back to Farghali 
and have him remain as the company president until they could find a suitable 
replacement or until he took his position at the National Bank. Kettner even 
entertained the idea that Wittert van Hoogland or Feith could occupy the position after 
Farghali left.49 However, Farghali’s proposed move to the National Bank never 
materialized, as the bank went in another direction.50 Farghali was left as president, 
and he would serve in that position for another two years until the government 
sequestered him and the company. 
Despite these setbacks in Kettner’s pursuit of his goal, he remained fully 
committed to his plan of a board shakeup. Yet the actions of Abu el-Einein Salim 
soon struck it a decisive blow, in the form of a request from Salim for his bonus as a 
member of the board of directors.51 While this request may seem innocuous, it 
represented Salim’s intention to continue his employment on the Pyramid board. The 
news that Kettner received the next day—that the Department of Companies 
(Maṣlaḥat al-Sharikāt), the government body in charge of assuring compliance with 
the Company Law, had approved the continuation of Salim’s presence on the Pyramid 
board—only confirmed what Kettner had been dreading, that Salim had no intention 
of leaving his position at Crown.52 On one level, Salim’s intractability made Kettner’s 
job more difficult as it created an inherently volatile position on the board. Because 
Salim was over sixty, his continuation on the board was wholly contingent on the 
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continued approval of the government. More significantly for Kettner, though, 
Salim’s actions confirmed his suspicions about the man’s untrustworthiness. Salim 
had long rubbed Kettner the wrong way; he would come to the brewery office and act 
like a managing director, Kettner’s position, giving orders to the under directors 
instead of deferring to the Dutchman.53  While the occasional over-stepping of bounds 
may have been forgivable, it became much harder for Kettner to swallow when it was 
coupled with Salim’s mendacity on the issue of his continuing presence on the board. 
The Department of Companies’ confirmation of Salim came as a shock to 
Kettner. Salim had confirmed in a letter to Kettner that he would step down, only then 
to go behind Kettner’s back to request a continuation of his tenure. Kettner’s dislike 
for Salim was made even stronger by the “confidential” information he received from 
Ismaʿil Hafez that Salim was under investigation by the government for 
embezzlement.54 This information was the last straw for Kettner, and he told Wittert 
van Hoogland that, “even for Egypt,” Salim’s malfeasance was beyond the pale.55  
This statement represents not only Kettner’s frustration, but also the reification of the 
us-versus-them mentality that Kettner had developed during the few short years he 
worked at Pyramid. 
Despite Kettner’s utter distaste for Salim, he could not fire the man. The 
particularities of the Company Law dictated that Kettner could not remove a 
government-approved member of the board.56 Therefore, it was Emil Natti, his closest 
ally in the company, who had to resign. As of January 31, 1959, the board was 
composed of Kettner, Feith, Wittert van Hoogland, Farghali, Sharif, Salim, and Hafez, 
with Farghali as president. The loss of Natti was a blow to Kettner because he 
believed Natti was the Dutchman’s main defense against “intrigues.”57 Intrigues were 
also the reason that Kettner was greatly dispirited by the presence of another Egyptian 
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on the board, Ismaʿil Hafez. As I will show in the next section, Salim’s betrayal of 
Kettner confirmed his belief that Egyptians were undermining him in the workplace.  
Us Versus Them 
To understand Kettner’s intense reaction to the actions of Salim, it is necessary to 
look at Kettner’s prior relations with Egyptians in the company. All of these 
interactions and the power dynamics beneath them were framed by Pyramid’s 
relatively clear organizational structure. Kettner, as a managing director, served as the 
direct link between the executive, headed by Farghali, and the management of the 
company. During his time in charge, from 1957 to 1963, three directors sat below 
Kettner: Albert Farag, Emilio Natti, and Gerardus Hubertus Ulenberg. Albert Farag, a 
Coptic Christian, was in charge of the communication department, which contained 
the secretariat and the accounting section. Emilio Natti was at the head of the 
engineering division of the company, which included the workshop where all the 
brewery’s machinery was repaired, the garage housing the cars and trucks that 
transported the beer, the department where labels were made and affixed to the 
bottles, and the electrical department. A Dutch national trained at Heineken, 
Ulenberg, was the head brewmaster and head of the brewing department, which 
covered malting, fermenting, brewing, refrigeration, storage, and bottling.  
Originally, Ulenberg and the rest of the brewing department were under the watch 
of Natti, but Ulenberg proved so vital to the company that Kettner elevated him to the 
level of director.58 Below the three directors were the heads of each of the separate 
sub-departments, most of whom had Egyptian citizenship. For example, underneath 
Ulenberg were Fathi el Malt, the assistant brewmaster; Ahmed Hamdi Abu Khatwa, 
head of malting; Mohamed Ihab el Chamaa, head of fermenting; Mohamed Ramses 
Awad, head of the cellars; and Hafez Zaklama, head of bottling.59  Below these sub-
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department heads were two sets of company employees: salaried employees and 
workers. The salaried employees, who were paid monthly, were classified by the 
Department of Companies as muwaẓẓafīn (employees).  The rest of the people 
working for the company were paid a daily wage and were classified as workers 
(ʿummāl). These groups two were differentiated both by their salary structure and by 
the type of jobs they filled. The muwaẓẓafīn, who included the chiefs of the sub-
departments, were generally white-collar workers: supervisors, company doctors, 
lawyers, secretarial staff, translators, brewers, accountants, and so on, while the 
ʿummal were the blue-collar types: bottle fillers, bottle cleaners, label attachers, 
drivers, and assistant drivers.  Many daily wageworkers did have longstanding 
relationships with the company, but their turnover rates were higher than that of the 
muwaẓẓafīn.  
One notable omission from the above description of the organizational structure of 
Pyramid is the Egyptian, Ismaʿil Hafez. The role of Ismaʿil Hafez is discussed here in 
particular depth because of its importance to the company.  From the very first 
moment that Kettner arrived in Egypt and assumed his position in 1957, Hafez was an 
issue for him. One of the first instances of discord between the two occurred when 
Hafez, with the supposed aim of making Pyramid appear more vital to the Egyptian 
economy, suggested that the beer company branch out into partnerships with other 
industries, including making feed for cattle from their spent grain. Kettner rejected his 
suggestion, citing the proverb, “schoenmaker houd je bij je leest,” or “Cobbler, stick 
to thy last.”60 Nevertheless, Kettner conceded, in a letter to Wittert van Hoogland, that 
the company would probably have to do its "patriotic duty" and contribute in some 
way to the promotion of the "national economy.”61   
 
254 
If Kettner and Hafez had disagreed only over the investments the brewery should 
make, then the friction would have been resolved quickly. However, Kettner’s issues 
with Hafez stemmed more deeply from Kettner’s belief that Hafez was actively 
sabotaging the company. For Kettner, one notable incident was the feud between 
Hafez and the head of the garages, Hassan Tawfiq. As Kettner described it, the 
dispute began when Tawfiq had the temerity to deny Hafez the use of a company car, 
an act that won Tawfiq the “eternal hatred” of Hafez.62  According to Kettner, this act, 
in addition to the simmering jealously that Hafez felt toward Hassan Tawfiq for 
having been elected vice president of the workers’ syndicate instead of Hafez, led 
Hafez to ignore the reasonable requests of Tawfiq and actively sow discord among 
those who worked below Tawfiq at the garage.63  The situation reached such a level 
of discord that Kettner had to step in and arbitrate among Hafez, Tawfik, the workers’ 
syndicate, and the other heads of departments. Although a great number of 
accusations were made, the squabble was settled when Kettner threatened to not pay 
out any Ramadan bonuses.64  
Although the actions of Hafez seem to be those of a petty, vindictive man 
determined to rise in the ranks, it is important to remember that this depiction, coming 
from Kettner, is biased. Kettner states that he was gratified when the syndicate 
directed their complaints at Hafez and his supposed co-conspirator Alber Farag.65 
This bias appears to have extended beyond Hafez to Egyptians in general. This fact 
becomes patent when we look at Kettner’s efforts to replace a Coptic employee, 
Victor Moreno.  
The departure of an employee was a particular common occurrence in this period 
because of the Nasser-led government’s strengthening and expansion of the Company 
Law of 1947. Although the law had a significant effect on the executive level, it was a 
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blunt force object when it came to those below the executive. Both the Mutamaṣṣirūn 
(Egyptianized Foreigners, as Joel Beinin refers to those Arabic speaking Greeks, 
Italians and Jews), and the companies that employed them were faced with the 
dilemma that one of their greatest strengths—their cultural dynamism and multi-
cultural familiarity—had become a major threat to their employment.66 As discussed 
above, some workers applied for citizenship and were able to get it, but many were 
not. The large companies had two options in dealing with the cases of those who did 
not get citizenship: either replace them (i.e. fire them), or “move” them through a 
manipulation of the records produced for the Department of Companies. 
In the case of the Egyptian beer industry, we are privileged with a view into 
the companies’ “creative” accounting practices because they were caught in flagrante 
delicto. As a 1962 report shows, the two beer companies attempted to circumvent the 
watchful eye of the Ministry of Trade (Wizārat al-Tijāra), which housed the 
Department of Companies, by setting up a distribution office that was shared by both 
companies, but not formally part of either. Through this distribution office, the 
companies paid employees like Michel Elias, who would otherwise have raised the 
percentage of foreigners’ pay to an unacceptable level. Dealings such as this led the 
Ministry of Trade to look further into the companies’ books, where numerous 
inconsistencies were discovered, including the gifting of villas and unreported 
bonuses to foreign employees. All of this malfeasance was evidence of the beer 
companies’ flaunting of the Company Law of 1947. As punishment, the companies 
were forced to let go of some of their “foreign” workers.67 
In the case of one employee, Victor Moreno, he was not only unable to secure 
citizenship, but the company made no effort to “move” him. Instead, Pyramid 
removed him from his post, and the government forced him to leave the country.68 
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Moreno’s case was a very sad and tricky one because he had worked for Pyramid for 
over twenty-five years, and his dismissal left him penniless. Heineken offered 
employment with their brewery in the Belgian Congo, but Moreno refused, not 
willing to move to such a distant and unfamiliar location.69 Despite his long tenure 
with Pyramid, the company and its mother company, Heineken, showed very little 
compassion when discussing his exit. Upon Moreno’s termination, the Pyramid board 
agreed to pay 2,000 Egyptian pounds in indemnity to Moreno, while Heineken agreed 
to pay 9,000 francs.70 Moreno found this sum far too low, and he requested, in several 
seven-page letters to Wittert van Hoogland and Kettner, that Heineken pay him 
approximately 25,000 francs.71 This request was not only rejected by Kettner, who 
sent a letter to Moreno expressing that the calculations behind this claim were simply 
incorrect, but led Wittert van Hoogland to assert that Moreno’s claims were no longer 
of any importance to Kettner and that he must cut off the correspondence with him, 
which Kettner did.72  
If Kettner was ruthlessly business-minded in his dealings with Moreno, his search 
for Moreno’s replacement was no less informed by shrewd management tactics. 
Kettner was willing to use any means necessary to find the right fit for the position. 
Beyond talking to candidates and their references, Kettner also subjected them to 
handwriting tests. Implementing a theory that was used by the Egyptian army, Kettner 
had a handwriting specialist named Deen analyze potential employees’ handwriting in 
order to determine their employability.73 Kettner also consulted with Egyptians who 
could suggest other Egyptians as potential employees, as at this point, Pyramid could 
only hire Egyptians.  One of the Egyptians to whom Kettner talked was Ismaʿil Hafez. 
In an unsurprising turn of events, Kettner came out of a five-hour meeting with Hafez 
convinced more than ever of the man’s ill intentions. In particular, Kettner was off-
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put by Hafez’s suggestion that the position could be used to curry favor with the ever-
encroaching Egyptian government.  As Kettner notes, while Hafez “on the surface 
was an extremely dedicated and jovial friend,” he was, in reality, very dangerous.74  
This danger stemmed from Hafez’s status as an “untrustworthy, vain, ambitious, and 
overall a substandard individual.”75 These characteristics were only to be expected 
from Hafez because, as Kettner stated bluntly, he was an Egyptian.76  
These racial generalizations came in a letter to Wittert van Hoogland, where 
Kettner also details Hafez’s high opinion of himself and his desires for career 
advancement. As Kettner noted, Hafez used the discussion of the replacement of 
Moreno to assert what he imagined should be his rightful place at the company. 
Kettner believed that the operations of the company would be much better if he sat on 
the executive board and that he would be an asset, like he was during the tense days of 
the nationalization of the Suez Canal when the fate of the beer companies was not 
apparent in dealing with the government.77 In addition to believing that he would be a 
great asset to the company as a board member, Kettner stated that all decisions of the 
personnel department, which he headed, should be left solely to him.78 In Hafez’s 
eyes, the Moreno issue and others concerning “foreign” workers was the result of 
previous leaders, like Wittert van Hoogland, listening to opinions that were not 
Hafez’s. While these musings are clearly those of someone with ambition and great 
self-worth, it is not clear whether they carry the combative power with which Kettner 
imbued them. According to Kettner, these were the words of an Egyptian who aimed 
to turn him into a mere ornament and figurehead with no real power in the direction of 
the company.79  Kettner was particularly worried that if ever the day came that Hafez 
did acquire a leadership position in the company (which as we know he did), and had 
full say in personnel policies, the Coptic Christians would suffer.80 In Kettner’s eyes, 
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how could the Coptic Christian not suffer when a Muslim like Hafez controlled all 
personnel decisions? 
Pyramid’s policy with regard to Hafez did very little to assuage Kettner’s worries 
about this Egyptian, which was apparent from another Heineken employee’s 1959 
report on the company. As the report noted, during his time at the company, Hafez 
served both as a managing director, a position that was equal to Kettner’s, and as a 
head of two departments, the personnel and public relations departments. Where 
exactly he sat within the company hierarchy was not particularly clear. In his dual 
position, he was both underneath and the equal of Kettner. The lack of definition was 
particularly troubling to the heads of the other departments—Natti, Ulenberg, and 
Farag—who were unsure whether Hafez was their superior or equal.81 Hafez used this 
ambiguity to continually assert his authority.82 In particular, he was focused more on 
being a managing director, like Kettner, and delegated the personnel and public 
relations work to his subordinates.83  All of these statements seem to at least signal 
that Kettner was not being paranoid about Hafez’s plans for him. This is given further 
credence by the fact that Hafez claimed that he did not trust one of the subordinates, 
to whom he was delegating his work, because the subordinate was a spy for the 
military authorities.84   
While Kettner may have had an enemy in Hafez, the enmity that he expressed 
toward Egyptians was not limited to Hafez. Kettner also noted that he did not trust 
Tawfiq any more than he did Hafez. In Kettner’s opinion, Hafez was a dangerous 
person, who could only be trusted up until the point that he showed himself as an 
enemy.85 Kettner believed that Tawfiq was even more dangerous than Hafez “because 
he [was] more intelligent.”86 This general distrust of Egyptians was a reflection of the 
“us-versus-them” mentality that Kettner harbored. He believed that men like Hafez 
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and Tawfiq would always be on the ready to use the anti-Western sentiment that 
permeated Egypt at the time in order to get ahead.87 In fact, Kettner referred to this 
type of ladder-climbing through the use of nationalist sympathies as “Farghalism,” 
using the name of the man who, in his mind, was the progenitor of this maneuver in 
the company.88    
In fact, Kettner’s negative opinion of Egyptians may have reflected a general 
distrust of Egyptians among European Heineken workers in Egypt. We see another 
example of this feeling in a letter that Wittert Van Hoogland wrote to Kettner 
responding to the latter’s complaints about Hafez. Wittert Van Hoogland stated that 
Hafez’s shortcomings and intrigues were more or less normal in Egypt because the 
country was filled with two untrustworthy groups, the effendi and the Copt. For 
Wittert van Hoogland, the effendi were Mohammaden urbanites who were simply 
untrustworthy and incompetent.89 The Copt was equally untrustworthy, but because, 
as a minority constantly under threat in Egypt, he was so accustomed to intrigue and 
deceit that such was his default state.90 This alleged deceitfulness of the Copts was 
why Kettner, in the eyes of Wittert van Hoogland, should be glad to be rid of Victor 
Moreno.91  This prejudice was not mere idle expressions; it actively affected the 
Dutch management of the company. For example, when Kettner was assessing the 
causes of a dispute between Abu al-Einain Salim, a Muslim, and Alber Farag, a Copt, 
Wittert van Hoogland reminded him not to forget that, as a Copt, Farag was inclined 
towards intrigue.92  Wittert van Hoogland’s inherent distrust of Egyptians was also 
why, he told Kettner in the same letter, he distanced himself from the Egyptian staff 
in Cairo when he, Wittert van Hoogland, worked there. He advised the same thing for 
Kettner so that Kettner would be able to see “the forest from the trees.”93  
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Wittert van Hoogland’s comments are shocking to the modern reader for their 
frank condemnation of Egyptians, but they should not be surprising considering the 
power dynamics that underpinned them. Van Hoogland and Kettner came to work for 
the Egyptian breweries with an inherent sense of superiority. Not only were they 
acting on behalf the company that ultimately owned the breweries, Heineken, but they 
were also implementing the policies of one of the preeminent and most powerful 
brewers in the world. It then must have been a massive shock when these Egyptians 
did not listen to them and even, in the Dutch brewers’ eyes, actively worked against 
them.  
However, this distrust of Egyptians went beyond merely a sense of superiority. 
There were numerous other reasons that engendered a sense of “us versus them” in 
both the Dutch and the Egyptians. On the part of the Dutch, some of this mentality 
derived from the bolstering of the Company Law, which reified the differences 
between “foreign” and “Egyptian,” placing the foreigner in a disadvantaged position. 
While this turn against “foreign” elements could not compare to a long history of 
favor that these elements had received in Egypt, the turn certainly engendered a sense 
of beleaguerment in men like Kettner.  
Another factor contributing to anti-Egyptian sentiment was that Hafez, Farhgali, 
Salim, and Sharif were all Muslim Egyptians. As Kettner was all too aware, the 
imagined citizen of Nasser’s Egypt and the one most likely to maintain his status and 
advance was the Muslim Egyptian. Despite its claims to be secular, Nasser’s 
government still followed policies that marginalized Coptic Christians and Jewish 
Egyptians. Nasser’s secularism was merely lip service and was belied by his actions 
as the leader of Egypt.  When he struck at al-Azhār, it was not to lessen the role of 
Islam in society, but to co-opt the preeminent Islamic institution in Egypt. Nasser 
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recognized the importance of Islam to Egyptian society and did not “hesitate to utilize 
Islamic institutions to legitimize” his policies.94 He commissioned government 
propagandists to laud the government’s goals and their compatibility with Islam in the 
khutba (sermons) in Friday mosques, and he encouraged members of the government-
appointed ‘ulema to write tracts on the harmony of Islam and Arab socialism.95 With 
regard to social issues, although he passed laws that equalized gender relations 
somewhat, he was “extremely cautious” in his attitude toward family law and made 
no attempts to reform the Islamic institutions of polygamy or divorce.96 Nasser’s 
policies were also unfavorable to the minority religious communities. As compared to 
the Constitutional period, far fewer non-Muslims were able to achieve high levels of 
power under Nasser.  As Kettner notes, in the elections of 1957 “about half of the 
candidates were not approved by the government until the election (the bulk being 
Copts).” 97  In many districts, the government candidates were victorious in 
unopposed races.98  The contrast in the treatment of religious minorities was so stark 
that many non-Muslims came to regard pre-Nasser Egypt as a golden age for religious 
tolerance.99  
On the Egyptian side, Muslim Egyptians realized the advantageous position in 
which the Company Law and Nasser’s policies put them. Kettner noted that Salim had 
a sense that any legal decision could be ultimately reversed if he found the right 
lawyer.100 Likewise, the Egyptians were encouraged by the Dutch to organize along 
these lines. For example, Kettner freely admitted that one of the roles of Farghali was 
to control the other Egyptians on the board.101 That the Dutch did not know the 
Arabic language enabled the Egyptians, especially Farghali and Hafez, to control all 
interactions with the government and the Department of Companies. While this was 
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no doubt easier for Kettner than having to learn Arabic, it also meant that Kettner 
really could only gather secondhand information on Farghali and Hafez’s actions.  
The solidarity among Egyptian was not just an outside imposition. Solidarity 
certainly defined the Egyptian Muslims at Pyramid as well. As noted above, Salim 
was Farghali and Sharif’s “man.” Nepotism appeared to be a primary way for new 
executives and directors to be selected; for example, when Sameh Mohamed Moussa 
was added to the Crown board, one of his qualifications was that he knew Farghali. 
Likewise, Ismaʿil Hafez’s brother was a board member of Farghali’s Cotton 
Company, and thus he had deeper ties with Farghali than Kettner would ever have.102 
The numerous times Egyptians, especially Farghali and Hafez, refused to accept the 
commands of “experts” like Kettner may have been the manifestation of their own 
sense of “us-versus-them.”103  For Hafez especially, his refusal to fall in line with 
Kettner, or with Wittert van Hoogland before him, was partly driven by his sense that 
management relations were a zero-sum game.  
 The conflicts between the two groups also arose from causes beyond either of 
them. People like Kettner and Hafez were coming from very different worlds, and the 
mandate to work closely together must inevitably have led to instances of culture 
shock. An example of culture shock comes from another employee, Alber Farag, who 
was quite convinced that Heineken did not value him because they did not wish him 
Happy New Years or congratulate him when he first signed onto the company.104 This 
perceived slight obviously arose from a misalignment of ideas on what a large multi-
national corporation owes to its employees.  
The continual misunderstandings among the employees of Pyramid brewer, which 
engendered an us-versus-them mentality and enflamed nationalist sentiments, may 
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have been rooted in the fact that these men—Kettner, Hafez, and Farghali—simply 
did not have the same ideas of what was best for the company. An excellent reflection 
of this is seen in an account of a snafu over the import of bottles. Kettner recounts the 
incident as follows: 
When I was with Bienert, the export manager of the East German 
bottle factories, I signed a contract to buy five hundred thousand 
bottles contingent on the commercial counselor of their embassy 
receiving the import permit. Hafez came to tell me the next day that we 
were going to get a permit for Czech bottles. I told him this was no 
longer necessary, and that he had to withdraw the request, for now, in 
favor of the East German request for bottles. He apparently really 
looked into the German bottles, but the relevant letter is nowhere to be 
found.  
A few days later, I get an express letter from Farghali in which he 
writes that he had received a telegram from Prague, which referred to a 
bottle order from us and Crown that needed his mediation. I 
communicated to Farghali that I had just contracted with East 
Germany, on the basis of the commitment to the import permit 
aforementioned, and furthermore that the East German bottles, in terms 
of price and payments for us and the country, were even better. I added 
that we, therefore, should withdraw our request for import of Czech 
bottles. The next day we received the import permit (for the Czech 
bottles)! 
As for the East German Bottles, despite the commitments made, there 
was no message. A few days later Hafez comes to tell me that Farghali 
had ordered him to get the permit for the East German bottles, but that 
he would not go after the permit for bottles for Crown. 
 
As this passage shows, an apparently simple matter like choosing bottles could be a 
source of great contention among management. Kettner, the true technocrat, made an 
agreement with East Germany to receive a shipment of bottles that would be cheaper 
and easier that the other options available, but the deal was contingent on the East 
Germans receiving approval (the import permit) from the Egyptian government. 
Hafez, on the other hand, knowing the Egyptian bureaucracy and inhabiting a position 
equal to Kettner, went ahead and acquired an import permit for bottles from the 
 
264 
company’s usual supplier, the Czechs. When Hafez brought this news to Kettner, he 
backed away from the Czech bottles and agreed with Kettner that they should pursue 
the East German bottles. Whether it was too late to cancel the order or whether Hafez 
really believed that they should pursue the Czech bottles instead, the end result was 
that the Czech company received the request. They contacted Farghali, the head of the 
company, about the matter, so he demanded a quick response from Kettner on this 
technical issue, which fell under his purview as a managing director. After Kettner 
communicated why they should use the East German bottles, Kettner received the 
permit for the Czech bottles and could not help but feel that Hafez had gone behind 
his back to get approval for the Czech rather than East German bottles, especially 
because there is no proof (the missing letter) that Hafez actually did what Kettner 
said. Finally, Kettner saw Hafez pursue the East German bottles, but only after 
Farghali told him to do so, and without getting bottles for Crown, a situation that 
could be used as “evidence” of an Egyptian conspiracy.  When the misunderstandings 
present in the above anecdote are framed with the “us vs. them” narrative that the 
government was championing, they very quickly transform form being the natural 
frictions present in all companies into a full-on nationalist battle between “foriegners” 
and “Egyptians.” 
   
Crafting a Brand 
Although internally the beer companies would struggle with conflicts between the 
Dutch management and the Egyptian management and workforce, this period also 
saw Crown and Pyramid breweries become the national beer companies of Egypt. 
One of the main way they accomplished this was by putting forth a quality product 
that was masterfully branded to fit to the realities of the Egyptian market.    
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One of the most significant spurs for the realization of this market control came in 
1952 with an important technical innovation, a strain of barley specifically designed 
to grow in Egypt.  Malted barley, which was soaked in water to begin germination 
and then roasted to arrest this germination, was one of the essential ingredients of 
modern beer, along with hops and water. Before the innovation of “Egyptian” barley, 
the Egyptian breweries had to import the malted barley from the Netherlands, where 
Heineken carefully chose and roasted it. The import of malt from the Netherlands was 
problematic, as it was inefficient, costly, and exposed the malt to the possibility of 
spoilage or contamination. 
These problems with barley supply were resolved when a Dutch brewmaster who 
had trained at the Heineken Brewing company, Gerardus Hubertus Ulenberg, became 
the chief of beer-making at the Pyramid Brewery and created a strain of barley in 
1952.105  This new strain of barley was two-rowed; barley generally comes in two 
forms, two- and six-rowed depending on how many rows of seeds it has along its 
flowering head.106 Although more expensive that six-rowed barley, this two-rowed 
barley was better suited to growing conditions in Egypt. Ultimately, the breweries 
came to maximize both quality and price by using a two-rowed/six-rowed mix for 
making their malt.107 With this new strain, Pyramid could produce malt that was up to 
Heineken’s standards and that differentiated their beer from foreign competitors in 
Egypt. This innovation not only freed Pyramid from the major manufacturing 
bottleneck of importing large amounts of barley, but it also meant that Pyramid could 
become a hub of malt production in Egypt and the Middle East. One of the first 
results of this innovation was that Pyramid could now send malt to Crown Brewery to 
produce a similar product. These malt deliveries even went beyond the borders of 
Egypt. One of the main recipients of this new Egyptian malt was a brewery in the 
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Sudan that had also come under the control of Cobra in the 1950s, Blue Nile Brewery.  
For example, in 1958, Pyramid sent around 570 metric tons of malted barley to this 
brewery.108 The creation of this Egyptian variety of barley was another example of the 
benefits of Heineken’s ownership of Crown and Pyramid. Counter to Nasser’s 
narrative of foreign influences suffocating local industry, the inventiveness of a Dutch 
brewmaster had actually created a beer, and thus a beer industry, that was more 
Egyptian than not. 
Even as the barley was being standardized, so too was the bottle that contained the 
beer. Breweries started using standard-size bottles in 1952.  These bottles were 
imported in two standard sizes, small (330 ml) and large (660 ml). The companies had 
imported bottles since their founding because it was cheaper to import repurposed 
bottles from Europe than to purchase new bottles in Egypt.109 However, the breweries 
only started using standardized bottles in the 1950s when it became cheaper than 
using non-standard bottles. The government-levied duty on the bottles was based on 
the metric of “bottles per hectoliter.” Thus, for a certain duty paid, a company was 
able to bring a certain number of bottles. In 1952, the government made the number 
of bottles per hectoliter greater for standard bottles than nonstandard.110  The shift was 
not without difficulty, as the breweries had built up a tertiary market of selling the 
bottles. They thus had to either exchange the non-standard bottles at cost to the 
breweries (the standard bottles cost 5 milliemes more [20 milliemes] than the non-
standard bottles [15 milliemes]), which they did in Cairo and Suez, or they had to 
deliver the bottles on consignment, which they did in Cairo and Assiout.111       
In a trend that occurred in food industries around the world, as both the product 
within the packages as well as the packages themselves became more standardized 
and homogenous, companies like Pyramid and Crown had to find ways to 
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differentiate themselves from competitors.112 In the Egyptian case, there were three 
distinct reasons why after 1952, the breweries were looking for ways to stand out. 
Prior to 1952, the beers that Crown and Pyramid breweries sold were marked with a 
label that merely stated the brewery’s name. This was not an unusual branding 
practice for beer companies; Heineken still uses it to this day. Nevertheless, this 
reliance on the name of the breweries was not the most effective way to sell beers in 
the dual-brewery model. Selling similar beers under different names in Egypt’s two 
biggest markets created the very real possibility that Heineken would be cannibalizing 
its market share in both cities. Another motive for creating a brand was that after 
changing their name from Pyramid to Al-Ahram brewery as part of the 
Egyptianization process, Pyramid had made their own name less distinctive. One of 
Egypt’s main daily newspapers even shared the name of Al-Ahram. The third reason 
for creating a recognizable brand is that in the 1950s Crown and Pyramid’s first real 
challenger, Nile Brewery, appeared on the market selling similar beers. 
In order for these breweries to differentiate themselves, they turned to a nascent 
field in the business world, marketing. The breweries contracted an advertising 
agency, Al-Shark, to produce their advertising materials.113 The owner, a Mr. 
Maggyar, wasquite excellent in Kettner’s eyes, as he had trained at J. Walter 
Thompson, one of the world’s leading advertisers. Al-Shark handled the advertising 
for almost all major international groups in Egypt, and it even had a department for 
market research.114 However, this marketing firm could only do so much without a 
clear brand message from the company. 
Therefore, in the 1950s, these two beer companies, with the help of Heineken, 
developed Stella, the brand of beer that would come to dominate Egypt. They had 
been selling an industrially produced lager beer under the name Stella since the 1920s, 
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but in the 1950s they really built a brand around a beer that was golden in color and 
had a light, crisp taste; that had an alcohol by volume between 4 and 5 percent; and 
that was brewed from Egyptian-made malt (a proprietary mix of two-rowed, six-
rowed barley, and rice), imported hops, and Egyptian water.115 
The brand that was featured on bottles and company letterhead was truly a 
marketing masterpiece. It was simple—a black and white star with the name “Stella 
Beer” circling around it in both Arabic and French—but packed with numerous layers 
of meaning that resonated with the Egyptian market. The bilingual nature of the brand 
clearly evoked the imagined consumer of the beer as the middle- to upper-class 
Egyptian, but the power of this brand went beyond the use of French and Arabic, 
which was a very common advertising ploy at the time. Using the Italian word for 
star, Stella, was a masterful way to craft the product for the Egyptian market. The 
Italian language, like the culture itself, was perceived as exclusive, as only the truly 
“educated” Egyptians would know Italian, and yet familiar. Due to the long and 
prominent presence of Italians in Egypt, the Italian language had seeped into Egyptian 
colloquiallisms, especially vis-à-vis luxury products. For example, mūbīlīyya (Arabic 
colloquial, Furniture) from the Italian mobilia, lūkānda (Arabic colloquial, Hotel) 
form the Italian lokanda, or even the word for beer itself (bīra) had entered from 
Italian, birra. In addition to the name Stella’s evocation of familiar Italian culture, it 
also fit nicely in an Arabic context. The word was easily transliterated into Arabic 
(sīn-ta-lam-alif) and contained no difficult sounds for the Arabophone speaker. Even 
the word written in Arabic was flowing and continuous, containing none of the long 
vowels that usually break up foreign words written in Arabic. As for the actual 
symbol of the star, while it is not exactly clear where the name came from, it most 
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likely derived from the red star that had been a part of the Heineken brand from the 
brewery’s outset.  
Al-Shark publicized this brand through two avenues:  large public signs and 
newspaper advertisements. One particularly prominent electrical sign for Stella sat 
atop a building owned by a shareholder of the National Bottling Company, the 
company in charge of selling carbonated soda, Pepsi, in Egypt.116 While the signage 
was a public testament to the Stella brand, it was the newspaper advertisements that 
provided a clear articulation of what the Stella brand was intended to represent.  
All of the attributes that advertisements attributed to Stella were actually 
properties commonly associated with beer in the earliest Egyptian beer 
advertisements.  Advertisements by beer importers like Dressler, Amstel, and 
Guinness in the 1930s focused on the beverage’s refreshing nature, its healthfulness, 
and its curative properties.117 These advertising directives grew out of advances in 
both the beer industry and the advertising business. With regard to beer, due to 
advances in refrigeration technology, yeast biology, and bottling, advertisers could 
put forth a beer that was limpid, temperature-controlled, and free from “impurities.”  
Likewise, as advertisers sought to distance their products from the quackery of patent 
medicines, they aimed to imbue industrial produced products like beer with medicinal 
properties.118  All of this messaging was targeted at the “modern” consumer, who now 
invested consumer goods with the ability to signal their lifestyle and aid them in their 
quest for self-improvement.  
The Stella advertisements were noticeably more targeted than those that had 
preceded them.  Instead of merely showing “modern” Egyptians in their 
advertisements, these advertisements illustrated how beer could fit into the everyday 
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lives of the Egyptians. For example, a set of advertisements that featured “the Stella 
Fairy” argued that Stella could be a normative part of Egyptian life and even improve 
upon it.  This campaign opened with an advertisement depicting a buxom fairy 
floating in front of the Stella star and declaring, 
I am a healthful fairy, full of magic and happy things 
I am Stella, I am Stella, and everyone knows who I am. 
My wand refreshes and revives anyone it touches 
It fills one’s heart, gives one succor, and quenches one’s thirst.119 
 
In this advertisement, the healthful properties of beer are equated with magic and 
wonder.  The other advertisements in this series built upon the magical premise 
established in this advertisement.  One advertisement depicted four people on a date, 
two women sitting on a couch and two men in chairs on either side. Rather than 
enjoying themselves, they are sitting in bored silence. As the text above and below the 
image states, “When boredom and lack of interest prevail with no hope in sight. We 
call for the enchanting fairy. Stella, the shining star.” Below this line is another image, 
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in which, with the help of the fairy sitting atop the panel and touching the scene with 
her wand, and Stella, which sits in the foreground, one couple is dancing and the other 
is engaged in enjoyable conversation. The people in the advertisement exclaim, 
“Stella. Thank You! Thank You! Now we know the secret of how to bring people 
together.”120 At the bottom of the advertisements is a picture of the beer bottle 
standing next to a foaming glass of beer, with the slogan “Stella is Always Delicious” 
(Birrat Stella, al-Bīrra al-Ladhīdha)  
 
 
Above that image is a declaration of why Stella beer is the best: 
Stella Beer is made from nutritious (mughadhdhī) Egyptian barley 
And other choice ingredients. Stella beer is the freshest. 
It’s a cool, refreshing, and healthful drink. 
 
272 
 
This was not the only advertisement that focused on Stella’s role as a sort of social 
lubricant. In another advertisement with a similar setup, two young couples sit on the 
beach in their modern swimsuits, the men in swim trunks and the women in bikinis, 
all of them looking dreadfully bored. One woman is even reading a book underneath a 
beach umbrella. This boredom is a shame because the “weather is beautiful as the 
waves are rolling in and a gentle breeze is blowing.”  However, when they say the 
magic words: “We call for the enchanting fairy. Stella, the shining star,” the dour 
scene is transformed, with one couple playing with a ball in the sand and the other 
snuggled up underneath the beach umbrella.121  Another advertisement uses a similar 
format (problem, request for the fairy, solution) to show how Stella could even aid 
adults at work. In this third advertisement, the fairy, after hearing the magic words, 
blesses two men arguing over a difference of opinion about a contract, bestowing 
upon them bottles of Stella that immediately resolve the conflict and allow the two to 
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sign a contract.122 Thus, Stella can even “clear the air and resolve arguments” 
between feuding businessmen. 
 
 
Another advertisement in the Fairy Series takes aim again at the youth, showing 
Stella as a beverage for the tired athlete. The advertisement begins with a picture of 
men walking off a soccer pitch exhausted by their exertion in the gleaming sun and 
saying: “Playing has tired us out. We want something refreshing and revitalizing.”  
When they say the magic words, the fairy blesses them with Stella, and then we see 
them in the clubhouse celebrating and raising their glasses of cool Stella beer.  The 
players explain their new feeling by saying to the fairy, “A gulp from your health-
giving cup is magical and intoxicating.  It reactivates the body and fills it with power 
and health.” This advertisement is particularly interesting for two reasons. First, it 
portrays beer as the ideal after-sports drink. Although this advertisement pre-dates 
sports drinks by decades, it trades in the same promises of revitalization after sweaty 
exertion that advertisements for sports drinks use today. While it may seem odd to the 
modern viewer to imagine beer as a sports drink, this is really no different than 
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parading flavored, artificially colored water that is high is both salt and sugar as a 
“sports drink.” Most interestingly, this advertisement also mentions the intoxicating 
(nashwa) power of beer. Although it is meant in the figurative sense, this is one of 
few advertisements that even hinted at the reason many consumers bought and drank 
beer.123 
 In two especially striking advertisements from the series, the fairy is not 
transformative, but merely an observer placed in the corner of a vignette. One 
depicts a well dressed couple (the man wearing a tuxedo, the women a ball gown) 
dancing at a club as a band plays in the background. The other depicts a man 
exhausted from the day at work, lying in his reclining chair with the newspaper on his 
lap and a Stella in his hand. In addition to the lack of the mini-narrative of 
transformation, these advertisements are also distinct because the main text is a 
colloquial poem perfectly suited to the advertisement’s subject matter. Accompanying 
the couple dancing is a poem with an a-a-b-b rhyme scheme: 
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Dance and enjoy this happy day 
 For the day will pass and go away 
Stella opens the way for your day of celebration 
 As the delicious beer that gives you what you want 
Oh, how Stella pairs well with songs 
 And sets the mood for a beautiful evening 
For nothing can compare to its quality.124 
 
The vignette of the man relaxing is accompanied by a poem with an end-line rhyme of 
–ak. 
 
 After the strain and toil of the day 
  Drink Stella to ease your mind 
 You will forgot all your cares and worries 
  And the world will always look better 
 Your normal energy level will return 
  And it will immediately soothe your nerves 
 Drink Stella whenever 
  For it’s just what your health needs.125 
 
The fairy series thus shows that Stella beer could be an important aspect of the 
modern Egyptian’s lifestyle, and even add an element of magic. This turn to the 
magical represents a return to the origins of advertising, in which huge claims were 
made for patent medicines that were generally of dubious quality and effectiveness. 
The magic in these beer advertisements is more maturely rendered, however. An 
Egyptian reading these advertisements would not have imagined that Stella beer had 
magical powers, but the advertisers do show potential consumers that beer did have 
the ability to revive, refresh, and most importantly, bring people together. This last 
point was particularly of concern to the newly imagined consumer, the middle- and 
upper-class youth. 
Four out of the six advertisements (the party, the beach party, the sports field, and 
the dance club) were targeted at youthful audiences. The people depicted in these 
advertisements appear younger and are rendered in more cartoonish forms.  The 
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magic that the “fairy” brought was generally relevant to the lives of younger people; 
in two of the advertisements, Stella appears as the ultimate icebreaker between men 
and women. This line of advertisement also does much to focus on another aspect of 
beer, its cool refreshment. As discussed above, this was a characteristic of beer that 
was emphasized even in the first beer advertisements in Egypt. Yet these 
advertisements transformed beer into a sports-drink, the quintessential refreshing 
beverage. It is these two aspects—that beer is young and fun and refreshing—that 
would become the essential characteristics of beer in Egyptian advertisements, 
movies, and literature in the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
Brand Management 
The companies aimed to strengthen the brand Stella not only by clearly laying out 
what it was, but also by clearly defining the other brands it had in its portfolio. 
Although Stella would come to dominate the beer market in Egypt, eventually 
becoming synonymous with beer in the country, it was not the companies’ only brand. 
One of their most popular brands besides Stella was Märzen. Named after a type of 
German beer, märzen bier, which translates as March beer, it was a deep amber lager 
with a full body and moderate bitterness.126  Originally offered as a seasonal beer sold 
between October and March, the breweries decided in 1959 to offer it as a full-year 
beer because the sales were so strong.127 Wittert van Hoogland was particularly 
worried that because the name was so tied to a season that it did not make sense to sell 
it all year. Nevertheless, Kettner resolved that since the name did not carry the same 
associations in Arabic, it did not really matter.128  
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The breweries also sold a beer they labeled as Bayrisch, meaning “Bavarian” in 
German. Their darkest offering, it was not as successful a brand as Märzen.129 The 
name was not accurate in that it was not brewed in Bavaria, and the Germans 
protested the use of the name.130  Germans, like the French with wine, were very keen 
to protect their beers’ reputation. So when the breweries looked to expand production 
of Märzen to the full year, they also looked how to streamline their other non-Stella 
brands. 
After deliberating over eliminating the brand entirely, they decided to rebrand 
Mäzren Beer and indigenize it as Aswan beer, as a nod to the region (Upper Egypt) 
that they were looking to exploit further.  Market growth in the region had driven their 
excellent sales in the 1950s, as the demand for beer in Upper Egypt increased by 30% 
and 40% in the years 1957 and 1958.131 The breweries decided to also place it at a 
different price point than Stella.132 In 1959, they also debated adding two new types 
of beer to their portfolio, a higher abv (alcohol by volume) beer and bière de menage, 
which was a beer and wine mix.  They did not proceed on either account out of desire 
to protect their established brands. The high abv beer was nixed because the breweries 
feared it would eliminate any goodwill that they had left with the government.133 
Pyramid executives feared that the higher alcohol volume beer would have upset the 
government because the excise tax levied on beer was different than other high-abv 
liquors like wine, and thus this high-abv beer would appear to be an attempt to sneak 
a high-abv drink on the market without paying the appropriate taxes. Pyramid did not 
follow through on a bière de ménage because there were concerns that people would 
buy it expecting Stella, and be disappointed when it was not.134  
The idea of brand maintenance was also why this period marked another 
concerted push by Pyramid to bring Crown in line. Although Crown was receiving 
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malt from Pyramid and agreed to sell under the Stella label in 1953, they continued to 
assert their autonomy by putting out a beer in Alexandria that was different from the 
one in Cairo. When Kettner did some taste tests, he found Crown’s beer was lacking 
in its taste, brilliance, and foam stability.135 To lack these was a cardinal sin because, 
as discussed above, these were main selling points of beer in the Egyptian market. 
Kettner was so distressed at how this non-standardized beer was affecting the sales of 
Stella in Egypt that he suggested this failure to adhere to the principle of 
standardization warranted the replacement of the man in charge of beer production at 
Crown, Michel Mavroviti.136  However, an impertinent response, rather than 
compliance, followed all of this grandstanding.  
Thus, Spiro Spridis, a managing director at Crown, said to Kettner that the 
difference in quality was merely a matter of appreciation.137 His customers in 
Alexandria had never commented on the beer, which fit perfectly to their taste. Not 
only that, but these same customers said they preferred beer made in Alexandria to the 
one made in Cairo, a stab at Kettner and Pyramid.138 Spiro Spiridis noted that they 
should not dwell on this controversy and that they should have more meetings 
between the leadership of the two breweries, meetings that had been delayed by the 
upheaval in the country. These meetings would lead to slight modifications that would 
eventually bring the beer formulas more in line.139  Despite Spiridis’ words, the 
companies were still discussing the issue two years later. In fact, at that point Pyramid 
had resolved to send a brewmaster trained by Heineken to Crown so that this problem 
could finally be solved.140    
All of this brand management was important, for, as mentioned above, in June 
1947 another business oligarch, Muhammad Sirri Bey, founded a competing beer 
company, Nile Brewery, that differentiated itself from Pyramid and Crown by touting 
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its Egyptianness.141 This domestic challenger to the Pyramid-Crown conglomerate not 
only sought to distance itself from its competitor with its Egyptianness, but also 
aimed to capitalize on the rising economic nationalism of the period.   Besides its 
Egyptian name, which evoked the image of beer brewed with Nile water, its 
leadership and workforce comprised mostly Egyptians. Of the original board, five of 
the seven members were Egyptians. Likewise, of the thirty-two employees listed in 
the records for 1954, twenty-nine of them were Egyptian, with twenty-one being 
Muslim.142  
Despite Nile Brewery’s national credentials, it proved no match for the 
embedded Pyramid–Crown partnership.  Not long after Nile’s foundation, it began 
posting losses.  Between the 1950 and 1952, still in its early years, the company lost 
68,000 Egyptian pounds. As a result, the company had to take drastic measures to stay 
solvent. The most obvious way of maintaining a flagging business is by taking loans. 
Nile Brewery did, borrowing twenty-2,000 Egyptian pounds from Barclay’s Bank and 
12,000 Egyptian pounds from the Belgian Bank.143  Beside indebting itself to foreign 
banks, Nile Brewery was also kept afloat by an advance of over 16,000 Egyptian 
pounds from the board of the company.  
In order to reduce operating expenses, the brewery also shed staff while 
relying on temporary workers.  While some employees were eager to flee a sinking 
ship, others were, obviously not pleased to be terminated. One worker, Gharib Khater, 
filed a wrongful termination suit against the company in 1953, claiming in a case 
before the Petty Court for Worker Affairs (Maḥkamat Shu’ūn al-‘Umāl al-Juz’īyya) 
that the company had fired him because he was too old.  The court did uphold his 
termination on the grounds that Nile Brewery had terminated him due to their dire 
economic circumstances.144 The volatility of the company was even reflected in the 
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executive ranks, where over the course of five years, the entire board changed. 
Unsurprisingly, the company liquidated its assets in 1955, closed shop in 1956, and 
was quickly purchased by and incorporated into the Crown–Pyramid partnership. 
Muhammad Sirri Bey did not stay to see the end of the company, so Ahmed Fahmi 
was left with the unenviable task of liquidating all assets and informing workers that 
they no longer had jobs. 
Why did the Nile Brewery fail?  The company, had its own theories on its 
failure, which we find in the court records of its wrongful termination cases.  In these 
court records, the company offers four separate explanations for their unprofitability. 
The first was “illegal practices” of Pyramid/Stella Brewery in the local market; while 
they do not detail what these practices were, they claim that they went to the 
authorities and “no one did a thing.” The second explanation, again blaming Pyramid, 
claimed that Pyramid held the exclusive license to sell in the Canal Zone and that Nile 
Brewery was denied this source of revenue. The third alleged reason for Nile 
Brewery’s failure was the “very high” excise tax on the sale of beer.  The fourth 
reason offered by Nile Brewery for its demise was the lack of a response to their 
request to the government to allow them to sell beer in the Sudanese market. This 
silence prevented them from taking advantage of the market for beer in Egypt’s sister 
country of Sudan, “where beer sells very well.”145  
Although the Nile Brewery’s narrative of victimization seems plausible, the 
company’s ultimate failure was largely attributable to its over-expansion and to the 
embedded position of Pyramid and Crown Breweries in the Egyptian economy. One 
of the first major moves that the Nile Brewery made after its start-up in 1949 was the 
purchase of Ghumra Glass Bottling Company, which was in liquidation in 1950. This 
move for horizontal integration would have been smart except that instead of reviving 
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Ghumra, it proved a drag on the Nile Brewery; as mentioned above, Nile started 
posting losses in 1950.146  This loss was an inauspicious start for a company trying to 
unseat the powerful Pyramid–Crown partnership, and Nile never really recovered. 
Whether Pyramid acted illegally in its relations with Nile Brewery is less pertinent 
than the fact that this start-up, in order to make its way in the beer industry, had to 
reckon with the two beer companies. It is apparent from this court testimony that 
despite the intra-brewery rifts, the two beer companies Crown and Pyramid had fully 
achieved market dominance by 1953. The testimonial also confirms that by the 1950s, 
despite the two companies’ differences, they were on their way to achieving the 
marketer’s dream: having their brand, Stella lager beer, be synonymous with the 
product, beer. Further evidence of this achievement is that in the late 1950s, Pyramid 
and Crown were doing spectacularly well.  In June 1958 alone, they sold over 10,000 
hectoliters, which was half of what they sold yearly in the 1930s.147 
 
Conclusion 
 The failed attempt by the Nile Brewery to claim a part of the beer market in 
Egypt is a testament to the power of the Crown–Pyramid partnership. Despite the 
political volatility of the era from 1952 to 1958, Crown and Pyramid increased profits 
and cultivated a coherent brand identity that would serve them for the rest of their 
history.  However, as this chapter has shown, this success overlay the internal 
struggles of a multi-national company that existed within a business environment that 
was increasingly intolerant of any “foreign” presence.  
As a result, the activist government of Egypt, besides forcing the companies to 
cater to their demands out of fear of nationalization, soured relationships within 
companies’ management through its favoritism towards Muslim Egyptians.  Under 
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legislation like the amendments to the Company Law of 1947, ordinary interoffice 
friction transformed into pitched nationalist and religious battles.  While some may 
argue that a restructuring of the Egyptian economy to favor the “Egyptian” over the 
“foreign” was necessary in order to free it from foreign, imperial control, these 
policies essentially took a hammer to any productive trans-religious and trans-national 
relationships and recast them all in the rhetoric of “us-versus-them.” The management 
of companies now became a zero-sum game, with foreign nationals, Mutamaṣṣirūn, 
and religious minorities seeing every instance of Muslim cooperation as a threat to 
their endangered status in the company and the country, and Muslim Egyptians 
seeming to believe that they were able to play by a different set of rules.  
As I will show in the next chapter, the Nasser-led government did irreparable 
damage to management relationships within Crown and Pyramid, and also soured 
relations between management and the workforce. In this instance, it not only set 
“foreign” against “Egyptian,” but “productive” worker against “predatory” employer.
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Chapter 7: Toward a Model Company: Competing Visions for the Beer 
Industry, 1957–1960 
 
 “Do you know the difference between the United States and Egypt? The 
U.S.A have [sic] Eisenhower and Bob Hope, whereas the U.A.R has Gamal Abdel 
Nasser and no hope.”1 This joke was making the rounds in Cairo in 1959, according 
to a letter written by the managing director of Pyramid Brewery at the time, Erick 
Karl Kettner. While Kettner’s letter did not say any more about the joke, his decision 
to include it suggests that he did enjoy it. His inclusion of the joke also indicates that 
he assumed the recipient of his letter, Wittert van Hoogland, the head of Cobra, would 
enjoy the joke too.  The joke probably resonated for the men because their experience 
with the Nasser government had been uniformly negative. Every one of their 
interactions with the Egyptian government had resulted in greater difficulties in 
selling beer in Egypt.  This was particularly the case with the government’s legislation 
on “foreign” employees. That the reaction of most Egyptians to Nasser’s charismatic 
persona and his populist policies was overwhelmingly positive only amplified 
Kettner’s discontent and his feelings of hopelessness in managing a beer company 
under Nasser’s regime.  
 This chapter examines a set of interactions between Crown and Pyramid 
Breweries and the Egyptian government in the period from 1957 to 1960. As I show, 
this period of the breweries’ history was dominated by a battle between the 
management and the Nasser government over what constituted a “model company.” 
For the management of the breweries, a model company was a profitable one that had 
the autonomy and the efficient, disciplined, and obedient workforce to implement 
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Heineken’s methods of brewing. For the Nasser-led government, a model company 
was one that would make large profits autonomously, but that was willing and able to 
mobilize in support of Nasser’s grand projects, like the United Arab Republic, and his 
vision for the Egyptian economy. In addition, this company should house an 
empowered and unambiguously Egyptian workforce that was unquestionably loyal to 
the Egyptian government. The battle over visions of a model company was fought 
through both letters and legislation. In the one area where the differing visions 
overlapped—namely, in the desire to make profits—the breweries were successful. In 
the period from 1957 to 1960, they witnessed unprecedented profits and deep cultural 
penetration. However, in every other avenue, it was the Nasser-led government and its 
conception of a “model” company that won out.   
 In an eight-part analysis, this chapter shows the competing visions of the beer 
industry in Egypt from 1957 to 1960. The first two sections of the chapter set the 
context by discussing the unprecedented cultural penetration of beer in this period, 
and by examining the profit and growth that ensued.  The third section then recounts a 
direct interaction between the beer companies and President Nasser in order to show 
the close attention Nasser paid to the beer industry, as well as his capability and 
willingness to effect sudden and dramatic changes in that industry.  The fourth section 
examines the complicated interactions of the beer companies in the three-year period 
(1958–61) by showing how they dealt with exports as Egypt and Syria formed a 
union, the United Arab Republic, a venture that Nasser strongly supported. The fifth 
section discusses the vision that the Dutch management had for a “model” company 
workforce—a vision that would be challenged from below by the workers and from 
above by Nasser’s interference. Following this, the sixth section looks at the 
demographics of the workforce that the Dutch management was trying to shape. In the 
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seventh section, we see how this workforce, inspired by the legislation of the Nasser 
government, rebelled against the Dutch model. The final section describes the détente 
that was reached by the workforce and the management at the end of this period, on 
the eve of the beer industry’s nationalization.  
 
Young and Fun 
 During the late 1950s, as beer achieved an unprecedented cultural penetration, 
Pyramid and Crown were well on their way to reaching their goal of making beer a 
chief distraction for Egyptians in their social lives. The writings of one of the most 
popular Arabic authors of the time, Ihsan abd el-Quddus (1919–1991), reflected 
beer’s progress in this regard.2 Abd el-Quddus began his career at one of Egypt’s 
best-known political and cultural magazines, Ruz al-Yusuf. The magazine was the 
brainchild of Abd el-Quddus’s mother, the retired theater actress Ruz al-Yusuf (Rose 
el-Yousef). At Ruz al-Yusuf, Abd el-Quddus became a leading voice of liberal 
discontentment with the monarchal regime in 1940s Egypt. Indeed, as a result of his 
criticism, he spent a short time in prison. While Abd el-Quddus initially welcomed the 
king’s ouster, he soon ran afoul of the Free Officers Movement as well, and he served 
prison time again in 1954.3 
 After 1955, Abd el-Quddus turned to writing fiction. While his prose never 
did approach the quality and depth of literary giants like Naguib Mahfouz and Yusuf 
Idris, his circulation was unparalleled.4  The relative simplicity of his literary style 
and lexicon gave his works a mass appeal among the “youth of a modernizing middle 
class who struggled to free themselves of social and parental constraints, to adapt and 
adopt changing social and gender roles, and above all to experience and understand 
the notion of romantic love.”5  It would not be an exaggeration to state that Abd el-
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Quddus gave voice to a generation of young Egyptians growing up in the heady times 
of post-1952 Egypt. This voice was not one of stolen kisses and furtive rendezvouses, 
but one of “pett[ing] brazenly in the back seat of convertibles, arrang[ing] trysts in 
plushly furnished bachelor pads, and danc[ing] the night away—with a variety of 
partners—to the sounds of flowing whiskey and rhythm and blues.”6  
 This passage from his collection of short stories al-Banat wa al-Sayf (Girls of 
the Summer) exemplifies this frank modernity: 
…And she sat at table that sat next to a window looking out on the 
sea… Sayyid sat in front of her saying: 
 What would you like to drink? 
 Whiskey. Whiskey really wakes me up and I am dead tired, she 
said. 
 I have been on my feet all day. 
Sayyid got up and ordered a bottle of whiskey from the bar and two 
glasses. The waiter soon came with two bottles of soda water and a 
bucket of ice.  
 Don’t give me any soda, just ice, Sharifa said. 
 I know, said Sayyid. 
And then Sharifa drank. She drank three glasses in less than a quarter 
of an hour and she felt as if her energy had been replenished to such a 
point that she was going to explode. She couldn’t bear to sit down 
silently. She wanted to jump, scream, fight and hit someone.7   
 
 Ihsan Abd el-Quddus’s portrayal of this strong female character is particularly 
noteworthy. According to Joel Gordon, “Ihsan’s primary female characters, in one 
respect or another, are rebels. They may suffer from it, and they may even wind up in 
seemingly subservient positions they swore they would never occupy,” but what they 
stand against is always wrong.8  While el-Quddus’s female characters were the 
product of a “male pen,” they were some of the most complex of the time.9 They were 
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neither virginal ingénues nor fallen Svengalis, but three-dimensional people. 
Arguably, the prominence of alcohol in this passage and his work in general reflected 
the reality of this generation, rather than merely serving to make his book more 
exciting.  
 From Abd el-Quddus’s writing, we can sense beer’s social role among a 
particular class of Egyptians. His collection of stories, al-Banat wa al-Sayf, offers 
further insights into this role.  The collection tells the story of five different women’s 
experiences during a summer in Alexandria. This seasonal setting is significant as it 
establishes a world frame entirely different than the urban setting of Cairo. In 
summer, many members of a certain Egyptian social class moved out of their houses 
or apartments and into beach cabins (al-Kābīn). One’s days were not filled with work 
and the buzz of everyday life, but rather with the relaxation of swimming in the sea 
(al-baḥr) and eating on the beach (al-bilāj). Finally, those who summered in cabins 
would make the pilgrimage from various parts of Egypt to Alexandria, where they 
could meet with people outside of their typical social circle, although their 
interactions were still among people of a comparable class.  
 In this setting, beer was well adapted. One mention of beer comes in a story by 
Abd el-Quddus entitled “al-Bint al-Thalith” (“The Third Woman”). One character, 
Ismaʿil, comments to his friend ʿUmar, as he is going out to get food: “When you 
return your beer will be nice and cold for you….”10 This statement takes on greater 
significance when we discover that Ismaʿil is in a romantic relationship with Wafiyya, 
ʿUmar’s wife, who is occupying the cabin along with Ismaʿil and ʿUmar. Sending 
ʿUmar out of the cabin is a pretext for Isma’il to spend time with ‘Umar’s wife. This 
passage, beyond indicating Ismaʿil’s dastardly behavior, also indicates that the 
advertising of the beer companies was paying off. The key attribute of the beer here is 
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not its alcoholic content, but the fact that it will be a refreshing drink for ʿUmar upon 
his return from running errands. Abd al-Quddus’ disassociation of drunkenness from 
beer becomes starker when we examine the way he describes the effects of whiskey in 
the same story. One powerful description comes when Wafiyya is racked with guilt 
that her illicit affair is coming to light: “But she drank a cup [of whiskey] and then 
another and remembered her pain. The alcohol sent a warm feeling through her veins 
and encouraged her to reformulate her plan.”11 In this instance, whiskey is a useful 
beverage because of its alcohol content, which can warm one and impart courage. 
 An even better example of the normalization of beer in Egyptian culture 
comes from another story in al-Banat wa al-Sayf, entitled “al-Bint al-Ula” (“The First 
Woman”). The first mention of beer comes during a party scene: 
The party was at one of the cabins that sat on the rock of Bir Masʿaud 
and was attended by young men and women between eighteen and 
twenty-five. Most of the women wore pants…and the men wore 
opened shirts revealing sunburned brown-skin and necks with gold 
chains that said “Ma Sha Allah [What God Wants]!” They each had a 
tuft of hair hanging over their foreheads, which would flap like a black 
flag when the sea breeze blew. The gramophone sat in the middle of 
the cabin… There were a lot of bottles of beer and Coca-Cola, 
Limongo [a local brand of soda], and sandwiches.12   
 
This passage attributes three appealing characteristics to beer. First, it presents beer as 
a drink of the young and the happening, an ideal party beverage that was made for 
socialization. Second, the passage depicts beer as being, like Coca-Cola and Limongo, 
a refreshing drink that was ideal for the warm days and nights at the beach. Finally, 
the passage presents beer as a socially acceptable beverage on par with soft drinks. 
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 The next reference to beer in “Bint al-Ula,” which comes when the story’s 
protagonist, Maysa, arrives at the party, again speaks to beer’s role as a sociable 
drink. 
Then she entered the cabin and found herself next to Magid. She sat 
down and crossed her legs. Then Midhat shouted: One rock and roll 
song on account of Maysa. “Cheers to you,” shouted Nabil lifting the 
glass of beer from his lips.13 
 
This passage is followed by the most significant reference to beer in the story. Maysa, 
dispirited by the fact that she has partied on the beach so many times before, and 
presumably has drunk enough beer that it has lost all of its fun, bemoans the lack of 
anything “new” at the party. She is on the lookout for something different, which 
comes in the form of a mysterious man, Abu Bakr. When Maysa sees him, she wants 
to talk, but Nabil takes her to dance instead: 
She had to dance with Nabil and when she was done, Abu Bakr was 
busy talking. He didn’t do anything but talk and his beer remained 
unfinished in his hand…The bottles of beer, Coca-Cola, and Lemongo 
eventually ran out. The sandwiches were eaten, the gramophone ran 
out of juice, and everyone went home. However, she remained waiting 
for something new to happen and Abu Bakr was still there, unfinished 
beer in his hand.14 
 
In this instance, the beer and beer bottle represent the potential for sociability. When 
the beer runs out, it is a signal, like the gramophone running out of power, that the 
party is over. The beer bottle, specifically the beer bottle of Abu Bakr, also represents 
Maysa’s chances at experiencing something new and exciting. As long as beer 
remained in the bottle of Abu Bakr, there was a chance that he would remain and thus 
fulfill Maysa’s desire to find something new. Although Abu Bakr would prove to be a 
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troubling character, eventually involving her in a love triangle, the point here is that 
Maysa is able to meet this appealing character because his beer remains unfinished. 
 As Ihsan Abd el-Quddus was the son of two actors (his father Muhammad had 
left his engineering career for the stage), it was perhaps natural that he would also find 
work as a film writer.15 Even before he wrote specifically for film and television, his 
prose style made his novels and short stories well suited for adaption to film. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, a theme in his films is beer’s role as a key to youthful sociability. One 
excellent example of this theme is in the 1960 film version of al-Banat wa al-Sayf, 
directed by Izz al-Din Zuficar, Salah Abu Sayf, and Fatin Abd al-Wahab. In one of 
the movie’s first scenes, we discover the secret relationship of Ismaʿil and Wafiyya, 
which the film portrays as a predatory one, with Ismaʿil sexually assaulting Wafiyya 
as he sends ʿUmar out on errands. After assaulting Wafiyya and telling her how much 
he loves her, Ismaʿil ends the conversation by saying that he is going to get his beer, 
which has been chilling. Then, as he sits outside the bedroom where he assaulted 
Wafiyya, he asks her, “Would you like a glass of beer? It’s really hot out, and the beer 
is so cold.” Hearing no answer, he shakes his head and takes a big sip of the foamy 
glass. As Wafiyya silently refuses her assaulter, ʿUmar returns from getting food. 
When Wafiyya refuses to eat, Ismaʿil assures ʿUmar that Wafiyya’s mood is the result 
of her time out in the sun. He then hands ʿUmar a glass of beer and toasts him, as if 
nothing has happened.16   
 Although the circumstances of this scene are quite gruesome, this adaption of 
the Abd el-Quddus story again emphasizes two important characteristics of beer in 
Egyptian middle- and upper-class society: first, beer is a refreshing beverage perfectly 
suited for the warm weather of the beach; second, it is a drink of youthful sociability, 
a drink for young people looking to party and have fun. There is also a dark 
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undercurrent that links beer to sinful behavior like fornication; nevertheless, as I show 
in Chapter 8, this dark side of beer would only come out in later filmic depictions. 
Films of this era like Ana Hurra  (I’m Free), another adaption of an early Ihsan Abd 
el-Quddus novel, preferred to focus on beer’s role as a social lubricant for the youth. 
This 1959 adaption presents one scene in which beer’s essential role in youth 
sociability is paramount. The scene begins with the party hostess pouring bottles of 
beer into glasses. As she passes them out to party patrons, the camera focuses on a 
couple dancing to some western music. It follows them until they finish and everyone 
claps for them.17 Again, beer is the drink of the young and the fun.   
 This cultural penetration of beer as the summer drink of the young and fun 
was also seen in the sales of Pyramid and Crown. In 1960, Pyramid sold more than 
100,000 hectoliters of beer.18 Of that, the majority of it was sold during the summer 
months of May to August. In these months, the brewery managed to sell more than 
13,000 hectoliters per month.  Even in the months around these summer months, 
April, September, October, they sold roughly 10,000 hectoliters per month. However, 
outside of those months, Pyramid struggled to sell the same volume.  Their lowest 
month that year was January, Egypt’s coolest month, when they sold less than 2,000 
hectoliters. This was in stark contrast to May, when they sold more than 14,000 
hectoliters.19  The strong correlation between the cultural and economic had a great 
deal to do with the fact that Crown and Pyramid breweries were the predominant 
sellers of beer in Egypt in the 1960s. What was good for beer was good for Crown 
and Pyramid. In addition, it appears that the advertising work that the two breweries 
had done in the 1950s to portray beer as the drink of the summer and of youth was 
definitely paying off. 
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Growth  
 In this period of rapidly rising popularity, the two beer companies were doing 
so well that Pyramid, with the help of Heineken, began work in 1958 and 1959 on a 
multi-year plant-expansion plan, which would further spur growth and profitability.20 
Emblematic of the companies’ continued strong relationship, Heineken was heavily 
involved in every step of the process. The Dutch brewer took this opportunity to 
create a factory optimized for cutting-edge beer-making. Heineken not only 
conducted the feasibility study for the expansion, but also drew up the plans of the 
factory to best accommodate all of the machinery necessary for “modern” brewing.21 
In this modern setup, there were six areas where machinery would be updated or 
replaced: the malting system, cooling system, brew house, filtering system, bottling 
system, and lager cellar. The official in charge of providing estimates for the price of 
these improvements at Pyramid was Emil Natti.  
 In Natti’s estimate, the expansion of malting would involve the erection of a 
new malthouse and forty new silos so that a greater amount of barley could be stored; 
this expansion would cost 64,000 Egyptian pounds. The updates to the cooling 
system, which involved the replacement of two condensers, would cost around 14,000 
Egyptian pounds.22  For the brew house, extensive updates were required. The 
updated machinery would include a kettle, a hop filter, and a transporter of spent 
grain. The copper kettle was central to the brewing process because it was where wort 
(malted barley that had been infused or decocted in water) would be combined and 
boiled with the hops. This boiling achieved “sterilization of the wort, denaturing of 
enzymes, extraction of hop components, coagulation of proteins and polyphenols, 
wort concentration, color development, and the driving off of unwanted volatiles.”23 
The kettle’s heating system allowed the wart to boil continuously and consistently,24 
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before running through another piece of machinery that also had to be updated, the 
hop filter, or hop back, a false-bottomed straining vessel with small slots that allowed 
boiled wart to slowly filter through as it removed the particulates still contained in the 
wart. Fresh, unboiled hops covered the hop back’s false bottom. Besides serving as an 
excellent natural filter, these fresh hops imparted more flavor to the beer.25 The final 
new machine that Pyramid needed for its brew house was the spent grain transporter, 
which did exactly what it said, transport grain used during the manufacturing process.  
This remnant, composed mostly of barley husks, was one of the main byproducts of 
the brewing process. Although it had very little use to the brewery, it had a great deal 
of nutrient value and thus could have great value to farmers as a form of animal 
feed.26 Despite the importance of all of this machinery, the update would only cost 
16,000 Egyptian pounds. 
 In addition to Natti’s estimates for updating the malting system, cooling 
system, and brew house, he also provided estimates for updates to the filtering system, 
bottling system, and lager cellar. For the filter cellar, an expenditure of 10,000 
Egyptian pounds was needed in order to fund two improvements, beer pumps and 
beer filters. Hydraulic pumps were a necessity in a brewery, as they were the main 
way that liquid was transferred from one step to the other. For example, pumps were 
absolutely essential to transport fermented beer from where the beer was aging to the 
filter cellar, where the beer was purified of any particulates or organisms. The 
filtration step was a key point of difference between industrially produced lager beer 
and other, more artisanal brews like būẓa. By filtering the beer, a brewery was both 
able to improve the aesthetics of the beer (it gives beer a polished and clear 
appearance) and taste (it removed the dead yeast, which can alter the taste and give 
the beer turbidity).27 
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 Much greater expenditures were needed for improvements in bottling (100,000 
Egyptian pounds) and the lager cellar (105,000 Egyptian pounds). The expansion to 
the bottling system included increasing the amount of bottles in stock as well as the 
machinery used to fill the bottles. Bottles were one of the most cost-intensive features 
of the beer industry, and thus any improvement in bottling could help the bottom 
line.28  As for the lager cellar, it was also an important part of the brewing process, as 
that is where Stella Lager would complete its secondary fermentation.29 Secondary 
fermentation, or bottom fermentation, occurred after the beer had been stored for eight 
days at 7 to 13C (45-55F) and primary fermentation took place. After those eight 
days, bottom fermentation would start, and the brewery would store the beer for 
around three months at 1C (34F). 
 When Natti provided these estimates for the cost of Pyramid’s expansion, 
Heineken was quite shocked, but the high price of the expansion could be explained 
by three factors. First, instead of using inexpensive aluminum tanks, Pyramid had to 
buy more expensive enameled tanks from East Germany because the 1950s brought 
Egypt into new geopolitical alignment with Soviet-bloc countries. These new tanks 
also had to be outfitted with a carbon dioxide (CO2) cleaning system, which raised the 
price even more. This self-cleaning mechanism was the a result of a new practice in 
brewing, known as “Cleaning in Place” (CIP), which appeared in the 1950s. CIP was 
the idea that machinery should be outfitted with self-cleaning mechanisms so that they 
could remain closed systems and thus eliminate a vector of microbial infection.30  CIP 
was another manifestation of modern brewers’ demand for what I call total control 
brewing.  This approach involved the application of the most cutting-edge techniques 
and technology to create a standardized, sturdy, and sterile product that could be 
delivered to consumers. On top of the need for more expensive tanks, the building 
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code insisted that ceilings of the cellar basement be raised because it was being used 
as a canteen for employees.31 Finally, Natti’s estimates also incorporated the duties 
that the government would put on the equipment as well as the fluctuating exchange 
rate of the Egyptian pound. Even with the high price quotes, Heineken still approved 
the work.32  However, Heineken was insistent on following up with explicit technical 
advice on all of these features.  
For all the machines being built in Egypt, Heineken provided detailed 
diagrams in order to ensure their proper construction and installation. For the 
machinery that needed to be brought from abroad, they provided the pro-forma 
invoices to aid the purchase and transport. They also did their best to examine all of 
the machinery before it arrived in Cairo.33 They even took their help another step 
further by sending engineers to Egypt to make sure the work was progressing 
according to plan.34 Finally, Heineken also offered fully subsidized internships in 
Holland for engineers and managers from Pyramid who wanted to learn Heineken’s 
best practices. For example, in 1961, Heineken hosted two agricultural and beer 
technicians, Mohammad Awad Ramses and Ihab el Chamaa, the chief accountant, 
Mounir Tadros, and Pyramid’s commercial director, Alber Farag.35 Heineken took all 
of these measures in order to support the growth and expansion of Crown and 
Pyramid.  Nevertheless, growing the beer sector was not Heineken’s only concern in 
the Egyptian market, as I will show they also had to be cognizant of the demands of 
an increasingly activist Egyptian government. 
 
The President Speaks 
No matter how successful the breweries were in this period or how much input 
Heineken sought to have, they ultimately existed at the whim of the Egyptian 
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government led by Gamal Abdel Nasser. This section illustrates the point by 
recounting a direct interaction between the beer companies and the President. To be 
sure, the breweries’ continued operation in Egypt was contingent upon the authorities 
receiving and approving a yearly application for their continued functioning in 
Egypt.36  An even clearer example of the government’s role as the ultimate arbiter of 
the companies’ fate was their “arrêté” on the “professions scientifiques.” According to 
this legislation, the beer companies’ classification as “indirect chemical industries” 
meant that all chemical work had to be performed by someone with a bachelor’s of 
science degree. The problem with this rule was that the brewmaster Gerardus 
Ulenberg, who was in charge of everything that would be classified as chemical work 
(analysis of water, malt, and yeast), did not have this degree. Rather than simply 
ignore this legislation, though, the companies worked hard to comply. They both 
contracted with a laboratory to do their chemical work and placed someone on the 
payroll with the necessary degree.37      
By 1958, the interests of the Egyptian government had become inextricably 
tied to the interests of its unquestioned leader, Nasser. As the state’s ultimate 
powerbroker, he had the ability to determine the fate of any company, organization, or 
person in the country with just a few words.  Unfortunately for the beer companies 
and the rest of the private sector, Nasser and his government had not mapped out a 
clear ideological platform to provide an overarching rationale for his policies. It was 
unclear, therefore, whether the Nasser-led government’s activist policies with regard 
to the economy, as discussed in Chapter 6, were intended as a temporary palliative or 
were the beginning of a full-scale takeover of the private sector.  
Ideological pragmatism was a key feature of Nasser’s ruling style, which can 
rightly be called self-styled populism; that is, “a predominately middle-class 
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movement that mobilize[d] the lower classes, especially the urban poor, with radical 
rhetoric against imperialism, foreign capitalism and the political establishment.”38 
Nasser placed himself and his charismatic persona, the native-born father (baba) and 
president to the people (al-shaʿb) of Egypt, at the center of this populism. 39  While 
the businessmen of the private sector could not peg his motives, they recognized that 
whatever action he took, it would be popularly supported. With his populist policies, 
like land reform, and his anti-imperialism, Nasser had won massive popularity and 
legitimacy with the working class, the fellahin, and the effendiya—that group of 
students, professionals, teachers, civil servants, and small businessmen who were 
differentiated from the lower classes by their education and worldview and 
differentiated from the elite by their socio-economic status.40  
 However, even without an explicit agenda from Nasser, the breweries were 
not left completely in the dark. Nasser himself shed some light on his plans for the 
breweries in a 1960 conversation he had with Ismaʿil Hafez, a director of Pyramid and 
the bête noir of Pyramid’s managing director, Erick Kettner. This conversation 
occurred within the framework of an Agricultural and Industrial Production Fair on 
January 3, 1960.41 The beer companies, like the rest of the agricultural and industrial 
firms in the country, had assigned their senior staff to man a stand at the convention. 
The breweries chose to represent themselves together at the Stella stand.42  As 
discussed above, this unanimity exemplifies how powerful a brand Stella had become 
by this time.   
 At the Agricultural and Industrial Production Fair, government officials 
walked around, gathering information on the current status of the various companies. 
Around noon on that day, the President, together with his Minister of Finance, Dr. 
Abdel Monʿim al-Qaysuni, and his Minister of Industry, Dr Aziz Sidki, stopped at the 
 
304 
Stella stand for a twenty-minute conversation. Nasser opened the conversation by 
asking about the general operations of the company. Hafez responded that business 
was good, but that the companies paid nearly 400,000 Egyptian pounds in excise 
taxes.43  Nasser was quick to remind Hafez that the excise taxes on exported beer 
were refunded, and then he turned to Qaysuni to confirm this statement. The 
discussion of excise taxes enabled Nasser to shift the conversation to the topic that 
interested him, namely, the export of beer.  
 Nasser posed the question, “How are exports?” Hafez could only answer that, 
besides the malt that the companies sent to the Sudan, exports were rather limited. 
Troubled by this answer, Nasser called over Aziz Sidqi and had Hafez repeat the same 
information to the Minister of Industry.44  Sidqi’s response was that the Egyptian 
government had limited the production of the company by withholding export 
licenses. Sidqi pointed out that recently a new export license had been issued to allow 
Stella to bolster its exports. Hafez agreed and noted that the companies had been 
doing all they could to increase exports. As Nasser perused photographs of the 
factories and their latest installments, Hafez stated that the larger issue was that the 
empty bottles necessary for bottling the beer were not produced locally. Although a 
local company, Yasin Glass, had attempted to do so, they had proved incapable of the 
task. Nasser pointed out, quite astutely, that Yasin Glass’s failure was due in part to 
their inability to produce colored glass.45   
 Colored glass was a vital innovation in beer-bottling because hops, one of the 
main ingredients of beer, is light-sensitive. When hops is exposed to light, a process 
of photo-oxidation occurs, and a compound know as 3-methyl-2-butene-thiol (MBT) 
is produced. MBT is a powerful substance that can provide both a pungent odor and 
an off-flavor to beer.46 Thus, while glass bottles proved to be an excellent and 
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reproducible container that created an impermeable boundary between beer and most 
outside forces, unless colored, they provided no protection against the damaging sun. 
Moreover, not all colored bottled were created equal. Brown glass bottles provided 
the optimal amount of protection against the sun,47 although Pyramid and Crown 
chose green bottles for Stella Beer. Green bottles were in fact quite poor at keeping 
the light out, but the choice was driven by marketing: green bottles gave a better sense 
of the crisp and clear beer contained within. 
 Back at the Stella stand, Hafez noted the President’s correct assessment of the 
bottle situation, but added that part of the issue was also that these local factories 
preferred to make bottles manually rather than automatically.  The fact that this choice 
was an issue for Pyramid and Crown communicates how mechanized the bottle-
making process had become. Not only was Stella beer made through the use of 
automated machinery, but the filling of the bottles occurred through a mechanized 
process as well. Thus, a factory that was hand-making glass bottles was unable to fill 
the needs of Crown and Pyramid; handmade bottles, even those made by the best 
craftsmen, were never exactly the same size.  The bottling machines were calibrated 
to a specific bottle size and thus could not accommodate bottles of varying sizes. “Of 
course that is correct,” Nasser noted to Hafez, and then turned to Sidqi and repeated 
the same phrase.48 
 Next, Nasser wondered from where and for how much the breweries were 
getting the bottles. Hafez responded that they were imported from East Germany and 
Czechoslovakia at the price of eighteen to twenty milliemes for the 630 ml bottles and 
twelve to fifteen milliemes for the 330 ml bottles. Hafez added that the breweries had 
faced difficulties in importing these bottles due to the Ministry of Industry refusing 
their import requests.49 What happened next was an illustration of how fully power 
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was concentrated in Nasser’s hands, and of how intensely personal—and one might 
say micro-managerial—his rule truly was. The President turned to the Minister of 
Industry and said, “Give them the license agreement." Speaking then to Hafez, he 
said, "Send the request off tomorrow and it will be immediately approved."50  
 Why was Nasser so quick to offer to fix this bottle-import problem? The 
answer must surely be that he believed sincerely that exports were an essential part of 
Egypt’s economic restructuring—and because he was amenable to beer production.  
In particular, exporting products like Stella beer abroad was a way to achieve a 
favorable trade balance and restore the currency reserves that had been completely 
depleted by the Nasser government’s spending.51  The year that this fair took place 
was the same year that Egypt’s Ministry of Planning issued its first comprehensive 
five-year plan, which “intended to raise national income from £E 100 million to £E 
184 million.”52  Key goals of this five-year plan included the restoration of a 
favorable trade balance, the balancing of economic growth, the expansion of 
employment, and the ensuring of greater social justice.53 Also, in the same month that 
this fair was taking place, January 1960, the Nasser regime began its work on the 
Aswan High Dam, an edifice that represented Egypt’s new, empowered economic 
direction. It was funded in part by revenues from the nationalized Suez Canal. 
 There at the Stella stand at the Agricultural and Industrial Production Fair, 
Nasser’s sincere belief in the power of exports led him to begin lecturing Hafez on the 
matter. He believed that Stella could be a part of his effort because it had a good 
reputation at home, especially among tourists, and abroad. After pontificating for 
several minutes, he made a suggestion that again showed his awareness of the positive 
aspects of the beer industry: that the breweries should look further into their exports in 
Ghana and the other countries of southeast Africa, where there was a good market for 
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their products.  He closed his speech to Hafez by saying that because Stella produced 
good beer and had a good reputation in the market, there was no reason for the 
government to interfere with its processes.54 
 This interaction between Nasser and the upper management of Crown and 
Pyramid, while short, is packed with significance for the story of the beer industry in 
Egypt. The most noteworthy facet of the conversation was Nasser’s awareness of the 
particularities of beer-making in Egypt and of the strength of the Stella brand in both 
domestic and foreign markets. Nasser’s frank and knowledgeable discussion of beer 
shows openness to the product and a desire to support its growth, a stance that would 
become unthinkable for an Egyptian president after the 1970s. The conversation also 
shows that like the industrialists working at the breweries, Nasser was just as 
committed, if not more so, to making the Egyptian economy, including the beer 
industry, strong and expansive. He saw Stella, and specifically its export to other 
countries in the Third World, as a way to collect currency and even out Egypt’s trade 
balance. Even if we view Nasser’s words as idle promises, they still are evidence of 
the charisma and political acumen that allowed Nasser to reach the highest echelons 
of the Egyptian government.  
Export 
 This section examines how Crown and Pyramid dealt with exports in the three 
years (1958–61) prior to nationalization, at a time when Egypt and Syria, supported 
by Nasser, formed the United Arab Republic. In that period, the beer companies’ 
exports were divided into three sales zones: exclusive Pyramid zones, exclusive 
Crown zones, and shared zones. The exclusive Pyramid zone was limited to the 
Sudan, a region to which exporting full bottles of beer always proved difficult. This 
difficultly was due in large part to the fact that the Egyptian government’s treatment 
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of Egyptian beer in Sudan was paradoxical. Although Egypt had claimed Sudan 
during the era of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in that country (1898–1956), the 
Egyptian government charged much higher excise fees and taxes on imported 
Egyptian beer than foreign beer.55 After 1956, the beer companies also had to deal 
with an independent Sudanese government that restricted the import of foreign beer as 
part of their general protections to encourage local industry.56 However, Pyramid was 
still able to profit from the Sudanese market because of their six percent ownership 
stake in a Sudanese brewery, Blue Nile.57 While Pyramid may not have been able to 
sell Stella beer directly in Sudan, Blue Nile was a venture that could still make them 
money. This was due to Pyramid’s role as a “colonized colonizer.” The term, 
borrowed from the work of Eve Troutt-Powell, refers to the idea that Egypt carried 
out an imperial project in Sudan as the Ottomans, French, and British pursued their 
own project in Egypt. As a result of Egypt’s dual position, its colonial actions in the 
Sudan were tied intimately to its efforts to shrug off its own colonial yoke.58  
 This term “colonized colonizer” seems appropriate for Pyramid’s venture in 
the Sudan, too, because Pyramid’s relationship with Blue Nile was eerily similar to 
Heineken’s relationship to Pyramid. Blue Nile was able to produce its own beer, 
Camel Beer, but all the raw materials came from abroad. Heineken provided the hops 
and the yeast, and Pyramid provided the malt, about six hundred metric tons of malt 
exported to the company in 1958 alone.59 The malt was a blend of two- and six-rowed 
barley that Pyramid itself used when making Stella beer.60 The brewmaster of Blue 
Nile, like the brewmaster at Pyramid, was trained outside of the company; 
specifically, he was trained at Pyramid Brewery rather than Heineken proper.  As a 
“colonized” brewery, Blue Nile was under double surveillance. Erick Karl Kettner, 
Heineken’s representative at Pyramid Brewery, not only monitored the internal 
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happenings of the company, but also required that Blue Nile send Camel beer to Cairo 
to be tested in their laboratories.  Wittert van Hoogland, Kettner’s boss, monitored 
Kettner’s work with Blue Nile and the brewery itself.61   
 As for the exclusive Crown zones, they were limited to countries on the 
Mediterranean basin, including Cyprus, Libya, Syria, and Lebanon.  By 1960, Syria 
had proved to be the largest market outside of these countries. This prominence had a 
great deal to do with political developments. In February 1958, under the guidance of 
Nasser, the governments of Egypt and Syria joined together to form the United Arab 
Republic. In addition to the political motives for joining the two countries, there were 
also economic factors. For the Syrians, the union shielded them from communism and 
gave them access to the much larger Egyptian market.62 For Egypt and Nasser, Syria 
was a welcome market for Egypt’s industrial products and was the main wheat 
supplier to Egypt.63 Nevertheless, the two countries’ economies had significant 
differences, and the work of integrating them became one of the main struggles of this 
new union. 
After September 1958, Nasser’s government worked in earnest to create a united 
Egyptian–Syrian economy. The government created a ten-year economic plan, which 
calculated expenditures of around 2 billion Syrian pounds. Most of these funds were 
allocated to the improvement of irrigation and hydroelectric power in the country.  
The Nasser government also sent a tripartite commission to Syria; called the Higher 
Ministerial Committee, it was composed of an Egyptian Vice-President, a Syrian 
Vice-President, and the Minister of the Interior. The Committee aimed to “study the 
obstacles to implementation of projects; to stimulate economic activity; to study the 
public services program; and to expedite the formation of the National Union.”64 For 
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Pyramid and Crown, the government’s most significant step was the elimination of all 
custom duties, except nine competitive products, between the two countries.65 
 This new free path of trade wedded a market to Egypt that Pyramid and Crown 
were already looking to tap. In 1957, Kettner and Wittert van Hoogland of Pyramid’s 
Dutch management privately discussed opening a Heineken interest in Syria,66 with 
the idea of placing their Dutch brewmaster, Gerardus Hubertus Ulenberg, in charge of 
it.67  They chose Ulenberg because of their assumption that Syrians would be more 
comfortable dealing with a Dutchman than a fellow Middle Easterner.68 That is, they 
assumed that the Syrians would rather listen to and follow a foreign, non-Arab expert 
than an Egyptian, whom they would see as an equal, not a superior.   
 However, the unification of Egypt and Syria preempted these plans. On the 
announcement of the union, there was an almost immediate disagreement between the 
two companies over who should be free to exploit the Syrian market. Although 
Crown’s leaders were amenable to drawing up a new agreement between the two 
companies, they still argued for their right to be the main exporter to Syria as before. 
Pyramid, on the other hand, believed that the situation had changed to such a degree 
that any prior agreements did not apply.69  
 Pyramid believed it should be exporting the majority of the beer there because 
it could produce beer a hectoliter cheaper than Crown could.70 The two companies 
eventually reached an agreement on the sale of beer in Syria. Crown allowed Pyramid 
to export to Syria, which was called the Northern Province (Egypt was the Southern 
Province), if Pyramid agreed to pay a fifty-pound fee on every hectoliter they 
exported.71 Crown only negotiated after having difficulty selling its own beer in Syria. 
Regardless, Pyramid was quite pleased to replace Crown beer, and its beer received a 
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better reception in the market, because it was believed to be superior to the Crown-
produced Stella in its taste, brilliance, and foam stability. 72  
 Nevertheless, the market for Stella beer was not huge. For example, in 1959, 
Pyramid sold 1,200 cartons of large bottles (660 ml) and 1,800 cartons of small 
bottles (330 ml), which put sales at around 1000 hl.73  The people at Pyramid 
attributed the lack of demand to the fact that, despite Syrians having greater 
purchasing power, there were simply fewer of them: Egypt’s population was nearly 
five times larger than Syria’s. In addition, Kettner noted that, as compared to 
Egyptians, Syrian “Muslims were more strict in the interpretation of the Koran 
[sic].”74  Although this statement comes from a non-expert on the matter, it still is 
interesting to note that foreigners perceived Syrians to be somehow more observant 
than Egyptians in avoiding alcohol. Beyond a smaller population and perhaps a 
greater religiosity, another reason for the less than stellar sales could have been the 
presence of a rival beer in Syria, called Al-Chark. Founded in 1954, this beer came 
from Aleppo and had already made inroads into the market when Stella arrived in the 
late 1950s.  
 The Syrian beer market was small enough that Kettner seriously doubted the 
utility of exporting there. Unlike Nasser, Kettner was skeptical about possibilities for 
exports in general. Beyond the risks of shipping beer (bottle breakage, spoilage, etc.), 
there were significant bureaucratic hurdles, including heavy paperwork, that reduced 
Pyramid’s prospects of a profitable export market. Indeed, exporting to Syria raised a 
few challenges about doing business in foreign markets. While the gain in visible 
costs was not huge, the gains in invisible costs (contributions to fixed costs and wages 
and salaries) were significant.75 Moreover, the reality of conjoining Egypt with Syria 
raised practical problems for the breweries. For example, the breweries were unsure 
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whether the UAR’s decision to cancel certain import customs meant that those selling 
Syrian beer in Egypt would have to pay the Egyptian duty of LE 4.5 or if the 
breweries would have to pay the significantly lower Syrian duty.76 Besides the raised 
costs of the government’s push for exports, the new free trade agreement also 
inaugurated another possible development, the entrance of another beer into the 
Egyptian market.  For just as Egyptians could export Stella to Syria, Syrians could 
now presumably export Al-Chark to Egypt. 
 From the moment the U.A.R formed in February 1958, Al-Chark had its eye 
on the Egyptian market. In September 1958, the general director of Al-Chark, an Al-
Chark company administrator, and an official from the UAR’s Ministry of Agriculture 
visited Pyramid, where Kettner and Alber Farag received them. Kettner learned that, 
unlike the brewery in the Sudan, the Syrian brewery was well stocked with malt. One 
of their administrators was a large landowner who grew barley. The Syrian brewery 
also put out feelers during the meeting to see whether they could reach an accord with 
Pyramid.77 Kettner was willing to listen because the sample of beer they gave him 
was good, and he was wary of their intentions for the Egyptian market. He was right 
to be cautious, for, in 1959, this brewery used the port of Alexandria to ship a small 
amount of beer, 450 cases of large bottles and 150 cases of small bottles, to Egypt.78 
This beer was the first local competition in the Egyptian market since the collapse and 
buy-out of Nile Brewery. Still, the management of Pyramid ultimately did not worry 
much about this would-be competitor.  
 There were two ways to deal with this new entrant, cooperation or 
competition. Crown and Pyramid could take the Syrian brewer up on its unofficial 
offer for partnership in beer distribution, and thus profit from Al-Chark’s sale while 
limiting its market penetration. However, Kettner decided against this course for two 
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reasons. First, Kettner was confident that Stella would win out based on quality.  
While the beer he tasted from Al-Chark was good, he felt that it was lacking the 
brightness and clarity of Stella.79 More importantly, Pyramid thought that competition 
from Al-Chark in Egypt would help to make Crown and Pyramid appear not to be a 
monopoly. This designation was important because at the time the Egyptian 
government was targeting monopolistic firms in order to reduce prices.80 Heineken 
executives in Amsterdam agreed with Kettner that having an inferior beer on the 
market would not hurt Stella and would at least give the appearance of a competitive 
market.81  
 The developments in the Syrian market encouraged Pyramid to reevaluate its 
entire policy of foreign sales vis-à-vis Crown Brewery. Besides the agreed-upon 
markets, all other foreign markets, such as Jordan and Aden, remained common 
markets. This shared responsibility was an issue for Pyramid Brewery. It meant that 
two varieties of Stella with two different recipes, Crown’s version (tailored for the 
Alexandria market) and Pyramid’s version, were entering the same markets. This 
redundancy was problematic on two counts. First, the two Stellas were competing 
against each other. For example, in Jordan both Crown and Pyramid had granted 
concessions to Jordanian traders to sell Stella beer.82 Second, the different recipes of 
the beers were confusing consumers on what Stella beer actually was, as Crown’s 
Stella was believed to be lacking in it taste, brilliance, and foam stability. 83  In the 
eyes of Pyramid, this was problematic because they believed strongly that Crown’s 
Stella was inferior and thus was prejudicing consumers from buying the “true” Stella 
produced by Pyramid.84 
 Pyramid thus laid out both short- and long-term plans to remedy the situation. 
In the short term, they resolved that Crown and Pyramid would decide, prior to entry, 
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on which company would be the prime distributor all in new markets. As for the 
markets that Crown controlled, it would keep those that it wanted and would 
immediately offer the others to Pyramid, which would have to pay a fee to sell there. 
In the long term, this unnecessary competition was another signal that Heineken and 
Pyramid needed to unify the production of both companies and eliminate any 
competition in foreign markets. Instead of each running its own operations, both 
breweries would contribute to a foreign trade fund, in proportion to its profits, and this 
fund would then be used for everything associated with the exploitation of foreign 
markets, including exploration, travel, and marketing.85 As I will show in the next 
chapter, Pyramid would take another shot at unifying the companies in 1961 before 
the government did it for them later that same year.  
  
The Ten Commandments 
 Pyramid’s desire for greater control in the export market paralleled Erick Karl 
Kettner’s battle for total control within the brewery. As I will show in this section, 
prior to the Nasser government’s institution of pro-labor policies, Kettner was 
determined to make Pyramid a “model company” by having a docile, efficient, and 
disciplined Egyptian workforce.  As the production manager, Kettner dictated labor 
relations at the breweries. Kettner was particularly concerned about instilling the 
ethos of what I call total control brewing, which entailed applying cutting-edge 
techniques and technologies to create a standardized and sturdy product for all 
consumers.  Following through on this ethos required not only the best machinery and 
materials, but also an efficient and obedient workforce.    
One way that Kettner attempted to bring workers in line with his thinking was 
through the installation of a system he referred to as the Ten Commandments. These 
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were ten key practices that Kettner believed would produce a better company.86 There 
were as follows: 
1. Efficiency 
2. Organization  
3. Training 
4. Communication 
5. Supervision 
6. Discipline 
7. Safety 
8. Cleanliness, Order, and Maintenance 
9. Human Relations 
10. Character 
 
Kettner learned these Ten Commandments at lectures he attended at the Central 
Social Employers Association (Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers Verbond, CSWV) in the 
Netherlands. Founded in 1919, this was an organization of employers, among which 
Heineken was a prominent member—Heineken CEO Dirk Stikker served as its head 
in 1939—that looked to establish standards and practices in the relationship between 
employers and their employees.87 Ensuring uniformity in management tactics may 
have been one of Heineken’s secrets to running a successful company. We know that 
the company had a blue book of guidelines that it distributed to its employees; this 
book probably contained the Ten Commandments or similar information.88  
 Although the commandments were ten in number, they could be grouped 
under two headings, “efficiency” and “discipline,” which happened to correspond to 
commandments 1 and 6, respectively.  Commandments one through five fit under the 
rubric of efficiency, and six through ten fit under discipline. The emphasis on 
efficiency and discipline clearly echoes Egypt’s colonial past. As On Barak has 
discussed in his monograph On Time, which focuses on the efficient use of time, 
efficiency was a pillar of the technoscientific enlightenment that the colonial project 
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was supposed to bring to Egypt. Proponents of its ethos believed that efficiency 
assured a more orderly society while maximizing profits.89  Barak also noted that the 
efficient use of time was tied heavily to the commodification of time, an idea best 
summarized by the Weberian ideal that “time equals money.”90  
 Kettner used this exact phrase, “time is money,” when discussing the first 
commandment of efficiency. As for discipline, this word echoed Egypt’s earlier 
colonial past. As noted by Timothy Mitchell, inspired by the writings of Foucault, 
order and discipline were essential elements of the European colonial project in 
Egypt, started by the French in 1798 and continued by the British in 1882.91  In 
domains ranging from urban planning, to military organization, to schooling, and even 
the Arabic language, the colonial powers aimed to discipline what they deemed to be 
the unruly Egyptian. This all-encompassing need for discipline was echoed by the 
mantra that Kettner attached to sixth commandment of discipline: “discipline is the 
yardstick of life.”92  
 Kettner believed that in order for the beer company to be “efficient,” it had to 
be cognizant of three Ms: manpower, machines, and materials. In regard to 
manpower, an efficient company was one that designated the right number of workers 
for the right amount of time for a particular job. Machines in an efficient company ran 
for the correct amount of time, at the correct intensity or speed, and were maintained 
adequately. Finally, with regard to materials, efficiency came in the form of precision 
when using resources (especially in the case of beer production, water, electricity, and 
malt), care in the storage of vital materials (hops and malt), and accuracy when 
making the labels that would mark each bottle.93   
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 The company could achieve the three Ms of efficiency by following the 
precepts of four of the commandments (organization, training, communication, and 
supervision). Each of these precepts had its own mnemonic. The company and its 
employees could achieve maximal efficiency by following the 3 Ds of organization 
(distribution of work, delegation of authority, and decentralization); the 3 Cs of 
communication (clear orders, chain of command, and contact with the other brewery); 
and the 3 Ss of supervision (stay in your section, see [where there were inefficiencies 
and then address them], and study).94 The only commandment that did not have a 
mnemonic was “training” because this was relatively self-explanatory; that is, more 
training makes an employee better.  This first group of five commandments, as should 
be obvious from the sheer number of mnemonics, was meant as an “easy” road map 
for managers to follow in order to eliminate inefficiency.  Emblematic of the 
underlying logic of “total brewing” and “modernity” was this one-size-fit-all guide 
that could be implemented in all situations and locales. The unquestioned ease of 
transferability was no doubt a reason that Kettner felt that he could implement in 
Egypt the principles that he had learned in the Netherlands.  
 The second division of commandments (six through ten) was less a universal 
guide than an exhortation to abandon “undisciplined” habits in order to become a 
better employee. The guiding commandment was number six, discipline. For Kettner, 
discipline was synonymous with adherence to regulations set by authority. It was an 
essential aspect of a modern life, and it featured in every sphere of society, including 
family, religion, the army, the legal system, and even the international community.  A 
disciplined worker was one who accepted the authority of those above him, even if 
the regulations did not make sense. Kettner also believed that undisciplined behavior 
was contagious. If the department heads were not disciplined, they could not expect 
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those under them to be either.95  This fit with another facet of Kettner’s definition of 
discipline, which was self-discipline or self-denial. Kettner argued that self-discipline 
was true wisdom and that the Egyptian should practice moderation when it came to 
food, drink, expressions of authority, and spending money.96  
 In addition to these other qualities, a disciplined workplace was also safe 
(commandment number seven, safety) and clean (commandment number eight, 
cleanliness). Kettner noted that cleanliness was particularly important for the beer 
industry, as one could “not work in a mess.”97  The belief in cleanliness offers another 
example of how “total brewing” aimed to remove permeability from the process of 
beverage-making. By calling the process permeable, I am referencing the fact that due 
to the nature of the machinery (earthenware containers, reed pipes, palm-leave filters, 
etc.) and techniques (hand-crafting, lack of sterilization and refrigeration, etc.) used in 
pre-industrial beverage production, foreign organisms and materials were bound to 
enter somewhere in the transition from raw materials to final product, just as materials 
essential to production were bound to exit.  
 Another characteristic of the disciplined workplace was that all relations 
within the factory (commandment number nine, human relations) were guided by the 
principle that those below followed the rules set by their superiors.  At the same time, 
superiors were disciplined enough to not inflict unfair or extremely harsh rules upon 
those below them. The whole system relied upon employees who had proper character 
(commandment 10). This word character stood in for the idea that employees should 
be motivated by what was best for the company, not by their private interests. Most 
importantly, employees should not plot against fellow employees or dissemble in their 
interpersonal dealings. Although Kettner would work hard to implement of all these 
commandments in the Pyramid workplace, it was the commandments associated with 
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discipline, especially commandments nine and ten—human relations and proper 
character—that would obsess him during his tenure with the company. He was wholly 
inimical to “intrigues,” to which he believed Egyptians were unduly susceptible. 
 Kettner was very committed to instilling the Ten Commandments among the 
management and aimed to do so in ways beyond the standard lecture, of which there 
were many. One particularly interesting method he used was staging a contest among 
the department heads to see who had the best knowledge of the Ten Commandments. 
The Awad brothers (Ramses and Antoine) ended up winning the contest, and the 
results were announced at the company cafeteria.98 While Kettner noted that this 
contest was “very well received” and that it gave him “an invaluable perspective” on 
members of the management, one has to wonder how well it actually did go over. For 
example, there were two members of management who chose not to participate.99  
Kettner’s implementation of these commandments went beyond testing the 
management on them; the commandments framed his very treatment of the workers. 
As his letters show, he was obsessed with exploiting their working capabilities 
effectively and efficiently. This desire for exploitation was most obvious in Kettner’s 
treatment of those involved in the most labor-intensive step of beer making, the 
bottling line. Within Pyramid’s bottling plant, there were two bottling lines, the 
G.B.G.B line and the Benghazi line. Kettner was keenly aware of the productive 
capacity of these lines and was constantly looking to improve their output. It is 
illustrative to look at his conceptualization and quantification of this production to 
fully understand the effect of the Ten Commandments and the total brewing method 
on his mindset.   
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He instituted a two-shift system on the G.B.G.B. line at the Pyramid, despite 
the fact that it had caused issues with workers in the past.100 The two shifts on the 
G.B.G.B. line covered twelve net working hours. During those twelve hours, the 
brewery could bottle, at maximum efficiency, 45 hectoliters an hour (.75 hl a minute) 
in large bottles or 24 hectoliters per hour  (.40 hl a minute) using small bottles.101  
Bottling took place on five and half days each week. The remaining half-day of the 
six-day workweek was dedicated to cleaning the bottles. Bottlers worked roughly 
twenty-five days per month. With that time frame and the fact that small bottles made 
up twenty percent of sales, Kettner figured that the G.B.G.B. could bottle roughly 
11,500 hectoliters per month.102 The Benghazi line, on the other hand, could only 
produce 30 hectoliters per hour in large bottles and 16 hectoliters per hour in small 
bottles; the line was most efficient when it specialized in large bottles only. The 
schedule of the line was one six-hour shift per day, and the workers would generally 
work six days per week for about twenty-five days per month. Thus, the line could 
produce roughly 4,300 hectoliters a month, and the bottling plant as a whole could 
produce 15,800 hl per month.103  
 Significantly, Kettner could, and did, alter both of these schedules to extract 
even more work from the bottlers. If the company received a permit, workers from 
both lines could clean on Fridays so that they could have more time to bottle. In 
addition, the breweries could get permits to tack another hour of overtime onto the 
shifts. With both of those additions, the bottling plant could produce almost 19,000 
hectoliters of beer each month.104 While we cannot be sure how close the factory got 
to these numbers, it is more important to realize how Kettner, and Heineken more 
broadly, conceptualized of its workers in their pursuit of total brewing. Thus, Kettner 
was determined to make Pyramid a “model company” using the buzzwords and 
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pabulums of the Ten Commandments to craft a docile, efficient, and disciplined 
Egyptian workforce. 
The Workforce 
 Having discussed Kettner’s ideal vision for the Pyramid workforce and the 
ways in which he constantly pushed the workforce in his pursuit of greater efficiency, 
this section examines the demographics of the workforce that Kettner and the rest of 
the Dutch management was trying to shape, and shows how the workers and 
employees suffered under a pay structure that was stacked against them. This pay 
structure was actually quite common throughout the beer industry, and included 
Pyramid, Crown, and even Nile Brewery. At the very top of the pay structure was the 
board of directors. They each received a base salary for their membership on the 
board, which was usually around five hundred Egyptian pounds. This base pay was 
supplemented by various sums of money that could come under numerous titles. For 
example, they could receive additional funds that were called any of the following: a 
share (ḥiṣṣa) of the yearly profits, or a bonus (ʿilawa), compensation from the profits 
entitled to the board (mukāfa’), travel expenses, or remuneration (minḥa).  Although 
there were a bevy of names for this extra pay, they all resulted in a final salary that 
was closer to 2,000 pounds. This salary was supplemented even more for a managing 
director, who would accrue numerous business expenses that the company would 
subsidize. For example, in 1959, Erick Kettner received a base salary of 365 pounds, 
but made a total of 1,945 pounds plus nearly eight hundred pounds in travel 
expenses.105  
 Below the directors, there were two sets of company employees: salaried 
employees and workers. The salaried employees, who were paid monthly, were 
classified by the Department of Companies (Maṣlaḥat al-Sharikāt), as muwaẓẓafīn 
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(employees).  The rest of the people working for the company were paid a daily wage 
and were classified as workers (ʿummāl). These groups were differentiated not only 
by salary structure, but also by the type of jobs they filled. The muwaẓẓafīn, who 
included the chiefs of the sub-departments, were generally white-collar workers, 
supervisors, company doctors, lawyers, secretarial staff, translators, brewers, and 
accountants, while the ʿummal were the blue-collar types, including bottle fillers, 
bottle cleaners, label attachers, drivers, and assistant drivers.  The daily-wage earners 
could often have long relationships with the company, but in general had much 
greater turnover that the muwaẓẓafīn.  Everyone was paid a base salary that was 
dependent on his or her position, and that was subject to some gradual increases over 
time. In addition to the base salary, workers received a sum for living expenses, which 
was regulated by government and thus could not be lower than a certain amount. 
Pyramid generally did not pay any more than required,106 and the sum hardly ever 
kept up with the skyrocketing cost of living.107  Yearly bonuses also supplemented the 
pay of salaried employees and workers. 108    
 Although the company generally used the same pay system for salaried 
employees and workers who had been with the company longer than twenty years, 
there were significant differences in the amount of pay. For example, in 1957, the 
Egyptian employees with the highest salaries were Alber Farag and Ismaʿil Hafez, 
Kettner’s archrival. This position made sense as they served in important positions in 
the company. Farag was the head of the communications department, which 
encompassed both the company’s secretariat and its accounting department. Hafez, as 
discussed above, sat in an amorphous position, serving both as a head of a department 
(personnel and public relations) and a near equal to Kettner.  Due to their high 
position with the company, Pyramid paid them a large base salary of 101.5 pounds. 
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As further proof that the details are important when considering corporate pay in 
Egypt in this period, Ismaʿil Hafez ended up making over forty pounds more than 
Farag thanks to bonuses and the like.109  
 The two lowest-paid Egyptian employees were Haggag Mahmud Abu ʿAla 
and Muhammad Ahmed Hamdi Abu Khatwa. While there is no indication of what 
positions they held, their total monthly salaries were 18 and 23 pounds, 
respectively.110 This put their salaries around 150 pounds less than the top employee 
earners. From the low salary numbers, we can assume that they held positions just 
slightly above the blue-collar level. They might have been assistant mechanics, the 
head of the guards, or drivers. We do know that Khatwa had a degree from an 
agricultural college, which implies a more elevated status.111  Their salaries were 
likely similar to workers who had been with the company for a long time.  
 A discrepancy divided not only the top- and bottom-earning Egyptian 
employees, but also those whom the government classified as Egyptian and non-
Egyptian employees.  For example, in 1957, the highest-paid non-Egyptian employee, 
Emil Natti, an Italian protégé, made 278 pounds total, more than 70 Egyptian pounds 
more than Hafez. A great deal of this difference came from the different base salaries, 
as Natti made 166 pounds to Hafez’s 105. The rest of the difference came from 
remuneration from the company’s profits, which was double for Natti (83 versus 
46.5).112 Surprisingly, the discrepancy between the lowest paid non-Egyptian 
employee and his Egyptian counterpart is far smaller.  John Naguib Anton made 28 
pounds total, compared to the 18 of Abu ‘Ala. Perhaps this had something to do with 
the fact that Anton was a Palestinian. Every other non-Egyptian employee made over 
sixty pounds.113  In total, the forty-one white-collar Egyptians together made in 
salary, bonuses, and incentives 2,120 Egyptian pounds, while eight non-Egyptian 
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employees made 1,042 Egyptian pounds. There was a similar wage discrepancy in 
British American Tobacco between foreign and Egyptian workers.  For example, “In 
1947, 18 of the 25 best-paid employee positions went to Britons and seven were 
occupied by other foreign nationals.”114 These discrepancies, rather than simply 
reflecting preferential treatment for foreign nationals, also resulted from the foreign 
nationals sometimes being more skilled and accustomed to higher wages.115   
 As for the weekly workers at Pyramid and Crown, we have very little 
information. What we do know is that weekly workers who had not accrued twenty-
years of service were generally awarded, in bonuses, one month’s salary plus living 
expenses for the two major Muslim holidays (Eid al-Adha, the big Eid or Bairam, and 
Eid al-Fitr, the small Eid or Bairam).116 In 1948, these workers also received a bonus 
equivalent to one month’s pay on account of Mr. Martin’s departure and replacement 
by Wittert van Hoogland. Emblematic of the power of the workers, Wittert was 
stymied in his desire to eliminate what in his eyes should have been a one-time bonus. 
This dispute came within the larger framework of the resistance of employees and 
workers to the hard line that Wittert took vis-à-vis pay. For example, he also wanted 
to limit the Eid bonuses to just one month’s salary.117 
 To get a better understanding of what workers in these two companies were 
earning, we can look at information contained in the file of a short-lived competitor to 
Pyramid and Crown, Nile Brewery. In 1954, Nile had a five-member board of 
directors. Like Pyramid and Crown, the president of the board was a Muslim Egyptian 
named Ahmad Fahmy.118 The rest of the board was divided evenly between Egyptians 
and non-Egyptians.  Below the board, there were sixteen salaried employees 
(muwaẓẓafīn), of whom twelve were Egyptian. Although they made up seventy-five 
percent of the workforce, the Egyptian employees were paid eighty-five percent of the 
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salaries. Among the twelve Egyptians, one, Elia Zakri, was a woman. She served as 
the secretary.119 Besides Zakri, among the Egyptian employees there were three 
accountants, three market agents (muʿtamad al-sūq), one head of mechanics, one debt 
collector (muḥaṣṣil), one head of warehouses, and one chemist.120 The two most 
important positions, the director (mudīr) and the brewmaster, were both non-
Egyptian. The director was a Greek, George Athanasopulu, and the brewmaster was 
an Italian, Limongelli Angelo. Again, we see that beer companies in Egypt relied on 
the technical skill of non-Egyptians for making beer. The importance of Angelo to the 
entire operation is confirmed by the fact that he was the highest-paid employee, 
making thirty-eight pounds.121  Further proof of the fluidity between Egyptian and 
“non-Egyptian” in pre-1960s Egypt is that two of the “Egyptian” employees, Paniyoti 
Kufasi and Brotini Miravadimilo, acquired Egyptian citizenship in 1952.122  
 Below the salaried employees, there were forty workers (ʿummāl), thirty-nine 
of whom were Egyptian. They were divided among five different areas essential to the 
operation of the company: the beer factory, the delivery cars, the workshop, the 
warehouse, and security.  The factory was where all of the operations associated with 
making the beer took place, including malting, fermenting, brewing, and bottling. Due 
to its importance, it is not surprising that the factory employed the greatest number of 
workers. Within the factory, the workers were divided between general workers and 
the majority, who worked at the minbar al-taʿbiyya (the bottling line).  This 
preponderance of workers on the line made sense, as it was the production of clean, 
well-sealed, and clearly labeled bottles that assured that a sellable product hit the 
market. The privileging of the bottling department was also due to the value of glass 
bottles in Egypt. Because bottles generally had to be imported or bought at a 
significant expense domestically, the reuse of bottles was an essential aspect of selling 
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beer in Egypt. Thus workers in the bottling sector of the factory not only filled bottles 
and sealed them, but also washed and refurbished them.123  
 As discussed above, a vital process in beer-making was the storage of beer so 
that the beer could “finish,” that is, complete its fermentation process, and remain 
chilled and preserved before it went out on the market. Nile’s storage operation was 
left completely in the hands of one Egyptian employee, Shehata Ahmad Misbah.124 
The dearth of workers was attributable to the fact that as long as the refrigeration 
systems were running properly, there was very little work to be done within the 
storehouse.  There was also one worker employed in the brewery’s office, who would 
most likely have been a farrāsh, that is, a blue-collar worker who kept the office tidy 
and brought beverages and food to employees within the office.  
 The department where beer went after it was bottled, the delivery department, 
had the largest staff after the factory because it was in charge of delivering product 
throughout Egypt. This was done via cars that brought cases of beer out to market and 
picked up empty bottles for cleaning and re-using. The delivery department included 
both drivers and assistant drivers. The presence of an assistant driver indicates that 
this job entailed not only the successful transport of beer to market and empty bottles 
back, but also the lifting and carrying that was an essential feature of the beer-selling 
operation.125 
 Another vital department in the beer company was the workshop, which was 
in charge of keeping all machinery working. For example, if there was an issue with a 
car, refrigerator, or bottling machine, the workers in the workshop would do their best 
to fix it.  Like the workshop, the security department was essential. There, guards 
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protected the machinery and the stored beer. The one non-Egyptian worker for Nile, 
Yerodot Yoanidis, worked in security and was that department’s best-paid employee. 
 All of these workers, including Yoanidis, were paid daily and made no more 
than five hundred milliemes a day. The best-paid worker was Muhammad al-Jalil 
Baraka, who worked in the beer factory and made five hundred and twenty milliemes 
a day. The three lowest-paid employees, Farouk Abd al-Aziz Yusuf, who worked in 
the bottling section of the beer factory; Mabruk Ali Qutb, who worked in the office as 
a farrāsh; and Shehata Ahmad Misbah, who worked at the warehouse; all made one 
hundred and forty milliemes a day.126 Thus, there was nearly a five-fold difference 
between the pay of the highest- and lowest-paid workers. This disparity did not arise 
from differences in seniority because all four of the highest- and lowest-paid Egyptian 
workers had joined the company in the same year.  It was rather a matter of respect.127 
In total, Nile paid its Egyptian workers more than 7,000 milliemes (around seven 
pounds) per day. That sum was roughly half of what one employee would earn in a 
year. These salary discrepancies become even starker when one compares the pay of a 
worker to that of a board member. As this section has shown, the workforce of 
Pyramid was subject to a pay structure that was bound to sew discontent. That 
discontent is the subject of the next section.  
Turning the Workforce 
 Despite Kettner’s commandments that stressed supervision and discipline, the 
workers in the Egyptian beer industry were not helpless. The Pyramid workers had 
been unionized since at least the 1940s and now, in the 1950s, had the inspiration of 
Nasser’s legislation on their side. The workers’ organization into a Workers Syndicate 
(The Union of Employees and Workers for the Beer Company) included both 
employees and workers.  In a 1949 report by Pieter R. Fieth, a Heineken 
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representative sent to report on the beer industry in Egypt, he noted that the workers at 
what he still called Bomonti were better paid than workers in similar positions at other 
companies,128 and that their union was well-organized and accustomed to striking for 
better treatment. In one strike, Mr. Martin, the man who preceded Wittert van 
Hoogland as managing director of the brewery, had no choice but to give into the 
union’s demands for pay increases and bonuses. As a holder of British citizenship, 
Martin had feared that the union would be able to use the anti-British sentiment that 
was pervasive in the country during the 1940s in order to inspire a publicly supported 
strike.129 The union was able to achieve tangible goals before the RCC coup because 
it was well organized and because the company was doing so well. The management 
of the company considered the seven years between 1942 and 1949 to be fat years and 
was unable to limit workers’ bonuses because the workers, too, were aware of the 
company’s profitability.130  
 The union would be further emboldened by the legislation of the RCC and 
later the Nasser-led government. Before the 1960s, the government was only partially 
successful in Egyptianizing the workforce to their liking. Although private companies 
like Pyramid and Crown were forced to reckon with new legislation and make 
changes to their employment structure, they still had methods to prevent the complete 
“Egyptianization” of their workforce. Nevertheless, that was not the only legislation 
that was working to change the status of workers within the Egyptian economy in 
general and the beer companies specifically. As part of Nasser’s populist program, he 
aimed to motivate the working class by greatly increasing their standard of living.131  
In December 1952, the government enacted new labor legislation, which it 
strengthened in April 1953. In sum, this legislation granted workers “significantly 
improved material benefits—increased severance compensation, longer annual 
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vacations, free transportation to factories in remote areas, and free medical care.”132 It 
also gave the workers unprecedented job security by making the dismissal of a worker 
without cause a “very expensive and bureaucratically cumbersome undertaking.”133  
 This new legislation won Nasser and the RCC the immediate support of the 
many workers, although the regime’s measures effectively served to thwart the 
development of a free and powerful labor movement. One reason was that this new 
legislation was coupled with a ban on labor strikes; in addition, the government 
passed laws that stifled the activities of trade unions. For example, the government 
allowed white-collar and blue-collar workers to form separate unions within a single 
venture and also confirmed the practice of having unions form within each company 
rather than across the industry.134 Both maneuvers did much to limit the formation of 
broad-based labor movements. Yet Nasser positioned himself as a populist who 
sought to mobilize the working class through legislation and through a charged 
rhetoric attacking “foreign economic imperialists.” Nasser and his government 
portrayed the foreign capitalists as being among the main perpetrators of the 
exploitation (istighlāl) of the Egyptian people and their economy.135 He argued that 
their elimination, coupled with the elevation of the beleaguered Egyptian working 
class, would set Egypt on a new and prosperous path.  Nasser’s turn to conspiratorial 
rhetoric that vilified a single group as the agents of subjugation was yet another 
example of Nasser’s combative populism.136 
 All of these actions on the part of Nasser mobilized and empowered the workers 
at Pyramid and Crown. The clearest indication of this empowerment was the removal 
of a Swiss employee and the chief of the engineers, Mr. Eigenheer, in 1957. This 
event arose out of a disagreement between Eigeneheer and his subordinate, Anton 
Awad, which in Awad’s eyes, arose out of Eigenheer’s lack of respect for him. This 
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perceived lack of respect boiled over one day when Eigenheer sat in Awad’s chair and 
refused to vacate it when Awad asked him to do so. For Awad, this behavior was all 
the more galling because Eigenheer did so in front of all of the workers.137 As a result 
of this incident, Awad filed a complaint to the board through the union stating that he 
could not “stomach” Eigenheer’s behavior, which was a clear example of his lack of 
“class.”138 The union pushed for Eigenheer’s removal from his position. Although the 
union’s response may seem extreme, it reflects the cultural differences between those 
who had been raised in Egypt and new arrivals like Eigenheer.  While sitting in 
Awad’s chair may have seemed to be only a minor transgression, Awad understood 
Eigenheer’s refusal to move in plain sight of the workers as a violation of the social 
hierarchy within the workplace and therefore as a significant affront.   
 Eigenheer’s disrespect to Awad was all the more embarrassing because 
Eigenheer was a foreign worker. The Nasser-led government’s policies fostered an 
atmosphere of distrust between Egyptians and the “foreign” elements in the country, 
portraying the latter as exploitative parasites preventing the advancement of the 
Egyptian economy. Thus, every interaction between “foreign” and “native” workers 
was framed with the idea that the two sides were taking part in a zero-sum game. 
Awad interpreted Eigenheer’s refusal to move as proof of Nasser’s depiction of 
foreigners. Kettner, for his part, was increasingly aware of the precarious position of 
foreigners in Egypt.  He attributed the union’s push for the removal of Eigenheer to 
the rising tide of “Arab Nationalism” in Egypt.139 The idea of Arab Nationalism was 
at a particular high point at this time, 1957, in Egypt. Only a year earlier, Nasser had 
asserted Egyptian sovereignty by nationalizing the Suez Canal.  About a year after, 
Nasser would form the United Arab Republic, the most significant articulation of 
Arab nationalism at the time, which entailed a union with Syria. 
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 As Kettner noted, this agitation against Eigenheer was inspired by the 
Egyptian authorities’ smear campaign against the “advantages” of foreigners in the 
country.140 While we can never know for sure whether that was the case, we do know 
that the policies of the Nasser-led government emboldened the union to act more 
assertively than it otherwise may have. Their case for the removal of Eigenheer was 
based primarily on the fact that he was over sixty years old and was in violation of the 
1955 modification that the government had made to the Company Law of 1947, 
which required that the government approve the employment of all members of the 
board over the age of sixty. The law did not impose the same restrictions on 
employees and workers, but that did not stop the union from leveraging this law for 
their purposes. 
Kettner attempted to mediate the situation by charging Hassan Tawfik, another 
Egyptian engineer, with settling the issue. However, Tawfik’s response “sickened” 
Kettner. When Kettner broached the subject to Tawfik, he looked at Kettner like “a 
farmer with a toothache,” a Dutch saying meaning that while he listened, he was not 
that interested in what Kettner had to say. Kettner posited that this reaction was due to 
the fact that “the whole affair had been instigated, if not by himself, then by his fellow 
engineers Awad and Nossier.”141 Seeing Tawfik’s response, Kettner believed that 
Eigenheer’s removal was a fait accompli. When he mentioned the events to Wittert, 
he suggested that Eigenheer was “finished” because he was not a member of the 
union,142 and that the path of least resistance was to remove Eigenheer by getting him 
to retire.143 Kettner hoped that he could keep Eigenheer on for a year or two, until he 
turned 64 and could, with repatriation, qualify for a legal base pension in 
Switzerland.144 In the end, Eigenheer asked for his own dismissal and left the 
company in the spring of 1958. Eigenheer’s resignation reflected the advantages that 
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some of foreign nationals did have. His departure was tied to the very favorable 
transfer agreements that became available to repatriated Swiss citizens at the time.145  
Back at Pyramid, Kettner wanted to replace Eigenheer with an Egyptian, 
Nasser Nusayr, but Emil Natti, his consultant in the workforce, demurred and 
mentioned that Nusayr had language troubles when he visited Holland because he did 
not speak enough of any European language to communicate.146 Kettner thus resolved 
to leave the issue of a replacement to Natti, Hassan Tawfik, and Ismaʿil Hafez.147 
However, this resolution would not be the end of nationality-based conflicts. In 
Kettner’s eyes, the successful move against Eigenheer marked open season on one of 
the only remaining foreign workers, the head brewmaster, Gerardus Hubertus 
Ulenberg.148 As discussed in Chapter 6, Ulenberg was vital to the operations of 
Pyramid in Egypt, having created a strain of barley that was well suited to Egyptian 
growing conditions and that enabled the company to drastically reduce the amount of 
malt that it imported. Kettner reasoned that the host of complaints against Ulenberg in 
1957 was part of a carefully timed plot aimed at removing another foreigner from the 
company.149 Kettner resented Egyptians for what he saw as their power plays. As he 
observed to Wittert, “It's like you said to me at the time, you cannot hate these people 
because hatred has something noble in itself; you can only have the deepest 
contempt.150” This remark highlights the deep animus that Kettner and Wittert felt for 
some Egyptians. Nevertheless, the complaints against Ulenberg went unheeded, and 
he remained with the company until its full nationalization in 1963. 
 Another power struggle between management and workers would soon arise, 
forworkers had the power not only to agitate against “foreign” employees whom they 
found distasteful, but also to demand a greater share of company profits. In June 
1957, the union sent a letter to Kettner requesting that he grant them an additional 
 
333 
bonus in recognition of their “efforts and sacrifices” in the workplace.151 Kettner met 
their demands with a noncommittal response, stating that the management of the 
company would be delighted to give bonuses to the employees and workers, but that 
before he could guarantee anything, he had to see the sales results for the year, which 
would become clear in October.152  Kettner echoed the sentiment in his meeting with 
the company management, whose minutes the syndicate could access, adding that his 
policy on bonuses was “wait and see.” 
 When October came and no further bonuses were forthcoming, the union 
responded in a strongly worded letter to Kettner: 
Mr. Director, we waited and we saw ... We have seen how the 
Company rewards its workers and its employees for the efforts of a 
whole season ... We have seen how the Company appreciates the 
considerable effort all provided ... We have seen how the Company 
forgets all the sacrifices made by the workers and employees at a price 
of their nerves and their blood ... We have seen how the Company has 
increased sales but has decreased bonuses. 153  
 
This infuriated response from the union grew out of the fact that the brewery, under 
Kettner’s leadership, had had a banner year during the first three quarters of 1957, yet 
decreased bonuses to employees and workers.  Sales for the company grew from 
51,000 hectoliters between January and September to more than 56,000 hectoliters.154   
This marked nearly a nine percent increase, and the workers reckoned that by the end 
of the year it would be nearly ten percent.155 In the eyes of the union, these banner 
profits made an increased bonus a foregone conclusion. They expected to receive a 
bonus that was more than double what they were paid the year before. However, the 
bonus in fact represented a 25% decrease for employees and salaried workers and a 
30% decrease for non-salaried workers from the bonus paid out in October 1956.156 
 
334 
 The union was obviously not pleased with the bonus and saw this action as 
another step toward a policy of restricting workers’ and employees’ payments to only 
wages and salaries. That year, the company did indeed actively try to institute such a 
policy. The decrease in bonuses followed Kettner’s removal of all “special bonuses” 
to employees and workers, on the pretext that bonuses would cause jealousy among 
the company’s employees and workers.157 The union believed that the claims of 
jealously were ridiculous, and they saw the elimination of bonuses as proof that their 
hopes for improvements were misguided.158 There was a great deal of bluster in the 
union’s interaction with Kettner, which was emblematic of how disrespected they felt 
by his actions in general. Emil Natti, Kettner’s trusted ally in the fight against 
“intrigue” in the company, worked hard to calm the tempers on all sides. However, 
the ultimate solution to the kerfuffle was Kettner’s announcement of salary and wage 
increases for the employees and workers at Pyramid, which, on average, were around 
five to six percent.159 This settlement was a compromise because the money would 
not come in the form of a bonus, a practice that the management was seeking to 
curtail, and yet it would still allow the employees and workers to enjoy the fruits of 
Pyramid’s excellent profits in 1957. 
 Having examined Kettner’s volatile relations with his Egyptian coworkers, the 
question remains as to how much of Kettner’s distaste for Egyptians grew out of their 
striving against him and how much was imagined. As Robert Vitalis has observed, 
management’s cries about the dangers of nationalism, communism, careerism, and so 
forth often have roots in anti-labor attitudes.160 Worker solidarity was not one of 
Kettner’s Ten Commandments; indeed, it was completely at odds with the ideal 
workforce of his imagination. For Kettner, an employee or worker was an 
independent entity who should follow the Ten Commandments faithfully and ensure 
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that others did as well. The fact that despite Kettner’s very low opinion of him, Nasser 
and his policies seemed only to grow more popular with the majority of Egyptians, 
especially his workers, surely amplified Kettner’s negative feelings towards those 
Egyptian workers. Kettner’s contempt for Egyptian people also throws his Ten 
Commandments into a new light.  When we consider Kettner’s underlying contempt 
for Egyptians, these commandments become not merely the best way to run a 
brewery, but the best way to protect Kettner against the imagined hatred and deceit of 
a herd of rapacious Egyptians.  Yet as the next section will show, Kettner’s animosity 
for the Egyptian workers and employees was not absolute. 
A Worker–Management Détente 
It would be simplistic to portray working relations between the management 
and labor at Pyramid as an unceasing battle. After the rough period of 1957 to 1958, 
relations improved a great deal. The clearest example of this improvement was the 
three-part plan that Kettner and the management instituted in 1959. The first part 
involved an end-of-the-year bonus of three and a half months of base salary for 
employees and ninety days of base salary for workers.161 A third of this bonus was 
withheld and placed in the investment portfolio of Pyramid, with a promised interest 
rate of three percent per year, to be redeemed when the workers and employees retired 
from the company.162  In essence, this was a pension plan that relied on company 
investment.  
 The second part of the plan was the codification of working hours and 
vacation time.  For those who worked in the factory, hours were set from 7 am to 4 
pm, with a one-hour lunch break for eleven months out of the year. For the month of 
Ramadan, factory workers were expected to work from 7am to 2 pm.163 Those who 
worked in an administrative office were expected to work from Monday through 
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Wednesday between January 2 and May 15, from the hours of 8 am to 5 pm with a 
one-hour lunch break. On Thursday, Saturday, and Sunday, they were expected to 
work from 8 am to 2 pm, with Fridays off. Between May 16 and the end of December, 
they were expected in the office between 7:30 am and 2 pm. Finally, their working 
hours during Ramadan were 7:30 am to 1:30 pm.164 
   Because workers set their own schedules, the companies made no special 
allowances for their time off.  Needless to say, given the worker’s disadvantaged 
position, the company had no legal commitment to them beyond the pay for a day’s 
work, which prevented these workers from indulging in any long absences. For the 
administrative staff, on the other hand, Kettner and the rest of the management 
established a set of vacation time regulations. For those with power of attorney with 
the company, like Kettner and Hafez, they had up to twenty-six business days of 
vacation. For heads of departments like Alber Farag and Hassan Tawfiq, vacation 
time depended upon seniority. Those who had been with the company for more than 
ten years received twenty-two days, while those who had not yet reached ten years 
received eighteen days. For all the other employees, vacation time was also tied to 
seniority.  Those who had worked for the company for ten years could take up to 
eighteen days off. Those who had worked more than five years could receive up to 
fifteen, and everyone else could take up to thirteen days.165  These vacations days 
were of course subject to limitations, the most significant being that the management 
of the company had to approve all days off beforehand in accordance with the 
company’s needs. In addition, an employee could not take more than twenty-one days 
off consecutively. An employee could not roll over vacation days to another year, nor 
convert any of the vacation days to sick days. In very rare cases, the management 
granted exemptions to these rules.166 
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 The third part of Kettner’s plan entailed establishing a fixed age of retirement. 
Everyone associated with the company was required to retire on the last day of the 
month in which he turned sixty years old. The company had the option to extend a 
person’s tenure beyond this date, for a period of no more than twenty-four months. 
However, no one could remain with the company once he had passed the age of sixty-
two.167 This ruling only applied to men, as women who worked with the company in 
any capacity were required to retire at age fifty, extendable to fifty-two.168 Although 
this part of the plan appears to have aligned the companies’ policies with those of the 
government, which in its 1955 modification of the Company law required retirement 
at sixty, the enforcement of this policy was not immediate. According to this plan, 
those working who were already sixty-one and over would have until January 1961 to 
retire. Those who were fifty-nine and over would have until January 1962. In 
addition, for everyone fifty-eight and younger, the plan would not be enforced until 
January 1963.169   
 The response of the union to Kettner’s plan was overwhelmingly positive. The 
union sent two letters, one to Kettner and one to Hafez, thanking them for these 
measures. In the letter that the union sent to Hafez, they remarked that these actions 
engendered “a great hope” and “complete confidence” in Hafez.170 As for their letter 
to Kettner, they noted that these moves represented a good spirit, a desire for internal 
stability and peace, and a sincere paternal feeling.171 In each letter, the union leaders 
noted that they were fully committed to the company and to its new motto: “for a 
model company.”172 Besides the letters, the union also sent Kettner flowers for 
Christmas, and, to Kettner at least, there appeared to be a greater sense of cooperation 
and a happier demeanor among the union members.173  
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 Kettner was deeply touched and indeed shocked by the overwhelmingly 
positive response from the union.174 In particular, he was surprised with how well 
workers had received news of the termination of some bonuses. He attributed the 
plan’s warm reception to the fact that it showed him to be “a good family man,” who, 
in the interest of the welfare of the union members’ wives and children, would 
withhold money for savings instead of allowing the men to spend it.175 Although 
Kettner’s reasoning has shades of paternalism, the overwhelmingly positive response 
to the plan indicates that perhaps there were some earnest feelings of appreciation for 
it.  Regardless, this was a rare high point in union–management relations in the 
history of Pyramid Brewery. As shown above, relations between the two groups had 
only become more complicated with the Nasser government’s legislation that pitted 
ostensible foreigners against natives, and set workers against exploiters. We cannot 
know whether cordial labor–management relations would have continued, for beer 
industry affairs entered a completely different phase when the government 
sequestered Pyramid Brewery in 1961. 
Conclusion  
The policies of the Nasser government exerted a dramatic impact on Pyramid 
and Crown Breweries in the pre-nationalization period from 1957 to 1960. While 
earlier chapters in this study discussed how the Nasser-led government defined and 
favored the “Egyptian” over the “foreign,” this chapter examined how the 
government, as well as the beer industry itself, defined a “model company” in the 
private sector in the period from 1957 to 1960.  The government wanted a company 
that was autonomous but ultimately subservient, a company whose growth would 
support Nasser’s grand projects, including the United Arab Republic.  In terms of 
internal structure, the government wanted a company in which the wage and power 
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gap between Egyptians workers and the management was smaller than it had been 
previously, but in which the workers were still too weak to pose a threat to the 
political order. Just as the beer companies had resisted Nasser’s policies regarding 
“foreigners,” so too they did not meet with passivity the legislation aimed at making 
them “model companies.” The companies’ resistance was especially important as 
their leadership had their own ideas about what a model company should be. Kettner 
in particular wanted a company in which Heineken’s executives would prevail over a 
docile, loyal, and exploitable workforce. Despite this strong vision, the beer 
companies in this period would ultimately recognize their tenuous position. They 
would work to keep the government happy, doing mostly as they were asked and 
dutifully maintaining profitability. Although the “Egyptian” workers bitterly fought 
the “foreign” management over a host of issues, the two sides ultimately reached a 
brief détente following the management’s devising of a mandatory retirement savings 
plan.  Meanwhile, throughout the period from 1957 to 1960, profits and sales were 
rising, and beer was enjoying a firm place in Egyptian culture.
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Chapter 8: Dutchmen and Compradors: How Stella Became the Beer of 
the Egyptian Regime, 1960–1970 
 
 From 1956 onward, the fear of nationalization was a persistent reality for 
Crown and Pyramid Breweries.  This fear drove the companies to be ever mindful of 
the government’s demands even as they worked to pursue the paths that would be 
most profitable. This balancing act shaped not only the interactions between the 
companies and the government, but also the relationships between the companies’ 
executives and management, and between their management and workforce. Until 
1960, the beer companies managed to negotiate this path successfully, remaining 
relatively stable and extremely profitable despite the massive changes that the 
government instituted. In 1960, the government pursued a new round of 
nationalizations that shattered any hope that the beer companies could remain 
independent. This chapter focuses on the period from 1960 to 1970, when the beer 
companies faced the reality of their impending nationalization (or “Egyptianization”) 
and then underwent the traumatic process itself.  
 As members of the Egyptian government used their power to grab incremental 
control of the beer industry, the actual experience of nationalization proved to be a 
deeply personal one for the executives and workers of the companies involved. To be 
sure, the Dutch, Greek, and Egyptian people involved in the beer industry had been 
expecting the takeover for some time; nevertheless, they responded to the 
government’s measures not with resignation, but rather by struggling to hold onto 
what they believed to be theirs. Some individuals fought against the regime, while 
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others collaborated.  However, as shown by the case of the Egyptian who came to 
head both companies, Dr. Ismaʿil Omar Foda, the only thing that mattered to the 
government was how useful any given person or entity could be to them. The business 
of commandeering a private sector enterprise was a messy one, and very few in the 
beer industry were left unscathed.   
 The nationalization or Egyptianization of the beer industry went beyond 
ensuring that everyone who worked in the companies had Egyptian citizenship. It also 
entailed excising all elements of the industry that the government deemed “foreign,” 
including all foreign nationals, some indigenous Coptic Christians, and 
mutamaṣṣirūn, those “people of foreign origin who had become permanent residents” 
and whose language and habits had become “Egyptianized.”1  Nationalization also 
meant the removal of some Muslim Egyptians, who, in the eyes of the government, 
had used their financial position to exploit the country and stifle its growth. Although 
these people had the key feature of true Egyptianess—adherence to Islam—they could 
never be “authentic” Egyptians in the eyes of the government because they had come 
from the elite classes. Beyond that, Egyptianizing meant closing the power and wealth 
gaps among the executives, the management, and the workforce.  Most importantly, it 
meant placing the entire industry under the government’s control.  
 The beer itself, as previous chapters have shown, needed no Egyptianizing. 
Thanks to the work of influential Dutchmen and of the Egyptian entrepreneurs against 
whom the Nasser-led regime would rally, beer had become the beverage of choice for 
young Egyptians looking for fun. Recall that by the 1950s, Egyptians had 
unprecedented access to Stella beer (see Chapter 7). As Stella had become the beer of 
Egypt, it had lost some of its “foreign” allure and veneer. Along the way, many 
Egyptians had come to regard beer as not merely an “evil” drink or a “fun” drink, but 
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as something in between: part of an everyday culture of leisure. Nevertheless, 
following Egyptianization, Stella’s new role as a state-owned and -produced beverage 
arguably cast a shadow over its sunny disposition—particularly as the authoritarian 
limits of the regime became clearer. 
 This chapter tracks the Egyptianization of the beer industry in eight sections. 
The first section shows how Nasser’s new round of nationalizations engendered deep 
fear within the beer companies. The next section examines how the companies forged 
ahead under the strain of waiting for their nationalizations. The third section discusses 
how the companies reacted as the private sector collapsed around them. The fourth 
describes the new reality for the companies after the sequestration of Pyramid and the 
eventual sequestration of Crown. The fifth turns to the workforce and their new role 
in the sequestered and conglomerated companies. The sixth looks at the removal of 
the Dutch from the Egyptian beer industry. The final section looks at the cultural 
legacy of the Dutch role in the Egyptian beer industry. 
Nationalizations 
 In 1960, the government shook the Egyptian business world with a new round 
of nationalizations, inspiring deep fear among the beer companies that they could be 
next. Nasser’s government struck the first blow against Egypt’s national banks, Bank 
Misr and the National Bank of Egypt, in February. The government followed by 
nationalizing major daily newspapers, such as al-Ahram, Akhbar al-Youm, and Ruz 
al-Yusuf.  Next, it took over the bus companies.2  Although the specter of government 
involvement had hung over Eric Karl Kettner’s head for nearly five years, as the 
managing director of Pyramid Brewery (see Chapter 7), he was still shocked by these 
events. When Kettner reported the events to Wittert van Hoogland, he could barely 
contain his disdain: “These [nationalizations] are justified by the claim that they are 
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done to ensure the freedom of the press (seriously).”3 For Kettner, this reasoning was 
farcical, as he believed these nationalizations had both economic and political 
motives, including the suppression of free speech. He noted that it was a poorly kept 
secret that the nationalized newspapers were going to have no say in what was 
printed.4  
 Kettner’s negative reaction to these nationalizations grew out his distaste for 
Nasser and his government. As I discussed in Chapter 7, Kettner had little faith in the 
populism of Nasser and only saw it as trouble for the Egyptian economy. Kettner’s 
feelings were only exacerbated by the fact that with each passing month the star of 
Nasser only shined brighter for the majority of Egyptians. Nasser’s populist 
policies—land reforms, support for workers and peasants rights, and the push for 
greater social equality, all infused by a strong anti-imperialism and jingoism—had 
won him massive support among the effendiya (the liminal class composed of 
students, professionals, teachers, civil servants, and small businessmen), workers, and 
peasants.5  The nationalization of the newspapers, which turned a relatively free press 
into one aimed solely to “justify, support and flatter” the increasingly authoritarian 
Nasser regime, only confirmed to Kettner that his skepticism of the regime was 
justified.6 
 However, it was not only what the newspapers printed that came under the 
purview of the government. Everything that the newspapers owned—the buildings, 
the presses, even the paper—became government property, too. The government 
appointed a committee of three, including a representative of the Government, the 
owner of the newspaper, and chairman of the government court, to run the 
publication.  As Kettner put it, the owner of the company was outnumbered “two to 
one” by government officials.7  In exchange for the confiscation of property, the 
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former owners of the newspapers were rewarded indemnified government bonds with 
a three percent interest and which were redeemable after twenty years.8  
 The nationalization of three vital sectors in quick succession—banks, 
transport, and newspapers—set the entire private sector on alert. The businessmen of 
the private sector assumed that the that cotton firms would be the next target and that 
their nationalization would be accompanied by a potential modification of the 
Agrarian Land Reform of 1952, reducing the number of feddans one could own from 
two-hundred to fifty.9 After that, perhaps even a larger round of nationalizations 
would follow. Businessmen were worried that even if they managed to avoid 
nationalization, the government would still destroy their profits with the restrictive 
policies that accompanied these nationalizations.10 
 For Kettner, these nationalizations not only signaled a renewal of activist 
government policy, but also coincided with the departure of his main ally in Pyramid 
Brewery, Emil Natti, who had turned sixty. As discussed previously, one way that the 
Nasser government slowly eliminated “foreign” elements was by making retirement 
obligatory once a person turned sixty. As an Italian national, Natti was allowed to 
repatriate up to 20,000 Egyptian pounds after his forced retirement.  Although the 
Egyptian government later proved recalcitrant about transferring the money, it did 
have an agreement with the Italian government that allowed for this transfer of 
funds.11 Natti’s departure was another blow for Kettner, as he said, “It was strange to 
be without this trusty figure.”  Kettner believed that Natti, an Egyptianized foreigner 
(mutamassir), protected him from the “intrigues” that, in Kettner’s mind, were 
endemic to Egyptians. 12 Although Natti had Italian citizenship, he had been in Egypt 
long enough to speak the necessary languages, French and Arabic, and understand the 
culture to serve as an intermediary between Kettner and the brewery’s workforce. It is 
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hardly a coincidence that the first sentence Kettner wrote after discussing Natti’s 
departure was, “Hafez intrigues more than ever, but so far with little success.”13    
 The businessmen of the private sector proved prescient in their worries over 
the renewed activist streak of the government. In the summer of 1960, the government 
nationalized “import houses and wholesalers of pharmaceutical products 
simultaneously with the tea packers.”14  In the winter, the government nationalized all 
institutions that had significant investments of Belgian capital. This included the 
Tramways du Caire, the Rolin Group (to which Pyramid used to belong), and the 
Banque Belge. This last bit of government business was quite troubling to Pyramid 
because Banque Belge was their primary bank. Kettner had a trusted contact in the 
bank, Mr. Ashkar, who had aided the brewery in the numerous transfer issues it faced 
as a multi-national functioning in Nasser’s Egypt.15 Kettner trusted this man to such 
an extent that, even after the bank had been nationalized, he wanted to maintain the 
relationship. 
 This round of nationalizations reverberated beyond Pyramid’s relations with 
the Banque Belge. The Egyptian stock market took a significant hit as economic 
volatility deleteriously affected domestic and foreign sales of one of Egypt’s biggest 
products, cotton. Prices dropped, and in the first quarter of 1960, cotton sellers were 
only able to sell three-fifths of what they had sold the previous year.16 The dip in the 
stock market would not have been so bad if it had been met by new capital from 
foreign investors looking to profit by “buying low.” However, the Egyptian 
government severely limited foreign investment, claiming to fear “predatory” foreign 
capitalists. The government, in fact, promulgated a law that required President Nasser 
to approve all foreign investment in the country.17 The limiting of foreign capital 
coupled with the government’s nationalizations of companies supported by large 
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amounts of foreign capital, struck fear in the hearts of those working at the Heineken 
backed Crown and Pyramid breweries. They could not help but dread, what the future 
held for them.      
Forging Ahead 
 Despite this turbulence, Kettner was convinced that Pyramid could continue to 
make money. He based his assumption on the fact that the breweries had witnessed 
sustained growth. In May 1959, for example, Pyramid sold 14,000 hectoliters of beer, 
as compared to 9,000 the previous year.18  To put this into perspective, the total 
amount of beer sold in 1923 was 40,000 hectoliters.19 He proved prescient. For 
example in 1960, Pyramid sold nearly 110,000 hectoliters of beer, meeting Kettner’s 
high expectations for that year.20 Meanwhile, These banner sales were the result of 
the fact that as the economy shook, Crown and Pyramid forged ahead, constantly 
adjusting to the rapidly changing world around them. As I will show in this section, 
Pyramid’s factory expansion project in the 1960s was a significant example of this 
policy of “forging ahead” even as they bore the strain of waiting for their 
nationalizations.  
 As discussed in the previous chapter, Heineken had approved Pyramid’s 
proposed expansion in 1958–59 to cover the ever-increasing demand for beer and the 
obsolescence of some of the breweries’ machinery. Heineken wanted the expansion to 
be supervised by a Dutch consultant-engineer, whose job would encompass six tasks: 
preparing all drawings, designs, and plans for the offices, ablution canteens, and the 
ancillary buildings; preparing plans for the drainage and sewage systems; preparing 
facility drawings and plans; preparing the specifications of the whole project that 
would be submitted to the contractors; giving all necessary advice concerning 
government building permits; evaluating the tendered offers from contractors; and 
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supervising the work of the contractors until the job was finished.21 Heineken was 
especially insistent on the consultant-engineer, believing that the brewery was “one of 
the most remarkable buildings in our concern” and strongly desired to keep the 
“majestic façade” intact.22  
 However, despite Heineken’s preference, Kettner was not keen on the 
involvement of Heineken-approved Dutch engineers. He noted that a disadvantage of 
using these engineers was that Kettner was not familiar with the building regulations 
in Egypt and thus could not direct the engineers properly. More importantly, as 
Kettner noted, the engineers’ involvement had the potential to run afoul of the 
government. The ever-increasing level of state interference meant that private 
companies had to take the utmost care in their administration to avoid drawing 
attention to themselves. Attention would only lead to nationalization.23 Instead of a 
Dutch consultant-engineer, therefore, Kettner insisted that they had to hire an 
Egyptian. At this stage, Heineken listened.  
 Kettner’s search came down to three candidates: Dr. William Selim Hanna, 
former professor of reinforced concrete in the engineering department at Cairo 
University and the ex-Minister of Municipalities; Mr. Faiz Wassef, who had a rather 
scant resumé, having only supervised the building of the factory for the Cairo Metal 
Company; and Dr. Ahmed Moharrem, then professor of reinforced concrete at Cairo 
University.24  Kettner ended up choosing Dr. Moharrem for several reasons. First, he 
was “a very prominent engineer and ha[d] a good architect as an associate.”25 Second, 
he came highly recommended from the Dutch company, International Products, which 
employed him in a similar capacity.26 The third and most important factor in Kettner’s 
decision was that Dr. Moharrem was Muslim.  The recent bout of nationalizations 
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convinced Kettner that the government was waging open war not only against the 
private sector, but in his estimation, against Christians as well.  
 Kettner noted that the “secret” battle against Christians had picked up during 
the previous year. As he remarked, any “intelligent” Christian understood that after 
the elimination of what he called “aliens,” those the government deemed foreign, the 
Control des Sociétés (Maslahat al-Sharikat) was going to target Christians at a “very 
accelerated pace.”27 He also claimed that intelligent Christians realized that there was 
“absolutely no future for their children” in the country.28  It was for this reason he 
made no effort to keep one of Pyramid’s female employees, Marie Sabbag, after she 
requested a move to Lebanon to be with her future husband. Rather, he let her leave 
and take a job as secretary to the Director of television.29 This prejudicial policy 
against Christians also had an effect beyond the choice of consultant-engineer.  
 Before the nationalizations of 1960, Pyramid had chosen Mr. Adly at SPECO, 
a construction company in Egypt, as the main contractor for the building of a new 
malting plant. After the nationalizations, Pyramid had to tender new offers on all 
construction projects in order to show that they were not favoring or colluding with a 
particular vendor or contractor. This obviously upset Adly as it made a job that he 
thought he had secured an open competition. He was particularly worried about low 
bidders undercutting him, as he charged a high fee for his high-quality work.30 
Pyramid’s board was not obligated to pick the lowest bidder, but the relationship 
between Pyramid and SPECO did not continue because Adly, as Kettner phrased it, 
was not a “follower of the Prophet.”31 
 A much happier problem for Pyramid in 1960 was that the demand for their 
beer was so great that they were running into production bottlenecks. As noted above, 
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1960 was a banner year for Pyramid. The excellent sales were due in large part to the 
heat wave that hit Egypt in the summer of 1960. The consumption of beer in Egypt 
fluctuated with the weather; demand grew when it was hot. In the 1960s, beer in 
Egypt became the alcoholic drink of the summer and the beach, and this was 
especially true in 1960.  In that year, the breweries sold more beer between the 
months of April and September (roughly 75,000 hectoliters) than in all of 1958 
(70,000 hectoliters).32  
 The hot spell was not the only contributor to increased consumption. Another 
significant factor was the significant growth and urbanization of the Egyptian 
population since the 1950s. Between the years 1947 and 1960, the population grew 
from 19 million to 26 million.33 In those same years, 1947 and 1960, more than 1 
million migrants arrived in Cairo.34  The majority of those migrating were from the 
rural parts of Egypt, and by 1960, there were nearly 7 million rural migrants living in 
Alexandria and Cairo.35  However, this growth and urbanization would not have 
meant as much to the fortunes of the beer industry if not for the policies of Nasser.  
The social welfare policies that the Nasser government was instituting in the country, 
i.e., minimum wages, overtime bans to encourage new hires, and forced price cuts, all 
meant more disposable income for average workers to buy beer.36 On a cultural level, 
Nasser’s ascendance made the culture of the effendi, which, as I have shown in 
previous chapters, was receptive to beer consumption, the hegemonic cultural 
discourse in the country.37 
 Kettner was fully aware that the policies of the President he disliked so much 
had made the beer business more profitable. Thus, he communicated to Heineken that 
with Nasser’s continued reign, beer sales were likely to continue increasing. Although 
Pyramid was able to meet the demand in Cairo, Kettner believed that the brewery was 
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“outgrowing its coat.” If beer sales in the summer months continued to grow by thirty 
percent for the next five years, the company would need to produce at least 75,000 
hectoliters per month during the summer—a number that was beyond their current 
capacity.38 Heineken saw the record sales of Pyramid in 1960, which Kettner admitted 
were conservative numbers, and resolved to expand Pyramid factory production.39 
 Heineken created a five-year plan that added even more construction to the 
already planned expansion. This new construction revolved around three measures. 
The first was to create a new brewhouse or new brewhouses that could put out four 
hundred hectoliters per brewing cycle of cold wort, which is pre-fermented beer, as 
opposed to the typical two hundred hectoliters.  The second step was the completion 
of a new cellar with eighteen fermentation tanks that could house the increased 
production of wort. Finally, because wort must be cooled to 20–26 Celsius before 
yeast can be added and fermentation can begin, the plan also called for a new wort 
cooler that could process one hundred and fifty to one hundred and eighty hectoliters 
per hour.40 With each of these changes in place, Heineken believed that the maximum 
monthly capacity of the brewery could be raised from around 17,000 hectoliters to 
62,000 hectoliters.41 
 While the ongoing expansions of the Pyramid factory would address some of 
the increasing demand for beer, an easier way to address the issue was by enabling 
Crown to produce at its full capabilities.  Kettner noted that during the heat wave, 
Crown was only able to produce 36,000 bottles of beer per day. This insufficient 
number was not due to any problems with the bottling machinery or the brewhouse; 
rather, the problem was staffing. Crown only employed one team in the brewery, in 
contrast to the multiple teams working at Pyramid.42  The excess at Pyramid was the 
result of the government’s restriction on dividend payouts to stockholders. Although 
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Pyramid was making banner profits, it could not send them out to stockholders, as 
was typical, in the form of larger dividends. Instead they were left with a mass of 
money they could only use to re-invest.43 Pyramid determined that the money was 
best spent on Crown, infusing it with funds so that they could expand production. 
With this extra money, Pyramid could help Crown hire new workers and even offer to 
pay for full control over all exports. Pyramid’s takeover of exports would be a 
significant help to Crown, as they had burnt through their entire reserves in both 1959 
and 1960 trying to export.44  
 However, the Pilavachis, who still controlled Crown, proved unwilling to 
forfeit control of a company they had run autonomously for decades. So much was 
this the case that when Wittert van Hoogland visited Pyramid in March 1961, he 
decided that instead of investing any more that he should, once again, try to fully 
incorporate Crown into Pyramid. The plan that Wittert van Hoogland put forth was 
quite similar to their first deal, discussed above, that aimed to broker better relations 
between Crown and Pyramid. In both instances, Heineken, acting through Cobra, 
encouraged Pyramid to exchange shares they had in an African brewery for shares in 
Crown. In the 1961 plan, Pyramid was to exchange its 50,000 shares in Blue Nile 
Brewery in Khartoum for 4,118 shares in Crown. These new Crown shares would 
bring Pyramid’s total to 8,978 and its control in the company to around thirty 
percent.45 Pyramid had three reasons for wanting to trade shares with Crown instead 
of purchasing the shares with cash outright.  First, the Egyptian Exchange Control 
Authorities, the government body that regulated these types of transactions, would 
most likely object to such a large transfer of cash.  Second, Pyramid needed to remain 
liquid with the cash to pay for its planned expansion. Third, by using shares, this 
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change in control of Blue Nile would have no effect on the export agreement that 
Pyramid and Blue Nile had vis-à-vis malt.46 
 Although both the factory expansion and the consolidation with Crown were 
well thought out and strongly desired by Heineken and Pyramid, they ultimately did 
not come to pass. These failures were attributable to the tenuous situation of every 
Egyptian private company in a rapidly changing country. As one illustration, Farghaly 
never got behind the plan to exchange shares because he believed that if the Exchange 
Control noticed any irregularities in their accounting, this would lead to immediate 
nationalization.47 This hesitation was emblematic of the great trepidation that every 
Pyramid executive felt about the future of the company. The near-constant threat that 
the situation was about to radically change, coupled with the continued intransigence 
of the Egyptians working underneath him, led Kettner to request that Wittert line up a 
transfer from Pyramid.  In a response letter, Wittert dismissed Kettner’s request and 
went on to explain why it was so important for Kettner to remain in Egypt. 
 For Cobra, and for Heineken more broadly, Egypt was a prized source of 
income from Africa. This was especially the case because, concurrently, Cobra was 
losing a great deal of income from another of its major interests in Africa, Bralima 
Brewery in Brazzaville, in the French territory of Congo.48 The centrality of the 
Egyptian beer industry to their African portfolio meant that Cobra and Heineken were 
adamant about maintaining their control of the two breweries despite everything that 
was happening with Nasser’s regime. They also believed strongly that Kettner, with 
his years of experience in Egypt, would be the one best able to negotiate for the 
companies amidst this difficult situation.49    
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 Against this context of uncertainty, Wittert urged Kettner to simply press on.50 
Kettner was in a beautiful country with a pleasant climate and, as Wittert pointed out, 
was running a company in solid financial condition.51  Wittert’s letter had the desired 
effect on Kettner, who decided to soldier on in his position, reasoning that he could 
not leave and “let the Egyptians fix it themselves.” If he were to do so, two powerful 
men—Ahmad Farghaly, the biggest stockholder and President and CEO of Pyramid, 
and Ismaʿil Hafez, the most powerful man in Pyramid besides Kettner and Farghaly—
would demoralize the “valuable” employees, such as Alber Farag, Hassan Tawfiq, 
and Munir Tadros, by constantly exposing them to intrigues and backdoor dealings.52 
Kettner thus resolved to try to make the best of the situation in which he found 
himself.  
The First Salvo 
 Only a month after Kettner confirmed his willingness to stay on at Pyramid, in 
July 1961, the political mood in Egypt quickly changed. Nasser’s distaste for the 
private sector had become clear to journalists and industrialists alike by 1960, but the 
decrees he issued in July 1961 went beyond what either group had imagined.53  
Nasser’s moves sent a clear signal that he no longer believed the private sector could 
lead Egypt to the economic resurgence that he desired.54 Not coincidentally, these 
decrees occurred on the ninth anniversary of the Free Officers movement. The regime 
portrayed the decrees as a revolution against “the dictatorship of capital.” 55 Although 
the regime did not express it in these exact terms, these actions were an open 
declaration of war on those “compradorial” elements within Egypt that had stifled the 
development of the country.56  A comprador as defined in the traditional study of 
political economy as the “native agents or partners of foreign investors who 
operate[d] in some form in the local economy.”57 While Robert Vitalis has shown that 
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this term was ill-suited to Egyptian businessmen, like ʿAbbud Pasha, who would 
come under attack of the Nasser regime, the term does reasonably encapsulate the 
Egyptian government’s view of capitalists like Ahmad Farghali Pasha, the President 
and CEO of Pyramid Brewery.58 For the government, these compradors were part of 
the group of “exploiters” (“only five percent”) who need to be vanquished in order to 
free the exploited (“ninety-five percent”).59    
 What this fight against the exploiters meant in practice was the modification of 
the land law, which limited property owners to one hundred feddans per person, as 
well as the enactment of a series of laws that nationalized the great majority of the 
corporate sector.60 These laws allowed the government to take full control of 149 
companies, which included all banks, insurance companies, and cement factories, all 
of which were central to the Nasser-led government’s plans for a rapid 
industrialization of Egypt.61 The laws also allowed Nasser’s government to take fifty 
percent of the shares of ninety-one other companies, in exchange for government 
bonds with 4% interest. The laws limited the holdings of one person in one of 159 
more companies to 10,000 pounds worth of shares. A purported goal of these laws 
was to improve the working conditions of Egyptians. They legislated that workers 
must be represented on every corporate board in the country, and that boards could 
only have seven members. All corporate dividends were abolished, and the 
government legislated that companies had to allocate ten percent of net profits to 
workers, another ten to a central service fund, and five percent to social services. The 
laws limited working hours to seven hours per day and restricted every person to 
working just one job. They also limited remuneration to 5,000 pounds.  Finally, the 
laws increased tax revenues and closed the stock exchange for two months.62 
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 Despite the passage of all of this legislation, both Pyramid and Crown were 
initially able to avoid the fate of nationalization. Incidentally, Gianaclis wine and 
Societe Nationale de Levure  (yeast) were left out of the purview of the 
nationalization legislation as well. Farghaly saw this as more than a coincidence, 
believing it “inconceivable” that the state would get involved in the alcohol business 
because of the traditional Islamic disapproval of wine.63 He was so sure of it that he 
assured Kettner to ignore Ismaʿil Hafez, who was claiming that the day of reckoning 
was coming for the breweries.64   Kettner needed no convincing, as he believed 
Farghaly’s claims were merely wishful thinking. Kettner could not imagine that the 
government would leave only the alcohol producers unaffected by the nationalization, 
that they would give special treatment to a “forbidden” product.65  Kettner figured 
that the delay was only due to the fact that it would take some time to persuade the 
“preachers of the Quran,” probably meaning the sheikhs of Al-Azhar, that it was 
lawful for the government to nationalize the companies.66 When Farghaly was 
insistent that the breweries would be spared, citing the fact that only four hundred of 
the seven hundred private companies were nationalized, Kettner asked Farghaly to 
name one company that had not fallen under the control of the government. Farghaly 
was unable to do so.67 In short, Kettner was preparing for the eventuality that Pyramid 
and Crown would be nationalized; his primary concern was not whether this would 
happen, but which type of nationalization the company would fall under. Would the 
government fully nationalization them, take fifty percent of their shares, or limit 
stockholders to $10,000 worth of shares? 
 Kettner did not have to wait long to find out. On August 7, 1961, the process 
of nationalization began, innocuously enough, with an article published in Journal 
Officiel, in the French-language government gazette, stating that the government had 
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sequestrated Pyramid, which entailed freezing all of the companies assets and placing 
them under the control of a sequestrator. When Kettner told Farghaly the news, he 
was shocked. So was Ismaʿil Hafez, although he was more upset that the government 
did not appoint him as the chief sequestrator of the company.68  Hafez, utterly 
bewildered by the decision, took a trip to Alexandria to save face. Kettner was not 
surprised by the move, but he was confused and a bit suspicious about the 
circumstances that surrounded it. He was not sure why they were sequestrated rather 
than nationalized. He imagined that this maneuver was a way for the government to 
gather information on the company and its finances before it decided to which of the 
three nationalization operations it would subject the company.69  
 While Kettner was unsure about the reasons the government decided to 
sequester and not nationalize them, he was reasonably certain that the decision for 
sequestration was the result of intrigues by an Egyptian within the company. He had 
reason to suspect someone because, at the time, it appeared that the government only 
sequestered companies suspected of irregularity. 70  The possibility became all the 
more probable when Crown escaped being sequestered.71 Considering the long 
history between Kettner and Hafez, as well as the latter’s well-known desire to be the 
chief sequestrator, it was no wonder that Kettner suspected Hafez of turning the keys 
of the company over to the government. Kettner also came upon information that 
seemed to support the idea that it was Hafez who had sold out the company.  The first 
bit of information came in discussions with the executives at Phillips, who said an 
Egyptian was selling them out just like “Ismail Hafez did at another Dutch 
company.”72   
 For Kettner, this theory of treachery could explain why Hafez was so upset 
when he was not appointed sequestrator of the company.73 It also explained why 
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Hafez delayed his departure to Holland until around the time of the company’s 
sequestration. In addition to these hints, before sequestration, Hafez was a vocal 
proponent of a government plan to incorporate Pyramid in a newly created body for 
consumer products, of which one of his friends was in charge.74 Of course, Hafez 
pinned the blame on Abu El Einayn al-Salim, another member of the board of 
directors.75 This was not such an unreasonable statement, as Kettner suspected Salim 
as well. Kettner noted that during the Board Meeting on July 21, 1961, Salim 
“behaved very strangely and made, in Arabic, all kinds of threats.” Then on August 3, 
he threatened Kettner that he was going to write to the government ministers about the 
“intolerable state of affairs” within the company. When Kettner informed Farghaly of 
Salim’s odd behavior, Farghaly told him in French, “Salim is crazy and he is a 
moron.”76 Regardless of who was actually responsible for sequestration, Kettner 
decided on discretion—as he termed it, “waiting for the ulcer to burst”—because the 
company was still under investigation by the government, and he had no intention of 
bringing unneeded attention to the issue.77  
 Part of his unwillingness to pursue the issue further may have derived from the 
fact that, from the beginning, Kettner had assumed government interference was 
inevitable. It would have been exceptional if the alcohol industry had avoided a reality 
that the majority of the private sector had suffered. In the case of Pyramid, avoiding 
sequestration would have been especially noteworthy because of the strong 
association the company had with Muhammad Ahmad Farghaly.  He was the 
embodiment of the exploitative comprador that the Nasser government held up as the 
bane to the development of a self-sufficient Egypt. Exemplary of this fact is that 
Farghaly contravened every regulation that the Nasser government passed on the 
private sector and executives.  For example, after 1955, when the government 
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modified the Company Law requiring anyone who sat on the board of companies as 
an administrateur or trustee to be under the age of sixty and to be a director at only 
one company, Farghaly was over the age of sixty and sat on the boards of twenty-nine 
different companies. When the Nasser-led government put forth its July Decrees in 
1961, Farghaly, as the largest stockholder in Pyramid, was in clear violation of the 
law that one’s stake in the company was not to exceed 10,000 Egyptian pounds.78  
 It is thus not surprising that when the Egyptian government arrested 
individuals “planning to overthrow the regime,” Ahmad Farghaly was among them. 
These arrests came in the aftermath of the secession of Syria from the United Arab 
Republic (UAR), which was a blow to Nasser’s prestige in the Arab world as the head 
of Arab nationalism.79 His crackdown on these supposed anti-regime forces was a 
way to prove the continuing vibrancy and effectiveness of his message in the wake of 
a diplomatic defeat. Striking out against his enemies in response to foreign policy 
issues was not a new policy. As Kettner stated, “Nasser becomes more dangerous as 
he has less success with his foreign policy.”80 These “anti-regime” forces were in fact 
“three different strains of the old regime: politicians, remnants of the old landed elite 
like the Badrawi Ashur Family; and a mixed group of merchants and industrialists, a 
few of Egyptian nationality and many more of foreign descent.”81  
 The arrest of Farghaly and his ilk represented the Nasser regime’s further 
expansion of those classified as enemies of the state. Despite all the legislation 
working against Farghaly, he was able to maintain his position after 1956 for the same 
reason that he was able to reach his position in the first place: namely, he had strong 
international business connections and claimed an identity as a Muslim-Egyptian. 
Farghaly’s arrest and subsequent expulsion from the corporate sector represents the 
Nasser-led government’s full enunciation that, like “foreign” forces, predatory 
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“Egyptian” Muslim capitalists like Farghaly had stifled Egypt’s economic 
development, too. For so long, Farghaly, and to a lesser extent Hafez and other 
Muslim Egyptians like Abu al-Enein Salim, had relied on the fact that they were the 
“good guys,” who could use their privileged position to avoid the fates of “foreign” 
entities. These arrests marked the end of that era.  
After this point, Farghaly, like many of the business elites associated with the old 
regime, was broken and marginalized.  Farghaly reportedly disappeared from Cairo, 
not even returning when the government confiscated his horses at the Sporting Club.82 
In that same Sporting Club, the Nasser-led government carried out another symbolic 
act. They transformed the polo fields, the staging ground for a game of the wealthy, 
into football pitches, the staging ground for the popular (sha’bi) game of the people. 
The golfers of the club, displaying a bit of tone-deafness, were upset that this 
transformation also eliminated the main course on which they practiced.83 
Nevertheless, Farghaly did not disappear completely. Kettner later met him by chance 
at the upscale Semiramis Hotel, where he was eating with a "belle,"84 and reported 
that Fargaghly seemed pleased to see him and even inquired about the company. 
Farghaly expressed his regret that Hafez was so unwise as to refuse to cooperate with 
the new sequestrator, Dr. Ismaʿil Omar Foda.85 Under the watch of Dr. Foda, the 
company would accelerate down the path to full “Egyptianization.”  
A New Boss  
 In Isma’il Omar Foda’s capacity as, at first, the government’s sequestrator, he 
ran the beer industry in Egypt and indeed led it for the next twenty-one years.86   This 
next section will look at what sequestration under Foda meant for the beer companies 
in practice. Specifically, it will look how Foda dealt with key people like Kettner, 
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Hafez, the Pilavachis, and the workers, and how the beer companies fared under his 
tenure in its activities, including domestic and foreign sales. 
 The regime’s first choice for sequestrator had in fact been Dr. Abdel Aziz 
Hussein.  But after Dr. Hussein recused himself of the position and recommended 
Foda instead, Foda assumed the position. With a Ph.D. in microbiology from the 
University of California–Berkeley, Dr. Ismai’l Omar Foda certainly claimed 
educational credentials and a degree of technical expertise that was unmatched among 
Egyptians. His doctoral work at Berkeley had focused on the nutrition and 
metabolism of a particular strain of bacteria, acetobacter melanogenum.87 
Specifically, he had examined acetobacter’s use of maltose as a nutrient, a process 
that would result in the production of “gluconic and 5-ketogluconic acids.”88 This 
research expertise proved relevant to his work for Pyramid because many acetobacters 
can convert ethanol, the alcohol in beer and wine, into acetic acid. Likewise, because 
acetobacters “are acid- and ethanol-tolerant and not inhibited by hop compounds, they 
grow rapidly in beer, producing acid off-flavors and turbidity.”89 As discussed above, 
this process had a negative impact on the flavor of beer; however, if brewers properly 
stored the beer and kept its exposure to oxygen low, they could avoid the problem of 
acetobacter altogether.90  
 While hiring someone with such expertise was certainly a boon for Pyramid, it 
must also have been a difficult decision for the regime members who appointed him. 
Foda came from a family of landed elite, one of the main targets of the Nasser-led 
regime. In the view of Nasser ideologues, these feudalist property owners (al-iqṭā’īn) 
had done with the country’s land what the compradors had done to the economy. Dr. 
Foda was the grandson of a large landowner from Sinballawein in the Dahqaliyya 
province in the Delta, and his father was a member of the Chamber of Deputies 
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(Majlis al-Nuwāb). Emblematic of how Foda came from one of the targeted groups of 
the regime, the government had confiscated thousands of feddans of lands from his 
father, Hussein Foda, in the Agrarian reform acts, and also frozen the assets of his 
brother, Daoud, while placing him under house arrest in 1961.  In other words, and 
perhaps ironically, Dr. Foda had direct familial experience with the kind of socialist 
takeover that had struck out against the beer companies—albeit in his own case, with 
regard to landed and not corporate property. 
 While the regime may have had difficulty in appointing Foda, he also had 
difficulty in accepting. The government’s land reforms had hit his family hard, and 
many of his relatives privately maintained that the reforms had sent their 
paterfamilias, Hussein Foda, who was the father of Dr. Foda, to an early grave. And 
yet, with his father gone and his brother incapacitated, Dr. Foda had responsibility for 
supporting his mother and five sisters as they struggled with their new reality. He had 
been supporting his family by serving in the Department of Food Technology at the 
College of Agriculture at Cairo University, but the government position—despite 
being objectionable on philosophical grounds—offered the possibility that of 
government leniency in any other future dealings with the family.  Indeed, Dr. Foda’s 
appointment had elements of mutual convenience on both sides. For Dr. Foda, 
accepting the government’s offer was done out of necessity and not out of liking, 
while the government officials were motivated by a pragmatic recognition that Dr. 
Foda was exceptionally qualified for the position.  
 Foda was cordially received by the Dutch contingent of Pyramid, despite 
being the physical embodiment of the government’s takeover. Kettner and the Dutch 
Brewmaster, Gerardus Ulenberg Ulenberg, were well-disposed to him.91 Foda’s 
intrusion was surely softened by the fact that he paid all respects to Heineken and 
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their operations.92 He also was quite forthcoming with Kettner on the reasons that 
precipitated the sequestration. As he made clear to Kettner, as well, the underlying 
reason for the sequestration was the regime’s fear that the Egyptian board members 
would manipulate the company’s finances to extract even more money from the 
country.93 The government was also worried that  “reactionaries” could use profits to 
“prevent the realization of a socialist state” by funding a counter-revolution.94 
Heineken’s reaction to Foda’s appointment reflects the awkward circumstances 
surrounding their new relationship: 
Although—as a matter of course—the sequestration of a company 
never calls for congratulations, we would like to congratulate, in this 
case, the authorities and the company on their choice. Your name is 
well known to us as a gentleman of the highest integrity and of great 
authority in the agricultural field.95 
 
Beyond wishing Foda congratulations, Heineken also wished him luck with a 
company that they deemed difficult. 
We express our sincere wish that you will be able to execute your 
difficult task in promoting the company’s interest, aided by the support 
of the appointed sub-sequestrator, Mr. Ismail Hafez, and the 
unrelenting assistance of all the members of the company’s staff.”96 
 
While the letter was signed “Heineken,” it had been written by the head of Cobra and 
former managing director of Pyramid Wittert van Hoogland, and it reflects Wittert’s 
inherent distrust of Egyptians. It is no small coincidence that Wittert mentioned Hafez 
specifically in the letter because, as discussed throughout this work, the Dutch viewed 
Hafez the source of many of the company’s intrigues. Unsurprisingly, Hafez was one 
of the first issues that Foda had to grapple with in his new position as the man in 
charge of Pyramid.  
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 Hafez admitted spontaneously to Kettner that his relationship with Foda was 
extremely negative.97 Nevertheless, despite Foda’s power to remove Hafez, Foda kept 
him on as his assistant sequestrator. This relationship, like Foda’s with the 
government, was defined by a need for convenience that overcame the enmity at its 
heart. For Foda, Hafez was one of the longest-tenured executives left who remained 
“acceptable” in the eyes of the government. As a Muslim Egyptian whom the 
government had not designated as persona non grata, he was a definite asset as well. 
He had the benefit of years of experience with the company, which Foda lacked. 
  Hafez did not face the same fate as Farghlay because, for one, he had not 
reached the high position of Farghaly. Another reason he may have been acceptable to 
the government was that he was an alleged government collaborator (see Chapter 7). 
Beyond the previously discussed allegations, which are all but confirmed by the 
archival record, Hafez had also served as an informant to the government on Pyramid, 
reporting that the Dutch were moving a large amount of money outside of Egypt in a 
form of capital flight.  Hafez, who had wanted to be chief sequestrator himself and 
who therefore harbored ill will toward Foda, benefited from his contacts with the 
regime. He was able to become directing manager at Pyramid, the position that 
Kettner once held and that Hafez had always wanted. Nevertheless, Hafez did not 
make life easy for Foda. For example, Hafez almost caused mutiny among the staff by 
publicly proposing a plan that would replace all of them. 98 Foda was aware of 
Hafez’s plans and his scheming, but they ultimately led to very little.99  Foda kept him 
on regardless, as a way to maintain continuity. 
 The whole history of the relationship between Pyramid and Crown was 
characterized by dueling forces, as economic forces pushed the companies together 
and executives pulled them apart, so it is perhaps not surprising that the two 
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companies did not enter sequestration in unison. While Pyramid was sequestered in 
August 1961, Crown remained free from government control. However, everyone 
involved in both Crown and Pyramid recognized that this situation was temporary. 
Ismaʿil Hafez, in particular, had his eyes on Crown and pushed hard for its 
sequestration. He hoped that if he led the charge, he could serve as the main 
sequestrator of the company, a position he failed to secure at Pyramid.100  Hafez was 
so set on this plan that he fabricated an elaborate lie that there was a “Hafez Period” at 
Pyramid Brewery, where he ruled supreme and had taken over the Alexandrian 
brewery.101  
 Hafez was not the only one preparing for the eventuality of Crown’s 
sequestration. The Pilavachis, Zenon and Christine, were likewise preparing for 
imminent change. As Greek citizens, they realized that their stake in the company was 
in danger. This danger was made more fully manifest by the fact that the government 
had nationalized Zenon Pilavachi’s interest in Abu Zabal and Kafr el Zayat 
Fertiliser.102  When sequestration hit individual members of Crown’s board, Sameh 
Moussa and Mahmud Abdel Sidky, in 1961, Crown took the opportunity to 
reorganize. Christine Pilavachi resigned from the board, as did Spiro Spirits, who had 
served as managing director of the brewery, and Mohammed Wasik Abaza, a relative 
of Aziz Abaza.103 Beyond this reorganization, the Pilavachis also followed a plan to 
limit the damage from Crown’s eventual sequestration. They sold a small amount of 
their shares to reduce their holding in Crown to 4,000 shares. The purpose of the sale 
was not to end their relationship, but rather, they believed, to establish a reasonable 
price for the shares. By establishing this price, they hoped that when the government 
did sequester the company, it would pay the established price for their shares.104 
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 The Pilavachis, who were ethnic Greeks born and raised in Egypt, anticipated 
the entrance of the Greek government into the matter. As they saw it, if the Greeks in 
Egypt voluntarily liquidated their assets, then the odds of Greek government 
intervention on their behalf would be quite low. The odds were much better if their 
property was forcibly confiscated. The Pilavachis based this assumption on the fact 
that the Greek government partially compensated those Greeks who had lost their 
possessions in the communist takeover of Bulgaria in 1946.105 Kettner was confident 
that if the Pilavachis had not expected Greek intervention, they would have redone 
their entire business portfolio.106 
 However, all of the Pilavachis’ planning was for naught, as they never 
received a response from the Egyptian government. Instead, when the Egyptian 
government informed Crown and Pyramid that it would levy an excise tax on beer, 
they were left sitting on the stock. News of the tax spread, the stock tumbled, and the 
Pilavachis faced a significant loss. Meanwhile, the position of Greeks within Egypt 
was becoming more tenuous. News spread of state security forces capturing fourteen 
Egyptian-born Greeks carrying out espionage for Israel.107 Because it was a matter of 
espionage, it is difficult to determine whether the accusations are true, especially 
because the papers remain closed to researchers, but in any case, the mere allegation 
was damaging enough. These events, coupled with the Greek government’s 
membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), meant that the 
situation for Greeks in Egypt was becoming increasingly awkward.108 
 In December 1961, the government sequestered Crown Brewery. This 
sequestration was accompanied by the sequestration of the Central Bureau, the shared 
depot where both Pyramid and Crown sold their beer. Despite Ismaʿil Hafez’s 
machinations, he was not awarded the position of head sequester, as that position was 
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once again given to Omar Foda. The government also passed over Hafez for the 
position of sub-sequester. In a case similar to that of Pyramid Brewery, the 
government gave no reason for the sequestration. Albert Farag speculated that the 
government targeted Crown because the Pilavachis did not offer enough of their 
shares up for sale.109  
 Kettner believed that the Pilavachi’s actions could have been part of the reason 
the government targeted Crown, but he believed a more significant reason was the 
reorganization of what he called “Organismes Publiques.” These were the structures 
through which the Nasser regime aimed to organize the growing public sector. Prior to 
December 1961, formerly private assets that the government absorbed went into three 
public holding companies: the Economic Organization, the Misr Organization, and the 
Nasr Organization. The Economic Organization was the first structure that the 
government created, and it came in response to the nationalization of British and 
French assets in 1957.110  The government created the Misr Organization to handle 
the assets of the Misr Group, which included Bank Misr and its assets, which 
“accounted for 60 percent of all textile production and 53 percent of employment in 
the textile sector.”111  Finally, the Nasr Organization, which was composed of twenty-
four companies capitalized at forty million pounds, covered the state enterprises that 
arose from the first Five-Year Plan laid out by Minister of the Economy ʿAbd al-
Munʿim al-Qayssuni in 1960.112  
 However, as Kettner noted, as Crown was being sequestered, the Egyptian 
government was rethinking its organization of the public sector. An upshot of their 
latest rounds of nationalization was that public sector was outgrowing these three ad-
hoc organizations. On December 16, 1961, the government, through decree No.1899, 
“Effectively abolished the three existing General Organizations.”113 In their place, the 
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government grouped 438 companies, including the newly sequestered Crown 
Brewery, into thirty-nine General Organizations organized along sectoral lines. Each 
of these General Organizations was attached to the Ministry that was most relevant. In 
the case of Pyramid Brewery, Crown Brewery, and the Central Bureau, all of their 
stock was nationalized, and the government placed them under the auspices of the 
newly formed General Corporation for Food Industries (al-Muʾassasa al-Miṣriyya al-
‘Āmma li-l-Ṣināʿāt al-Ghidhāʾiyya, GCFI), headed by Dr. Hasan Mohammed 
Ashmawi.114   
 The General Organizations’ full integration into the Egyptian economic system 
had a great deal to do with how highly the Egyptian government valued beer exports 
(see Chapter 7). The government saw these exports as an easy way to bring foreign 
currency into the country. It was not coincidental, then, that one of the first directives 
the government assigned Foda as the head of the beer companies was to export 10,000 
hectoliters of beer to Romania.115 This trade relationship proved to be one of the most 
fruitful for the company.  Foda was even able to sign a trade agreement with Romania 
in 1968 that guaranteed the export of 40,000 hectoliters of beer in exchange for nearly 
one million dollars from the Romanian government.116  In a similar vein, the 
government also forced the company to start exporting to Aden.117 Perhaps the 
greatest example of the use of the beer company to expand foreign trade is that by 
1966, the beer company had even expanded into the Jordanian market, owning forty 
percent of a company there.118    
 The government not only encouraged new foreign investment, but also 
cultivated the relationships the breweries already had. They were particularly 
concerned with the brewery’s relationship with Blue Nile Brewery in Sudan. The 
nationalization of both Crown and Pyramid placed Blue Nile Brewery in Khartoum in 
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the middle of the struggle between Heineken and the Egyptian government.  While it 
was Pyramid that owned an interest in Blue Nile and provided it with malt, most of its 
interactions were with Wittert van Hoogland, rather than with anyone in Egypt. Van 
Hoogland sat on the board ex officio, and his pay from the company went directly to 
Heineken.119 When the Egyptian government nationalized the two beer companies, 
Wittert van Hoogland held out hope that he could circumvent the Egyptian 
government by having Blue Nile Brewery pay a higher director’s fee to him in 
exchange for goods and service rendered.120 Unfortunately for Wittert, that was not to 
be, and Blue Nile soon removed him from his ex officio position on the board, citing 
the fact that he was working with an English brewery, Flowers, that rivaled Anchor 
Brewhouse.121 This rivalry between Flowers and Anchor Brewhouse was important 
because the latter had a controlling interest in Blue Nile Brewery.  As for the Egyptian 
government, it retained a role in the Sudanese company by having Foda meet with the 
board in Khartoum and hosting representatives from Blue Nile in Cairo.122  Thus in 
his initial interactions with Pyramid, Dr. Foda did his best to balance his desire to 
assert his and the Egyptian government’s new role in the company with his desire to 
maintain the aspects of the company that had made it so successful. 
Workers’ New Role 
 After Crown’s sequestration in 1961, the government resolved that both it and 
Pyramid would be officially nationalized, which meant being conglomerated into Al-
Ahram Brewing Company. This welding together of the two companies would occur 
in a multi-step process, and Foda was tasked with overseeing it. As noted above, both 
Foda and the government preferred to maintain as much continuity as possible for the 
simple reason that the beer industry in Egypt had been flourishing, and they wanted to 
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ensure that it continued to do so. Yet as this section describes, Foda soon faced limits 
in his attempts to ensure continuity in policies toward the workforce.  
 The 1961 July decrees, which had arrested the private sector, also aimed to 
empower the Egyptian workforce. The decrees limited working hours to seven hours 
per day and eliminated overtime.  Likewise, companies could not use any seasonal 
workers; anyone who worked for the company had to be a full-time employee. These 
regulations plus the ruling that a person could only hold one job at a time aimed at not 
only lessening the burden of employed workers, but also opening up more jobs for the 
unemployed. In addition to regulations on who could work for a company and for 
how long, the July Decrees also sought to close the wage gap. They set the upper limit 
for remuneration for everyone at a company at 5,000 pounds. They eliminated all 
dividends and required each company to use twenty-five percent of its profit for its 
workers, in the form of wage increases and increased social services.  
 This legislation had a serious effect on Pyramid, undercutting many of the 
policies Kettner had put in place to create a modern, total-control brewery. These new 
laws eliminated his two-shift system and his ability to keep the brewery open 
continuously with three teams of workers. Because a team could now only cover 
seven hours, three teams could only cover twenty-one hours. The company also lost 
the ability to take advantage of temporary workers, who used to fill in when needed 
and required a minimal commitment. The company now had to have everyone on the 
payroll, and it had to provide social services for all of them.  Kettner, who was 
completely marginalized upon the sequestration of the company, saw all of these 
requirements as unnecessary increases in overhead and worried that without a price 
increase in beer, the company would suffer.123 Besides increasing the operating costs 
of the company, this legislation also limited Pyramid’s ability to shape its work staff. 
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All hiring and firing, even for the lowest-paid worker, had to be approved by the 
sequestrator and thus the government. This made it extremely difficult, in Kettner’s 
opinion, to find a good second-in-command for Hasan Tawfiq, an Egyptian who had 
served as Pyramid’s head of garages prior to sequestration, but who would now be 
assuming a more prominent role as the head of both Crown and Pyramid’s 
factories.124    
 Following the decrees, workers not only received a larger piece of the profits 
than before, but also gained a greater stake in the company. The July Decrees required 
the board of directors of each company to reserve spots for a representative of the 
workers (ʿummāl) and a representative employee (muwaẓẓafīn). This requirement 
forced a radical change in the board of the newly amalgamated company.  Besides 
Foda, who occupied the position of delegated member (ʿuḍu al-muntadab) on the 
board of directors, the board was composed of appointed and elected members. In the 
case of appointed members, again, it appears that Foda preferred continuity under his 
tenure. He chose Egyptian workers, who had trained and worked under the watch of 
Dutch managers. To fill the role of director of factories, he chose Hasan Tawfik, who 
had previously served as the head of garages. As the new business director, Foda 
chose Alber Farag, who had previously headed Pyramid’s communications 
department. Foda also elevated the assistant brewmaster, Fathi el Malt, to the new 
directorship of malt-making. The final appointment for Foda was placing Muhammad 
Ramses ʿAwad, who had been in charge of the brewery’s cellars, as the new director 
of beer-making.125 With these appointments, Foda essentially elevated the Egyptians 
who had served as the heads of old departments to new directorships. Beyond not 
upsetting the hierarchy in the company, these appointments also allowed Foda to draw 
on the experience of men who had been with the company for many years.  
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 Having experienced people on the board may also have been a counterbalance 
against the other four members on the board, who all sat in elected positions. While it 
is not clear who exactly was eligible to vote in these elections, it was most likely the 
members of the company union. The results appear to bear this out, as only one of the 
four elected board members, Ihab Shamaa’, had served in any leadership position 
previously. Prior to being elected as the assistant director of beer-making, he had 
served as the head of fermentation under Ulenberg.  As for the other three, Ghattas 
Hanna Ghattas was elected to the board as the head of the warehouses, Hussein 
Ahmed Muhammad Mani was elected as the head of the car workshop in Giza, and 
Galal Ahmad Rutan was elected as the head machinist at the factory in Alexandria.126      
 This board represented the culmination of the government-led takeover of the 
beer industry. Not only did a handpicked representative sit at the top of the company, 
but also, the board embodied the government’s demographic vision for the country. 
The entire board was composed of Egyptians. Perhaps unsurprisingly considering the 
regime’s rhetoric, only two out of the nine members of the new executive board, Alber 
Farag and Ghattas Hanna Ghattas, were Christians. The rest, and the overwhelming 
seven-out-of-nine majority, were Muslims. Not only were all the “foreign” elements 
eliminated or outnumbered, but the Egyptian collaborators were sidelined as well. 
Even masters of industry like Ahmad Farghaly were absent from the board. And 
again, for personal reasons relating to the government’s prior treatment of his family’s 
property, the board’s most powerful member, Foda, was subservient to the 
government as well. Thus the nationalization and consolidation created a board and 
workforce loyal to the regime. The board’s subservience derived from the fact their 
continued employment was entirely reliant on the whims of the government and its 
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leader, Nasser. The workforce was loyal because they had been given unprecedented 
power, wages, and job security.  
Dealing with the Dutch 
 Although the “foreign” elements had all been purged from the executive, the 
nationalization of the breweries did not mark the end of the relationship between the 
Dutch and Egyptian brewing. As I will show, due to both Dutch desire and the 
Egyptian government’s prodding, the relationship between the two countries’ brewing 
industries lasted until the mid-1970s. The government’s sequestration of Pyramid in 
1961 signaled a new era in Egyptian brewing, but it was the government’s 
sequestration of Crown later that year that confirmed that the situation would never be 
the same.  When the news of Crown’s sequestration reached Holland, Wittert 
conceded that Cobra and Heineken’s influence beyond the technical level was 
“0.0.”127 As was true of all developments in the beer industry in Egypt after 1957, 
there was no better observer of this than Kettner.  
 Despite Kettner’s long track record with the company, upon the sequestration 
of Pyramid, he was immediately marginalized. He was removed from his post as 
managing director and assigned the role of consultant.128 What this actually meant on 
the ground was something quite different than what he was expecting, as Kettner 
notes: 
But to return to my office roles these are, as mentioned, minimal. The only 
regular contact I have takes place during weekly management meetings. 
Beyond that, Foda never consults me and I do not give unsolicited advice 
except during said meetings in the general discussions.  Neither does [Alber] 
Farag come to me to ask for my opinion.129 
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This total marginalization was quite a change from the elevated position that Kettner 
was accustomed to. Nevertheless, the Nasser led-government’s policy initiatives 
meant there was no other way for the business to operate. Despite his well-
demonstrated expertise, Kettner was the embodiment of the foreign capitalist 
exploiting Egypt.  
 Kettner did not succumb easily to these changes. His refusal to be sidelined is 
most obvious in a letter he sent to Dr. Foda in January 1962. In it, he expresses his 
worry that the significant gains that the company made in the years between 1958 and 
1961 would be undone by the company’s unwillingness to hire any new staff or 
upgrade the machinery as Heineken had planned.130  As Kettner noted, the companies’ 
machinery, especially the cooling system, was struggling to handle the increased 
demand, and without the planned changes, the brewery was likely to run into severe 
technical issues. However, Kettner also conceded that no matter what he, Cobra, and 
Heineken said, their roles were purely advisory. He noted this lack of control in order 
to exculpate himself and the rest of the Dutch from what he saw as the inevitable 
trouble facing the breweries, noting that, “In all those circumstances where our advice 
has not been followed, the responsibility for the consequences does not lie with us or 
our representatives in Egypt.”131  
 Kettner was especially perturbed by one of the first moves Dr. Foda made after 
taking control of the two companies. The Nasser-led government, in a bid to gain 
greater revenue from the companies, and perhaps also to atone for the government’s 
ownership of the beer companies, raised the excise tax on beer to six Egyptian pounds 
per hectoliter in 1962.132 The government's move put Foda in an unenviable position. 
Not only did he have no say in the tax increase, but he could also not raise the price of 
beer to reflect the tax increase without attaining government approval.  
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 Nevertheless, Kettner believed that Foda was failing in his duties as his 
replacement by not pushing to raise the price of beer.133 Kettner’s justification for the 
price hike was that the six-pound excise tax was one of the highest in the world. Not 
only that, but when the government had carried out a similar move with cigarettes, the 
cigarette companies were able to raise their prices. Kettner viewed a one-pound per 
large bottle increase as completely fair and unlikely to have any negative effect on the 
consumer.134  However, if the breweries were unable to respond to this excise tax with 
a complimentary increase in price, the shareholders and employees of the company 
would suffer, and the company itself might not be able to finance the continuing 
extension plans.135 Ketntner also noted, in another letter he sent to Foda, that the 
government would lose precious tax income without a price increase. Kettner 
reminded Foda that he also had precedent to act without government approval. The 
governors of Aswan and Assiout had increased the price of beer without prior 
approval.136  
 Kettner met with Foda several times about this issue, but it did not seem that 
the Egyptian wanted his advice. Foda even justified his refusal to act to Kettner by 
noting that the price increases in Assiut and Aswan would soon be overturned. 
However, in February of 1962, Foda announced that he would increase the price once 
the breweries officially came under the control of the GCFI. Kettner was, of course, a 
bit peeved that Foda had decided on the price increase after rebuffing him so many 
times.137  
 Besides lobbying for a price increase, Kettner was also in negotiations with 
Foda on the matter of a technical contract between Heineken/Cobra and the Egyptian 
breweries. The technical contract was an agreement that was meant to formalize the 
relations between Heineken/Cobra and the Egyptian breweries after nationalization. In 
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essence, it laid out what Heineken and Cobra would offer the Egyptian government in 
services and what the Egyptian government would offer Heinken and Cobra in 
payment.  
 Although there was a technical contract put in place upon sequestration, 
Heineken, the Egyptian government, and Dr. Foda agreed to negotiate a new technical 
contract after the conglomeration of the two beer companies.  For Heineken, 
contracting with a hostile government with very different ideas for the future of the 
beer industry was their only option. Otherwise, they risked the possibility that another 
company would come into Egypt and capitalize on the more than twenty years of 
work they put in to grow a customer base in Egypt.138 For the Egyptian government, 
on the other hand, dealing with a foreign company was the path of least resistance to 
ensure that its new property remained profitable and useful.   
 The text from a proposed technical agreement clearly lays out what each side 
was looking for in the relationship.  The Egyptian government was using its strong 
negotiating position to try to extract as much as it could from Heineken. It sought to 
reify Heineken’s position as a broker with foreign companies for raw materials and 
machines. This meant recommending companies that the brewery should buy from, 
and also pressuring those companies to replace faulty or insufficient products they 
supplied. The government also demanded the right to purchase these materials from 
third parties not recommended by Heineken, although they still wanted to have the 
Dutch company approve those materials and machines.139 The Egyptian government 
was especially keen to hold on to the “secrets” of Heineken. It wanted the Dutch 
company to continue to provide the breweries with Heineken's proprietary strain of 
yeast free of charge.140 Beyond the proprietary yeast, the Egyptian government also 
wanted Heineken to continue enforcing their particular way of malting and brewing 
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on the breweries. As the government said, they wanted the Dutch brewers to provide 
“the special and secret treatments for obtaining beer and malt of high quality.”141  As 
for the final product, the government wanted Heineken to continue in its position as 
adviser on quality control. This meant that Heineken should continue frequently 
testing the quality of the product and sending engineers to analyze the work of the 
companies. The Egyptian government even wanted Heineken to train employees of 
the two breweries in Holland and for the Dutch brewery to pay all the fees they 
incurred.  
 As for Heineken, the biggest incentive for negotiating was the right to be the 
exclusive technical advisor to every brewery, malt house, and soft drink company in 
Egypt, including extant and future operations. Finally, the Egyptian government 
agreed not to disclose any of the technical information that Heineken provided.142 
Beyond these stipulations, the Egyptian government would also remunerate the Dutch 
brewer. While the exact terms were not agreed upon, the breweries were to pay 
Heineken all their profits over and above the costs. The sum would be paid in Dutch 
currency, or if there was not enough available, in malt.143  
 One of the key points of disagreement between the two sides involved the role 
that Gutsavus Ulenberg, the head brewmaster, would continue to play in the 
operations in Egypt. The government allowed Ulenberg to stay on after 
nationalization as the director of brewing in Egypt because he was much less visible 
than Kettner and much more central to the brewing operations. However, it was not 
clear what his future with the company would be. Kettner tried to map out that future 
in discussions with Dr. Foda.  Kettner relayed the results of these discussions in a 
letter to Ulenberg. In the letter, Kettner stated that Ulenberg’s role would remain 
unchanged as the production manager. He would still be associated with the company, 
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and he would be required to produce a “first class product.”144 More specifically, he 
would be tasked with the six following jobs:  
1) Specifying in a timely manner to the sequesterator (Dr. Foda) the 
need for land and excipients (preservatives or anything added to help 
the beer), as he had done previously. 
2) Identifying deficiencies in the technical equipment to the chief 
engineer, stating the date on which this issue should be remedied 
without running a risk to quality.  
3) In consultation with the chief engineer, drafting of the maintenance 
program.  
4) Providing for staff and identifying whether their requirements are 
met. 
5) Supervision of the laboratory. 
6) Correspondence with Holland on brewing practices and other 
technical matters.145  
  
While this move may at first appear to be an example one Dutchman looking out for 
another, in fact it was Kettner's last play at relevance. As we see from a letter Wittert 
later sent to Kettner, he had overstepped his bounds. While Wittert recognized that 
Kettner may have been trying to give Ulenberg strength or solace, he was actually 
doing more harm than good.146  
In Wittert’s eyes, Kettner’s only role, which he made clear in several letters, 
was to serve as the liaison between Heineken and the Egyptian government. Beyond 
that, Wittert van Hoogland wanted Kettner to fully recuse himself from any of the 
day-to-day happenings of the brewery.  His meetings with Foda on the price of beer 
and the role of Ulenberg as well his insistence on receiving daily reports on the status 
of the brewery were all unnecessary and unwanted. Wittert’s commands to Kettner 
were part of his larger plan for extricating Heineken from Egypt. As Wittert saw it, the 
Egyptian government was quite satisfied with the status quo after sequestration. As 
such, the Egyptian government would stall negotiations indefinitely, in hopes of 
receiving the technical advice of Ulenberg, who was still living and working in Egypt, 
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without paying a penny “in the form of technical compensation, pension premiums, to 
say nothing of dividends” to Heineken or Cobra.147  
 Wittert conceded that he and Heineken were also not willing to go the other 
route, selling a portion of their shares and leaving a technical advisor to keep “a finger 
in the pie.”148 Having witnessed what had happened to the Pilavachis made them extra 
cautious. He and Heineken had something else in mind. The Dutch side would go 
silent in the negotiations on the technical contract and eventually break them off. This 
break would allow them to maintain their rights as the majority shareholders of both 
Crown and Pyramid, if there ever came a day where the ruling regime of Egypt 
normalized its relationships with the West.149 With this plan in mind, it was absolutely 
essential for Kettner to stay quiet and minimize his role, lest he reveal the true 
intentions of Heineken. After a period of quiet, Wittert assured Kettner that he could 
exit the country without issue or complaint from the government.150 Likewise, Wittert 
and Heineken needed Kettner’s silence in order to ensure that Ulenburg would also be 
able to leave the country without issue. 
 Kettner’s response was rather fractious considering Wittert’s position as his 
superior. Kettner argued that Wittert’s criticism of his decision to talk to Foda about 
the price of beer, albeit mild, was “frankly incomprehensible.”151  In Kettner’s view, 
how could he possibly “show his face again” in Holland if he had not raised his voice 
against administrative incompetence that would cost the shareholders nearly 200,000 
pounds per year?  Should he, as the representative of the largest shareholders in the 
company, have sat on his hands as the Egyptian government robbed the company of 
its money? He hoped that Wittert’s accusations were not in earnest, but rather a way to 
test his “fighting spirit.”152  As for his advice to Ulenberg, he felt completely justified. 
Not only was he Ulenberg’s former superior, but the demands of both Foda and 
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Heineken had left Ulenberg unclear of his role in the company.  In addition, he had 
made it very clear to Ulenberg that if he received a letter from Heineken, he should 
follow the directions contained within, rather than the advice of Kettner.     
 As for Wittert’s plans for him and for Heineken’s future in Egypt, Kettner was 
completely on board.  He was fully prepared to leave Egypt, and conditions were 
lining up for his departure. His residence permit was expiring, and in order to renew 
it, he had to provide a reason for staying. Because he was no longer an administrator 
on the board of Pyramid, the only valid pretext for his continued residence was to 
present himself as an official representative of Cobra or Heineken in Egypt.153 
However, considering Wittert’s plan, making this claim made very little sense. Thus, 
Kettner would tender his resignation to Foda.  
Kettner was further convinced of the appropriateness of his resignation 
because, in his eyes, the brewery was descending into greater disorganization with 
Foda at the helm. The intrigues and mutual distrust that Kettner was so keen on 
fighting in his tenure as the managing director were, in his words, “rampant.”154 
Kettner did not believe that Foda was long for the position, if the current state 
continued. He believed that the company needed an expert, like himself, to run it. 
Unfortunately, as Kettner noted, there was “every reason for these types” to stay away 
from the brewery, as they would not take kindly to giving unheeded advice and then 
being blamed when the brewery did not succeed.155 Thus, he came to believe that 
Heineken should accept whatever plan the government put forth and agree to serve in 
an advisory role to the GCFI.  This course of action was the only way to get out while 
minimizing the losses.  
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 Although the departures of the last Heineken element from Egypt were all but 
decided by March 1962, they did not take place until May 1962. This delay was due 
to the fact that even in the act of resignation, the Egyptian government held control. 
Specifically, all departures had to be approved by Dr. Foda. In addition, all 
outstanding debts and payments had to be settled with the Egyptian authorities. Only 
then did the government grant an exit visa. Although it took Kettner a significant 
amount of time to settle his account with the Egyptian government, Dr. Foda 
eventually accepted his resignation and departure.  
 However, Dr. Foda was not as conciliatory with Ulenberg, as his departure 
from Egypt became a serious bone of contention between the Dutch and the Egyptian. 
This turn of events came as a shock to the Dutch because it appeared initially that 
Foda was fully behind the move. Foda had even committed to paying the full travel 
expenses for Ulenburg’s departure. However, after the initial appearance of support, 
Dr. Foda made  “an about face.”156  Heineken could not figure out why Dr. Foda had 
taken this position because it appeared to go against the interests of the breweries and 
the Egyptian government. If it was an attempt at intimidation, Heienken believed that 
they could take a strong stand. First, they understood that the breweries and the 
Egyptian government would like the technical support of Heineken to continue “at all 
costs.”157 In addition, Egypt was looking for international loans. Thus, any 
international incident could possibly endanger their chances of receiving help from 
other Western countries. Heineken conjectured that Dr. Foda was acting on his own 
accord. In their eyes, his actions were a poor attempt to make sure that the 
relationship between the breweries and Heineken continued when they became part of 
the GCFI.158 Regardless, Heineken was able to extract Ulenberg and Kettner from the 
country in the summer of 1962.  
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 For Ulenberg, this was the end of his tenure in Egypt, but not his relationship 
with the brewery. In 1964, he would visit the brewery as a representative for 
Cobra/Heineken to make a technical assessment of the brewery. This visit was part of 
a larger tour of breweries he made for Cobra. For example, he would also carry out a 
technical evaluation of a brewery in Australian New Guinea.159 Thus, Ulenberg slid 
from his position in Egypt back into the world beer empire of Heineken/Cobra. 
Kettner, however, did not reintegrate so easily back into the Cobra/Heineken world.  
Heineken wrote him in January 1963, stating that they were unable to find a 
“suitable” position for him within the company. As a result, they were giving him a 
severance package of fifty thousand dollars.  The board expressed regret, but affirmed 
that they had tried as hard as they could to find a position that would be in some way 
connected to what he did in Cairo. Unfortunately, no position existed for him. Thus, 
his years of work in Egypt assured him nothing except a generous severance package. 
One wonders whether Heineken’s failure to find a position for Kettner had anything to 
do with his difficult, imperious personality.  
 Although the last vestiges of their control on the ground had disappeared, 
Heineken and Cobra’s relationship continued with the breweries and the Egyptian 
government. In 1964, they finally signed a new technical contract for a period of five 
years. As part of the agreement, the conglomerated breweries could request a 
technical advisor from Heineken. However, they never took the Dutch brewery up on 
that provision. Rather, the relationship was much more distant than during the time of 
Kettner. The most probable reason for the distance was the heated debate among the 
entities over the remuneration for the nationalization of Heineken’s interest in the two 
companies.    
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 According to Law 82 of 1961, when foreign companies were nationalized, the 
foreign stockholders were paid for the stock they lost. The dispute between Heineken 
and the Egyptian government was over what stock price should be used when 
calculating what the Egyptian government owed foreign investors. The Egyptian 
government claimed that it was the price of the stock in the Egyptian exchange on the 
day of its nationalization. While this may seem to be a reasonable way to determine 
the value of a share, Heineken argued otherwise. They claimed the Egyptian 
government’s sequestration of the beer companies’ assets in 1961 before 
nationalization had driven down the price of the stock, and thus, the price of the stock 
on the exchange was not an accurate reflection of Heineken’s investment in the 
company.160 This impasse was a common feature of the post-1963 Egyptian economy. 
So common was such a dispute, in fact, that there was a permanent committee 
delegated with arbitrating them, called the Permanent Committee for Negotiation of 
Compensation. The two sides finally came to an agreement in 1970, in which 
Heineken would be paid seven Egyptians pounds per share, which Heineken 
considered close enough to the pre-sequestration share price of ten Egyptian 
pounds.161 Perhaps not coincidentally, the thawing of the relations between the 
foreign company and the Egyptian government took place in the very year that Nasser 
died.  
A Lasting Impact 
 Although the departure of Kettner was rather unceremonious considering the 
duration he had spent working for Pyramid, the Dutch involvement that he 
represented in the Egyptian beer industry had a lasting cultural impact. A testament to 
his work there was the penetration of Stella beer into the Egyptian market. By 1974, 
an estimated five million of the thirty-five million Muslims in Egypt consumed beer, 
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most of which was sold by the Al-Ahram Brewing Company.162 While we cannot be 
sure of the veracity of these numbers, it surely gives a sense of how significant Stella 
beer’s presence was in Egyptian culture. 
 As Chapter 7 showed, by the 1960s, advertising campaigns had helped to 
make beer the young Egyptian’s choice for a party beverage, perfect for warm days 
and nights on summer vacations. The image Stella beer exuded was one of youth, 
sociability, and refreshment. This image continued during and after nationalization 
and sequestration. One particularly notable example comes, again, from a cinematic 
adaption of an Ihsan Abd el-Quddus story, Al-Naddara al-Sawda (The Dark Glasses, 
1963). The film revolves around another “bad” girl, Madiha, nicknamed Maddy 
(played by Nadia Lutfi), and her relationship with ʿUmar (Ahmad Mazhar) as they 
both struggle with finding love and happiness in Nasserite Cairo. Beer makes a cameo 
in their love affair when Maddy brings ʿUmar to the pool of the social club that she 
frequents. As she introduces ʿUmar to all of her friends using their nicknames, we see 
the young crowd wearing bathing suits and sitting around a table with beer bottles 
upon it.  
 ʿUmar, who is a conscientious and serious factory manager, is visibly put off 
by the lighthearted attitudes of her friends.  This dichotomy between the serious and 
the trivial is a major theme in the film, and one that both Maddy and ʿUmar struggle 
with. In the pool scene, the beer bottles, like the nicknames and the pool, are part and 
parcel of the fun and triviality of Maddy’s life. They sit in opposition to the classicist 
literature that ʿUmar reads—Balzac, Shaw, Checkov, Ahmad Shawqi, and Taha 
Hussein—and the social consciousness he shows by visiting infirmed factory 
workers.163 Nevertheless, beer still carried the same association: youth, fun, and 
refreshment. 
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 The message of refreshment would have a permanence that far outlasted 
Kettner and the Dutch influence on the Egyptian beer industry. For example, in a 1972 
advertisement for non-alcoholic Stella, reads 
Stella Beer 
Non-Alcoholic 
Refreshing and Reinvigorating 
Always Fresh and Pure.164  
 
Although Pyramid had discussed producing a non-alcoholic beer in 1949, al-Ahram 
Beverages only started production of it in the 1970s in response to the rising tide of 
Islamic religiosity in the country.165  Thus, even when the company branched out into 
non-alcoholic beers, they held firmly to fresh and refreshing aspects of their beer. In 
fact, there is very little in the advertisement to suggest that the beer was non-alcoholic 
outside of the bottle, which had the words, bidūn kaḥūl (non-alcoholic) on the label 
beneath the Stella name. The image of the frothy glass of beer on the left side of the 
advertisement could easily have been lifted from an advertisement for regular 
Stella.166 As I have discussed above, this repurposing would not have been difficult, 
as Stella in the 1960s had transcended its position as solely an alcoholic beverage and 
had come to be seen, especially among middle and upper-class Egyptians, as a 
refreshing summertime beverage. 
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 All of this is not to say, however, that nationalization and sequestration did not 
change the place of Stella Beer in Egyptian culture. One significant index of that 
change comes from an English novel published in 1964, called Beer in the Snooker 
Club. Written by a previously unknown Anglophone Copt named Waguih Ghali, it 
tells the story of Ram, “a Francophone, British-educated Copt” as he struggles with 
his trans-cultural identity.167 As should be obvious from the title, beer has some role to 
play in his internal struggle. The clearest example of this role relates to a concoction, 
a sort of cocktail, that Ram makes and calls “Draught Bass.” While its name was 
taken from the English beer, Bass, it had very little in common with that beer, as it 
obvious from Ram’s recipe for it:  
I opened two bottles of Egyptian Stella beer and poured them into a 
large tumbler, then beat the liquid until all the gas had escaped. I then 
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added a drop of vodka and some whisky. It was the nearest we could 
get to Draught Bass.168 
 
This cocktail, one literary critic has suggested, was “as much as a symbol of Nasser’s 
Egypt, as of the characters’ divided sympathies.”169 Further, Ram’s mixing of 
constituent alcohols represents his desire to eschew “the English brew and the 
prefabricated cultural hegemony it represents” to produce “a more complex 
construction of himself influenced by, but not a product of, England.”170 However, 
Ram’s use of Stella goes beyond merely its identification as an Egyptian beer. The 
violence he performs on it, as well as its centrality to his concoction, represents his 
complicated relationship with this product.  
This novel came out at a time when Stella was the only beer that an Egyptian 
could buy on the open market. As the beer of Egypt, it did not hold the same allure 
that a drink like Bass did.  It was a semi-luxury product, one that was easily 
accessible, but because of its long cultural history, not devoid of meaning. The 
beerwas not as luxurious as Bass, and its consumption did not connect its drinker to 
another world of the imagination, namely, 
The world of intellectuals and underground metros and cobbled streets 
and a green countryside…The world where students had rooms, and 
typists for girl-friends, and sang songs and drank beer in large 
mugs…A whole imaginary world.171 
 
Nevertheless, Stella had such hegemony over the beer market in Egypt that it was still 
central to the life that Ram wanted to live. For example, when he goes to a club to 
swim at the pool, he drinks a cold Egyptian beer with lunch.172 Then, another time at 
the club in Egypt, he gets the urge for a beer: 
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I felt like having a cold beer and eating salted peanuts; then a cigarette 
and another beer and more peanuts. I could do it, of course, even 
though I had no money. But I knew the pattern too well; the depression 
afterwards and the self-disgust.173 
 
In both instances, the temperature of the beer is central to its description. This 
description shows how as much as he would like to transcend it, both Ram and Ghali 
were attuned to the pleasures of a cold Stella on a warm Egyptian day by the pool or 
in the club. 
The relationship that the fictional character Ram had with with Stella 
paralleled the one that the author Waguih Ghali had with the Nasser regime. Ghali 
was conflicted: he supported the socialist, anti-colonial platform of Nasser, but he was 
also a strong opponent of its repressive policies, including its curtailment of political 
expression.174 Stella beer was an ideal commodity to embody this dilemma: the 
regime produced it after the beer companies’ nationalization, and yet it had become so 
central to lives of a certain class of Egyptians that its cultural value was able, in many 
respects, to transcend this or any regime. 
 The changing role of beer was also on display in the film adaption of an Ihsan 
Abd el-Quddus story, called Abi Fawq al-Shajara (Father’s Up a Tree, 1968). The last 
film to feature one of Egypt’s most famous singers and actors, Abdel Halim Hafez, 
Father’s Up a Tree, tells the story of the moral rise and fall of ʿAdil, a young Egyptian 
male student. The main driver of the story is ʿAdil’s love for a girl named Amal. 
Although she reciprocates the feeling, she is unwilling to spend time alone with ʿAdil 
out of her own sense of propriety. Amal’s repeated rebuffing of ʿAdil’s demands for 
alone-time of the kind that, he claims, lots of other young men and women were 
having, leads ʿAdil to fall in with the “wrong” crowd.    
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 ʿAdil first meets the “wrong” crowd—where else?—on the beach. Beer plays 
a central role in this critical moment of the film. As ʿAdil jogs out of the water onto 
the beach, the camera frames him and an unidentified hand, its owner otherwise 
obscured by a beach umbrella, emptying a green bottle into a glass embossed with the 
famous Stella star. Signaling the imminent danger, the music shifts from playful to 
ominous as we watch the hand perfectly pour the beer. When ʿAdil reaches the 
umbrella, the camera reveals a group of four young men drinking and having fun. 
After exchanging English “hellos,” one of the young men asks ʿAdil if he would like a 
sip. He says, “No thank you, I don’t drink.” They all burst out laughing when they 
hear his response.  They invite ʿAdil out to party with them, but he turns them down.  
 The short conversation is filled with laughter and jokes. After ʿAdil excuses 
himself from their presence, they make fun of him for not coming out. ʿAdil then 
meets one of his friends, who ask him how he knows the group of “guys,” a leading 
question meant to signal that the friend does not trust the group. ʿAdil assures his 
friend that the men have damm khafif (Arabic, a sense of humor, lit. light blood). He 
states that they meet everything in the world with a sense of humor and are willing to 
try anything. His friend warns ʿAdil to stay away from them, saying that it is obvious 
to him that they are not good people. 
   After a couple of encounters between ʿAdil and Amal, where ʿAdil lays out 
what he wants from Amal and meets only rejection, ʿAdil decides to make a change. 
Instead of going to the beach where ʿAmal and the rest of his social group (al-shilla) 
hang out, he joins the “wrong” crowd for a party on another beach. Their beach party 
is rowdy and alcohol-infused. The scene opens with the leader of the gang, Ashraf 
(Samir Sabri), guzzling a whole large bottle of beer as the beer spills all over his chest 
and face. There is music and dancing, and beer is central to the party. One partygoer 
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dips his sandwich in his beer and then eats it. Another couple dances while they 
balance a beer bottle between their foreheads. At first, ʿAdil observes on the sidelines, 
but then Ashraf comes over and pours him a beer. ʿAdil asks him what he is pouring, 
and when Ashraf responds, “beer,” ʿAdil states, again, that he does not drink. Ashraf 
goads him to “just try it.” When he does, he immediately spits it out. Ashraf 
encourages him to try it again and pours him some more. While he pours, he says to 
ʿAdil, “Look, this here (points at the beer) fātḥa shahiya (awakens your appetite) and 
when you drink it you will have a night that you will never forget.” 
 True to Ashraf’s words, the group transitions from the wild beach scene to a 
cabaret. There they continue to drink beer and have a wild night watching the dancer 
Fardos (Nadia Lutfi). ʿAdil meets Fardos, who has taken a liking to him, and they 
eventually start drinking whisky together. From here, the plots takes ʿAdil and Fardos, 
now lovers, to Beirut. ʿAdil’s father, worried by his son’s actions, travels to Lebanon, 
only to fall into the “libertine charms of Beirut.”175 Eventually, son and father meet, 
come to their senses, and leave Beirut together. The move ends with ʿAdil reuniting 
with Amal, who has abandoned her “old ways.” The film ends with the two “running 
then embracing and kissing numerous times, silhouetted by the setting sun.”176   
 This film, which was a “smash success,” tells us a great deal about Stella 
beer’s role after nationalization. In this film, beer still carried its association with 
youth, refreshment, beaches, and summer. It also had achieved an association with the 
medicinal properties that advertisers had been attributing to it. As Ashraf noted, it 
really “opens up the appetite.” However, this phrase, like beer itself, had a double 
meaning. It was not only an appetite for food, but for sex. In this movie, it was a 
straight line from ʿAdil tasting a beer on the beach to cavorting with a dancer in 
Beirut. Thus, post-nationalization, beer regained its sense of danger. Yes, it could 
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refresh, but it could also lead to intoxication and poor decision-making.  Still, it was 
only a “gateway” drink.  When ʿAdil really starts to veer off the righteous path, he 
eschews beer for hard liquor. This positioning of beer as a gateway drug for friends 
gathering on a public beach is a reflection of how deeply beer had penetrated 
Egyptian society, but it was also a sign that beer was developing a more ominous 
reputation and that attitudes towards it were shifting.  After nearly eighty years in the 
country, beer was no longer a generic and unambiguously negative beverage grouped 
with all the other alcoholic drinks in the category of “alcohol.” But nor was it the 
harmless and refreshing soft drink that advertisers tried to portray it as. It was 
something that could refresh and intoxicate, something that could be fun and 
dangerous. By the end of the 1960s, the position of beer in popular Egyptian culture 
was becoming more complex. 
Conclusion  
 Through the nationalization of Crown and Pyramid Breweries, a process that 
the business sector was powerless to stop, the Egyptian government achieved the 
indisputable “Egyptianization” of the country’s beer industry. What this 
Egyptianization meant in practice was a company devoid of both “foreign” elements 
and rich indigenous Egyptians who had ties to the business order of the former 
regime.  The Egyptianized beer industry was also one in which the gap in power and 
wealth between the executive and the workforce was small, and in which operations 
were ultimately controlled by a Nasser-led government. 
 The nationalization of companies occurred not by means of police raids and 
arrests, but through polite letters and high-level negotiations. These outward 
expressions of decorum masked the forceful maneuverings of a government that was 
determined to wrest control over the economic system by pushing individuals like 
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Kettner and Farghaly out of the way. Yet Heineken, the multinational beer 
conglomerate, pushed back to the extent that it could, fighting well into the 1970s for 
the value of its nationalized shares—a fact that suggests, again, how protracted 
nationalization was in practice.  The beer industry that remained after that process 
found itself docile, beholden to Nasser’s regime and its quest for a self-sufficient and 
self-assured Egypt. Nevertheless, the continuing high demand for Stella in Egypt 
testified to the cultural history of beer in Egypt, which had been shaped by the work 
of Dutchmen and their associates in Egypt.    
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
 
You know, without doubt, every group of people needs a distraction. 
For example, there’s arak in Turkey and Lebanon. We wish for beer to 
become the popular drink in Egypt. It is my pleasure to inform you that 
it was the ancient Egyptians who first manufactured beer.1   
 
These words were spoken by an employee of Pyramid Brewery, Isma‘il Hafez, 
to the president of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, in 1960. The context of the remark 
was a conversation between the two men at the Agricultural and Industrial Production 
Fair in Cairo on January 3, 1960. To read this passage in the context of Egypt today, 
where conservative Muslim piety exerts a strong force in public culture, where beer 
no longer enjoys wide public visibility and acceptability, and where sales of 
nonalcoholic beer-like beverages have been soaring, Hafez’s claims sound unrealistic 
or even delusional. However, when read in the context of 1960s Egypt, the comment 
makes sense, coming from a businessman who expected to see the nation’s beer 
industry enjoy sustained growth and who believed that there was no reason why beer 
could not become an ever-more popular commodity among a diverse array of 
Egyptian people.  
As the preceding chapters have shown, Crown and Pyramid Breweries had by 
1970 achieved their goal of making Stella Beer the alcoholic beverage of choice for 
the large population of Egyptians who drank alcohol.  By this date, Stella beer had 
achieved both a cultural and economic hegemony that would not be challenged until 
the 1990s. This dissertation, tracing the rise of Stella, has detailed the development of 
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the Egyptian beer industry, and in so doing, has illuminated the history of debates 
over what it has meant to be Egyptian, as well as the history of Egyptian business and 
popular culture. 
 The growth of the Egyptian beer industry coincided with a period of 
nationalist ferment in the Egyptian landscape, as diverse thinkers grappled with 
questions about what it meant or should mean to be Egyptian. This struggle to define 
Egyptianness seeped into the economic sphere in the form of Egyptian economic 
nationalism, the belief that Egyptians should run the Egyptian economy. Between 
1916 and 1922, institutions like the Sidqi Commission on Commerce and Industry, 
Bank Misr, and the Egyptian Federation of Industries emerged in response to the calls 
for a more Egyptian economy. Bank Misr, which was founded and led by Egyptians, 
seemed to be the example par excellence of Egypt’s new economic nationalism. 
However, as Robert Vitalis has shown, these institutions were still tied intimately to 
non-Egyptian capital. In the 1920s, economic nationalism was a convenient way to 
support new ventures and garner public support for the multinational business groups 
that were forming around certain enterprising Egyptian individuals.2  However, 
beginning in the 1930s and culminating with the Joint Stock Company Law of 1947, 
the ideals of Egyptian economic nationalism became more of a reality. The law 
required Egyptian companies (those with major bases in Egypt) “to offer 51 percent 
of their stock to Egyptians and to place Egyptian nationals on 40 percent of the board 
seats.”3   
In the immediate aftermath of the Free Officers coup of 1952, these debates 
reached a new pitch as the revolutionary regime promoted a nativist vision of 
Egyptian identity that privileged local Muslims.  Through close study of the beer 
enterprise, and through the struggles between beer company shareholders, trustees, 
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and executives on the one hand and Egyptian government authorities on the other, one 
can see how the tug-and-pull over Egyptian identity gained expression within this one 
sector of the business community. This struggle would persist until the Nasser-led 
government, dissatisfied with the progress that the private sector was making toward 
the goal of a self-sufficient Egypt, nationalized large swaths of the private sector in 
the 1960s, including the two beer companies. This turn toward large-scale 
nationalization came only five years after the Nasser’s regime’s first and most famous 
nationalization, that of the Suez Canal in 1956. As I have shown, the nationalization 
of the beer companies entailed the transfer of control over Crown and Pyramid to the 
government, which amounted to their de facto and de jure Egyptianization.  
 
A History of Egyptianness  
 The parameters of this struggle over Egyptian identity can only be understood 
with a firm grasp of the actors caught within it. To map out these actors, it is useful to 
turn to Will Hanley’s study of citizenship in the courts in turn-of-the-century 
Alexandria.  Hanley divides the residents who appeared before the courts into four 
groups. The first group included the reasonably well-to-do foreign notables secure in 
Egypt and abroad. The second group covered the poor workers who left Europe to 
make a living in Egypt. The third included those with European privileges born 
outside of Europe. The final grouping contained those without foreign status: the 
locals.4 Four similar groupings existed within the beer companies, and in the private 
sector more broadly, each group affected to varying degrees by the Egyptian 
government’s application of the principles of economic nationalism.  
 The first grouping comprised those reasonably well-off transnational 
entrepreneurs, who were secure both in Egypt and abroad. These were men like 
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Walter Bomonti, Rene Gaston-Dreyfus, and Wittert van Hoogland. To the 
government, these men were undeniably foreign, having been born abroad and with 
foreign citizenship, and they made no attempts to change or hide that status. Below 
them sat those well-to-do or well-connected mutamaṣṣirūn, those “people of foreign 
origin who had become permanent residents,” and who in their language and habits 
had become “Egyptianized.”5 This group included the Mouratiadis, the Pilavachis, the 
Nattis, and the Ismaluns and covered those members of the Greek, Italian, and Jewish 
community who, despite often having foreign citizenship, had a strong connection to 
the country. The third grouping included all of those workers and laborers whom the 
government classified as foreign. This group included both the less well-off 
mutamaṣṣirūn and the workers who had migrated to Egypt to find work. The final 
group contained those who did not have any foreign status. As Hanley argues, in late 
nineteenth and early twentieth-century Alexandria, the court referred to this group as 
“locals.” He uses this broad term to refer to the panoply of identities that could be 
included or classified as “local” in Alexandria. In this study, this last grouping is more 
accurately called “Egyptian.”  
 As this study has shown, in the thirty-year period between 1930 and 1960, 
there was a narrowing of what it meant for an individual and a company to be 
Egyptian. For the government, an “authentic” Egyptian citizen was the native-born 
Muslim; that is, one born between Dumyat and Aswan and between Suez and Marsa 
Matrouh.  All others had to “prove” that they were not “foreign.” Generally, native-
born Coptic Christians, because of the deep historical roots of their community, were 
spared from having to prove their Egyptian credentials; however, their loyalty could 
always be questioned, especially if they had foreign citizenship. For those who were 
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neither native Coptic Christian nor Muslim, proving one’s Egyptianness was difficult, 
if not impossible.  
 The government’s definition of an individual’s Egyptianness was linked to its 
definition of companies’ Egyptianness. The definition of what it meant to an Egyptian 
company shifted between 1930 and 1960, from being a company that had its main 
base of operations in Egypt to being a company whose ranks were filled with 
unambiguously Egyptian managers and workers; with a management and workforce 
that were narrowly separated in terms of power and wages; and whose executive was 
under the control of the Egyptian government.  
 Both of these narrowing processes gradually and disproportionately affected 
the immigrant and mutamaṣṣirūn workers. These workers did not have a strong 
network or the money to fight the challenges put forth by the Egyptian government. 
Thus, if they were unable to acquire government sanction of their citizenship, they 
were the ones whom companies sacrificed in order to bring their percentages in line. 
It was only when the Egyptian government nationalized a large part of the private 
sector and declared all foreigners enemies of the state that well-connected men like 
Erick Karl Kettner were ultimately excised.   
 Nevertheless, this nativist legislation, especially that of the Nasser 
government, did alter the reality of those well-connected transnational entrepreneurs 
and mutamaṣṣirūn. The legislation transformed everyday disagreements between 
those with Egyptian status and those with foreign status into nationalist struggles 
between the “foreign” and the “Egyptian.”  This legislation also meant that 
transnational managers and executives, like Kettner, who had a very specific view of 
how the company should run, were placed in opposition to the Egyptian government, 
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which sought to empower the Egyptian worker by improving his pay, his quality of 
life, and his job security.  
 Ultimately, these transnational entrepreneurs and the mutamaṣṣirun met the 
same fate that so many below them already had. With the mass nationalizations of 
1961, the Nasser-led government pursued an aggressive program aimed at the full 
Egyptianization of industry in Egypt.  This “Egyptianization” went beyond ensuring 
that everyone who worked in the companies had an Egyptian passport. It entailed the 
excising of all “foreign” elements and those Egyptians who, in the eyes of the 
government, had used their financial position to exploit the country. Tied to that, 
Egyptianizing also encompassed removing those businessmen with Egyptian status, 
like Ahmad Farghaly, whom the government deemed to be exploiters, and placing the 
entire industry under the control of the government. In short, this dissertation has 
argued that in the post-1952 economy, when it came to defining Egyptianness, the 
government’s imagined Egyptian was the native-born, non-elite, Muslim man, and its 
imagined Egyptian company was one whose ranks were filled with unambiguous 
Egyptians, whose management and workforce were narrowly separated in terms of 
power and wages, and whose executive was under the control of the Egyptian 
government. 
 
A Social History 
 As I have shown, the history of beer in Egypt had important economic and 
political dimensions that were tied to the construction of Egyptian identity among 
people and corporations alike. That history also had strong cultural dimensions.  This 
study, by examining the consumption of beer as well as the representation of beer in 
movies, advertisements, novels, and other vehicles of cultural expression, has 
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highlighted the “native” appeal of beer as an Egyptian commodity.  Unlike, for 
example, vodka in Russia, the history of beer in Egypt was not the story of how a 
colonial power or government used a beverage to dull the mind of the populace and 
exploit them.6 Nor was it a story of government officials desperately seeking to 
extirpate the evil of a beverage as backyard brewers and moonshiners stayed one step 
ahead.  Rather, it was a history of a beverage that, amidst social and economic 
changes and clever advertising, became an integral and mainstream part of Egyptian 
culture.  
 This dissertation has told this cultural history of beer by focusing, above all, 
on the brand known as Stella.  It took only thirty years from Stella’s creation in the 
1920s, as a joint Pyramid and Crown venture, to become the dominant local brand. 
Stella reached such a level of cultural penetration that it achieved the ultimate goal of 
any brand, becoming synonymous with the product that it sold.  It would not be an 
exaggeration to state that after 1950, for a certain class of Egyptians, Stella was beer.  
To say “’Ayza Stella” (“I want a Stella”), in colloquial Egyptian Arabic, meant, “I 
want a beer.” The success of Stella in Egypt as a modern, industrially manufactured 
product, was built upon the cultural legacy of Egypt’s home-brewed būẓa. Būẓa had 
deep roots in Egyptian culture: its antecedents date back centuries, perhaps to the 
Pharoanic era.  Egyptians enjoyed the beverage in the privacy of their homes and in 
social settings like taverns, even if devout Muslims and Christians often frowned 
upon its consumption.  
 The years 1897 and 1898 were watersheds in the history of beer in Egypt.  
This was when a set of Belgian entrepreneurs established Crown Brewery in 
Alexandria and Pyramid Brewery in Cairo, thereby making beer into an industrially 
produced commodity. During the pre-World War I period, the two breweries 
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struggled to build up their clientele in the face of competition from a whole host of 
foreign beers and other local and foreign alcohols. Fortunately for the breweries, the 
sale of ice and malt—two auxiliary products of its factories—proved profitable 
enough to make up for any lag in the sales of beer until the arrival of World War I. It 
was during this war that the two companies, freed by Egypt’s detachment from the 
world market, established a profitable business selling beer.  Linked to a shared parent 
company in Brussels, both companies found customers among the heterogeneous 
expatriate communities in Egypt: Greeks, Italians, Britons, and others who had 
ventured to Egypt in search of new economic opportunities following the opening of 
the Suez Canal in 1869. It soon became clear that the two Belgian beer companies had 
tapped into another significant pool of customers: native Egyptians.  
 Specifically, the companies were successful in selling to a developing class of 
Egyptians called the effendiya. This group, like beer itself, had undergone a historical 
transformation. The first generation of effendiya, who had their origins in the 
Muhammad Ali era in the 1840s of Egypt, were a small group of “new men,” set apart 
from other Egyptians by their education, their Western manners and dress, and their 
worldviews.7 By the end of the century, the effendiyya came to represent a “new 
urban society, new social institutions, and new ways of life,” serving as engineers, 
doctors, lawyers, journalists, and political activists.8   By the time Egypt became 
semi-independent in 1922, the effendiya, the urban office class, came to represent, at 
least for the liberal nationalists, the perceived middle of Egyptian society. The 
effendiya were the bearers of the national mission, and they were distinct from the 
awlād al-balad (native sons, “the good guys”), the fellahin, and the awlād al-dhawāt 
(Arabic, sons of distinction, the “elite”).9 In practice, to be an effendi was to inhabit a 
liminal space between the lower and upper classes. They, like the elite, were trained 
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in the same traditions of secularism, modernism, and liberalism, but their background 
and financial status kept them separate from that elite.10   
 Notwithstanding the historical era, Crown and Pyramid targeted the effendiya 
in their sales strategy because this was the ideal consumer of their local product. On 
one hand, alcohol served as the perfect commodity to perform effendi modernity.11 Its 
consumption achieved a double effect: while linking its Egyptian drinker to the 
“modern” European, who drank on social occasions, it also separated him from both 
the non-elite and the religious Egyptian, who viewed alcohol as socially suspect at 
best or as religious anathema at worst. On the other hand, the effendiya’s 
consumption was tied somewhat to price because they lacked the financial 
wherewithal that enabled the Egyptian elite to strictly drink imported alcohol. For 
these reasons, Stella beer proved to be the ideal beverage for this class: it offered the 
quality and some of the social capital of foreign alcoholic beverages, while carrying a 
much more reasonable price.  Likewise, because of its effervescence and the beer 
industry’s mastery of refrigeration techniques, it could be presented, unlike that other 
cheap beverage, būẓa, as a cool refreshment that was ideally suited to the warm 
climate of Egypt. It is not surprising, then, that as I have shown, early advertisements 
for beer in Egypt depicted the Egyptian effendi. Granted, the effendiya was not a 
monolith. While there were those who found “modernity” at the bottom of a mug of 
beer, there were others who found it in the total abstention from alcohol. Effendi 
teetotalers were inspired both by the indigenous tradition of temperance and by the 
international Christian temperance movement that entered Egypt in the 1880s in the 
form of the Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU).  
 These calls for temperance did not present a serious challenge to the 
profitability or growth of the beer industry at this time. After 1933, Stella beer started 
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to take off in Egypt. This ascendancy was the result of two factors, the continued 
growth of the effendi class who consumed the beer, and the entry of one of the 
world’s most successful brewers, Heineken, into the Egyptian market. The Dutch 
brewers, who took control of Pyramid and bought a large number of Crown shares, 
did their best to take a rather successful brand in the 1920s and 1930s, Stella, and 
transform it into the beer of Egypt. As I have shown, they crafted a brand of beer, 
Stella, that traded on its light golden color, its crisp taste, and its effervescence to 
make it synonymous with summertime refreshment. The breweries also did their best 
to portray Stella as a drink of the young and the hip, and as an instant party starter that 
could break the ice between shy men and women of a certain class. If the cultural 
productions of Egypt in the 1950s are any indication, the breweries succeeded.  They 
depicted beer not as a harmful intoxicant, but as part of the life of a young, modern, 
urban Egyptian. 
 Thus, when the Nasser regime casted its first look at the beer industry, it 
recognized the value of the product that Crown and Pyramid were selling. While the 
people selling the beer may have been obstacles to Egypt and its economic progress, 
the beer that they were selling was not. It had value to the regime as drink that was 
popular both within Egypt and abroad. Yet even as Gamal Abdel Nasser was ready to 
recognize Egyptian beer as part of modern Egyptian culture, he saw the beer industry 
as being ripe for nationalization as part of Egypt’s larger push for economic 
independence and international respect. While Nasser’s nationalization and 
conglomeration of Pyramid and Crown in 1963 marked the full Egyptianization of the 
beer industry, Stella beer had really been Egyptian for decades. The transformation 
that came with the government takeover of the beer industry was that Stella changed 
from being a drink of fun and sun, to being one with a dark and dangerous underside. 
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It thus became a complex drink for a complex period in Egypt’s history, when a great 
many people were elated by the Nasser regime’s creation of a newly self-confident 
Egypt, but were also troubled by his increasingly authoritarian streak. 
 
An Industrial History  
 The history of beer in Egypt is also a history of the country’s industrialization. 
Again, before the advent of Pyramid and Crown breweries in the late 1890s, 
Egyptians were already making a beer-like alcoholic product, būẓa, using an artisanal 
process that I described as “permeable.” That is, due to the nature of the machinery 
(earthenware containers, reed pipes, palm-leave filters, etc.) and techniques (hand-
crafting, lack of sterilization and refrigeration, etc.) used in pre-industrial beverage 
production, foreign organisms and materials were bound to permeate or enter 
somewhere in the transition from raw materials to final product, just as materials 
essential to production were bound to exit. The permeability of the būẓa-making 
process was an essential feature of this product, and more broadly, was central to the 
production of alcoholic beverages in Egypt prior to the 1880s.  Būẓa’s production did 
not work if yeast did not enter into the process through a permeable boundary. The 
permeability of the process not only made the product possible, but also put its 
production into direct conflict with the “technoscientific ideals” that began to enter 
Egypt after the arrival of the French in 1798.12  
  Whereas būẓa and the rest of the pre-industrial alcoholic beverages of Egypt 
were in opposition to these ideals of standardization, efficiency, and reproducibility, 
industrialized beer was fully in line with them. In the 1890s, as the technologies of 
beer allowed for greater transportability, and the Egyptian government, under the 
watch of Sir Evelyn Baring, Lord Cromer, was opening the Egyptian market up to 
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“modern” and European products, the beer industry entered Egypt in the form of 
Crown Brewery in 1897. However, it would be too simplistic to attribute the arrival of 
the techniques and technologies for making modern beer to European entrepreneurs 
“enlightening” the Middle East. Although these Europeans had an integral role in 
bringing many of these technologies to Egypt, the beer industry only succeeded after 
it had adapted itself to the environment of Egypt. 
 All of the Europeans who tried to manufacture beer in Egypt had faith that 
“total control brewing” would allow them to overcome every obstacle in Egypt. The 
Europeans assumed that through the assiduous application of the most current 
techniques and technologies, brewers could produce a standardized and durable 
product in a timely and cost-efficient manner. This sense of control was especially 
important in a market like Egypt, which, in the eyes of these entrepreneurs, had not 
been fully modernized. These entrepreneurs were ultimately misguided in this belief 
and needed to adapt. It was simply not feasible to produce a beer in Egypt by 
importing all the materials and making no concessions to the environmental realities 
of the country. That is part of the reason that it took until World War I for the 
breweries to find a firm footing in Egypt. The breweries did eventually find a winning 
formula for the alcoholic beverage business in Egypt, using cutting-edge 
technological practices to exploit the local advantages of the Egyptian market: 
primarily cheap labor, plentiful water, a hot and dry climate, and a thirsty population 
that was eager for a refrigerated product.  
 Soon after the establishment of the breweries, European entrepreneurs took a 
great interest in them. First, in the 1920s, the enterprising Swiss Bomontis purchased 
control of Pyramid, endowing it with their name and linking it to their Istanbul-based 
beer-making interest. The Bomontis not only kept the breweries current on the latest 
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in brewing techniques and technologies, but they also established an effective selling 
partnership between Pyramid and Crown. This partnership—which allowed each of 
the breweries to focus on one of the two major urban markets in Egypt, Alexandria 
and Cairo—would be the basis of all later beer-selling operations in Egypt.  Rene 
Gaston-Dreyfus, the French head of another transnational brewing group, followed 
the Bomontis in his interest in the Egyptian beer market, and he took control of 
Bomonti-Pyramid in the early 1930s. However, the most significant and most global 
of the entrants into the Egyptian beer business was Heineken, which sought to add 
Egypt to its growing multinational beer empire.  
 It is under Heineken’s reign that we can truly see the interaction between 
“total control brewing” and the reality of the Egyptian environment. Heineken was on 
the cutting edge of brewing techniques and technologies and did everything in its 
power to instill those principles in Egypt’s breweries. Until the companies’ 
nationalization in 1963, Crown, because of its distance from Cairo, where Heineken 
chose to be based, proved, inimical to any push to fall in line with Heineken’s 
“modern” methods. They believed that they had figured out how to make and sell beer 
to the Alexandrian market and generally refused to be cowed by Heineken. Pyramid, 
on the other hand, opened itself up fully to the Dutch conglomerate, as its managing 
director from 1938 to 1963 was a Heineken-appointed Dutchmen. Nevertheless, the 
application of the latest techniques and technologies only occurred when they were 
approved and supported by the locals in the management and the workforce. Although 
men like Wittert van Hoogland and Erick Karl Kettner believed that the deceitful and 
indolent locals were in constant need of reform and modernization, they also realized 
that nothing was accomplished without those locals. Although the management on the 
ground was oftentimes imperious and adversarial, Heineken worked also to adapt the 
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best they could to the Egyptian market. One of the great innovations of Egyptian 
brewing—the adaptation of a strain of barley, beer’s main ingredient, to the Egyptian 
climate—happened under the watch of a Heineken-trained brewmaster. 
 Heineken was so committed to producing the highest-quality and most 
“modern” beer that when Crown and Pyramid breweries underwent the slow 
transformation from a completely private to a state-controlled enterprise, the 
Heineken representatives on the ground never forgot about the product. Private 
correspondence suggests that they may have disliked the working conditions and the 
fractiousness between the workers and the local members of the executive, but they 
never stopped caring about the beer they made until they were no longer welcome in 
Egypt. The Nasser-led government recognized that Heineken brought something 
special to the equation. When they negotiated with Heineken to hammer out the 
details of nationalization, the government fought hard to maintain the relationship 
with Heineken and hold on to their “secrets” for making great beer. 
 
Conclusion 
 The history of beer in Egypt unfolded during an exciting period for the 
country, from the late 1890s, when the country was a quasi-colonial state under 
British occupation, through the 1960s, when the country was a socialist republic 
trying to assert its independence within a highly competitive global economy. The 
study ends around 1970, just as Egyptian beer had enjoyed its peak popularity and 
visibility. What came next, the erasure of beer from the Egyptian public sphere, is 
another, equally complex story, one that is tied to the massive social changes that took 
place in Egypt between 1970 and the present. Among those changes was the assertion 
of a certain kind of Islamic modernism during the regimes of Anwar Sadat (1970–81) 
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and Husni Mubarak (1981–2011). This post-1970 history of beer is beyond the scope 
of this study, and yet the early signs of a popular Islamist opposition to beer were 
already becoming evident in the 1920s and 1930s with the emergence of a Muslim 
temperance movement. Suffice it to say here that as Islamist ideologies became more 
widespread and assertive during the 1970s, ’80s, and ’90s, beer lost its public 
credibility among vocal segments of the Egyptian Muslim population. Nevertheless, 
in recent years, the Stella beer company, Al-Ahram Beverage Company, has not been 
suffering: rather, it has compensated for the relative decline of beer sales by 
promoting the sale of non-alcoholic, beer-like alternatives. For example, in 1997, Al-
Ahram’s sales of non-alcoholic beverages, including its non-alcoholic beer offering, 
Birell, and its malt beverage line, Fairuz, made up a quarter of its sales.13 Although 
Hafez may never have envisioned the company as such, Al-Ahram is still trying to 
package beer, even non-alcoholic beer, as the distraction of the Egyptian people. 
 In the 1950s, a flashing, neon-lit Stella advertisement atop a building in 
downtown Cairo might have been commonplace.  By the 1990s, such a sign would 
have been unthinkable in Egypt, perceived as an affront to Egypt’s sensibilities and to 
its “culture.”  To trace the half-century’s worth of events that connect these two very 
different realities, and to situate that half-century within several millennia of Egypt’s 
history, is to tell the economic, political, and cultural history of Egypt at large—
viewed entirely through a mug of beer. 
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o Sharikat Birat Crown Brewery, 3019-006809—3019-006810 
o Sharikat Birat al-Nil, 3019-011918—3019-011917 
• Wizarat al-Shu’ūn al-Ijtima‘iyya   
o Egyptian Temperance Association, “Taqrir al -Jam‘īyya Marfu‘ ila al-
Inzar al-Malakiyya al-Karima Yahya Mawlana al-Malak al-Muazzam al-
Malak Ahmad Fu’ad al-Awil.” 4029-000365 
 
 
Presbyterian Historical Society 
 
- Anna Young Thompson Papers (1868-1931) 
 RG-58-1-6 
 RG-58-1-8 
- United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. Commission on Ecumenical Mission 
and Relations, Records (1833-1966) 
 John R. Alexander 
 RG 209-1-22 
Newspapers 
Al-Ahram 
Akhir al-Saʿa   
Kan wa Yakun 
Al-Manar 
Majallat al-Azhar 
Ruz al-Yusuf 
Al-Tankit wa al-Tabith 
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